ED Decision 2023/007/R
PBN OPERATIONS
(a) When the operator intends to use PBN, the operator should either:
(1) demonstrate that the GNSS is robust against loss of capability; or
(2) select an aerodrome as a destination alternate aerodrome only if an IAP that does not rely on a GNSS is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome.
GNSS ROBUSTNESS AGAINST LOSS OF CAPABILITY â HELICOPTERS
(b) The operator may demonstrate robustness against the loss of capability of the GNSS if all of the following criteria are met:
(1) At flight planning stage, SBAS or GBAS are expected to be available and used.
(2) The failure of a single receiver or system should not compromise the navigation capability required for the intended instrument approach.
(3) The temporary jamming of all GNSS frequencies should not compromise the navigation capability for the intended route. The operator should provide a procedure to deal with such cases unless other sensors are available to continue on the intended route.
(4) The duration of a jamming event should be determined as follows:
(i) Considering the average speed and height of a helicopter flight, the duration of a jamming event may be considered to be less than 2Â minutes.
(ii) The time needed for the GNSS system to re-start and provide the aircraft position and navigation guidance should also be considered.
(iii) Based on (i) and (ii) above, the operator should establish the duration of the loss of GNSS navigation data due to jamming. This duration should be no less than 3Â minutes, and may be no longer than 4Â minutes.
(5) The operator should ensure resilience to jamming for the duration determined in (4) above, as follows:
(i) If the altitude of obstacles on both sides of the flight path are higher than the planned altitude for a given segment of the flight, the operator should ensure that there is no excessive drift on either side by relying on navigation sensors such as an inertial system with performance in accordance with the intended function.
(ii) If (i) does not apply and the operator cannot rely on sensors other than GNSS, the operator should develop a procedure to ensure that a drift from the intended route during the jamming event has no adverse consequences on the safety of the flight. This procedure may involve air traffic services.
(6) The operator should ensure that no space weather event is predicted to disrupt GNSS reliability and integrity at both the destination and the alternate aerodromes.
(7) The operator should verify the availability of RAIM for all phases of flight based on GNSS, including navigation to the alternate aerodrome.
(8) The operatorâs MEL should reflect the elements in points (b)(1) and (b)(2).
OPERATIONAL CREDITS
(c) To comply with point NCC.OP.153, when the operator intends to use âoperational creditsâ (e.g. EFVS, SAÂ CATÂ I, etc.), the operator should select an aerodrome as destination alternate aerodrome only if an approach procedure that does not rely on the same âoperational creditâ is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome.
AMC1 NCC.OP.153 outlines PBN destination aerodrome rules, including GNSS robustness demonstrations for helicopters, jamming duration limits, and operational credit restrictions.
* Summary by Aviation.Bot - Always consult the original document for the most accurate information.
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