AMC1 NCC.OP.153 Destination aerodromes -- instrument approach operations

• ED Decision 2023/007/R found in: Air Operations (965/2012) Part-ARO Part-ORO Part-CAT Part-SPA Part-NCC Part-NCO Part-SPO (Feb 2025)

AMC1 NCC.OP.153 Destination aerodromes — instrument approach operations ED Decision 2023/007/R PBN OPERATIONS (a) When the operator intends to use PBN, the operator should either: (1) demonstrate that the GNSS is robust against loss of capability; or (2) select an aerodrome as a destination alternate aerodrome only if an IAP that does not rely on a GNSS is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome. GNSS ROBUSTNESS AGAINST LOSS OF CAPABILITY — HELICOPTERS (b) The operator may demonstrate robustness against the loss of capability of the GNSS if all of the following criteria are met: (1) At flight planning stage, SBAS or GBAS are expected to be available and used. (2) The failure of a single receiver or system should not compromise the navigation capability required for the intended instrument approach. (3) The temporary jamming of all GNSS frequencies should not compromise the navigation capability for the intended route. The operator should provide a procedure to deal with such cases unless other sensors are available to continue on the intended route. (4) The duration of a jamming event should be determined as follows: (i) Considering the average speed and height of a helicopter flight, the duration of a jamming event may be considered to be less than 2 minutes. (ii) The time needed for the GNSS system to re-start and provide the aircraft position and navigation guidance should also be considered. (iii) Based on (i) and (ii) above, the operator should establish the duration of the loss of GNSS navigation data due to jamming. This duration should be no less than 3 minutes, and may be no longer than 4 minutes. (5) The operator should ensure resilience to jamming for the duration determined in (4) above, as follows: (i) If the altitude of obstacles on both sides of the flight path are higher than the planned altitude for a given segment of the flight, the operator should ensure that there is no excessive drift on either side by relying on navigation sensors such as an inertial system with performance in accordance with the intended function. (ii) If (i) does not apply and the operator cannot rely on sensors other than GNSS, the operator should develop a procedure to ensure that a drift from the intended route during the jamming event has no adverse consequences on the safety of the flight. This procedure may involve air traffic services. (6) The operator should ensure that no space weather event is predicted to disrupt GNSS reliability and integrity at both the destination and the alternate aerodromes. (7) The operator should verify the availability of RAIM for all phases of flight based on GNSS, including navigation to the alternate aerodrome. (8) The operator’s MEL should reflect the elements in points (b)(1) and (b)(2). OPERATIONAL CREDITS (c) To comply with point [NCC.OP.153](#_DxCrossRefBm927679748), when the operator intends to use ‘operational credits’ (e.g. EFVS, SA CAT I, etc.), the operator should select an aerodrome as destination alternate aerodrome only if an approach procedure that does not rely on the same ‘operational credit’ is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome. AMC1 NCC.OP.153 Destination aerodromes — instrument approach operations ED Decision 2023/007/R PBN OPERATIONS (a) When the operator intends to use PBN, the operator should either: (1) demonstrate that the GNSS is robust against loss of capability; or (2) select an aerodrome as a destination alternate aerodrome only if an IAP that does not rely on a GNSS is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome. GNSS ROBUSTNESS AGAINST LOSS OF CAPABILITY — HELICOPTERS (b) The operator may demonstrate robustness against the loss of capability of the GNSS if all of the following criteria are met: (1) At flight planning stage, SBAS or GBAS are expected to be available and used. (2) The failure of a single receiver or system should not compromise the navigation capability required for the intended instrument approach. (3) The temporary jamming of all GNSS frequencies should not compromise the navigation capability for the intended route. The operator should provide a procedure to deal with such cases unless other sensors are available to continue on the intended route. (4) The duration of a jamming event should be determined as follows: (i) Considering the average speed and height of a helicopter flight, the duration of a jamming event may be considered to be less than 2 minutes. (ii) The time needed for the GNSS system to re-start and provide the aircraft position and navigation guidance should also be considered. (iii) Based on (i) and (ii) above, the operator should establish the duration of the loss of GNSS navigation data due to jamming. This duration should be no less than 3 minutes, and may be no longer than 4 minutes. (5) The operator should ensure resilience to jamming for the duration determined in (4) above, as follows: (i) If the altitude of obstacles on both sides of the flight path are higher than the planned altitude for a given segment of the flight, the operator should ensure that there is no excessive drift on either side by relying on navigation sensors such as an inertial system with performance in accordance with the intended function. (ii) If (i) does not apply and the operator cannot rely on sensors other than GNSS, the operator should develop a procedure to ensure that a drift from the intended route during the jamming event has no adverse consequences on the safety of the flight. This procedure may involve air traffic services. (6) The operator should ensure that no space weather event is predicted to disrupt GNSS reliability and integrity at both the destination and the alternate aerodromes. (7) The operator should verify the availability of RAIM for all phases of flight based on GNSS, including navigation to the alternate aerodrome. (8) The operator’s MEL should reflect the elements in points (b)(1) and (b)(2). OPERATIONAL CREDITS (c) To comply with point [NCC.OP.153](#_DxCrossRefBm318087356), when the operator intends to use ‘operational credits’ (e.g. EFVS, SA CAT I, etc.), the operator should select an aerodrome as destination alternate aerodrome only if an approach procedure that does not rely on the same ‘operational credit’ is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome. ##### AMC1 NCC.OP.153 Destination aerodromes — instrument approach operations *ED Decision 2023/007/R* **PBN OPERATIONS** (a) When the operator intends to use PBN, the operator should either: (1) demonstrate that the GNSS is robust against loss of capability; or (2) select an aerodrome as a destination alternate aerodrome only if an IAP that does not rely on a GNSS is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome. **GNSS ROBUSTNESS AGAINST LOSS OF CAPABILITY — HELICOPTERS** (b) The operator may demonstrate robustness against the loss of capability of the GNSS if all of the following criteria are met: (1) At flight planning stage, SBAS or GBAS are expected to be available and used. (2) The failure of a single receiver or system should not compromise the navigation capability required for the intended instrument approach. (3) The temporary jamming of all GNSS frequencies should not compromise the navigation capability for the intended route. The operator should provide a procedure to deal with such cases unless other sensors are available to continue on the intended route. (4) The duration of a jamming event should be determined as follows: (i) Considering the average speed and height of a helicopter flight, the duration of a jamming event may be considered to be less than 2 minutes. (ii) The time needed for the GNSS system to re-start and provide the aircraft position and navigation guidance should also be considered. (iii) Based on (i) and (ii) above, the operator should establish the duration of the loss of GNSS navigation data due to jamming. This duration should be no less than 3 minutes, and may be no longer than 4 minutes. (5) The operator should ensure resilience to jamming for the duration determined in (4) above, as follows: (i) If the altitude of obstacles on both sides of the flight path are higher than the planned altitude for a given segment of the flight, the operator should ensure that there is no excessive drift on either side by relying on navigation sensors such as an inertial system with performance in accordance with the intended function. (ii) If (i) does not apply and the operator cannot rely on sensors other than GNSS, the operator should develop a procedure to ensure that a drift from the intended route during the jamming event has no adverse consequences on the safety of the flight. This procedure may involve air traffic services. (6) The operator should ensure that no space weather event is predicted to disrupt GNSS reliability and integrity at both the destination and the alternate aerodromes. (7) The operator should verify the availability of RAIM for all phases of flight based on GNSS, including navigation to the alternate aerodrome. (8) The operator’s MEL should reflect the elements in points (b)(1) and (b)(2). **OPERATIONAL CREDITS** (c) To comply with point [NCC.OP.153](#_DxCrossRefBm523089348), when the operator intends to use ‘operational credits’ (e.g. EFVS, SA CAT I, etc.), the operator should select an aerodrome as destination alternate aerodrome only if an approach procedure that does not rely on the same ‘operational credit’ is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome.