AMC 25.1457 Cockpit voice recorders
1. General
The installation of a recorder with an ETSO
authorisation against ETSO-C123c (or equivalent standard accepted by EASA)
satisfies the approval requirement in CS
25.1457(a).
In showing
compliance with CS 25.1457, the applicant should take account of EUROCAE
Document No ED-112A ‘MOPS for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems’ or a
later revision.
‘Deployable
recorder’ designates a flight recorder installed on the aeroplane which is
capable of automatically deploying from the aeroplane.
2. Combination
recorders
a. If the recorder performs several
recording functions (i.e. it is a combination recorder), the means for
pre-flight checking the recorder for proper operation should indicate which
recording functions (e.g. FDR, CVR, data-link recording, etc.) have failed.
b. When two flight data and cockpit voice
combination recorders are installed, either because they are required or
because they are an acceptable alternative to a flight data recorder and a
cockpit voice recorder, then these two fight data and cockpit voice
combination recorders should be connected to separate power buses.
3. Automatic means to
stop the recording after a crash impact
The
automatic means to stop the recording (which is required if the recorder has a
recording duration of less than 25 hours) should operate even if a power
supply is still available.
The
automatic means to stop the recording within 10 minutes after a crash impact
may rely on:
a. dedicated crash impact detection
sensors. In that case, negative acceleration sensors (also called
‘g-switches’) should not be used as the sole means of detecting a crash
impact; or
b. the recording start-and-stop logic,
provided that this start-and-stop logic stops the recording 10 minutes after
power is lost on all engines (and, when applicable, the APU) when the
aeroplane is on the ground.
4. Means for pre-flight checking of the
recorder
The means for pre-flight checking of the
recorder should be able to detect and indicate the following:
a. A
loss of electrical power to the flight recorder system;
b. A
failure of the data acquisition and processing stages;
c. A
failure of the recording medium and/or drive mechanism; and
d. A
failure of the recorder to store the data in the recording medium as shown by
checks of the recorded data including, as far as is reasonably practicable for
the storage medium concerned, its correct correspondence with the input data.
5. Means for the
flight crew to stop the cockpit voice recorder function
The means
required for the flight crew to stop the cockpit voice recorder function after
the completion of the flight is needed in order to preserve the recording for
the purpose of investigating accidents and serious incidents. In fulfilling
this requirement, it is acceptable to use circuit breakers to remove the power
to the equipment. Such a means to stop the cockpit voice recorder function is
not in contradiction with CS 25.1357(f), because it would not be used
under normal operating conditions, but after an accident or a serious incident
has occurred.
6. Power sources
a. An alternate power source is a power
source that is different from the source(s) that normally provides (provide)
power to the cockpit voice recorder function.
In CS 25.1457(d)(6), a ‘normal shutdown’ of power to the cockpit voice recorder means a
commanded interruption of the power supply from the normal cockpit voice
recorder power bus; for example, after the termination of a normal flight.
‘All other power’ means the electrical power source(s) used for normal
operation of the cockpit voice recorder function. The following applies to the
installation of an alternate power source:
i. A tolerance of 1 minute on the 10
minutes minimum power requirement of CS 25.1457(d)(6) is acceptable;
ii. The use of aeroplane batteries or other
power sources is acceptable, provided that electrical power to the essential
and critical loads is not compromised;
iii. If the alternate power source relies on
dedicated stand-alone batteries (such as a recorder independent power supply),
then these batteries should be located as close as practicable to the
recorder;
iv. The means for performing a pre-flight
check of the recorder for proper operation should include a check of the
availability of the alternate power source;
v. If the cockpit voice recorder function
is combined with other recording functions within the same unit, the alternate
power source may also power the other recording functions; and
vi. If two flight data and cockpit voice
combination recorders are installed, either because they are required, or
because they are an acceptable alternative to single-function recorders, then
only one recorder needs to have an alternate power source for the cockpit
voice recorder function. This should be the combination recorder that is
located closer to the cockpit area.
b. If the cockpit voice recorder function
has a recording duration of less than 25 hours, the electrical power to this
function should not be supplied for more than 10 minutes after power is lost
on all engines (and, when applicable, the APU) when the aeroplane is on the
ground.
7. Recorder container
The
attachment of the recorder container should comply with the specifications
given in EUROCAE Document No ED-112A.
The
container of a non-deployable recorder should be installed in the rear section
of the aeroplane and in an area that increases the chances of the equipment
surviving crash impact forces and the heat damage caused by a fire. However,
it should not be installed where aft-mounted engines may crush the container
during impact.
If two
combination flight data and cockpit voice recorders (non-deployable) are
installed, then the container of the recorder that is dedicated to the cockpit
voice recorder function may be located near the flight crew compartment if at
least one recorder is installed in the rear section.
8. Deployable
recorder
If the
recorder is deployable:
a. The automatic deployment capability
should be available as long as the aeroplane is airborne; this should include
cases in which electrical power is lost from the engines and APU.
In the event
of a landing on water, the deployment should occur upon the immersion of the
aeroplane in water; this means that the automatic deployment capability should
remain available after contact with the water for a certain period in order to
allow automatic deployment upon immersion;
b. The assessment of the effects of
unintended deployment of the recorder in flight should include:
i. The effects on the continued safe
flight and landing of the aeroplane. This assessment should cover the normal
flight envelope of the aeroplane and include the following aspects:
—
Potential
impact on aeroplane structure, including flight control surfaces, and on
systems; and
—
Aerodynamic
effects caused by the cavity created in the structure after deployment.
In order to
address the effects of the impact on the aeroplane after deployment, the
applicant should:
—
either
demonstrate that impact with the aeroplane is extremely improbable;
—
or
demonstrate continued safe flight and landing after impact damage, considering
all flight phases. The demonstration should include the effect of the damage
to the structure and systems on residual strength, stability, control and
aeroelasticity:
—
Residual
strength should be demonstrated in accordance with AMC 25.571, Section 10.(c); and
—
Freedom
from aeroelastic instability should be demonstrated within the aeroelastic
stability envelope as defined by CS 25.629(b)(2); and
ii. The effects on persons other than
aeroplane occupants due to unintended deployment while the aeroplane is
airborne, in particular the risk of serious or fatal injuries for persons
being hit by the deployed part.
Several
methods can be adopted in order to quantify the probability of causing serious
or fatal injuries to the persons on the ground associated with unintended
deployment of a recorder. However, the following variables should be used:
—
The
density of population, with reasonable correction factors related to time
exposure and shielding such as being indoors and shielded by, for example,
buildings, or being in a means of transportation; and
—
The
size and weight of the deployed part.
The
probability of causing a serious or fatal injury is expressed as the
combination of:
—
the
probability of an unintended deployment;
—
the
probability of a person being hit by the deployed part; and
—
the
probability that, if hit by the deployed part, a person will suffer serious or
fatal injuries. This probability may be set to 1, as a conservative
assumption; otherwise, the applicant may propose another value to EASA for
approval.
c. The assessment of the effects of
unintended deployment of the recorder on ground should include:
i. The risk of injuries caused to persons.
This should include those who are involved in aeroplane maintenance, ground
handling, taxiing, rescue operations, or emergency evacuation; and
ii. The effects on other aircraft and
facilities.
In
particular:
—
A
conspicuous placard or label that is visible from the outside of the aeroplane
should be placed adjacent to the recorder deployment point;
—
ICA
and/or operational procedures should be provided to prevent injuries during
maintenance and ground handling;
—
Operational
procedures should define the first actions to be taken by the flight crew when
the recorder is no longer attached to the aeroplane, in order to address any
risk to continued safe flight and landing and the possible effects on other
aircraft and facilities;
—
Procedures
should address the precautions that should be taken to avoid injuries which
could be caused by an unintended deployment during emergency evacuation;
—
Information
that addresses the precautions to be taken by search-and-rescue services after
an accident should be publicly available; and
—
The
deployment mechanism should only release the recorder in one piece.
d. There may be a means to manually
disengage the deployment capability when the aeroplane is not capable of
moving under its own power; however, in this case, an alert should be provided
to the flight crew during the pre-flight checks if the deployment capability
is disengaged;
e. The deployable recorder installation
should be such as to guarantee the highest probability of the deployment of
the recorder in the event of an explosion or a collision. In particular, the
installation and the performance of the deployment capability should be such
that, in most cases of collision, the deployment of the recorder can take
place before the deployment mechanism is damaged. However, the installation
should be such that, to the extent possible, the recorder does not deploy in a
non-catastrophic occurrence such as a hard landing or a tail strike.
f. The demonstration of compliance with CS 25.1457(e)
should cover the whole flight envelope of the aeroplane, and additional
trajectories that might be expected during the initial stages of an accident
sequence.
The
applicant may use the following Table 1 parameter ranges that have been
observed during occurrences of loss of control of large aeroplanes:
Table 1: Parameter ranges
|
Parameter |
Range |
Unit |
|
Pitch angle |
+/- 60 |
° |
|
Roll angle |
+/- 60 |
° |
|
Pitch rate |
+/- 20 |
°/s |
|
Roll rate |
+/- 30 |
°/s |
|
Yaw rate |
+/- 20 |
°/s |
|
Altitude |
0 to 26 000 ft |
ft |
|
Speed |
60 kt to VD/MD
(design diving speed) |
|
|
Vertical speed |
from maximum negative vertical speed at
VD/MD to 0 |
|
g. The alert that the recorder is no longer
attached to the aeroplane should be provided as early as permitted by the
principles of AMC 25.1322.
h. The deployment capability should
function under all the environmental conditions for which the aeroplane is
certificated.
i. The effect of exposure to environmental
conditions (such as temperature, rain, lightning strikes, etc.) on the
serviceability of the flight recorder and of its deployment capability should
be addressed by design features and/or by ICA. ICA or operational procedures
or both should also be provided such as to prevent maintenance and operational
actions on the external surfaces of the aeroplane (such as painting, cleaning,
application of de-/anti-icing fluids, etc.) from adversely affecting the
serviceability of the flight recorder and its deployment capability.
j. In order to limit the effects on
search-and-rescue services of an unintended activation of the emergency
locator transmitter (ELT) that is integrated in the recorder:
—
unintended
deployment of the recorder should be classified at least as a major failure
condition; and
—
operational
procedures should define the flight crew actions to be taken after they
realise that an unintended recorder deployment has taken place, including
actions to prevent an unnecessary search-and-rescue response.
Furthermore,
in order to identify the conditions which triggered an unintended deployment
of the recorder (including the ensuing activation of the ELT) or an activation
of the ELT without deployment of the recorder, appropriate data should be
recorded on board or transmitted to the ground to support the post-flight
analysis.
9. Evaluation of the
CVR recording
The following acceptable means of compliance with CS 25.1457(b) is provided to
demonstrate that the performance of a new or modified CVR system is acceptable
and that the quality of the CVR recording is acceptable. Inspections of the
CVR recording that are part of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
are not in the scope of this paragraph.
a. The CVR system
should be installed in accordance with the recommendations made in EUROCAE
Document ED-112A, in particular:
—
Chapter
2-5, Equipment installation and installed performance, and
—
Part
I, Cockpit Voice Recorder System, Chapter I-6.1.1 Interface design, I‑6.1.2 Recorder
Operation and I-6.1.3 Bulk Erasure Interlocks.
Particular attention should be given to the location of the cockpit
area microphone (CAM). ED‑112A, Chapter I-6.2., Equipment location, provides guidance on this
topic.
It should be noted that the CVR may record on more than four channels,
and that this may help to avoid superimposition between signal sources
recorded on the same CVR channel.
b. To ensure that the
CVR system is properly installed, and to verify that the quality of the audio
signals recorded on all the channels is acceptable, the applicant should
conduct a flight test. The recording obtained should be evaluated to confirm
that the quality is acceptable during all the normal phases of flight
(including taxi-out, take-off, climb, cruise, descent, approach, landing, and
taxi-in). ED‑112A provides guidance for testing a new CVR installation. (Refer
to Chapter I-6.3).
c. The evaluation of the CVR recording
should include:
i. the tasks described in ED-112A, Annex
I-A, Chapter I-A.3;
ii. checking that the vocal signal sources
are intelligible and that non-vocal alerts on headsets or speakers can be
identified;
iii. checking that the levels of sidetone
signals (e.g. radio) and public address are adjusted so that these signals are
audible and do not mask the signals from the flight crew microphones (refer to
ED-112A, Part I, Chapter I-6.1.1);
iv. checking the start-and-stop function of
the CVR system. The CVR should begin to operate no later than when power from
sources other than from the alternate power source is available and the
pre-flight checklist is started. The CVR should continue to operate until
either the completion of the final post-flight checklist or until 10 minutes
after power is lost on all engines (and, when applicable the APU) and the
aeroplane is on the ground.; and
v. checking for the presence of any fault
in the memory of the built-in-test feature of the CVR, if applicable.
d. The evaluation of the CVR recording
should fulfil all of the conditions below:
i. The equipment used for the CVR
recording replay should meet the specifications of Chapter I-A.2 of Annex I-A
of ED-112A or a higher standard;
ii. The replay and evaluation of CVR
recordings should be performed by personnel who have adequate knowledge of CVR
systems and aircraft operations, and who have appropriate experience of the
techniques used to evaluate recordings;
iii. The observations from the evaluation
should be documented in an evaluation report. An example of an evaluation
report is provided in ED-112A, Annex I-A; and
iv. The evaluation report should indicate the
quality of each audio signal required to be recorded by CS 25.1457(c) according to defined criteria. For example, the following audio
quality rating scale may be used:
GOOD:
1. When considering a vocal signal source
(crew voice, radio reception, radio sidetone, interphone, public address, synthetic
voice in callouts, warnings and alerts) recorded on a channel other than the
CAM channel, the signal is intelligible without using any signal
post-processing techniques, and no significant issue (e.g. saturation, noise,
interference, or inadequate signal level of a source) affects the quality of
this signal;
2. When considering non-vocal alerts
recorded on a channel other than the CAM channel, the sounds are accurately
identifiable in the recording without using any signal post-processing
techniques, and no significant issue affects the quality of the sound recording;
3. When considering the CAM, the recording
is representative of the actual ambient sound, conversations and alerts as if
an observer was listening in the cockpit, and no significant issue affects the
quality of the signal; and
4. No ‘medium’ or ‘major’ issue is
identified on any channel (see Table 1 below for examples).
FAIR: a
significant issue affects the signal source being considered. However, the
related signal can still be analysed without signal post-processing, or by
using signal post‑processing techniques provided by standard audio analysis
tools (e.g. audio level adjustment, notch filters, etc.). The severity of the
identified issues is not rated higher than ‘medium’ (see Table 1 below for
examples).
POOR: the
signal source being considered is not intelligible or not identifiable, and
this cannot be corrected even with the use of signal post-processing
techniques. The severity of the identified issues is not necessarily rated as
‘major’, it may also be rated as ‘medium’, depending on the consequences for
the required signal sources (see Table 1 below for examples); and
v. the audio quality rating of a CVR
channel required by CS 25.1457(c) should be the same as the worst
audio quality rating among the signal sources to be recorded on this channel.
e. The performance of the CVR system should
be considered acceptable by the applicant only if, for none of the signal
sources required by CS 25.1457(c) or by the applicable operating
rules, the quality of the audio recording was rated as ‘poor’. In addition, if
the CVR system is part of a new aeroplane type, the performance of the CVR
system should be considered acceptable by the applicant only if, for all of
the signal sources required by CS 25.1457(c) and by the applicable operating
rules, the quality of the audio recording was rated as ‘good’.
Table 1: Examples of issues
affecting a signal source and of the associated severity.
Issue severity rating |
Examples of issues |
|
MAJOR: leading to a ‘POOR’ rating for the
affected signal |
—
One or more warning or callout is not recorded —
Uncommanded interruption of the CAM signal —
Unexplained variation of the CAM dynamic range —
Hot-microphone function not operative —
CVR time code not available —
CAM saturation (due to low frequency vibration) —
Radio side tone is missing —
One required signal source is missing from the recording (e.g. one
microphone signal not recorded) —
Poor intelligibility of one microphone source (e.g. speech through
oxygen mask microphone) —
Quasi-permanent physical saturation of the CAM due to its excessive
sensitivity —
Quasi-permanent electrical saturation of a CVR channel —
Mechanical and/or electrical interference making the transcription of
signals difficult or impossible —
Insufficient CAM sensitivity —
Fault in the start/stop sequence |
|
MEDIUM: leading to a ‘POOR’ or ‘FAIR’ rating for
the affected signals, depending on the
duration and the occurrence rate of the issues. |
—
Inappropriate level balance between signal sources on a CVR channel
that results in a signal source masking other signal sources —
Electrical interference caused by either the aircraft or the recorder
power supply —
Low dynamic range of the recording on a CVR channel —
Low recording level of alert and or callout —
Oversensitivity of the CAM line* to electromagnetic interference in
the HF, UHF, or EHF domain (Wi-Fi, GSM, 5G, etc.) —
Oversensitivity of the CAM line* to electrostatic discharge (ESD)
phenomena —
Oversensitivity of the CAM to air flow or conditioning noise (bleed
air) —
Phasing anomaly between CVR channels —
Side tone recorded with a low level —
Transitory saturation |
*CAM line: microphone+control or
preamplifier unit+wiring to the CVR
10. Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA)
When
developing the ICA for the CVR system, required by CS 25.1529 and Appendix H, the applicant should address all the
failures that may affect the correct functioning of the CVR system or the
quality of the recorded audio signals.
Examples of
failures (indicative and non-exhaustive list):
—
Loss
of the recording function or of the acquisition function of the CVR;
—
Any
communication or audio signal (required by CS 25.1457(c) or by the applicable air operations regulations) is missing, or is
recorded with an audio quality that is rated ‘poor’ (refer to the example of
audio quality rating provided in Section 9 of this AMC);
—
Failure
of a sensor, transducer or amplifier dedicated to the CVR system (e.g. failure
of the cockpit area microphone);
—
Failure
of a means to facilitate the finding of the CVR recording medium after an
accident (e.g. an underwater locating device or an emergency locator
transmitter attached to the recorder);
—
Failure
of any power source dedicated to the CVR (e.g. dedicated battery);
—
Failure
of the start-and-stop function;
—
Failure
of a means to detect a crash impact (for the purpose of stopping the recording
after a crash impact, or for the purpose of deploying the recorder if it is
deployable).
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