AMC 20-6B Extended-range operation with two-engine aeroplanes ETOPS certification and operation

• ED Decision 2021/006/R found in: AMC-20 Amdt 21 - Airworthiness of Products, Parts and Appliances (Apr 2021)

AMC 20-6B Extended-range operation with two-engine aeroplanesETOPS certification and operation ED Decision 2021/006/R Chapter I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 1: PURPOSE This AMC states an acceptable means but not the only means for obtaining approval for two-engine aeroplanes intended to be used in extended-range operations and for the performance of such operations. An applicant may elect to use another means of compliance which should be acceptable to EASA or the competent authority. Compliance with this AMC is not mandatory. Use of the terms shall and must apply only to an applicant who elects to comply with this AMC in order to obtain airworthiness approval or to demonstrate compliance with the operational criteria. This AMC is structured in 3 chapters which contain the following information: — Chapter I of this AMC provides general guidance and definitions related to extended-range operations. — Chapter II of this AMC provides guidance to (S)TC holders that seek ETOPS type design approval of an engine or a particular aeroplane-engine combination. These aeroplanes may be used in extended-range operations. — Chapter III of this AMC provides guidance to operators that seek ETOPS operational approval to conduct extended-range operations under the requirements of the applicable operational regulations. The purpose of this revision No. 3 of AMC 20-6 is to remove: (a)       the airworthiness criteria applicable to non-ETOPS operations between 120 minutes and 180 minutes; and (b)       the weight discriminant for the non-ETOPS operations. ETOPS type design approvals and operational approvals obtained before the issue of this revision remain valid. Extension of existing ETOPS type design approvals or operational approvals beyond 180 minutes should be issued in accordance with this revision. New ETOPS type design approvals and operational approvals should be issued in accordance with this revision. SECTION 2: RELATED REFERENCES CS-Definitions: ED Decision No. 2003/011/RM as last amended. CS-E: ED Decision No. 2003/9/RM, as last amended (CS-E 1040). CS-25: ED Decision No. 2003/2/RM, as last amended, (CS 25.901, 25.903, 25.1309, 25.1351(d), 25.1419, 25.1535, CS-25 Subpart J). Part-21: Annex to Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012, as last amended. Part-M: Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, as last amended. Part-145: Annex II to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, as last amended. SECTION 3: ABBREVIATIONS AFM:                     aeroplane flight manual ATS:                       air traffic services CAME:                  continuing airworthiness management exposition CAMO:                 continuing airworthiness management organisation approved pursuant to Part-MSubpart-G CG:                         centre of gravity IFSD:                      in-flight shut-down MCT:                     maximum continuous thrust MMEL:                  master minimum equipment list MEL:                      minimum equipment list RFFS                      rescue and fire fighting services (S)TC:                    (supplemental) type certificate SECTION 4: TERMINOLOGY a.         Approved One-Engine-Inoperative Cruise Speed (1)       The approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed for the intended area of operation must be a speed, within the certified limits of the aeroplane, selected by the operator and approved by the competent authority. (2)       The operator must use this speed in (i)        establishing the outer limit of the area of operation and any dispatch limitation, (ii)       calculation of single-engine fuel requirements under [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm421436794)Section 4 to this AMC and, (iii)      establishing the level off altitude (net performance) data. This level off altitude (net performance) must clear any obstacle en route by margins as specified in the operational requirements. A speed other than the approved one-engine-inoperative-speed may be used as the basis for compliance with en-route altitude requirements. The fuel required with that speed or the critical fuel scenario associated with the applicable ETOPS equal-time point, whichever is higher has to be uplifted. (3)       As permitted in [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm421436794)to this AMC, based on evaluation of the actual situation, the pilot-in-command may deviate from the planned one-engine-inoperative cruise speed. Note: The diversion distance based on the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed may take into account the variation of the True Air Speed. b.         Dispatch Dispatch is when the aircraft first moves under its own power for the purpose of takingoff. c.         ETOPS Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures (CMP) The ETOPS CMP document contains the particular airframe-engine combination configuration minimum requirements, including any special inspection, hardware life limits, master minimum equipment list (MMEL) constraints, operating and maintenance procedures found necessary by EASA to establish the suitability of an airframe/engine combination for extended-range operation. d.         ETOPS significant system ETOPS Significant System means the aeroplane propulsion system and any other aeroplane system whose failure could adversely affect the safety of an ETOPS flight, or whose functioning is important to continued safe flight and landing during an aeroplane diversion. Each ETOPS significant system is either a Group 1 or Group 2 system based on the following criteria: *(1)* ETOPS Group 1 Systems: Group 1 Systems are ETOPS significant systems that, related to the number of engines on the aeroplane or the consequences of an engine failure, make the capability of the systems important for an ETOPS flight. The following provides additional discriminating definitions of an ETOPS Group 1 Significant System: (i)        A system for which the fail-safe redundancy characteristics are directly linked to the number of engines (e.g. hydraulic system, pneumatic system, electrical system). (ii)       A system that may affect the proper functioning of the engines to the extent that it could result in an in-flight shutdown or uncommanded loss of thrust (e.g. fuel system, thrust reverser or engine control or indicating system, engine fire detection system). (iii)      A system which contributes significantly to the safety of an engine inoperative ETOPS diversion and is intended to provide additional redundancy to accommodate the system(s) lost by the inoperative engine. These include back-up systems such as an emergency generator, APU, etc. (iv)      A system essential for prolonged operation at engine inoperative altitudes such as anti-icing systems for a two-engine aeroplane if single engine performance results in the aeroplane operating in the icing envelope. *(2)* ETOPS Group 2 Systems: Group 2 Systems are ETOPS significant systems that do not relate to the number of engines on the aeroplane but are important to the safe operation of the aeroplane on an ETOPS flight. The following provides additional discriminating definitions of an ETOPS Group 2 Significant System: (i)        A system for which certain failure conditions would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with an ETOPS diversion (e.g. long‑range navigation or communication, equipment cooling, or systems important to safe operation on a ETOPS diversion after a decompression such as anti-icing systems). (ii)       Time-limited systems including cargo fire suppression and oxygen if the ETOPS diversion is oxygen-system-duration-dependent. (iii)      Systems whose failure would result in excessive crew workload or have operational implications or significant detrimental impact on the flight crew’s or passengers’ physiological well-being for an ETOPS diversion (e.g. flight control forces that would be exhausting for a maximum ETOPS diversion, or system failures that would require continuous fuel balancing to ensure proper CG, or a cabin environmental control failure that could cause extreme heat or cold to the extent it could incapacitate the crew or cause physical harm to the passengers). (iv)      A system specifically installed to enhance the safety of ETOPS operations and an ETOPS diversion regardless of the applicability of paragraphs (2)(i), (2)(ii) and (2)(iii) above (e.g. communication means). e.         Extended-Range Entry Point The extended-range entry point is the first point on the aeroplane’s route which is: — For two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of 20 or more, at 60 minutes flying time at the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed (under standard conditions in still air) from an adequate aerodrome. — For two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of 19 or less, at 180 minutes flying time at the approved one-engine-inoperative speed (in still air) from an adequate aerodrome. f.          In-flight Shutdown (IFSD) In-flight shutdown (IFSD) occurs when an engine ceases to function and is shutdown, whether self-induced, flight crew initiated or caused by an external influence. For ETOPS, all IFSDs occurring from take-off decision speed until touch-down shall be counted. EASA considers IFSD for all causes, for example: flameout, internal failure, flight-crew-initiated shutdown, foreign object ingestion, icing, inability to obtain or control desired thrust or power, and cycling of the start control, however briefly, even if the engine operates normally for the remainder of the flight. This definition excludes the cessation of the functioning of an engine when immediately followed by an automatic engine relight and when an engine does not achieve desired thrust or power but is not shutdown. These events as well as engine failures occurring before take-off decision speed or after touchdown, although not counted as IFSDs, shall be reported to the competent authority in the frame of continued airworthiness for ETOPS. g.         Maximum Approved Diversion Time A maximum approved diversion time(s) for the airframe/engine combination or the engine, established in accordance with the type design criteria in this AMC and Appendices 1 and 2 to this AMC. This maximum approved diversion time(s) is reflected in the aeroplane and engine type certificate data sheets or (S)TC and in the AFM or AFM-supplement. Any proposed increase in the maximum approved diversion time(s), or changes to the aircraft or engine, should be re-assessed by the (S)TC holder in accordance with Part 21.A.101 to establish if any of the type design criteria in this AMC should be applied. h.         Operator’s Approved Diversion Time Operator’s approved diversion time is the maximum time authorised by the competent authority that the operator can operate a type of aeroplane at the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed (under standard conditions in still air) from an adequate aerodrome for the area of operation. i.          System: A system includes all elements of equipment necessary for the control and performance of a particular function. It includes both the equipment specifically provided for the function in question and other basic equipment such as that necessary to supply power for the equipment operation. (1)       Airframe System. Any system on the aeroplane that is not part of the propulsion system. (2)       Propulsion System. The aeroplane propulsion system includes the engine and each component that is necessary for propulsion; components that affect the control of the propulsion units; and components that affect the safe operation of the propulsion units. SECTION 5: CONCEPTS Although it is self-evident that the overall safety of an extended-range operation cannot be better than that provided by the reliability of the propulsion systems, some of the factors related to extended-range operation are not necessarily obvious. For example, cargo compartment fire suppression/containment capability could be a significant factor, or operational/maintenance practices may invalidate certain determinations made during the aeroplane type design certification or the probability of system failures could be a more significant problem than the probability of propulsion system failures. Although propulsion system reliability is a critical factor, it is not the only factor which should be seriously considered in evaluating extended‑range operation. Any decision relating to extended-range operation with two-engine aeroplanes should also consider the probability of occurrence of any conditions which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions. The following is provided to define the concepts for evaluating extended-range operation with two‑engine aeroplanes. This approach ensures that the level of safety of extended-range operation withtwo-engine aeroplanes is consistent with the level of safety required for current extended-range operation with three and four-engine turbine powered aeroplanes without unnecessarily restricting operation. a.         Airframe Systems A number of airframe systems have an effect on the safety of extended range operation; therefore, the type design certification of the aeroplane should be reviewed to ensure that the design of these systems is acceptable for the safe conduct of the intended operation. b.         Propulsion Systems In order to maintain a level of safety consistent with the overall safety level achieved by modern aeroplanes, it is necessary for two-engine aeroplanes used in extended-range operation to have an acceptably low risk of significant loss of power/thrust for all design- and operation-related causes (see [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788)). c.         Maintenance and Reliability Programme Definition Since the quality of maintenance and reliability programmes can have an appreciable effect on the reliability of the propulsion system and the airframe systems required for extended-range operation, an assessment should be made of the proposed maintenance and reliability programme's ability to maintain a satisfactory level of propulsion and airframe system reliability for the particular airframe/engine combination. d.         Maintenance and Reliability Programme Implementation Following a determination that the airframe systems and propulsion systems are designed to be suitable for extended-range operation, an in-depth review of the applicant's training programmes, operations and maintenance and reliability programmes should be accomplished to show ability to achieve and maintain an acceptable level of systems reliability to safely conduct these operations. e.         Human Factors System failures or malfunctions occurring during extended-range operation could affect flight crew workload and procedures. Since the demands on the flight crew may increase, an assessment should be made to ensure that more than average piloting skills or crew co‑ordination is not required. Chapter II TYPE DESIGN APPROVAL CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 1: APPLICABILITY This chapter is applicable to (S)TC applicants or holders that seek ETOPS type design approval for an engine or a particular aeroplane-engine combination. SECTION 2: COMPETENT AUTHORITY The competent authority for the issue of an ETOPS type design approval is EASA. SECTION 3: GENERAL When a two-engine aeroplane is intended to be used in extended-range operations, a determination should be made that the design features are suitable for the intended operation. The ETOPS significant system for the particular airframe/engine combination should be shown to be designed to fail-safe criteria and it should be determined that it can achieve a level of reliability suitable for the intended operation. In some cases, modifications to systems may be necessary to achieve the desired reliability. SECTION 4: ELEGIBILITY To be eligible for extended-range operations, the specified airframe/engine combination, should have been certified according to the airworthiness standards of large aeroplanes and engines. The process to obtain a type design ETOPS approval requires the applicant to show that in accordance with the criteria established in this Chapter II and Appendices 1 and 2: — the design features of the particular airframe/engine combination are suitable for the intended operations; and, — the particular airframe/engine combination, having been recognised eligible for ETOPS, can achieve a sufficiently high level of reliability. The required level of reliability of the airframe/engine combination can be validated by the following methods: (1)       METHOD 1: in-service experience for ETOPS type design approval defined in Section 6.1 of and Appendices [1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788)and[2](#_DxCrossRefBm421436790)to this AMC, or (2)       METHOD 2: a programme of design, test and analysis agreed between the applicant and EASA, (i.e. approval plan) for Early ETOPS type design approval defined in Appendices 1 and 2 to this AMC. SECTION 5: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL An applicant for, and holders of a (S)TC requesting a determination that a particular airframe/engine combination is a suitable type design for extended-range operation, should apply to EASA. EASA will then initiate an assessment of the engine and airframe/engine combination in accordance with the criteria laid down in this Chapter II and in Appendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788) & [2](#_DxCrossRefBm421436790)to this AMC. SECTION 6: VALIDATION METHODS OF THE LEVEL OF RELIABLITY This chapter together with Appendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788) and [2](#_DxCrossRefBm421436790) to this AMC should be followed to assess the reliability level of the propulsion system and airframe systems for which ETOPS type design approval is sought. Appendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788) and [2](#_DxCrossRefBm421436790) describe both the in-service experience method and the early ETOPS method. 6.1       METHOD 1: IN-SERVICE EXPERIENCE FOR ETOPS TYPE DESIGN APPROVAL Prior to the ETOPS type design approval, it should be shown that the world fleet of the particular airframe/engine combination for which approval is sought can achieve or has achieved, as determined by EASA (seeAppendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788) and [2](#_DxCrossRefBm421436790)), an acceptable and reasonably stable level of propulsion system in-flight shutdown (IFSD) rate and airframe system reliability. Engineering and operational judgement applied in accordance with the guidance provided in [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788) will then be used to determine that the *IFSD rate objective* for all independent causes can be or has been achieved. This assessment is an integral part of the determination in Section 7 paragraph (2) for type design approval. This determination of propulsion system reliability is derived from a world fleet database containing, in accordance with requirements of [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788), all in-flight shutdown events, all significant engine reliability problems, design and test data and available data on cases of significant loss of thrust, including those where the propulsion system failed or the engine was throttled back or shut down by the pilot. This determination will take due account of the approved maximum diversion time, proposed rectification of all identified propulsion and ETOPS significant systems problems, as well as events where in-flight starting capability may be degraded. 6.2       METHOD 2: EARLY ETOPS ETOPS approval is considered feasible at the introduction to service of an airframe/engine combination as long as EASA is totally satisfied that all aspects of the approval plan have been completed. EASA must be satisfied that the approval plan achieves the level of safety intended in this AMC and in the aeroplane and engine certification bases. Any non-compliance with the approval plan can result in a lesser approval than sought for. (S)TC holders will be required to respond to any incident or occurrence in the most expeditious manner. A serious single event or series of related events could result in immediate revocation of ETOPS type design approval. Any isolated problem not justifying immediate withdrawal of approval, should be addressed within 30 days in a resolution plan approved by EASA. (S)TC holders will be reliant on operators to supply incident and occurrence data. SECTION 7: EVALUATION CRITERIA of the ETOPS type design The applicant should conduct an evaluation of failures and failure combinations based on engineering and operational consideration as well as acceptable fail-safe methodology. The evaluation should consider effects of operations with a single engine, including allowance for additional stress that could result from failure of the first propulsion system. Unless it can be shown that equivalent safety levels are provided or the effects of failure are minor, failure and reliability analysis should be used as guidance in verifying that the proper level of fail-safe design has been provided. Excluding failures of the engine, any system or equipment failure condition, or combination of failures that affects the aeroplane or engine and that would result in a need for a diversion, should be considered a Major event (CS 25.1309) and therefore the probability of such should be compatible with that safety objective. The following criteria are applicable to the extended-range operation of aeroplanes with two engines: (1)       Airframe systems should be shown to comply with CS 25.1309 in accordance with Sections 7 and 8 of Chapter II and with[Appendix 2](#_DxCrossRefBm421436790) to this AMC. (2)       The propulsion systems should be shown to comply with CS 25.901. (i)        Engineering and operational judgement, applied in accordance with the guidance provided in Section 6 and [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788), should be used to show that the propulsion system can achieve the desired level of reliability. (ii)       Contained engine failure, cascading failures, consequential damage or failure of remaining systems or equipment should be assessed in accordance with CS 25.901. (iii)      It should be shown during the type design evaluation that the approved engine limits at all approved power settings will not be exceeded when conducting an extended duration single-engine operation during the diversion in all expected environmental conditions. The assessment should account for the effects of additional engine loading demands (e.g. anti-icing, electrical, etc.) which may be required during the single-engine flight phase associated with the diversion. (3)       The safety impact of an uncontained engine failure should be assessed in accordance with CS 25.903. (4)       The APU installation, if required for extended-range operations, should meet the applicable CS‑25 provisions (Subpart J, APU) and any additional requirements necessary to demonstrate its ability to perform the intended function as specified by EASA following a review of the applicant's data. If certain extended-range operation may necessitate in-flight start and run of the APU, it must be substantiated that the APU has adequate capability and reliability for that operation. The APU should demonstrate the required in-flight start reliability throughout the flight envelope (compatible with overall safety objective but not less than 95%) taking account of all approved fuel types and temperatures. An acceptable procedure for starting and running the APU (e.g. descent to allow start) may be defined in order to demonstrate compliance with the required in-flight start reliability. If this reliability cannot be demonstrated, it may be necessary to require continuous operation of the APU. (5)       Extended duration, single-engine operations should not require exceptional piloting skills and/or crew co-ordination. Considering the degradation of the performance of the aeroplane type with an engine inoperative, the increased flight crew workload, and the malfunction of remaining systems and equipment, the impact on flight crew procedures should be minimised. Consideration should also be given to the effects on the crew’s and passengers’ physiological needs (e.g. cabin temperature control), when continuing the flight with an inoperative engine or one or more inoperative airframe system(s). The provision of essential services to ensure the continued safety of the aeroplane and safety of the passengers and crew, particularly during very long diversion times with depleted/degraded systems, should be assessed. The applicant should provide a list of aircraft system functions considered to be necessary to perform a safe ETOPS flight. The applicants should consider the following examples: (i)        Flight deck and cabin environmental systems integrity and reliability (ii)       The avionics/cooling and consequent integrity of the avionic systems (iii)      Cargo hold fire suppression capacity and integrity of any smoke/fire alerting system (iv)      Brake accumulator or emergency braking system capacity/integrity (v)       Adequate capacity of all-time dependent functions (vi)      Pressurisation system integrity/reliability (vii)     Oxygen system integrity/reliability/capacity, if the Maximum Approved Diversion Time is based on the oxygen system capability (viii)    Integrity/reliability/capacity of back-up systems (e.g. electrical, hydraulic) (ix)      Fuel system integrity and fuel accessibility. Fuel consumption with engine failure and/or other system failures (see paragraph (11)) (x)       Fuel quantity and fuel used, indications and alerts (see paragraph (10)). (6)       It should be demonstrated for extended duration single-engine operation, that the remaining power (electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic) will continue to be available at levels necessary to permit continued safe flight and landing, and to provide those services necessary for the overall safety of the passengers and crew. Unless it can be shown that cabin pressure can be maintained on single-engine operation at the altitude necessary for continued flight to an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome, oxygen should be available to sustain the passengers and crew for the maximum diversion time. (7)       In the event of any single failure, or any combination of failures not shown to be Extremely Improbable, it should be shown that electrical power is provided for essential flight instruments, warning systems, avionics, communications, navigation, required route or destination guidance equipment, supportive systems and/or hardware and any other equipment deemed necessary for extended-range operation to continue safe flight and landing at an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome. Information provided to the flight crew should be of sufficient accuracy for the intended operation. Functions to be provided may differ between aeroplanes and should be agreed with EASA. These should normally include: (i)        attitude information; (ii)       adequate radio communication (including the route specific long-range communication equipment as required by the applicable operational regulations) and intercommunication capability; (iii)      adequate navigation capability (including route specific long-range navigation equipment as required by the applicable operational regulations and weather radar); (iv)      adequate cockpit and instrument lighting, emergency lighting and landing lights; (v)       sufficient captain and first officer instruments, provided cross-reading has been evaluated; (vi)      heading, airspeed and altitude including appropriate pitot/static heating; (vii)     adequate flight controls including auto-pilot; (viii)    adequate engine controls, and restart capability with critical type fuel (from the stand-point of flame out and restart capability) and with the aeroplane initially at the maximum relight altitude; (ix)      adequate fuel supply system capability including such fuel boost and fuel transfer functions that may be necessary; (x)       adequate engine instrumentation; (xi)      such warning, cautions, and indications as are required for continued safe flight and landing; (xii)     fire protection (cargo, APU and engines); (xiii)    adequate ice protection including windshield de-icing; (xiv)    adequate control of cockpit and cabin environment including heating and pressurisation; and, (xv)     ATC transponder. Note: For 90 minutes or less ETOPS operations, the functions to be provided must satisfy the requirements of CS 25.1351(d)(2) as interpreted by AMC 25.1351(d). (8)       Three or more reliable and independent electrical power sources should be available. As a minimum, following failure of any two sources, the remaining source should be capable of powering the items specified in paragraph (7). If one or more of the required electrical power sources are provided by an APU, hydraulic system, or ram air turbine, the following criteria apply as appropriate: (i)        The APU, when installed, should meet the criteria in paragraph (4). (ii)       The hydraulic power source should be reliable. To achieve this reliability, it may be necessary to provide two or more independent energy sources (e.g. bleed air from two or more pneumatic sources). (iii)      The ram air turbine (RAT) should be demonstrated to be sufficiently reliable in deployment and use. The RAT should not require engine-dependent power for deployment. If one of the required electrical power sources is provided by batteries, the following criteria apply: (iv)      When one of the three independent electrical power sources is time-limited (e.g. batteries), such power source should have a capability to enable the items required in paragraph (7) to be powered for continued flight and landing to an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome and it will be considered to be a time-limited system in accordance with paragraph (12). (9)       For ETOPS approvals above 180 minutes, in addition to the criteria for electrical power sources specified in paragraph (8) above, the following criteria should also be applied: (i)        Unless it can be shown that the failure of all three independent power sources required by paragraph (8) above is extremely improbable, following failure of these three independent power sources, a fourth independent power source should be available that is capable of providing power to the essential functions referred to in paragraph (7) for continued safe flight and landing to an adequate ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome (ii)       If the additional power source is provided by an APU, it should meet the criteria in paragraph (4). (iii)      If the additional power source is provided by a hydraulic system or ram air turbine, the provisions of paragraph (8) apply. (10)     It should be shown that adequate status monitoring information and procedures on all ETOPS significant systems are available for the flight crew to make pre-flight, in-flight go/no-go and diversion decisions. Adequate fuel quantity information should be available to the flight crew, including alerts, and advisories, that consider the fuel required to complete the flight, abnormal fuel management or transfer between tanks, and possible fuel leaks in the tanks, the fuel lines and other fuel system components and the engines. (11)     Fuel system (i)        The aeroplane fuel system should provide fuel pressure and flow to the engine(s) in accordance with CS 25.951 and 25.955 for any fuel pump power supply failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable. (ii)       The fuel necessary to complete the ETOPS mission or during a diversion should be available to the operating engine(s) under any failure condition, other than fuel boost pump failures, not shown to be extremely improbable[[4]](#_ftn4) (e.g. cross-feed valve failures, automatic fuel management system failures). (12)     Time-limited system In addition to the maximum approved diversion time, diversion time may also be limited by the capacity of the cargo hold fire suppression system or other ETOPS significant time-limited systems determined by considering other relevant failures, such as an engine inoperative, and combinations of failures not shown to be extremely improbable. Time-limited system capability, if any, must be defined and stated in the Aeroplane Flight Manual or AFM-supplement and CMP document. (13)     Operation in icing conditions Airframe and propulsion ice protection should be shown to provide adequate capability (aeroplane controllability, etc.) for the intended operation. This should account for prolonged exposure to lower altitudes associated with the single engine diversion, cruise, holding, approach and landing. (i)        The aeroplane should be certified for operation in icing conditions in accordance with CS 25.1419. (ii)       The aeroplane should be capable of continued safe flight and landing in icing conditions at depressurisation altitudes or engine inoperative altitudes. The extent of ice accumulation on unprotected surfaces should consider the maximum super cooled liquid water catch at one-engine inoperative and depressurisation cruise altitudes. Substantiated icing scenario(s) should be assumed to occur during the period of time when icing conditions are forecast. The icing episode(s) assumed should be agreed with EASA. The probability of icing longer than that assumed, and agreed for the icing episode(s), in combination with the probability of the aeroplane having to operate in icing conditions (e.g. engine in-flight shutdown or decompression) should be shown to be extremely improbable. (14)     Solutions to achieve required reliability The permanent solution to a problem should be, as far as possible, a hardware/design solution. However, if scheduled maintenance, replacement, and/or inspection are utilised to obtain type design approval for extended-range operation, and therefore are required in the CMP standard document, the specific maintenance information should be easily retrievable and clearly referenced and identified in an appropriate maintenance document. (15)     Engine condition monitoring Procedures for an engine condition monitoring process should be defined and validated for ETOPS. The engine condition monitoring process should be able to determine, if an engine is no longer capable of providing, within certified engine operating limits, the maximum thrust required for a single engine diversion. The effects of additional engine loading demands (e.g. anti-ice, electrical), which may be required during an engine inoperative diversion, should be accounted for. SECTION 8: ANALYSIS OF FAILURE EFFECTS AND RELIABILITY 8.1       General The analysis and demonstrations of airframe and propulsion system level of reliability and failure effects required by Section 6 and Section 7 should be based on the expected longest diversion time for extended-range routes likely to be flown with the aeroplane. However, in certain failure scenarios, it may be necessary to consider a shorter diversion time due to the time-limited systems. 8.2       Propulsion systems (i)        An assessment of the propulsion system’s reliability for particular airframe/engine combinations should be made in accordance with Section 6 and [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788). (ii)       The analysis should consider: (A)      Effects of operation with a single-propulsion system (i.e. high-power demands including extended use of MCT and bleed requirements, etc.) and include possible damage that could result from failure of the first propulsion system. (B)      Effects of the availability and management of fuel for propulsion system operation (i.e. cross-feed valve failures, fuel mismanagement, ability to detect and isolate leaks, etc.). (C)      Effects of other failures, external conditions, maintenance and crew errors, that could jeopardise the operation of the remaining propulsion system, should be examined. (D)      Effect of inadvertent thrust reverser deployment, if not shown to be extremely improbable (includes design and maintenance). 8.3       Airframe systems An assessment of the airframe system’s reliability for particular airframe/engine combinations should be made in accordance with Section 7 and [Appendix 2](#_DxCrossRefBm421436790). The analysis should consider: (i)        Hydraulic Power and Flight Control An analysis should be carried out taking into account the criteria detailed in Section 7 paragraph (6). Consideration of these systems may be combined, since many commercial aeroplanes have full hydraulically powered controls. For aeroplanes with all flight controls being hydraulically powered, evaluation of hydraulic system redundancy should show that single failures or failure combinations, not shown to be extremely improbable, do not preclude continued safe flight and landing at an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome. As part of this evaluation, the loss of any parts of the hydraulic systems and any engine should be assumed to occur unless it is established during failure evaluation that there are no sources of damage or the location of the damage sources are such that this failure condition will not occur. Note: For 75 minutes or less ETOPS approval, additional analysis to show compliance with Section 7 will not be required for airframe systems, where for basic (non-ETOPS) Type Design Approval compliance with CS 25.1309, or its equivalent, has already been shown. (ii)       Services Provided by Electrical Power An analysis should show that the criteria detailed in Section 7 paragraphs (6), (7) and (8) are satisfied taking into account the exposure times established in paragraph (1). Note1:For 75 minutes or less ETOPS approval, additional analysis to show compliance with Section 7 will not be required for airframe systems, where for basic (non-ETOPS) Type Design Approval (TDA), compliance with CS 25.1309, or its equivalent, has already been shown. Note 2:For ETOPS approval above 180 minutes, the analysis should also show that the criteria detailed in Section 7 paragraph (9) are satisfied. (iii)      Equipment Cooling An analysis should establish that the equipment (including avionics) necessary for extended-range operation has the ability to operate acceptably following failure modes in the cooling system not shown to be extremely improbable. Adequate indication of the proper functioning of the cooling system should be demonstrated to ensure system operation prior to dispatch and during flight. Note:For 75 minutes or less ETOPS approval, additional analysis to show compliance with Section 7 will not be required for airframe systems, where for basic (non-ETOPS) type design approval (TDA), compliance with CS 25.1309, or its equivalent, has already been shown. (iv)      Cargo Compartment It should be shown that the cargo compartment design and fire protection system capability (where applicable) is consistent with the following: (A)      Design The cargo compartment fire protection system integrity and reliability should be suitable for the intended operation considering fire detection sensors, liner materials, etc. (B)      Fire Protection The capacity/endurance of the cargo compartment fire suppression system should be established. (v)       Cabin Pressurisation Authority/EASA-approved aeroplane performance data should be available to verify the ability to continue safe flight and landing after loss of pressure and subsequent operation at a lower altitude (see also Section 7 paragraph (6)). (vi)      Cockpit and Cabin Environment The analysis should show that an adequate cockpit and cabin environment is preserved following all combinations of propulsion and electrical system failures which are not shown to be extremely improbable, e.g. when the aeroplane is operating on standby electrical power only. Note:For 75 minutes or less ETOPS approval, additional analysis to show compliance with Section 7 will not be required for airframe systems, where for basic (non-ETOPS) type design approval (TDA), compliance with CS 25.1309, or its equivalent, has already been shown. SECTION 9: ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE CONDITIONS In assessing the fail-safe features and effects of failure conditions, account should be taken of: (1)       The variations in the performance of the system, the probability of the failure(s), the complexity of the crew action. (2)       Factors alleviating or aggravating the direct effects of the initial failure condition, including consequential or related conditions existing within the aeroplane which may affect the ability of the crew to deal with direct effects, such as the presence of smoke, aeroplane accelerations, interruption of air-to-ground communication, cabin pressurisation problems, etc. (3)       A flight test should be conducted by the (S)TC holders and witnessed by EASA to validate expected aeroplane flying qualities and performance considering propulsion system failure, electrical power losses, etc. The adequacy of remaining aeroplane systems and performance and flight crew ability to deal with the emergency, considering remaining flight deck information, will be assessed in all phases of flight and anticipated operating conditions. Depending on the scope, content, and review by EASA of the (S)TC holders database, this flight test could also be used as a means for approving the basic aerodynamic and engine performance data used to establish the aeroplane performance identified in Chapter III. (4)       Safety assessments should consider the flight consequences of single or multiple system failures leading to a diversion, and the probability and consequences of subsequent failures or exhaustion of the capacity of time-limited systems that might occur during the diversion. Safety assessments should determine: (i)        The effect of the initial failure condition on the capability of the aeroplane to cope with adverse conditions at the diversion airport, and (ii)       The means available to the crew to assess the extent and evolution of the situation during a prolonged diversion. The aeroplane flight manual and the flight crew warning and alerting and display systems should provide clear information to enable the flight crew to determine when failure conditions are such that a diversion is necessary. The assessment of the reliability of propulsion and airframe systems for a particular airframe/engine combination will be contained in EASA-approved Aeroplane Assessment Report. In the case EASA is validating the approval issued by a third-country certification authority, the report may incorporate the assessment report established by the latter. Following approval of the report, the propulsion and airframe system recommendations will be included in an EASA-approved CMP document that establishes the CMP standard requirements for the candidate engine or airframe/engine combination. This document will then be referenced in the Operation Specification and the Aircraft Flight Manual or AFM-Supplement. SECTION 10: ISSUE OF THE ETOPS TYPE DESIGN APPROVAL Upon satisfactory completion of the aeroplane evaluation through an engineering inspection and test programme consistent with the type certification procedures of EASA and sufficient in-service experience data (see Appendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788)and[2](#_DxCrossRefBm421436790)): (1)       The type design approval, the maximum approved diversion time and demonstrated capability of any time-limited systems will be reflected in the approved AFM or AFM-Supplement, and the aeroplane and engine type certification data sheet or supplemental type certificate which contain directly or by reference the following pertinent information, as applicable: (i)        special limitations (if necessary), including any limitations associated with a maximum diversion time established in accordance with Section 8 paragraph (1) and time-limited systems (for example, the endurance of cargo hold fire suppression systems); (ii)       additional markings or placards (if required); (iii)      revision to the performance section of the AFM to include the data required by [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm421436794) paragraph 10; (iv)      the airborne equipment, installation, and flight crew procedures required for extended‑range operations; (v)       description or reference to the CMP document containing the approved aeroplane standards for extended-range operations; (vi)      a statement to the effect that: ‘The Type design, systems reliability and performance of the considered aeroplane/engine models combinations have been evaluated by EASA in accordance with CS-25, CS-E and AMC 20-6 and have been found suitable for ETOPS operations when configured, maintained and operated in accordance with this document. This finding does not constitute an approval to conduct ETOPS operations.’ (2)       The engine ETOPS type design approval and maximum approved diversion time will be reflected in the engine type certification data sheet or supplemental type certificate which contain directly or by referencing the following pertinent information, as applicable: (i)        special limitations (if necessary), including any limitations associated with the maximum approved diversion time should be established; (ii)       additional markings or placards (if required); (iii)      description or reference to a document containing the approved engine configuration. SECTION 11: CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS OF THE ETOPS TYPE DESIGN APPROVAL (1)       EASA will include the consideration of extended-range operation in its normal surveillance and design change approval functions. (2)       The (S)TC holders whose approval includes a type design ETOPS approval, as well as EASA, should periodically and individually review the in-service reliability of the airframe/engine combination and of the engine. Further to these reviews and each time that an urgent problem makes it necessary, in order to achieve and maintain the desired level of reliability and therefore the safety of ETOPS, EASA may: — require that the type design standard be revised; for example, by the issuance of an airworthiness directive, or, — issue an emergency conformity information[[5]](#_ftn5). (3)       The Reliability Tracking Board will periodically check that the airframe/propulsion system reliability requirements for extended-range operation are achieved or maintained. For mature ETOPS products, the RTB may be replaced by the process to monitor their reliability as defined in [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788), Section 6.b and [Appendix 2](#_DxCrossRefBm421436790), Section 5.c. Note: Periodically means in this context 2 years. (4)       Any significant problems which adversely affect extended-range operation will be corrected. Modifications or maintenance actions to achieve or maintain the reliability objective of extended-range operations for the airframe/engine combination will be incorporated into the CMP document. EASA will co-ordinate this action with the affected (S)TC holder. (5)       The CMP document which establishes the suitability of an engine or airframe/engine combination for extended-range operation defines the minimum standards for the operation. Chapter III OPERATIONAL APPROVAL CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 1: APPLICABILITY This acceptable means of compliance is for operators seeking an ETOPS operational approval to operate: (1)       Two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum passenger seating configuration of 20 or more, in excess of 60 minutes at the approved one-engine-inoperative speed (under standard conditions in still air) from an adequate aerodrome; (2)       or Two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum passenger seating configuration of 19 or less, in excess of 180 minutes at the approved one-engine-inoperative speed (in still air) from an adequate aerodrome. SECTION 2: COMPETENT AUTHORITY The competent authority for the issue of an ETOPS operational approval to an operator is the authority that has issued its Air Operator Certificate. Nevertheless, as the operational approval requires the operator to comply with the continuing airworthiness requirements of [Appendix 8](#_DxCrossRefBm421436789)to this AMC, the operator has to ensure that the specific ETOPS elements related to continuing airworthiness are approved by the competent authority designated in Annex I (Part-M) to [Regulation (EU) 1321/2014](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R1321&qid=1659625007071). SECTION 3: APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS This chapter details the approval process required for ETOPS in accordance with the operational requirements. SECTION 4: METHODS FOR OBTAINING ETOPS OPERATIONS APPROVAL There are two methods for obtaining an ETOPS approval, depending on the availability and amount of prior experience with the candidate airframe/engine combination: — ‘Accelerated ETOPS approval’ that does not require prior in-service experience with the candidate airframe/engine combination; — ‘In-service ETOPS Approval’, based on a prerequisite amount of prior in-service experience with the candidate airframe/engine combination. Elements from the ‘accelerated ETOPS approval’ method may be used to reduce the amount of prior in-service experience. SECTION 5: ACCELERATED ETOPS APPROVAL The criteria defined in this section permit approval of ETOPS operations up to 180 minutes, when the operator has established that those processes that are necessary for successful ETOPS are in place and are proven to be reliable. The basis of the accelerated approval is that the operator will meet equivalent levels of safety and satisfy the objectives of this AMC. The accelerated ETOPS approval process includes the following phases: — Application phase — Validation of the operator’s ETOPS processes — Validation of operator ETOPS continuing airworthiness and operations capability — Issue of ETOPS operations approval by the competent authority 5.1       Application phase The operator should submit an accelerated ETOPS operations approval plan to the authority 6 months before the proposed start of ETOPS. This time will permit the competent authority to review the documented plans and ensure adequate ETOPS processes are in place. (A)      Accelerated ETOPS operations approval plan: The accelerated ETOPS operations approval plan should define: 1.         The proposed routes and the ETOPS diversion time necessary to support those routes; 2.         The proposed one-engine-inoperative cruise speed, which may be area-specific depending upon anticipated aeroplane loading and likely fuel penalties associated with the planned procedures; 3.         How to comply with the ETOPS Processes listed in paragraph (B); 4.         The resources allocated to each ETOPS process to initiate and sustain ETOPS operations in a manner that demonstrates commitment by management and all personnel involved in ETOPS continuing airworthiness and operational support; 5.         How to establish compliance with the build standard required for type design approval, e.g. CMP document compliance; 6.         Review gates: A review gate is a milestone of the tracking plan to allow for the orderly tracking and documentation of specific provisions of this section. Normally, the review gate process will start 6 months before the proposed start of ETOPS and should continue until at least 6 months after the start of ETOPS. The review gate process will help ensure that the proven processes comply with the provisions of this AMC and are capable of continued ETOPS operations. (B)       Operator ETOPS process elements The operator that seeks Accelerated ETOPS operations approval should also demonstrate to the competent authority that it has established an ETOPS process that includes the following ETOPS elements: 1.         Airframe/engine combination and engine compliance with ETOPS Type Design Build Standard (CMP); 2.         Compliance with the continuing airworthiness requirements as defined in [Appendix 8](#_DxCrossRefBm421436789), which should include: a.         A maintenance programme; b.         A proven ETOPS reliability programme; c.         A proven oil consumption monitoring programme; d.         A proven engine condition monitoring and reporting system; e.         A propulsion system monitoring programme; f.          An ETOPS parts control programme; g.         A proven plan for resolution of aeroplane discrepancies. 3.         ETOPS Operations Manual supplement or its equivalent in the Operations Manual; 4.         The operator should establish a programme that results in a high degree of confidence that the propulsion system reliability that is appropriate to the ETOPS diversion time would be maintained; 5.         Initial and recurrent training and qualification programmes in place for ETOPS related personnel, including flight crew and all other operations personnel; 6.         Compliance with the Flight Operations Programme as defined in this AMC; 7.         Proven flight planning and dispatch programmes that are appropriate to ETOPS; 8.         Procedures to ensure the availability of meteorological information and MEL that are appropriate to ETOPS; and 9.         Flight crew and dispatch personnel familiar with the ETOPS routes to be flown; in particular, the requirements for, and selection of ETOPS en-route alternate aerodromes. (C)       Process elements documentation: Documentation should be provided for the following elements: 1.         Technology that is new to the operator and significant differences in ETOPS significant systems (engines, electrical, hydraulic and pneumatic), compared to the aeroplanes currently operated and the aeroplane for which the operator is seeking Accelerated ETOPS operations approval; 2.         The plan to train the flight and continuing airworthiness personnel to the different ETOPS process elements; 3.         The plan to use proven or manufacturer-validated training and maintenance and operations manual procedures relevant to ETOPS for the aeroplane for which the operator is seeking accelerated ETOPS operations approval; 4.         Changes to any previously proven or manufacturer-validated training, maintenance or operations manual procedures described above. Depending on the nature of any changes, the operator may be required to provide a plan for validating such changes; 5.         The validation plan for any additional operator unique training and procedures relevant to ETOPS, if any; 6.         Details of any ETOPS support programme from the airframe/engine combination or engine (S)TC holder, other operators or any third-country authority or other competent authority; and 7.         The control procedures when a contracted maintenance organisation or flight dispatch organisation is used. 5.2       Validation of the operator’s ETOPS processes This section identifies process elements that need to be validated and approved prior to the start of accelerated ETOPS. For a process to be considered proven, the process should first be described, including a flow chart of process elements. The roles and responsibilities of the personnel that manage the process should be defined including any training requirement. The operator should demonstrate that the process is in place and functions as intended. This may be accomplished by providing data, documentation and analysis results and/or by demonstrating in practise that the process works and consistently provides the intended results. The operator should also demonstrate that a feedback loop exists to facilitate the surveillance of the process, based on in-service experience. If any operator is currently approved for conducting ETOPS with a different engine and/or airframe/engine combination, it may be able to document proven ETOPS processes. In this case, only minimal further validation may be necessary. It will be necessary to demonstrate that processes are in place to assure equivalent results on the engine and/or airframe/engine combination being proposed for Accelerated ETOPS Operations Approval. (A)      Reduction in the validation requirements: The following elements will be useful or beneficial in justifying a reduction by the competent authority in the validation requirements of ETOPS processes: 1.         Experience with other airframes and/or engines; 2.         Previous ETOPS experience; 3.         Experience with long-range, over-water operations with two, three or four engine aeroplanes; 4.         Any experience gained by flight crews, continuing airworthiness personnel and flight dispatch personnel, while working with other ETOPS approved operators, particularly when such experience is with the same airframe or airframe/engine combination. Process validation may be done on the airframe/engine combination, which will be used in Accelerated ETOPS operation or on a different aeroplane type than that for which approval is being sought. (B)       Validation programme: A process could be validated by demonstrating that it produces equivalent results on a different aeroplane type or airframe/engine combination. In this case, the validation programme should address the following: 1.         The operator should show that the ETOPS validation programme can be executed in a safe manner; 2.         The operator should state in its application any policy guidance to personnel involved in the ETOPS process validation programme. Such guidance should clearly state that ETOPS process validation exercises should not be allowed to adversely impact the safety of actual operations, especially during periods of abnormal, emergency, or high cockpit workload operations. It should emphasise that during periods of abnormal or emergency operation or high cockpit workload ETOPS process validation exercises may be terminated; 3.         The validation scenario should be of sufficient frequency and operational exposure to validate maintenance and operational support systems not validated by other means; 4.         A means should be established to monitor and report performance with respect to accomplishment of tasks associated with ETOPS process elements. Any recommended changes that result from the validation programme to ETOPS continuing airworthiness and/or operational process elements should be defined. (C)       Documentation requirements for the process validation The operator should: 1.         document how each element of the ETOPS process was utilised during the validation; 2.         document any shortcomings with the process elements and measures in place to correct such shortcomings; 3.         document any changes to ETOPS processes, which were required after an in-flight shutdown (IFSD), unscheduled engine removals, or any other significant operational events; 4.         provide periodic process validation reports to the competent authority (this may be addressed during review gates). (D)      Validation programme information Prior to the start of the validation process, the following information should be submitted to the competent authority: 1.         Validation periods, including start dates and proposed completion dates; 2.         Definition of aeroplane to be used in the validation (the list should include registration numbers, manufacturer and serial number and model of the airframe and engines); 3.         Description of the areas of operation (if relevant to validation) proposed for validation and actual operations; 4.         Definition of designated ETOPS validation routes. The routes should be of duration required to ensure necessary process validation occurs; 5.         Process validation reporting. The operator should compile results of ETOPS process validation. 5.3       Validation of operator ETOPS continuing airworthiness and operations capability The operator should demonstrate competence to safely conduct and adequately support the intended operation. Prior to ETOPS approval, the operator should demonstrate that the ETOPS continuing airworthiness processes are being properly conducted. The operator should also demonstrate that ETOPS flight dispatch and release practices, policies, and procedures are established for operations. An operational validation flight may be required so that the operator can demonstrate dispatch and normal in-flight procedures. The content of this validation flight will be determined by the competent authority based on the previous experience of the operator. Upon successful completion of the validation flight, when required, the operator should modify the operational manuals to include approval for ETOPS as applicable 5.4       ETOPS operations approval issued by the competent authority Operations approvals granted with reduced in-service experience may be limited to those areas determined by the competent authority at time of issue. An application for a change is required for new areas to be added. The approval issued by the competent authority for ETOPS up to 180 minutes should be based on the information required in [Appendix 3](#_DxCrossRefBm421436793)Section 3. SECTION 6: IN-SERVICE ETOPS APPROVAL Approval based on in-service experience on the particular airframe/engine combination. 6.1       Application Any operator applying for ETOPS approval should submit a request, with the required supporting data, to the competent authority at least 3 months prior to the proposed start of ETOPS with the specific airframe/engine combination. 6.2       Operator experience Each operator seeking approval via the in-service route should provide a report to the competent authority, indicating the operator’s capability to maintain and operate the specific airframe/engine combination for the intended extended-range operation. This report should include experience with the engine type or related engine types, experience with the aeroplane systems or related aeroplane systems, or experience with the particular airframe/engine combination on non-extended range routes. Approval would be based on a review of this information. Each operator that requests Approval to conduct ETOPS beyond 180 minutes should already have ETOPS experience and hold a 180-minute ETOPS approval. Note 1: The operator’s authorised maximum diversion time may be progressively increased by the competent authority as the operator gains experience on the particular airframe/engine combination. Not less than 12 consecutive months experience will normally be required before authorisation of ETOPS up to 180 minutes maximum diversion time, unless the operator can demonstrate compensating factors. The factors to consider may include duration of experience, total number of flights, operator’s diversion events, record of the airframe/engine combination with other operators, quality of operator’s programmes and route structure. However, the operator will still need, in the latter case, to demonstrate the capability to maintain and operate the new airframe/engine combination at a similar level of reliability. In considering an application from an operator to conduct extended-range operations, an assessment should be made of the operator’s overall safety record, past performance, flight crew training and experience, and maintenance programme. The data provided with the request should substantiate the operator’s ability and competence to safely conduct and support these operations and should include the means used to satisfy the considerations outlined in this paragraph. (Any reliability assessment obtained, either through analysis or service experience, should be used as guidance in support of operational judgements regarding the suitability of the intended operation.) 6.3       Assessment of the operator's propulsion system reliability Following the accumulation of adequate operating experience by the world fleet of the specified airframe/engine combination and the establishment of an IFSD rate objective in accordance with [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788) for use in ensuring the propulsion system reliability necessary for extended‑range operations, an assessment should be made of the applicant’s ability to achieve and maintain this level of propulsion system reliability. This assessment should include trend comparisons of the operator’s data with other operators as well as the world fleet average values, and the application of a qualitative judgement that considers all the relevant factors. The operator’s past record of propulsion system reliability with related types of power units should also be reviewed, as well as its record of achieved systems reliability with the airframe/engine combination for which authorisation is sought to conduct extended-range operations. Note: Where statistical assessment alone may not be applicable, e.g. when the fleet size is small, the applicant’s experience will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. 6.4       Validation of operator ETOPS continuing airworthiness and operations capability The operator should demonstrate competence to safely conduct and adequately support the intended operation. Prior to ETOPS approval, the operator should demonstrate that the ETOPS continuing airworthiness processes are being properly conducted. The operator should also demonstrate that ETOPS flight dispatch and release practices, policies, and procedures are established for operations. An operational validation flight may be required so that the operator can demonstrate dispatch and normal in-flight procedures. The content of this validation flight will be determined by the competent authority based on the previous experience of the operator. Upon successful completion of a validation flight, where required, the operational specifications and manuals should be modified accordingly to include approval for ETOPS as applicable. 6.5       ETOPS operations approval issued by the competent authority Operations approvals based on in-service experience are limited to those areas agreed by the competentauthority at time of issue. Additional approval is required for new areas to be added. The approval issued by the competent authority for ETOPS should specifically include provisions as described in [Appendix 3](#_DxCrossRefBm421436793)Section 4. SECTION 7: ETOPS APPROVAL CATEGORIES There are four approval categories: — Approval for 90 minutes or less diversion time — Approval for diversion time above 90 minutes up to 180 minutes — Approval for diversion time above 180 minutes — Approval for diversion times above 180 minutes of operators of two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum passenger seating configuration of 19 or less An operator that seeks ETOPS approval in one of the above categories should comply with the requirements that are common to all categories and the specific requirements of the particular category for which approval is sought. 7.1       REQUIREMENTS COMMON TO ALL ETOPS APPROVAL CATEGORIES: (i)        Continuing Airworthiness The operator should comply with the continuing airworthiness considerations of [Appendix 8](#_DxCrossRefBm421436789). (ii)       Release Considerations (A)      Minimum equipment list (MEL) Aeroplanes should only be operated in accordance with the provisions of the approved minimum equipment list (MEL). (B)      Weather To forecast terminal and en-route weather, an operator should only use weather information systems that are sufficiently reliable and accurate in the proposed area of operation. (C)      Fuel Fuel should be sufficient to comply with the critical fuel scenario as described in [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm421436794) to this AMC. (iii)      Flight Planning The effects of wind and temperature at the one-engine-inoperative cruise altitude should be accounted for in the calculation of equal-time point. In addition to the nominated ETOPS en-route alternates, the operator should provide flight crews with information on adequate aerodromes on the route to be flown which are not forecast to meet the ETOPS en-route alternate weather minima. Aerodrome facility information and other appropriate planning data concerning these aerodromes should be provided before commencement of the flight to flight crews for use when executing a diversion. (iv)      Flight Crew Training The operator’s ETOPS training programme should provide initial and recurrent training for flight crew in accordance with [Appendix 6](#_DxCrossRefBm421436795). (v)       En-route Alternate [Appendix 5](#_DxCrossRefBm421436792) to this AMC should be implemented when establishing the company operational procedures for ETOPS. (vi)      Communications Equipment (VHF/HF, Data Link, Satellite Communications) For all routes where voice communication facilities are available, the communication equipment required by operational requirements should include at least one voice-based system. 7.2       SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: 7.2.1   APPROVAL FOR 90 MINUTES OR LESS DIVERSION TIME The operator’s approved diversion time is an operational limit that should not exceed either: — the maximum approved diversion time,or — the time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes. If the airframe/engine combination does not yet have a type design approval for at least 90 minutes diversion time, the aircraft should satisfy the relevant ETOPS design requirements. Consideration may be given to the approval of ETOPS up to 90 minutes for operators with minimal or no in-service experience with the airframe/engine combination. This determination considers such factors as the proposed area of operations, the operator's demonstrated ability to successfully introduce aeroplanes into operations and the quality of the proposed continuing airworthiness and operations programmes. Minimum equipment list (MEL) restrictions for 120 minutes ETOPS should be used unless there are specific restrictions for 90 minutes or less. 7.2.2   APPROVAL FOR DIVERSION TIME ABOVE 90 MINUTES UP TO 180 MINUTES Prior to approval, the operator’s capability to conduct operations and implement effective ETOPS programmes, in accordance with the criteria detailed in this AMC and the relevant appendices, will be examined. The operator’s approved diversion time is an operational limit that should not exceed either: — the maximum approved diversion time, or — the time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes. i)          Additional Considerations for aircraft with 120 minutes Maximum Approved Diversion Time In the case of an aircraft approved for 120 minutes maximum approved diversion time, an operator may request an increase in the operator’s approved diversion time for specific routes provided: 1.         The requested operator’s approved diversion time does not exceed either: — 115% of the maximum approved diversion time or, — the time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes. 2.         The aeroplane fuel carriage supports the requested operator’s approved diversion time. 3.         It can be shown that the resulting routing will not reduce the overall safety of the operation. Such increases will require: (A)      EASA to assess overall type design including time-limited systems, demonstrated reliability; and (B)       the development of an appropriate MEL related to the diversion time required. ii)         Additional Considerations for aircraft with 180 minutes Maximum Approved Diversion Time In the case of an aircraft certified for 180 minutes maximum approved diversion time, an operator may request an increase in the operator’s approved diversion time for specific routes provided: 1.         The requested operator’s approved diversion time does not exceed either: — 115% of the maximum approved diversion time or, — the time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes 2.         The aeroplane fuel carriage supports the requested operator’s approved diversion time diversion time. 3.         It can be shown that the resulting routing will not reduce the overall safety of the operation. Such increases will require: (A)      EASA to assess overall type design including time-limited systems, demonstrated reliability; and (B)       the development of an appropriate MEL related to the diversion time required. 7.2.3   APPROVAL FOR DIVERSION TIME ABOVE 180 MINUTES Approval to conduct operations with diversion times exceeding 180 minutes may be granted to operators with previous ETOPS experience on the particular engine/airframe combination and an existing 180-minute ETOPS approval on the airframe/engine combination listed in their application. Operators should minimise diversion time along the preferred track. Increases in diversion time by disregarding ETOPS adequate aerodromes along the route should only be planned in the interest of the overall safety of the operation. The approval to operate more than 180 minutes from an adequate aerodrome shall be area-specific, based on the availability of adequate ETOPS en-route alternate aerodromes. (i)        Operating limitations In view of the long diversion time involved (above 180 minutes), the operator is responsible for ensuring at flight planning stage, that on any given day in the forecast conditions, such as prevailing winds, temperature and applicable diversion procedures, a diversion to an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome will not exceed the: (A)      Engine-related time-limited systems capability minus 15 minutes at the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed; and (B)       Non-engine-related time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes, such as cargo fire suppression, or other non-engine-related system capability at the all-engine-operative cruise speed. (ii)       Communications Equipment (VHF/HF, Data Link and Satellite-based communications) Operators should use any or all these forms of communications to ensure communications capability when operating ETOPS in excess of 180 minutes. 7.2.4   APPROVAL FOR DIVERSION TIMES ABOVE 180 MINUTES OF OPERATORS OF TWO-ENGINE AEROPLANES WITH A MAXIMUM PASSENGER SEATING CONFIGURATION OF 19 OR LESS AND A MAXIMUM TAKE-OFF MASS LESS THAN 45 360 KG (i)        Type Design The airframe/engine combination should have the appropriate type design approval for the requested maximum diversion times in accordance with the criteria in CS 25.1535 and Chapter II ‘Type Design Approval Considerations’ of this AMC. (ii)       Operations Approval Approval to conduct operations with diversion times exceeding 180 minutes may be granted to operators with experience on the particular airframe/engine combination or existing ETOPS approval on a different airframe/engine combination, or equivalent experience. Operators should minimise diversion time along the preferred track to 180 minutes or less whenever possible. The approval to operate more than 180 minutes from an adequate aerodrome shall be area‑specific, based on the availability of alternate aerodromes, the diversion to which would not compromise safety. Note: Exceptionally for this type of aeroplanes, operators may use the accelerated ETOPS approval method to gain ETOPS approval. This method is described in Section 5. SECTION 8:ETOPS OPERATIONS MANUAL SUPPLEMENT The ETOPS Operations Manual supplement or its equivalent material in the Operations Manual, and any subsequent amendments, are subject to approval by the competent authority. The authority will review the actual ETOPS in-service operation. Amendments to the Operations Manual may be required as a result. Operators should provide information for and participate in such reviews, with reference to the (S)TC holder where necessary. The information resulting from these reviews should be used to modify or update flight crew training programmes, operations manuals and checklists, as necessary. An example outline of ETOPS Operations Manual Supplement content is provided in [Appendix 7](#_DxCrossRefBm421436791) to this AMC. SECTION 9: FLIGHT PREPARATION AND IN-FLIGHT PROCEDURES The operator should establish pre-flight planning and dispatch procedures for ETOPS and they should be listed in the Operations Manual. These procedures should include, but not be limited to, the gathering and dissemination of forecast and actual weather information, both along the route and at the proposed ETOPS alternate aerodromes. Procedures should also be established to ensure that the requirements of the critical fuel scenario are included in the fuel planning for the flight. The procedures and manual should require that sufficient information is available for the aeroplane pilot-in-command, to satisfy him or her that the status of the aeroplane and relevant airborne systems is appropriate for the intended operation. The manual should also include guidance on diversion decision-making and en-route weather monitoring. Additional guidance on the content of the ‘Flight preparation and in-flight procedures’ section of the Operations Manual is provided in [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm421436794) to this AMC. SECTION 10: OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS The operational limitations to the area of operations and the Operator’s approved diversion time are detailed in [Appendix 3](#_DxCrossRefBm421436793) to this AMC – ‘Operational Limitations’. SECTION 11: ETOPS EN-ROUTE ALTERNATE AERODROMES An operator should select ETOPS en-route alternate aerodromes in accordance with the applicable operational requirements and [Appendix 5](#_DxCrossRefBm421436792) to this AMC –En-route alternate. SECTION 12: INITIAL/RECURRENT TRAINING An operator should ensure that prior to conducting ETOPS, each crew member has completed successfully ETOPS training and checking in accordance with a syllabus compliant with [Appendix 7](#_DxCrossRefBm421436791) to this AMC, approved by the competent authority and detailed in the Operations Manual. This training should be type- and area-specific in accordance with the applicable operational requirements. The operator should ensure that crew members are not assigned to operate ETOPS routes for which they have not successfully passed the training. SECTION 13: CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE The fleet-average IFSD rate for the specified airframe/engine combination will continue to be monitored in accordance with Appendices [1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788), [2](#_DxCrossRefBm421436790) and [8](#_DxCrossRefBm421436789). As with all other operations, the competent authority should also monitor all aspects of the extended-range operations that it has authorised to ensure that the levels of reliability achieved in extended-range operations remain at the necessary levels as provided in [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm421436788), and that the operation continues to be conducted safely. In the event that an acceptable level of reliability is not maintained, if significant adverse trends exist, or if significant deficiencies are detected in the type design or the conduct of the ETOPS operation, then the appropriate competent authority should initiate a special evaluation, impose operational restrictions if necessary, and stipulate corrective action for the operator to adopt in order to resolve the problems in a timely manner. The appropriate authority should alert the certification authority when a special evaluation is initiated and make provisions for their participation. [Amdt 20/7] [Amdt 20/21] --- [[4]](#_ftnref4)     Extremely improbable is defined in CS 25.1309 and AMC to CS 25.1309. [[5]](#_ftnref5)     See EASA Airworthiness Directive Policy reference C.Y001-01 (28.07.08). AMC 20-6B Extended-range operation with two-engine aeroplanesETOPS certification and operation ED Decision 2021/006/R Chapter I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 1: PURPOSE This AMC states an acceptable means but not the only means for obtaining approval for two-engine aeroplanes intended to be used in extended-range operations and for the performance of such operations. An applicant may elect to use another means of compliance which should be acceptable to EASA or the competent authority. Compliance with this AMC is not mandatory. Use of the terms shall and must apply only to an applicant who elects to comply with this AMC in order to obtain airworthiness approval or to demonstrate compliance with the operational criteria. This AMC is structured in 3 chapters which contain the following information: — Chapter I of this AMC provides general guidance and definitions related to extended-range operations. — Chapter II of this AMC provides guidance to (S)TC holders that seek ETOPS type design approval of an engine or a particular aeroplane-engine combination. These aeroplanes may be used in extended-range operations. — Chapter III of this AMC provides guidance to operators that seek ETOPS operational approval to conduct extended-range operations under the requirements of the applicable operational regulations. The purpose of this revision No. 3 of AMC 20-6 is to remove: (a) the airworthiness criteria applicable to non-ETOPS operations between 120 minutes and 180 minutes; and (b) the weight discriminant for the non-ETOPS operations. ETOPS type design approvals and operational approvals obtained before the issue of this revision remain valid. Extension of existing ETOPS type design approvals or operational approvals beyond 180 minutes should be issued in accordance with this revision. New ETOPS type design approvals and operational approvals should be issued in accordance with this revision. SECTION 2: RELATED REFERENCES CS-Definitions: ED Decision No. 2003/011/RM as last amended. CS-E: ED Decision No. 2003/9/RM, as last amended (CS-E 1040). CS-25: ED Decision No. 2003/2/RM, as last amended, (CS 25.901, 25.903, 25.1309, 25.1351(d), 25.1419, 25.1535, CS-25 Subpart J). Part-21: Annex to Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012, as last amended. Part-M: Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, as last amended. Part-145: Annex II to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, as last amended. SECTION 3: ABBREVIATIONS AFM: aeroplane flight manual ATS: air traffic services CAME: continuing airworthiness management exposition CAMO: continuing airworthiness management organisation approved pursuant to Part-MSubpart-G CG: centre of gravity IFSD: in-flight shut-down MCT: maximum continuous thrust MMEL: master minimum equipment list MEL: minimum equipment list RFFS rescue and fire fighting services (S)TC: (supplemental) type certificate SECTION 4: TERMINOLOGY a. Approved One-Engine-Inoperative Cruise Speed (1) The approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed for the intended area of operation must be a speed, within the certified limits of the aeroplane, selected by the operator and approved by the competent authority. (2) The operator must use this speed in (i) establishing the outer limit of the area of operation and any dispatch limitation, (ii) calculation of single-engine fuel requirements under [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657988)Section 4 to this AMC and, (iii) establishing the level off altitude (net performance) data. This level off altitude (net performance) must clear any obstacle en route by margins as specified in the operational requirements. A speed other than the approved one-engine-inoperative-speed may be used as the basis for compliance with en-route altitude requirements. The fuel required with that speed or the critical fuel scenario associated with the applicable ETOPS equal-time point, whichever is higher has to be uplifted. (3) As permitted in [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657988)to this AMC, based on evaluation of the actual situation, the pilot-in-command may deviate from the planned one-engine-inoperative cruise speed. Note: The diversion distance based on the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed may take into account the variation of the True Air Speed. b. Dispatch Dispatch is when the aircraft first moves under its own power for the purpose of takingoff. c. ETOPS Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures (CMP) The ETOPS CMP document contains the particular airframe-engine combination configuration minimum requirements, including any special inspection, hardware life limits, master minimum equipment list (MMEL) constraints, operating and maintenance procedures found necessary by EASA to establish the suitability of an airframe/engine combination for extended-range operation. d. ETOPS significant system ETOPS Significant System means the aeroplane propulsion system and any other aeroplane system whose failure could adversely affect the safety of an ETOPS flight, or whose functioning is important to continued safe flight and landing during an aeroplane diversion. Each ETOPS significant system is either a Group 1 or Group 2 system based on the following criteria: *(1)* ETOPS Group 1 Systems: Group 1 Systems are ETOPS significant systems that, related to the number of engines on the aeroplane or the consequences of an engine failure, make the capability of the systems important for an ETOPS flight. The following provides additional discriminating definitions of an ETOPS Group 1 Significant System: (i) A system for which the fail-safe redundancy characteristics are directly linked to the number of engines (e.g. hydraulic system, pneumatic system, electrical system). (ii) A system that may affect the proper functioning of the engines to the extent that it could result in an in-flight shutdown or uncommanded loss of thrust (e.g. fuel system, thrust reverser or engine control or indicating system, engine fire detection system). (iii) A system which contributes significantly to the safety of an engine inoperative ETOPS diversion and is intended to provide additional redundancy to accommodate the system(s) lost by the inoperative engine. These include back-up systems such as an emergency generator, APU, etc. (iv) A system essential for prolonged operation at engine inoperative altitudes such as anti-icing systems for a two-engine aeroplane if single engine performance results in the aeroplane operating in the icing envelope. *(2)* ETOPS Group 2 Systems: Group 2 Systems are ETOPS significant systems that do not relate to the number of engines on the aeroplane but are important to the safe operation of the aeroplane on an ETOPS flight. The following provides additional discriminating definitions of an ETOPS Group 2 Significant System: (i) A system for which certain failure conditions would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with an ETOPS diversion (e.g. long‑range navigation or communication, equipment cooling, or systems important to safe operation on a ETOPS diversion after a decompression such as anti-icing systems). (ii) Time-limited systems including cargo fire suppression and oxygen if the ETOPS diversion is oxygen-system-duration-dependent. (iii) Systems whose failure would result in excessive crew workload or have operational implications or significant detrimental impact on the flight crew’s or passengers’ physiological well-being for an ETOPS diversion (e.g. flight control forces that would be exhausting for a maximum ETOPS diversion, or system failures that would require continuous fuel balancing to ensure proper CG, or a cabin environmental control failure that could cause extreme heat or cold to the extent it could incapacitate the crew or cause physical harm to the passengers). (iv) A system specifically installed to enhance the safety of ETOPS operations and an ETOPS diversion regardless of the applicability of paragraphs (2)(i), (2)(ii) and (2)(iii) above (e.g. communication means). e. Extended-Range Entry Point The extended-range entry point is the first point on the aeroplane’s route which is: — For two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of 20 or more, at 60 minutes flying time at the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed (under standard conditions in still air) from an adequate aerodrome. — For two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of 19 or less, at 180 minutes flying time at the approved one-engine-inoperative speed (in still air) from an adequate aerodrome. f. In-flight Shutdown (IFSD) In-flight shutdown (IFSD) occurs when an engine ceases to function and is shutdown, whether self-induced, flight crew initiated or caused by an external influence. For ETOPS, all IFSDs occurring from take-off decision speed until touch-down shall be counted. EASA considers IFSD for all causes, for example: flameout, internal failure, flight-crew-initiated shutdown, foreign object ingestion, icing, inability to obtain or control desired thrust or power, and cycling of the start control, however briefly, even if the engine operates normally for the remainder of the flight. This definition excludes the cessation of the functioning of an engine when immediately followed by an automatic engine relight and when an engine does not achieve desired thrust or power but is not shutdown. These events as well as engine failures occurring before take-off decision speed or after touchdown, although not counted as IFSDs, shall be reported to the competent authority in the frame of continued airworthiness for ETOPS. g. Maximum Approved Diversion Time A maximum approved diversion time(s) for the airframe/engine combination or the engine, established in accordance with the type design criteria in this AMC and Appendices 1 and 2 to this AMC. This maximum approved diversion time(s) is reflected in the aeroplane and engine type certificate data sheets or (S)TC and in the AFM or AFM-supplement. Any proposed increase in the maximum approved diversion time(s), or changes to the aircraft or engine, should be re-assessed by the (S)TC holder in accordance with Part 21.A.101 to establish if any of the type design criteria in this AMC should be applied. h. Operator’s Approved Diversion Time Operator’s approved diversion time is the maximum time authorised by the competent authority that the operator can operate a type of aeroplane at the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed (under standard conditions in still air) from an adequate aerodrome for the area of operation. i. System: A system includes all elements of equipment necessary for the control and performance of a particular function. It includes both the equipment specifically provided for the function in question and other basic equipment such as that necessary to supply power for the equipment operation. (1) Airframe System. Any system on the aeroplane that is not part of the propulsion system. (2) Propulsion System. The aeroplane propulsion system includes the engine and each component that is necessary for propulsion; components that affect the control of the propulsion units; and components that affect the safe operation of the propulsion units. SECTION 5: CONCEPTS Although it is self-evident that the overall safety of an extended-range operation cannot be better than that provided by the reliability of the propulsion systems, some of the factors related to extended-range operation are not necessarily obvious. For example, cargo compartment fire suppression/containment capability could be a significant factor, or operational/maintenance practices may invalidate certain determinations made during the aeroplane type design certification or the probability of system failures could be a more significant problem than the probability of propulsion system failures. Although propulsion system reliability is a critical factor, it is not the only factor which should be seriously considered in evaluating extended‑range operation. Any decision relating to extended-range operation with two-engine aeroplanes should also consider the probability of occurrence of any conditions which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions. The following is provided to define the concepts for evaluating extended-range operation with two‑engine aeroplanes. This approach ensures that the level of safety of extended-range operation withtwo-engine aeroplanes is consistent with the level of safety required for current extended-range operation with three and four-engine turbine powered aeroplanes without unnecessarily restricting operation. a. Airframe Systems A number of airframe systems have an effect on the safety of extended range operation; therefore, the type design certification of the aeroplane should be reviewed to ensure that the design of these systems is acceptable for the safe conduct of the intended operation. b. Propulsion Systems In order to maintain a level of safety consistent with the overall safety level achieved by modern aeroplanes, it is necessary for two-engine aeroplanes used in extended-range operation to have an acceptably low risk of significant loss of power/thrust for all design- and operation-related causes (see [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982)). c. Maintenance and Reliability Programme Definition Since the quality of maintenance and reliability programmes can have an appreciable effect on the reliability of the propulsion system and the airframe systems required for extended-range operation, an assessment should be made of the proposed maintenance and reliability programme's ability to maintain a satisfactory level of propulsion and airframe system reliability for the particular airframe/engine combination. d. Maintenance and Reliability Programme Implementation Following a determination that the airframe systems and propulsion systems are designed to be suitable for extended-range operation, an in-depth review of the applicant's training programmes, operations and maintenance and reliability programmes should be accomplished to show ability to achieve and maintain an acceptable level of systems reliability to safely conduct these operations. e. Human Factors System failures or malfunctions occurring during extended-range operation could affect flight crew workload and procedures. Since the demands on the flight crew may increase, an assessment should be made to ensure that more than average piloting skills or crew co‑ordination is not required. Chapter II TYPE DESIGN APPROVAL CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 1: APPLICABILITY This chapter is applicable to (S)TC applicants or holders that seek ETOPS type design approval for an engine or a particular aeroplane-engine combination. SECTION 2: COMPETENT AUTHORITY The competent authority for the issue of an ETOPS type design approval is EASA. SECTION 3: GENERAL When a two-engine aeroplane is intended to be used in extended-range operations, a determination should be made that the design features are suitable for the intended operation. The ETOPS significant system for the particular airframe/engine combination should be shown to be designed to fail-safe criteria and it should be determined that it can achieve a level of reliability suitable for the intended operation. In some cases, modifications to systems may be necessary to achieve the desired reliability. SECTION 4: ELEGIBILITY To be eligible for extended-range operations, the specified airframe/engine combination, should have been certified according to the airworthiness standards of large aeroplanes and engines. The process to obtain a type design ETOPS approval requires the applicant to show that in accordance with the criteria established in this Chapter II and Appendices 1 and 2: — the design features of the particular airframe/engine combination are suitable for the intended operations; and, — the particular airframe/engine combination, having been recognised eligible for ETOPS, can achieve a sufficiently high level of reliability. The required level of reliability of the airframe/engine combination can be validated by the following methods: (1) METHOD 1: in-service experience for ETOPS type design approval defined in Section 6.1 of and Appendices [1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982)and[2](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657984)to this AMC, or (2) METHOD 2: a programme of design, test and analysis agreed between the applicant and EASA, (i.e. approval plan) for Early ETOPS type design approval defined in Appendices 1 and 2 to this AMC. SECTION 5: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL An applicant for, and holders of a (S)TC requesting a determination that a particular airframe/engine combination is a suitable type design for extended-range operation, should apply to EASA. EASA will then initiate an assessment of the engine and airframe/engine combination in accordance with the criteria laid down in this Chapter II and in Appendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982) & [2](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657984)to this AMC. SECTION 6: VALIDATION METHODS OF THE LEVEL OF RELIABLITY This chapter together with Appendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982) and [2](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657984) to this AMC should be followed to assess the reliability level of the propulsion system and airframe systems for which ETOPS type design approval is sought. Appendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982) and [2](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657984) describe both the in-service experience method and the early ETOPS method. 6.1 METHOD 1: IN-SERVICE EXPERIENCE FOR ETOPS TYPE DESIGN APPROVAL Prior to the ETOPS type design approval, it should be shown that the world fleet of the particular airframe/engine combination for which approval is sought can achieve or has achieved, as determined by EASA (seeAppendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982) and [2](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657984)), an acceptable and reasonably stable level of propulsion system in-flight shutdown (IFSD) rate and airframe system reliability. Engineering and operational judgement applied in accordance with the guidance provided in [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982) will then be used to determine that the *IFSD rate objective* for all independent causes can be or has been achieved. This assessment is an integral part of the determination in Section 7 paragraph (2) for type design approval. This determination of propulsion system reliability is derived from a world fleet database containing, in accordance with requirements of [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982), all in-flight shutdown events, all significant engine reliability problems, design and test data and available data on cases of significant loss of thrust, including those where the propulsion system failed or the engine was throttled back or shut down by the pilot. This determination will take due account of the approved maximum diversion time, proposed rectification of all identified propulsion and ETOPS significant systems problems, as well as events where in-flight starting capability may be degraded. 6.2 METHOD 2: EARLY ETOPS ETOPS approval is considered feasible at the introduction to service of an airframe/engine combination as long as EASA is totally satisfied that all aspects of the approval plan have been completed. EASA must be satisfied that the approval plan achieves the level of safety intended in this AMC and in the aeroplane and engine certification bases. Any non-compliance with the approval plan can result in a lesser approval than sought for. (S)TC holders will be required to respond to any incident or occurrence in the most expeditious manner. A serious single event or series of related events could result in immediate revocation of ETOPS type design approval. Any isolated problem not justifying immediate withdrawal of approval, should be addressed within 30 days in a resolution plan approved by EASA. (S)TC holders will be reliant on operators to supply incident and occurrence data. SECTION 7: EVALUATION CRITERIA of the ETOPS type design The applicant should conduct an evaluation of failures and failure combinations based on engineering and operational consideration as well as acceptable fail-safe methodology. The evaluation should consider effects of operations with a single engine, including allowance for additional stress that could result from failure of the first propulsion system. Unless it can be shown that equivalent safety levels are provided or the effects of failure are minor, failure and reliability analysis should be used as guidance in verifying that the proper level of fail-safe design has been provided. Excluding failures of the engine, any system or equipment failure condition, or combination of failures that affects the aeroplane or engine and that would result in a need for a diversion, should be considered a Major event (CS 25.1309) and therefore the probability of such should be compatible with that safety objective. The following criteria are applicable to the extended-range operation of aeroplanes with two engines: (1) Airframe systems should be shown to comply with CS 25.1309 in accordance with Sections 7 and 8 of Chapter II and with[Appendix 2](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657984) to this AMC. (2) The propulsion systems should be shown to comply with CS 25.901. (i) Engineering and operational judgement, applied in accordance with the guidance provided in Section 6 and [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982), should be used to show that the propulsion system can achieve the desired level of reliability. (ii) Contained engine failure, cascading failures, consequential damage or failure of remaining systems or equipment should be assessed in accordance with CS 25.901. (iii) It should be shown during the type design evaluation that the approved engine limits at all approved power settings will not be exceeded when conducting an extended duration single-engine operation during the diversion in all expected environmental conditions. The assessment should account for the effects of additional engine loading demands (e.g. anti-icing, electrical, etc.) which may be required during the single-engine flight phase associated with the diversion. (3) The safety impact of an uncontained engine failure should be assessed in accordance with CS 25.903. (4) The APU installation, if required for extended-range operations, should meet the applicable CS‑25 provisions (Subpart J, APU) and any additional requirements necessary to demonstrate its ability to perform the intended function as specified by EASA following a review of the applicant's data. If certain extended-range operation may necessitate in-flight start and run of the APU, it must be substantiated that the APU has adequate capability and reliability for that operation. The APU should demonstrate the required in-flight start reliability throughout the flight envelope (compatible with overall safety objective but not less than 95%) taking account of all approved fuel types and temperatures. An acceptable procedure for starting and running the APU (e.g. descent to allow start) may be defined in order to demonstrate compliance with the required in-flight start reliability. If this reliability cannot be demonstrated, it may be necessary to require continuous operation of the APU. (5) Extended duration, single-engine operations should not require exceptional piloting skills and/or crew co-ordination. Considering the degradation of the performance of the aeroplane type with an engine inoperative, the increased flight crew workload, and the malfunction of remaining systems and equipment, the impact on flight crew procedures should be minimised. Consideration should also be given to the effects on the crew’s and passengers’ physiological needs (e.g. cabin temperature control), when continuing the flight with an inoperative engine or one or more inoperative airframe system(s). The provision of essential services to ensure the continued safety of the aeroplane and safety of the passengers and crew, particularly during very long diversion times with depleted/degraded systems, should be assessed. The applicant should provide a list of aircraft system functions considered to be necessary to perform a safe ETOPS flight. The applicants should consider the following examples: (i) Flight deck and cabin environmental systems integrity and reliability (ii) The avionics/cooling and consequent integrity of the avionic systems (iii) Cargo hold fire suppression capacity and integrity of any smoke/fire alerting system (iv) Brake accumulator or emergency braking system capacity/integrity (v) Adequate capacity of all-time dependent functions (vi) Pressurisation system integrity/reliability (vii) Oxygen system integrity/reliability/capacity, if the Maximum Approved Diversion Time is based on the oxygen system capability (viii) Integrity/reliability/capacity of back-up systems (e.g. electrical, hydraulic) (ix) Fuel system integrity and fuel accessibility. Fuel consumption with engine failure and/or other system failures (see paragraph (11)) (x) Fuel quantity and fuel used, indications and alerts (see paragraph (10)). (6) It should be demonstrated for extended duration single-engine operation, that the remaining power (electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic) will continue to be available at levels necessary to permit continued safe flight and landing, and to provide those services necessary for the overall safety of the passengers and crew. Unless it can be shown that cabin pressure can be maintained on single-engine operation at the altitude necessary for continued flight to an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome, oxygen should be available to sustain the passengers and crew for the maximum diversion time. (7) In the event of any single failure, or any combination of failures not shown to be Extremely Improbable, it should be shown that electrical power is provided for essential flight instruments, warning systems, avionics, communications, navigation, required route or destination guidance equipment, supportive systems and/or hardware and any other equipment deemed necessary for extended-range operation to continue safe flight and landing at an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome. Information provided to the flight crew should be of sufficient accuracy for the intended operation. Functions to be provided may differ between aeroplanes and should be agreed with EASA. These should normally include: (i) attitude information; (ii) adequate radio communication (including the route specific long-range communication equipment as required by the applicable operational regulations) and intercommunication capability; (iii) adequate navigation capability (including route specific long-range navigation equipment as required by the applicable operational regulations and weather radar); (iv) adequate cockpit and instrument lighting, emergency lighting and landing lights; (v) sufficient captain and first officer instruments, provided cross-reading has been evaluated; (vi) heading, airspeed and altitude including appropriate pitot/static heating; (vii) adequate flight controls including auto-pilot; (viii) adequate engine controls, and restart capability with critical type fuel (from the stand-point of flame out and restart capability) and with the aeroplane initially at the maximum relight altitude; (ix) adequate fuel supply system capability including such fuel boost and fuel transfer functions that may be necessary; (x) adequate engine instrumentation; (xi) such warning, cautions, and indications as are required for continued safe flight and landing; (xii) fire protection (cargo, APU and engines); (xiii) adequate ice protection including windshield de-icing; (xiv) adequate control of cockpit and cabin environment including heating and pressurisation; and, (xv) ATC transponder. Note: For 90 minutes or less ETOPS operations, the functions to be provided must satisfy the requirements of CS 25.1351(d)(2) as interpreted by AMC 25.1351(d). (8) Three or more reliable and independent electrical power sources should be available. As a minimum, following failure of any two sources, the remaining source should be capable of powering the items specified in paragraph (7). If one or more of the required electrical power sources are provided by an APU, hydraulic system, or ram air turbine, the following criteria apply as appropriate: (i) The APU, when installed, should meet the criteria in paragraph (4). (ii) The hydraulic power source should be reliable. To achieve this reliability, it may be necessary to provide two or more independent energy sources (e.g. bleed air from two or more pneumatic sources). (iii) The ram air turbine (RAT) should be demonstrated to be sufficiently reliable in deployment and use. The RAT should not require engine-dependent power for deployment. If one of the required electrical power sources is provided by batteries, the following criteria apply: (iv) When one of the three independent electrical power sources is time-limited (e.g. batteries), such power source should have a capability to enable the items required in paragraph (7) to be powered for continued flight and landing to an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome and it will be considered to be a time-limited system in accordance with paragraph (12). (9) For ETOPS approvals above 180 minutes, in addition to the criteria for electrical power sources specified in paragraph (8) above, the following criteria should also be applied: (i) Unless it can be shown that the failure of all three independent power sources required by paragraph (8) above is extremely improbable, following failure of these three independent power sources, a fourth independent power source should be available that is capable of providing power to the essential functions referred to in paragraph (7) for continued safe flight and landing to an adequate ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome (ii) If the additional power source is provided by an APU, it should meet the criteria in paragraph (4). (iii) If the additional power source is provided by a hydraulic system or ram air turbine, the provisions of paragraph (8) apply. (10) It should be shown that adequate status monitoring information and procedures on all ETOPS significant systems are available for the flight crew to make pre-flight, in-flight go/no-go and diversion decisions. Adequate fuel quantity information should be available to the flight crew, including alerts, and advisories, that consider the fuel required to complete the flight, abnormal fuel management or transfer between tanks, and possible fuel leaks in the tanks, the fuel lines and other fuel system components and the engines. (11) Fuel system (i) The aeroplane fuel system should provide fuel pressure and flow to the engine(s) in accordance with CS 25.951 and 25.955 for any fuel pump power supply failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable. (ii) The fuel necessary to complete the ETOPS mission or during a diversion should be available to the operating engine(s) under any failure condition, other than fuel boost pump failures, not shown to be extremely improbable[[4]](#_ftn4) (e.g. cross-feed valve failures, automatic fuel management system failures). (12) Time-limited system In addition to the maximum approved diversion time, diversion time may also be limited by the capacity of the cargo hold fire suppression system or other ETOPS significant time-limited systems determined by considering other relevant failures, such as an engine inoperative, and combinations of failures not shown to be extremely improbable. Time-limited system capability, if any, must be defined and stated in the Aeroplane Flight Manual or AFM-supplement and CMP document. (13) Operation in icing conditions Airframe and propulsion ice protection should be shown to provide adequate capability (aeroplane controllability, etc.) for the intended operation. This should account for prolonged exposure to lower altitudes associated with the single engine diversion, cruise, holding, approach and landing. (i) The aeroplane should be certified for operation in icing conditions in accordance with CS 25.1419. (ii) The aeroplane should be capable of continued safe flight and landing in icing conditions at depressurisation altitudes or engine inoperative altitudes. The extent of ice accumulation on unprotected surfaces should consider the maximum super cooled liquid water catch at one-engine inoperative and depressurisation cruise altitudes. Substantiated icing scenario(s) should be assumed to occur during the period of time when icing conditions are forecast. The icing episode(s) assumed should be agreed with EASA. The probability of icing longer than that assumed, and agreed for the icing episode(s), in combination with the probability of the aeroplane having to operate in icing conditions (e.g. engine in-flight shutdown or decompression) should be shown to be extremely improbable. (14) Solutions to achieve required reliability The permanent solution to a problem should be, as far as possible, a hardware/design solution. However, if scheduled maintenance, replacement, and/or inspection are utilised to obtain type design approval for extended-range operation, and therefore are required in the CMP standard document, the specific maintenance information should be easily retrievable and clearly referenced and identified in an appropriate maintenance document. (15) Engine condition monitoring Procedures for an engine condition monitoring process should be defined and validated for ETOPS. The engine condition monitoring process should be able to determine, if an engine is no longer capable of providing, within certified engine operating limits, the maximum thrust required for a single engine diversion. The effects of additional engine loading demands (e.g. anti-ice, electrical), which may be required during an engine inoperative diversion, should be accounted for. SECTION 8: ANALYSIS OF FAILURE EFFECTS AND RELIABILITY 8.1 General The analysis and demonstrations of airframe and propulsion system level of reliability and failure effects required by Section 6 and Section 7 should be based on the expected longest diversion time for extended-range routes likely to be flown with the aeroplane. However, in certain failure scenarios, it may be necessary to consider a shorter diversion time due to the time-limited systems. 8.2 Propulsion systems (i) An assessment of the propulsion system’s reliability for particular airframe/engine combinations should be made in accordance with Section 6 and [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982). (ii) The analysis should consider: (A) Effects of operation with a single-propulsion system (i.e. high-power demands including extended use of MCT and bleed requirements, etc.) and include possible damage that could result from failure of the first propulsion system. (B) Effects of the availability and management of fuel for propulsion system operation (i.e. cross-feed valve failures, fuel mismanagement, ability to detect and isolate leaks, etc.). (C) Effects of other failures, external conditions, maintenance and crew errors, that could jeopardise the operation of the remaining propulsion system, should be examined. (D) Effect of inadvertent thrust reverser deployment, if not shown to be extremely improbable (includes design and maintenance). 8.3 Airframe systems An assessment of the airframe system’s reliability for particular airframe/engine combinations should be made in accordance with Section 7 and [Appendix 2](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657984). The analysis should consider: (i) Hydraulic Power and Flight Control An analysis should be carried out taking into account the criteria detailed in Section 7 paragraph (6). Consideration of these systems may be combined, since many commercial aeroplanes have full hydraulically powered controls. For aeroplanes with all flight controls being hydraulically powered, evaluation of hydraulic system redundancy should show that single failures or failure combinations, not shown to be extremely improbable, do not preclude continued safe flight and landing at an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome. As part of this evaluation, the loss of any parts of the hydraulic systems and any engine should be assumed to occur unless it is established during failure evaluation that there are no sources of damage or the location of the damage sources are such that this failure condition will not occur. Note: For 75 minutes or less ETOPS approval, additional analysis to show compliance with Section 7 will not be required for airframe systems, where for basic (non-ETOPS) Type Design Approval compliance with CS 25.1309, or its equivalent, has already been shown. (ii) Services Provided by Electrical Power An analysis should show that the criteria detailed in Section 7 paragraphs (6), (7) and (8) are satisfied taking into account the exposure times established in paragraph (1). Note1:For 75 minutes or less ETOPS approval, additional analysis to show compliance with Section 7 will not be required for airframe systems, where for basic (non-ETOPS) Type Design Approval (TDA), compliance with CS 25.1309, or its equivalent, has already been shown. Note 2:For ETOPS approval above 180 minutes, the analysis should also show that the criteria detailed in Section 7 paragraph (9) are satisfied. (iii) Equipment Cooling An analysis should establish that the equipment (including avionics) necessary for extended-range operation has the ability to operate acceptably following failure modes in the cooling system not shown to be extremely improbable. Adequate indication of the proper functioning of the cooling system should be demonstrated to ensure system operation prior to dispatch and during flight. Note:For 75 minutes or less ETOPS approval, additional analysis to show compliance with Section 7 will not be required for airframe systems, where for basic (non-ETOPS) type design approval (TDA), compliance with CS 25.1309, or its equivalent, has already been shown. (iv) Cargo Compartment It should be shown that the cargo compartment design and fire protection system capability (where applicable) is consistent with the following: (A) Design The cargo compartment fire protection system integrity and reliability should be suitable for the intended operation considering fire detection sensors, liner materials, etc. (B) Fire Protection The capacity/endurance of the cargo compartment fire suppression system should be established. (v) Cabin Pressurisation Authority/EASA-approved aeroplane performance data should be available to verify the ability to continue safe flight and landing after loss of pressure and subsequent operation at a lower altitude (see also Section 7 paragraph (6)). (vi) Cockpit and Cabin Environment The analysis should show that an adequate cockpit and cabin environment is preserved following all combinations of propulsion and electrical system failures which are not shown to be extremely improbable, e.g. when the aeroplane is operating on standby electrical power only. Note:For 75 minutes or less ETOPS approval, additional analysis to show compliance with Section 7 will not be required for airframe systems, where for basic (non-ETOPS) type design approval (TDA), compliance with CS 25.1309, or its equivalent, has already been shown. SECTION 9: ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE CONDITIONS In assessing the fail-safe features and effects of failure conditions, account should be taken of: (1) The variations in the performance of the system, the probability of the failure(s), the complexity of the crew action. (2) Factors alleviating or aggravating the direct effects of the initial failure condition, including consequential or related conditions existing within the aeroplane which may affect the ability of the crew to deal with direct effects, such as the presence of smoke, aeroplane accelerations, interruption of air-to-ground communication, cabin pressurisation problems, etc. (3) A flight test should be conducted by the (S)TC holders and witnessed by EASA to validate expected aeroplane flying qualities and performance considering propulsion system failure, electrical power losses, etc. The adequacy of remaining aeroplane systems and performance and flight crew ability to deal with the emergency, considering remaining flight deck information, will be assessed in all phases of flight and anticipated operating conditions. Depending on the scope, content, and review by EASA of the (S)TC holders database, this flight test could also be used as a means for approving the basic aerodynamic and engine performance data used to establish the aeroplane performance identified in Chapter III. (4) Safety assessments should consider the flight consequences of single or multiple system failures leading to a diversion, and the probability and consequences of subsequent failures or exhaustion of the capacity of time-limited systems that might occur during the diversion. Safety assessments should determine: (i) The effect of the initial failure condition on the capability of the aeroplane to cope with adverse conditions at the diversion airport, and (ii) The means available to the crew to assess the extent and evolution of the situation during a prolonged diversion. The aeroplane flight manual and the flight crew warning and alerting and display systems should provide clear information to enable the flight crew to determine when failure conditions are such that a diversion is necessary. The assessment of the reliability of propulsion and airframe systems for a particular airframe/engine combination will be contained in EASA-approved Aeroplane Assessment Report. In the case EASA is validating the approval issued by a third-country certification authority, the report may incorporate the assessment report established by the latter. Following approval of the report, the propulsion and airframe system recommendations will be included in an EASA-approved CMP document that establishes the CMP standard requirements for the candidate engine or airframe/engine combination. This document will then be referenced in the Operation Specification and the Aircraft Flight Manual or AFM-Supplement. SECTION 10: ISSUE OF THE ETOPS TYPE DESIGN APPROVAL Upon satisfactory completion of the aeroplane evaluation through an engineering inspection and test programme consistent with the type certification procedures of EASA and sufficient in-service experience data (see Appendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982)and[2](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657984)): (1) The type design approval, the maximum approved diversion time and demonstrated capability of any time-limited systems will be reflected in the approved AFM or AFM-Supplement, and the aeroplane and engine type certification data sheet or supplemental type certificate which contain directly or by reference the following pertinent information, as applicable: (i) special limitations (if necessary), including any limitations associated with a maximum diversion time established in accordance with Section 8 paragraph (1) and time-limited systems (for example, the endurance of cargo hold fire suppression systems); (ii) additional markings or placards (if required); (iii) revision to the performance section of the AFM to include the data required by [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657988) paragraph 10; (iv) the airborne equipment, installation, and flight crew procedures required for extended‑range operations; (v) description or reference to the CMP document containing the approved aeroplane standards for extended-range operations; (vi) a statement to the effect that: ‘The Type design, systems reliability and performance of the considered aeroplane/engine models combinations have been evaluated by EASA in accordance with CS-25, CS-E and AMC 20-6 and have been found suitable for ETOPS operations when configured, maintained and operated in accordance with this document. This finding does not constitute an approval to conduct ETOPS operations.’ (2) The engine ETOPS type design approval and maximum approved diversion time will be reflected in the engine type certification data sheet or supplemental type certificate which contain directly or by referencing the following pertinent information, as applicable: (i) special limitations (if necessary), including any limitations associated with the maximum approved diversion time should be established; (ii) additional markings or placards (if required); (iii) description or reference to a document containing the approved engine configuration. SECTION 11: CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS OF THE ETOPS TYPE DESIGN APPROVAL (1) EASA will include the consideration of extended-range operation in its normal surveillance and design change approval functions. (2) The (S)TC holders whose approval includes a type design ETOPS approval, as well as EASA, should periodically and individually review the in-service reliability of the airframe/engine combination and of the engine. Further to these reviews and each time that an urgent problem makes it necessary, in order to achieve and maintain the desired level of reliability and therefore the safety of ETOPS, EASA may: — require that the type design standard be revised; for example, by the issuance of an airworthiness directive, or, — issue an emergency conformity information[[5]](#_ftn5). (3) The Reliability Tracking Board will periodically check that the airframe/propulsion system reliability requirements for extended-range operation are achieved or maintained. For mature ETOPS products, the RTB may be replaced by the process to monitor their reliability as defined in [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982), Section 6.b and [Appendix 2](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657984), Section 5.c. Note: Periodically means in this context 2 years. (4) Any significant problems which adversely affect extended-range operation will be corrected. Modifications or maintenance actions to achieve or maintain the reliability objective of extended-range operations for the airframe/engine combination will be incorporated into the CMP document. EASA will co-ordinate this action with the affected (S)TC holder. (5) The CMP document which establishes the suitability of an engine or airframe/engine combination for extended-range operation defines the minimum standards for the operation. Chapter III OPERATIONAL APPROVAL CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 1: APPLICABILITY This acceptable means of compliance is for operators seeking an ETOPS operational approval to operate: (1) Two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum passenger seating configuration of 20 or more, in excess of 60 minutes at the approved one-engine-inoperative speed (under standard conditions in still air) from an adequate aerodrome; (2) or Two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum passenger seating configuration of 19 or less, in excess of 180 minutes at the approved one-engine-inoperative speed (in still air) from an adequate aerodrome. SECTION 2: COMPETENT AUTHORITY The competent authority for the issue of an ETOPS operational approval to an operator is the authority that has issued its Air Operator Certificate. Nevertheless, as the operational approval requires the operator to comply with the continuing airworthiness requirements of [Appendix 8](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657983)to this AMC, the operator has to ensure that the specific ETOPS elements related to continuing airworthiness are approved by the competent authority designated in Annex I (Part-M) to [Regulation (EU) 1321/2014](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R1321&qid=1659625007071). SECTION 3: APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS This chapter details the approval process required for ETOPS in accordance with the operational requirements. SECTION 4: METHODS FOR OBTAINING ETOPS OPERATIONS APPROVAL There are two methods for obtaining an ETOPS approval, depending on the availability and amount of prior experience with the candidate airframe/engine combination: — ‘Accelerated ETOPS approval’ that does not require prior in-service experience with the candidate airframe/engine combination; — ‘In-service ETOPS Approval’, based on a prerequisite amount of prior in-service experience with the candidate airframe/engine combination. Elements from the ‘accelerated ETOPS approval’ method may be used to reduce the amount of prior in-service experience. SECTION 5: ACCELERATED ETOPS APPROVAL The criteria defined in this section permit approval of ETOPS operations up to 180 minutes, when the operator has established that those processes that are necessary for successful ETOPS are in place and are proven to be reliable. The basis of the accelerated approval is that the operator will meet equivalent levels of safety and satisfy the objectives of this AMC. The accelerated ETOPS approval process includes the following phases: — Application phase — Validation of the operator’s ETOPS processes — Validation of operator ETOPS continuing airworthiness and operations capability — Issue of ETOPS operations approval by the competent authority 5.1 Application phase The operator should submit an accelerated ETOPS operations approval plan to the authority 6 months before the proposed start of ETOPS. This time will permit the competent authority to review the documented plans and ensure adequate ETOPS processes are in place. (A) Accelerated ETOPS operations approval plan: The accelerated ETOPS operations approval plan should define: 1. The proposed routes and the ETOPS diversion time necessary to support those routes; 2. The proposed one-engine-inoperative cruise speed, which may be area-specific depending upon anticipated aeroplane loading and likely fuel penalties associated with the planned procedures; 3. How to comply with the ETOPS Processes listed in paragraph (B); 4. The resources allocated to each ETOPS process to initiate and sustain ETOPS operations in a manner that demonstrates commitment by management and all personnel involved in ETOPS continuing airworthiness and operational support; 5. How to establish compliance with the build standard required for type design approval, e.g. CMP document compliance; 6. Review gates: A review gate is a milestone of the tracking plan to allow for the orderly tracking and documentation of specific provisions of this section. Normally, the review gate process will start 6 months before the proposed start of ETOPS and should continue until at least 6 months after the start of ETOPS. The review gate process will help ensure that the proven processes comply with the provisions of this AMC and are capable of continued ETOPS operations. (B) Operator ETOPS process elements The operator that seeks Accelerated ETOPS operations approval should also demonstrate to the competent authority that it has established an ETOPS process that includes the following ETOPS elements: 1. Airframe/engine combination and engine compliance with ETOPS Type Design Build Standard (CMP); 2. Compliance with the continuing airworthiness requirements as defined in [Appendix 8](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657983), which should include: a. A maintenance programme; b. A proven ETOPS reliability programme; c. A proven oil consumption monitoring programme; d. A proven engine condition monitoring and reporting system; e. A propulsion system monitoring programme; f. An ETOPS parts control programme; g. A proven plan for resolution of aeroplane discrepancies. 3. ETOPS Operations Manual supplement or its equivalent in the Operations Manual; 4. The operator should establish a programme that results in a high degree of confidence that the propulsion system reliability that is appropriate to the ETOPS diversion time would be maintained; 5. Initial and recurrent training and qualification programmes in place for ETOPS related personnel, including flight crew and all other operations personnel; 6. Compliance with the Flight Operations Programme as defined in this AMC; 7. Proven flight planning and dispatch programmes that are appropriate to ETOPS; 8. Procedures to ensure the availability of meteorological information and MEL that are appropriate to ETOPS; and 9. Flight crew and dispatch personnel familiar with the ETOPS routes to be flown; in particular, the requirements for, and selection of ETOPS en-route alternate aerodromes. (C) Process elements documentation: Documentation should be provided for the following elements: 1. Technology that is new to the operator and significant differences in ETOPS significant systems (engines, electrical, hydraulic and pneumatic), compared to the aeroplanes currently operated and the aeroplane for which the operator is seeking Accelerated ETOPS operations approval; 2. The plan to train the flight and continuing airworthiness personnel to the different ETOPS process elements; 3. The plan to use proven or manufacturer-validated training and maintenance and operations manual procedures relevant to ETOPS for the aeroplane for which the operator is seeking accelerated ETOPS operations approval; 4. Changes to any previously proven or manufacturer-validated training, maintenance or operations manual procedures described above. Depending on the nature of any changes, the operator may be required to provide a plan for validating such changes; 5. The validation plan for any additional operator unique training and procedures relevant to ETOPS, if any; 6. Details of any ETOPS support programme from the airframe/engine combination or engine (S)TC holder, other operators or any third-country authority or other competent authority; and 7. The control procedures when a contracted maintenance organisation or flight dispatch organisation is used. 5.2 Validation of the operator’s ETOPS processes This section identifies process elements that need to be validated and approved prior to the start of accelerated ETOPS. For a process to be considered proven, the process should first be described, including a flow chart of process elements. The roles and responsibilities of the personnel that manage the process should be defined including any training requirement. The operator should demonstrate that the process is in place and functions as intended. This may be accomplished by providing data, documentation and analysis results and/or by demonstrating in practise that the process works and consistently provides the intended results. The operator should also demonstrate that a feedback loop exists to facilitate the surveillance of the process, based on in-service experience. If any operator is currently approved for conducting ETOPS with a different engine and/or airframe/engine combination, it may be able to document proven ETOPS processes. In this case, only minimal further validation may be necessary. It will be necessary to demonstrate that processes are in place to assure equivalent results on the engine and/or airframe/engine combination being proposed for Accelerated ETOPS Operations Approval. (A) Reduction in the validation requirements: The following elements will be useful or beneficial in justifying a reduction by the competent authority in the validation requirements of ETOPS processes: 1. Experience with other airframes and/or engines; 2. Previous ETOPS experience; 3. Experience with long-range, over-water operations with two, three or four engine aeroplanes; 4. Any experience gained by flight crews, continuing airworthiness personnel and flight dispatch personnel, while working with other ETOPS approved operators, particularly when such experience is with the same airframe or airframe/engine combination. Process validation may be done on the airframe/engine combination, which will be used in Accelerated ETOPS operation or on a different aeroplane type than that for which approval is being sought. (B) Validation programme: A process could be validated by demonstrating that it produces equivalent results on a different aeroplane type or airframe/engine combination. In this case, the validation programme should address the following: 1. The operator should show that the ETOPS validation programme can be executed in a safe manner; 2. The operator should state in its application any policy guidance to personnel involved in the ETOPS process validation programme. Such guidance should clearly state that ETOPS process validation exercises should not be allowed to adversely impact the safety of actual operations, especially during periods of abnormal, emergency, or high cockpit workload operations. It should emphasise that during periods of abnormal or emergency operation or high cockpit workload ETOPS process validation exercises may be terminated; 3. The validation scenario should be of sufficient frequency and operational exposure to validate maintenance and operational support systems not validated by other means; 4. A means should be established to monitor and report performance with respect to accomplishment of tasks associated with ETOPS process elements. Any recommended changes that result from the validation programme to ETOPS continuing airworthiness and/or operational process elements should be defined. (C) Documentation requirements for the process validation The operator should: 1. document how each element of the ETOPS process was utilised during the validation; 2. document any shortcomings with the process elements and measures in place to correct such shortcomings; 3. document any changes to ETOPS processes, which were required after an in-flight shutdown (IFSD), unscheduled engine removals, or any other significant operational events; 4. provide periodic process validation reports to the competent authority (this may be addressed during review gates). (D) Validation programme information Prior to the start of the validation process, the following information should be submitted to the competent authority: 1. Validation periods, including start dates and proposed completion dates; 2. Definition of aeroplane to be used in the validation (the list should include registration numbers, manufacturer and serial number and model of the airframe and engines); 3. Description of the areas of operation (if relevant to validation) proposed for validation and actual operations; 4. Definition of designated ETOPS validation routes. The routes should be of duration required to ensure necessary process validation occurs; 5. Process validation reporting. The operator should compile results of ETOPS process validation. 5.3 Validation of operator ETOPS continuing airworthiness and operations capability The operator should demonstrate competence to safely conduct and adequately support the intended operation. Prior to ETOPS approval, the operator should demonstrate that the ETOPS continuing airworthiness processes are being properly conducted. The operator should also demonstrate that ETOPS flight dispatch and release practices, policies, and procedures are established for operations. An operational validation flight may be required so that the operator can demonstrate dispatch and normal in-flight procedures. The content of this validation flight will be determined by the competent authority based on the previous experience of the operator. Upon successful completion of the validation flight, when required, the operator should modify the operational manuals to include approval for ETOPS as applicable 5.4 ETOPS operations approval issued by the competent authority Operations approvals granted with reduced in-service experience may be limited to those areas determined by the competent authority at time of issue. An application for a change is required for new areas to be added. The approval issued by the competent authority for ETOPS up to 180 minutes should be based on the information required in [Appendix 3](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657987)Section 3. SECTION 6: IN-SERVICE ETOPS APPROVAL Approval based on in-service experience on the particular airframe/engine combination. 6.1 Application Any operator applying for ETOPS approval should submit a request, with the required supporting data, to the competent authority at least 3 months prior to the proposed start of ETOPS with the specific airframe/engine combination. 6.2 Operator experience Each operator seeking approval via the in-service route should provide a report to the competent authority, indicating the operator’s capability to maintain and operate the specific airframe/engine combination for the intended extended-range operation. This report should include experience with the engine type or related engine types, experience with the aeroplane systems or related aeroplane systems, or experience with the particular airframe/engine combination on non-extended range routes. Approval would be based on a review of this information. Each operator that requests Approval to conduct ETOPS beyond 180 minutes should already have ETOPS experience and hold a 180-minute ETOPS approval. Note 1: The operator’s authorised maximum diversion time may be progressively increased by the competent authority as the operator gains experience on the particular airframe/engine combination. Not less than 12 consecutive months experience will normally be required before authorisation of ETOPS up to 180 minutes maximum diversion time, unless the operator can demonstrate compensating factors. The factors to consider may include duration of experience, total number of flights, operator’s diversion events, record of the airframe/engine combination with other operators, quality of operator’s programmes and route structure. However, the operator will still need, in the latter case, to demonstrate the capability to maintain and operate the new airframe/engine combination at a similar level of reliability. In considering an application from an operator to conduct extended-range operations, an assessment should be made of the operator’s overall safety record, past performance, flight crew training and experience, and maintenance programme. The data provided with the request should substantiate the operator’s ability and competence to safely conduct and support these operations and should include the means used to satisfy the considerations outlined in this paragraph. (Any reliability assessment obtained, either through analysis or service experience, should be used as guidance in support of operational judgements regarding the suitability of the intended operation.) 6.3 Assessment of the operator's propulsion system reliability Following the accumulation of adequate operating experience by the world fleet of the specified airframe/engine combination and the establishment of an IFSD rate objective in accordance with [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982) for use in ensuring the propulsion system reliability necessary for extended‑range operations, an assessment should be made of the applicant’s ability to achieve and maintain this level of propulsion system reliability. This assessment should include trend comparisons of the operator’s data with other operators as well as the world fleet average values, and the application of a qualitative judgement that considers all the relevant factors. The operator’s past record of propulsion system reliability with related types of power units should also be reviewed, as well as its record of achieved systems reliability with the airframe/engine combination for which authorisation is sought to conduct extended-range operations. Note: Where statistical assessment alone may not be applicable, e.g. when the fleet size is small, the applicant’s experience will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. 6.4 Validation of operator ETOPS continuing airworthiness and operations capability The operator should demonstrate competence to safely conduct and adequately support the intended operation. Prior to ETOPS approval, the operator should demonstrate that the ETOPS continuing airworthiness processes are being properly conducted. The operator should also demonstrate that ETOPS flight dispatch and release practices, policies, and procedures are established for operations. An operational validation flight may be required so that the operator can demonstrate dispatch and normal in-flight procedures. The content of this validation flight will be determined by the competent authority based on the previous experience of the operator. Upon successful completion of a validation flight, where required, the operational specifications and manuals should be modified accordingly to include approval for ETOPS as applicable. 6.5 ETOPS operations approval issued by the competent authority Operations approvals based on in-service experience are limited to those areas agreed by the competentauthority at time of issue. Additional approval is required for new areas to be added. The approval issued by the competent authority for ETOPS should specifically include provisions as described in [Appendix 3](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657987)Section 4. SECTION 7: ETOPS APPROVAL CATEGORIES There are four approval categories: — Approval for 90 minutes or less diversion time — Approval for diversion time above 90 minutes up to 180 minutes — Approval for diversion time above 180 minutes — Approval for diversion times above 180 minutes of operators of two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum passenger seating configuration of 19 or less An operator that seeks ETOPS approval in one of the above categories should comply with the requirements that are common to all categories and the specific requirements of the particular category for which approval is sought. 7.1 REQUIREMENTS COMMON TO ALL ETOPS APPROVAL CATEGORIES: (i) Continuing Airworthiness The operator should comply with the continuing airworthiness considerations of [Appendix 8](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657983). (ii) Release Considerations (A) Minimum equipment list (MEL) Aeroplanes should only be operated in accordance with the provisions of the approved minimum equipment list (MEL). (B) Weather To forecast terminal and en-route weather, an operator should only use weather information systems that are sufficiently reliable and accurate in the proposed area of operation. (C) Fuel Fuel should be sufficient to comply with the critical fuel scenario as described in [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657988) to this AMC. (iii) Flight Planning The effects of wind and temperature at the one-engine-inoperative cruise altitude should be accounted for in the calculation of equal-time point. In addition to the nominated ETOPS en-route alternates, the operator should provide flight crews with information on adequate aerodromes on the route to be flown which are not forecast to meet the ETOPS en-route alternate weather minima. Aerodrome facility information and other appropriate planning data concerning these aerodromes should be provided before commencement of the flight to flight crews for use when executing a diversion. (iv) Flight Crew Training The operator’s ETOPS training programme should provide initial and recurrent training for flight crew in accordance with [Appendix 6](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657989). (v) En-route Alternate [Appendix 5](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657986) to this AMC should be implemented when establishing the company operational procedures for ETOPS. (vi) Communications Equipment (VHF/HF, Data Link, Satellite Communications) For all routes where voice communication facilities are available, the communication equipment required by operational requirements should include at least one voice-based system. 7.2 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: 7.2.1 APPROVAL FOR 90 MINUTES OR LESS DIVERSION TIME The operator’s approved diversion time is an operational limit that should not exceed either: — the maximum approved diversion time,or — the time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes. If the airframe/engine combination does not yet have a type design approval for at least 90 minutes diversion time, the aircraft should satisfy the relevant ETOPS design requirements. Consideration may be given to the approval of ETOPS up to 90 minutes for operators with minimal or no in-service experience with the airframe/engine combination. This determination considers such factors as the proposed area of operations, the operator's demonstrated ability to successfully introduce aeroplanes into operations and the quality of the proposed continuing airworthiness and operations programmes. Minimum equipment list (MEL) restrictions for 120 minutes ETOPS should be used unless there are specific restrictions for 90 minutes or less. 7.2.2 APPROVAL FOR DIVERSION TIME ABOVE 90 MINUTES UP TO 180 MINUTES Prior to approval, the operator’s capability to conduct operations and implement effective ETOPS programmes, in accordance with the criteria detailed in this AMC and the relevant appendices, will be examined. The operator’s approved diversion time is an operational limit that should not exceed either: — the maximum approved diversion time, or — the time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes. i) Additional Considerations for aircraft with 120 minutes Maximum Approved Diversion Time In the case of an aircraft approved for 120 minutes maximum approved diversion time, an operator may request an increase in the operator’s approved diversion time for specific routes provided: 1. The requested operator’s approved diversion time does not exceed either: — 115% of the maximum approved diversion time or, — the time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes. 2. The aeroplane fuel carriage supports the requested operator’s approved diversion time. 3. It can be shown that the resulting routing will not reduce the overall safety of the operation. Such increases will require: (A) EASA to assess overall type design including time-limited systems, demonstrated reliability; and (B) the development of an appropriate MEL related to the diversion time required. ii) Additional Considerations for aircraft with 180 minutes Maximum Approved Diversion Time In the case of an aircraft certified for 180 minutes maximum approved diversion time, an operator may request an increase in the operator’s approved diversion time for specific routes provided: 1. The requested operator’s approved diversion time does not exceed either: — 115% of the maximum approved diversion time or, — the time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes 2. The aeroplane fuel carriage supports the requested operator’s approved diversion time diversion time. 3. It can be shown that the resulting routing will not reduce the overall safety of the operation. Such increases will require: (A) EASA to assess overall type design including time-limited systems, demonstrated reliability; and (B) the development of an appropriate MEL related to the diversion time required. 7.2.3 APPROVAL FOR DIVERSION TIME ABOVE 180 MINUTES Approval to conduct operations with diversion times exceeding 180 minutes may be granted to operators with previous ETOPS experience on the particular engine/airframe combination and an existing 180-minute ETOPS approval on the airframe/engine combination listed in their application. Operators should minimise diversion time along the preferred track. Increases in diversion time by disregarding ETOPS adequate aerodromes along the route should only be planned in the interest of the overall safety of the operation. The approval to operate more than 180 minutes from an adequate aerodrome shall be area-specific, based on the availability of adequate ETOPS en-route alternate aerodromes. (i) Operating limitations In view of the long diversion time involved (above 180 minutes), the operator is responsible for ensuring at flight planning stage, that on any given day in the forecast conditions, such as prevailing winds, temperature and applicable diversion procedures, a diversion to an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome will not exceed the: (A) Engine-related time-limited systems capability minus 15 minutes at the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed; and (B) Non-engine-related time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes, such as cargo fire suppression, or other non-engine-related system capability at the all-engine-operative cruise speed. (ii) Communications Equipment (VHF/HF, Data Link and Satellite-based communications) Operators should use any or all these forms of communications to ensure communications capability when operating ETOPS in excess of 180 minutes. 7.2.4 APPROVAL FOR DIVERSION TIMES ABOVE 180 MINUTES OF OPERATORS OF TWO-ENGINE AEROPLANES WITH A MAXIMUM PASSENGER SEATING CONFIGURATION OF 19 OR LESS AND A MAXIMUM TAKE-OFF MASS LESS THAN 45 360 KG (i) Type Design The airframe/engine combination should have the appropriate type design approval for the requested maximum diversion times in accordance with the criteria in CS 25.1535 and Chapter II ‘Type Design Approval Considerations’ of this AMC. (ii) Operations Approval Approval to conduct operations with diversion times exceeding 180 minutes may be granted to operators with experience on the particular airframe/engine combination or existing ETOPS approval on a different airframe/engine combination, or equivalent experience. Operators should minimise diversion time along the preferred track to 180 minutes or less whenever possible. The approval to operate more than 180 minutes from an adequate aerodrome shall be area‑specific, based on the availability of alternate aerodromes, the diversion to which would not compromise safety. Note: Exceptionally for this type of aeroplanes, operators may use the accelerated ETOPS approval method to gain ETOPS approval. This method is described in Section 5. SECTION 8:ETOPS OPERATIONS MANUAL SUPPLEMENT The ETOPS Operations Manual supplement or its equivalent material in the Operations Manual, and any subsequent amendments, are subject to approval by the competent authority. The authority will review the actual ETOPS in-service operation. Amendments to the Operations Manual may be required as a result. Operators should provide information for and participate in such reviews, with reference to the (S)TC holder where necessary. The information resulting from these reviews should be used to modify or update flight crew training programmes, operations manuals and checklists, as necessary. An example outline of ETOPS Operations Manual Supplement content is provided in [Appendix 7](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657985) to this AMC. SECTION 9: FLIGHT PREPARATION AND IN-FLIGHT PROCEDURES The operator should establish pre-flight planning and dispatch procedures for ETOPS and they should be listed in the Operations Manual. These procedures should include, but not be limited to, the gathering and dissemination of forecast and actual weather information, both along the route and at the proposed ETOPS alternate aerodromes. Procedures should also be established to ensure that the requirements of the critical fuel scenario are included in the fuel planning for the flight. The procedures and manual should require that sufficient information is available for the aeroplane pilot-in-command, to satisfy him or her that the status of the aeroplane and relevant airborne systems is appropriate for the intended operation. The manual should also include guidance on diversion decision-making and en-route weather monitoring. Additional guidance on the content of the ‘Flight preparation and in-flight procedures’ section of the Operations Manual is provided in [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657988) to this AMC. SECTION 10: OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS The operational limitations to the area of operations and the Operator’s approved diversion time are detailed in [Appendix 3](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657987) to this AMC – ‘Operational Limitations’. SECTION 11: ETOPS EN-ROUTE ALTERNATE AERODROMES An operator should select ETOPS en-route alternate aerodromes in accordance with the applicable operational requirements and [Appendix 5](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657986) to this AMC –En-route alternate. SECTION 12: INITIAL/RECURRENT TRAINING An operator should ensure that prior to conducting ETOPS, each crew member has completed successfully ETOPS training and checking in accordance with a syllabus compliant with [Appendix 7](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657985) to this AMC, approved by the competent authority and detailed in the Operations Manual. This training should be type- and area-specific in accordance with the applicable operational requirements. The operator should ensure that crew members are not assigned to operate ETOPS routes for which they have not successfully passed the training. SECTION 13: CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE The fleet-average IFSD rate for the specified airframe/engine combination will continue to be monitored in accordance with Appendices [1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982), [2](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657984) and [8](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657983). As with all other operations, the competent authority should also monitor all aspects of the extended-range operations that it has authorised to ensure that the levels of reliability achieved in extended-range operations remain at the necessary levels as provided in [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1701657982), and that the operation continues to be conducted safely. In the event that an acceptable level of reliability is not maintained, if significant adverse trends exist, or if significant deficiencies are detected in the type design or the conduct of the ETOPS operation, then the appropriate competent authority should initiate a special evaluation, impose operational restrictions if necessary, and stipulate corrective action for the operator to adopt in order to resolve the problems in a timely manner. The appropriate authority should alert the certification authority when a special evaluation is initiated and make provisions for their participation. [Amdt 20/7] [Amdt 20/21] --- [[4]](#_ftnref4) Extremely improbable is defined in CS 25.1309 and AMC to CS 25.1309. [[5]](#_ftnref5) See EASA Airworthiness Directive Policy reference C.Y001-01 (28.07.08). AMC 20-6B Extended-range operation with two-engine aeroplanesETOPS certification and operation ED Decision 2021/006/R Chapter I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 1: PURPOSE This AMC states an acceptable means but not the only means for obtaining approval for two-engine aeroplanes intended to be used in extended-range operations and for the performance of such operations. An applicant may elect to use another means of compliance which should be acceptable to EASA or the competent authority. Compliance with this AMC is not mandatory. Use of the terms shall and must apply only to an applicant who elects to comply with this AMC in order to obtain airworthiness approval or to demonstrate compliance with the operational criteria. This AMC is structured in 3 chapters which contain the following information: — Chapter I of this AMC provides general guidance and definitions related to extended-range operations. — Chapter II of this AMC provides guidance to (S)TC holders that seek ETOPS type design approval of an engine or a particular aeroplane-engine combination. These aeroplanes may be used in extended-range operations. — Chapter III of this AMC provides guidance to operators that seek ETOPS operational approval to conduct extended-range operations under the requirements of the applicable operational regulations. The purpose of this revision No. 3 of AMC 20-6 is to remove: (a)       the airworthiness criteria applicable to non-ETOPS operations between 120 minutes and 180 minutes; and (b)       the weight discriminant for the non-ETOPS operations. ETOPS type design approvals and operational approvals obtained before the issue of this revision remain valid. Extension of existing ETOPS type design approvals or operational approvals beyond 180 minutes should be issued in accordance with this revision. New ETOPS type design approvals and operational approvals should be issued in accordance with this revision. SECTION 2: RELATED REFERENCES CS-Definitions: ED Decision No. 2003/011/RM as last amended. CS-E: ED Decision No. 2003/9/RM, as last amended (CS-E 1040). CS-25: ED Decision No. 2003/2/RM, as last amended, (CS 25.901, 25.903, 25.1309, 25.1351(d), 25.1419, 25.1535, CS-25 Subpart J). Part-21: Annex to Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012, as last amended. Part-M: Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, as last amended. Part-145: Annex II to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, as last amended. SECTION 3: ABBREVIATIONS AFM:                     aeroplane flight manual ATS:                       air traffic services CAME:                  continuing airworthiness management exposition CAMO:                 continuing airworthiness management organisation approved pursuant to Part-MSubpart-G CG:                         centre of gravity IFSD:                      in-flight shut-down MCT:                     maximum continuous thrust MMEL:                  master minimum equipment list MEL:                      minimum equipment list RFFS                      rescue and fire fighting services (S)TC:                    (supplemental) type certificate SECTION 4: TERMINOLOGY a.         Approved One-Engine-Inoperative Cruise Speed (1)       The approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed for the intended area of operation must be a speed, within the certified limits of the aeroplane, selected by the operator and approved by the competent authority. (2)       The operator must use this speed in (i)        establishing the outer limit of the area of operation and any dispatch limitation, (ii)       calculation of single-engine fuel requirements under [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189232)Section 4 to this AMC and, (iii)      establishing the level off altitude (net performance) data. This level off altitude (net performance) must clear any obstacle en route by margins as specified in the operational requirements. A speed other than the approved one-engine-inoperative-speed may be used as the basis for compliance with en-route altitude requirements. The fuel required with that speed or the critical fuel scenario associated with the applicable ETOPS equal-time point, whichever is higher has to be uplifted. (3)       As permitted in [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189232)to this AMC, based on evaluation of the actual situation, the pilot-in-command may deviate from the planned one-engine-inoperative cruise speed. Note: The diversion distance based on the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed may take into account the variation of the True Air Speed. b.         Dispatch Dispatch is when the aircraft first moves under its own power for the purpose of takingoff. c.         ETOPS Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures (CMP) The ETOPS CMP document contains the particular airframe-engine combination configuration minimum requirements, including any special inspection, hardware life limits, master minimum equipment list (MMEL) constraints, operating and maintenance procedures found necessary by EASA to establish the suitability of an airframe/engine combination for extended-range operation. d.         ETOPS significant system ETOPS Significant System means the aeroplane propulsion system and any other aeroplane system whose failure could adversely affect the safety of an ETOPS flight, or whose functioning is important to continued safe flight and landing during an aeroplane diversion. Each ETOPS significant system is either a Group 1 or Group 2 system based on the following criteria: *(1)* ETOPS Group 1 Systems: Group 1 Systems are ETOPS significant systems that, related to the number of engines on the aeroplane or the consequences of an engine failure, make the capability of the systems important for an ETOPS flight. The following provides additional discriminating definitions of an ETOPS Group 1 Significant System: (i)        A system for which the fail-safe redundancy characteristics are directly linked to the number of engines (e.g. hydraulic system, pneumatic system, electrical system). (ii)       A system that may affect the proper functioning of the engines to the extent that it could result in an in-flight shutdown or uncommanded loss of thrust (e.g. fuel system, thrust reverser or engine control or indicating system, engine fire detection system). (iii)      A system which contributes significantly to the safety of an engine inoperative ETOPS diversion and is intended to provide additional redundancy to accommodate the system(s) lost by the inoperative engine. These include back-up systems such as an emergency generator, APU, etc. (iv)      A system essential for prolonged operation at engine inoperative altitudes such as anti-icing systems for a two-engine aeroplane if single engine performance results in the aeroplane operating in the icing envelope. *(2)* ETOPS Group 2 Systems: Group 2 Systems are ETOPS significant systems that do not relate to the number of engines on the aeroplane but are important to the safe operation of the aeroplane on an ETOPS flight. The following provides additional discriminating definitions of an ETOPS Group 2 Significant System: (i)        A system for which certain failure conditions would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with an ETOPS diversion (e.g. long‑range navigation or communication, equipment cooling, or systems important to safe operation on a ETOPS diversion after a decompression such as anti-icing systems). (ii)       Time-limited systems including cargo fire suppression and oxygen if the ETOPS diversion is oxygen-system-duration-dependent. (iii)      Systems whose failure would result in excessive crew workload or have operational implications or significant detrimental impact on the flight crew’s or passengers’ physiological well-being for an ETOPS diversion (e.g. flight control forces that would be exhausting for a maximum ETOPS diversion, or system failures that would require continuous fuel balancing to ensure proper CG, or a cabin environmental control failure that could cause extreme heat or cold to the extent it could incapacitate the crew or cause physical harm to the passengers). (iv)      A system specifically installed to enhance the safety of ETOPS operations and an ETOPS diversion regardless of the applicability of paragraphs (2)(i), (2)(ii) and (2)(iii) above (e.g. communication means). e.         Extended-Range Entry Point The extended-range entry point is the first point on the aeroplane’s route which is: — For two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of 20 or more, at 60 minutes flying time at the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed (under standard conditions in still air) from an adequate aerodrome. — For two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of 19 or less, at 180 minutes flying time at the approved one-engine-inoperative speed (in still air) from an adequate aerodrome. f.          In-flight Shutdown (IFSD) In-flight shutdown (IFSD) occurs when an engine ceases to function and is shutdown, whether self-induced, flight crew initiated or caused by an external influence. For ETOPS, all IFSDs occurring from take-off decision speed until touch-down shall be counted. EASA considers IFSD for all causes, for example: flameout, internal failure, flight-crew-initiated shutdown, foreign object ingestion, icing, inability to obtain or control desired thrust or power, and cycling of the start control, however briefly, even if the engine operates normally for the remainder of the flight. This definition excludes the cessation of the functioning of an engine when immediately followed by an automatic engine relight and when an engine does not achieve desired thrust or power but is not shutdown. These events as well as engine failures occurring before take-off decision speed or after touchdown, although not counted as IFSDs, shall be reported to the competent authority in the frame of continued airworthiness for ETOPS. g.         Maximum Approved Diversion Time A maximum approved diversion time(s) for the airframe/engine combination or the engine, established in accordance with the type design criteria in this AMC and Appendices 1 and 2 to this AMC. This maximum approved diversion time(s) is reflected in the aeroplane and engine type certificate data sheets or (S)TC and in the AFM or AFM-supplement. Any proposed increase in the maximum approved diversion time(s), or changes to the aircraft or engine, should be re-assessed by the (S)TC holder in accordance with Part 21.A.101 to establish if any of the type design criteria in this AMC should be applied. h.         Operator’s Approved Diversion Time Operator’s approved diversion time is the maximum time authorised by the competent authority that the operator can operate a type of aeroplane at the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed (under standard conditions in still air) from an adequate aerodrome for the area of operation. i.          System: A system includes all elements of equipment necessary for the control and performance of a particular function. It includes both the equipment specifically provided for the function in question and other basic equipment such as that necessary to supply power for the equipment operation. (1)       Airframe System. Any system on the aeroplane that is not part of the propulsion system. (2)       Propulsion System. The aeroplane propulsion system includes the engine and each component that is necessary for propulsion; components that affect the control of the propulsion units; and components that affect the safe operation of the propulsion units. SECTION 5: CONCEPTS Although it is self-evident that the overall safety of an extended-range operation cannot be better than that provided by the reliability of the propulsion systems, some of the factors related to extended-range operation are not necessarily obvious. For example, cargo compartment fire suppression/containment capability could be a significant factor, or operational/maintenance practices may invalidate certain determinations made during the aeroplane type design certification or the probability of system failures could be a more significant problem than the probability of propulsion system failures. Although propulsion system reliability is a critical factor, it is not the only factor which should be seriously considered in evaluating extended‑range operation. Any decision relating to extended-range operation with two-engine aeroplanes should also consider the probability of occurrence of any conditions which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions. The following is provided to define the concepts for evaluating extended-range operation with two‑engine aeroplanes. This approach ensures that the level of safety of extended-range operation withtwo-engine aeroplanes is consistent with the level of safety required for current extended-range operation with three and four-engine turbine powered aeroplanes without unnecessarily restricting operation. a.         Airframe Systems A number of airframe systems have an effect on the safety of extended range operation; therefore, the type design certification of the aeroplane should be reviewed to ensure that the design of these systems is acceptable for the safe conduct of the intended operation. b.         Propulsion Systems In order to maintain a level of safety consistent with the overall safety level achieved by modern aeroplanes, it is necessary for two-engine aeroplanes used in extended-range operation to have an acceptably low risk of significant loss of power/thrust for all design- and operation-related causes (see [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226)). c.         Maintenance and Reliability Programme Definition Since the quality of maintenance and reliability programmes can have an appreciable effect on the reliability of the propulsion system and the airframe systems required for extended-range operation, an assessment should be made of the proposed maintenance and reliability programme's ability to maintain a satisfactory level of propulsion and airframe system reliability for the particular airframe/engine combination. d.         Maintenance and Reliability Programme Implementation Following a determination that the airframe systems and propulsion systems are designed to be suitable for extended-range operation, an in-depth review of the applicant's training programmes, operations and maintenance and reliability programmes should be accomplished to show ability to achieve and maintain an acceptable level of systems reliability to safely conduct these operations. e.         Human Factors System failures or malfunctions occurring during extended-range operation could affect flight crew workload and procedures. Since the demands on the flight crew may increase, an assessment should be made to ensure that more than average piloting skills or crew co‑ordination is not required. Chapter II TYPE DESIGN APPROVAL CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 1: APPLICABILITY This chapter is applicable to (S)TC applicants or holders that seek ETOPS type design approval for an engine or a particular aeroplane-engine combination. SECTION 2: COMPETENT AUTHORITY The competent authority for the issue of an ETOPS type design approval is EASA. SECTION 3: GENERAL When a two-engine aeroplane is intended to be used in extended-range operations, a determination should be made that the design features are suitable for the intended operation. The ETOPS significant system for the particular airframe/engine combination should be shown to be designed to fail-safe criteria and it should be determined that it can achieve a level of reliability suitable for the intended operation. In some cases, modifications to systems may be necessary to achieve the desired reliability. SECTION 4: ELEGIBILITY To be eligible for extended-range operations, the specified airframe/engine combination, should have been certified according to the airworthiness standards of large aeroplanes and engines. The process to obtain a type design ETOPS approval requires the applicant to show that in accordance with the criteria established in this Chapter II and Appendices 1 and 2: — the design features of the particular airframe/engine combination are suitable for the intended operations; and, — the particular airframe/engine combination, having been recognised eligible for ETOPS, can achieve a sufficiently high level of reliability. The required level of reliability of the airframe/engine combination can be validated by the following methods: (1)       METHOD 1: in-service experience for ETOPS type design approval defined in Section 6.1 of and Appendices [1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226)and[2](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189228)to this AMC, or (2)       METHOD 2: a programme of design, test and analysis agreed between the applicant and EASA, (i.e. approval plan) for Early ETOPS type design approval defined in Appendices 1 and 2 to this AMC. SECTION 5: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL An applicant for, and holders of a (S)TC requesting a determination that a particular airframe/engine combination is a suitable type design for extended-range operation, should apply to EASA. EASA will then initiate an assessment of the engine and airframe/engine combination in accordance with the criteria laid down in this Chapter II and in Appendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226) & [2](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189228)to this AMC. SECTION 6: VALIDATION METHODS OF THE LEVEL OF RELIABLITY This chapter together with Appendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226) and [2](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189228) to this AMC should be followed to assess the reliability level of the propulsion system and airframe systems for which ETOPS type design approval is sought. Appendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226) and [2](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189228) describe both the in-service experience method and the early ETOPS method. 6.1       METHOD 1: IN-SERVICE EXPERIENCE FOR ETOPS TYPE DESIGN APPROVAL Prior to the ETOPS type design approval, it should be shown that the world fleet of the particular airframe/engine combination for which approval is sought can achieve or has achieved, as determined by EASA (seeAppendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226) and [2](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189228)), an acceptable and reasonably stable level of propulsion system in-flight shutdown (IFSD) rate and airframe system reliability. Engineering and operational judgement applied in accordance with the guidance provided in [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226) will then be used to determine that the *IFSD rate objective* for all independent causes can be or has been achieved. This assessment is an integral part of the determination in Section 7 paragraph (2) for type design approval. This determination of propulsion system reliability is derived from a world fleet database containing, in accordance with requirements of [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226), all in-flight shutdown events, all significant engine reliability problems, design and test data and available data on cases of significant loss of thrust, including those where the propulsion system failed or the engine was throttled back or shut down by the pilot. This determination will take due account of the approved maximum diversion time, proposed rectification of all identified propulsion and ETOPS significant systems problems, as well as events where in-flight starting capability may be degraded. 6.2       METHOD 2: EARLY ETOPS ETOPS approval is considered feasible at the introduction to service of an airframe/engine combination as long as EASA is totally satisfied that all aspects of the approval plan have been completed. EASA must be satisfied that the approval plan achieves the level of safety intended in this AMC and in the aeroplane and engine certification bases. Any non-compliance with the approval plan can result in a lesser approval than sought for. (S)TC holders will be required to respond to any incident or occurrence in the most expeditious manner. A serious single event or series of related events could result in immediate revocation of ETOPS type design approval. Any isolated problem not justifying immediate withdrawal of approval, should be addressed within 30 days in a resolution plan approved by EASA. (S)TC holders will be reliant on operators to supply incident and occurrence data. SECTION 7: EVALUATION CRITERIA of the ETOPS type design The applicant should conduct an evaluation of failures and failure combinations based on engineering and operational consideration as well as acceptable fail-safe methodology. The evaluation should consider effects of operations with a single engine, including allowance for additional stress that could result from failure of the first propulsion system. Unless it can be shown that equivalent safety levels are provided or the effects of failure are minor, failure and reliability analysis should be used as guidance in verifying that the proper level of fail-safe design has been provided. Excluding failures of the engine, any system or equipment failure condition, or combination of failures that affects the aeroplane or engine and that would result in a need for a diversion, should be considered a Major event (CS 25.1309) and therefore the probability of such should be compatible with that safety objective. The following criteria are applicable to the extended-range operation of aeroplanes with two engines: (1)       Airframe systems should be shown to comply with CS 25.1309 in accordance with Sections 7 and 8 of Chapter II and with[Appendix 2](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189228) to this AMC. (2)       The propulsion systems should be shown to comply with CS 25.901. (i)        Engineering and operational judgement, applied in accordance with the guidance provided in Section 6 and [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226), should be used to show that the propulsion system can achieve the desired level of reliability. (ii)       Contained engine failure, cascading failures, consequential damage or failure of remaining systems or equipment should be assessed in accordance with CS 25.901. (iii)      It should be shown during the type design evaluation that the approved engine limits at all approved power settings will not be exceeded when conducting an extended duration single-engine operation during the diversion in all expected environmental conditions. The assessment should account for the effects of additional engine loading demands (e.g. anti-icing, electrical, etc.) which may be required during the single-engine flight phase associated with the diversion. (3)       The safety impact of an uncontained engine failure should be assessed in accordance with CS 25.903. (4)       The APU installation, if required for extended-range operations, should meet the applicable CS‑25 provisions (Subpart J, APU) and any additional requirements necessary to demonstrate its ability to perform the intended function as specified by EASA following a review of the applicant's data. If certain extended-range operation may necessitate in-flight start and run of the APU, it must be substantiated that the APU has adequate capability and reliability for that operation. The APU should demonstrate the required in-flight start reliability throughout the flight envelope (compatible with overall safety objective but not less than 95%) taking account of all approved fuel types and temperatures. An acceptable procedure for starting and running the APU (e.g. descent to allow start) may be defined in order to demonstrate compliance with the required in-flight start reliability. If this reliability cannot be demonstrated, it may be necessary to require continuous operation of the APU. (5)       Extended duration, single-engine operations should not require exceptional piloting skills and/or crew co-ordination. Considering the degradation of the performance of the aeroplane type with an engine inoperative, the increased flight crew workload, and the malfunction of remaining systems and equipment, the impact on flight crew procedures should be minimised. Consideration should also be given to the effects on the crew’s and passengers’ physiological needs (e.g. cabin temperature control), when continuing the flight with an inoperative engine or one or more inoperative airframe system(s). The provision of essential services to ensure the continued safety of the aeroplane and safety of the passengers and crew, particularly during very long diversion times with depleted/degraded systems, should be assessed. The applicant should provide a list of aircraft system functions considered to be necessary to perform a safe ETOPS flight. The applicants should consider the following examples: (i)        Flight deck and cabin environmental systems integrity and reliability (ii)       The avionics/cooling and consequent integrity of the avionic systems (iii)      Cargo hold fire suppression capacity and integrity of any smoke/fire alerting system (iv)      Brake accumulator or emergency braking system capacity/integrity (v)       Adequate capacity of all-time dependent functions (vi)      Pressurisation system integrity/reliability (vii)     Oxygen system integrity/reliability/capacity, if the Maximum Approved Diversion Time is based on the oxygen system capability (viii)    Integrity/reliability/capacity of back-up systems (e.g. electrical, hydraulic) (ix)      Fuel system integrity and fuel accessibility. Fuel consumption with engine failure and/or other system failures (see paragraph (11)) (x)       Fuel quantity and fuel used, indications and alerts (see paragraph (10)). (6)       It should be demonstrated for extended duration single-engine operation, that the remaining power (electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic) will continue to be available at levels necessary to permit continued safe flight and landing, and to provide those services necessary for the overall safety of the passengers and crew. Unless it can be shown that cabin pressure can be maintained on single-engine operation at the altitude necessary for continued flight to an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome, oxygen should be available to sustain the passengers and crew for the maximum diversion time. (7)       In the event of any single failure, or any combination of failures not shown to be Extremely Improbable, it should be shown that electrical power is provided for essential flight instruments, warning systems, avionics, communications, navigation, required route or destination guidance equipment, supportive systems and/or hardware and any other equipment deemed necessary for extended-range operation to continue safe flight and landing at an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome. Information provided to the flight crew should be of sufficient accuracy for the intended operation. Functions to be provided may differ between aeroplanes and should be agreed with EASA. These should normally include: (i)        attitude information; (ii)       adequate radio communication (including the route specific long-range communication equipment as required by the applicable operational regulations) and intercommunication capability; (iii)      adequate navigation capability (including route specific long-range navigation equipment as required by the applicable operational regulations and weather radar); (iv)      adequate cockpit and instrument lighting, emergency lighting and landing lights; (v)       sufficient captain and first officer instruments, provided cross-reading has been evaluated; (vi)      heading, airspeed and altitude including appropriate pitot/static heating; (vii)     adequate flight controls including auto-pilot; (viii)    adequate engine controls, and restart capability with critical type fuel (from the stand-point of flame out and restart capability) and with the aeroplane initially at the maximum relight altitude; (ix)      adequate fuel supply system capability including such fuel boost and fuel transfer functions that may be necessary; (x)       adequate engine instrumentation; (xi)      such warning, cautions, and indications as are required for continued safe flight and landing; (xii)     fire protection (cargo, APU and engines); (xiii)    adequate ice protection including windshield de-icing; (xiv)    adequate control of cockpit and cabin environment including heating and pressurisation; and, (xv)     ATC transponder. Note: For 90 minutes or less ETOPS operations, the functions to be provided must satisfy the requirements of CS 25.1351(d)(2) as interpreted by AMC 25.1351(d). (8)       Three or more reliable and independent electrical power sources should be available. As a minimum, following failure of any two sources, the remaining source should be capable of powering the items specified in paragraph (7). If one or more of the required electrical power sources are provided by an APU, hydraulic system, or ram air turbine, the following criteria apply as appropriate: (i)        The APU, when installed, should meet the criteria in paragraph (4). (ii)       The hydraulic power source should be reliable. To achieve this reliability, it may be necessary to provide two or more independent energy sources (e.g. bleed air from two or more pneumatic sources). (iii)      The ram air turbine (RAT) should be demonstrated to be sufficiently reliable in deployment and use. The RAT should not require engine-dependent power for deployment. If one of the required electrical power sources is provided by batteries, the following criteria apply: (iv)      When one of the three independent electrical power sources is time-limited (e.g. batteries), such power source should have a capability to enable the items required in paragraph (7) to be powered for continued flight and landing to an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome and it will be considered to be a time-limited system in accordance with paragraph (12). (9)       For ETOPS approvals above 180 minutes, in addition to the criteria for electrical power sources specified in paragraph (8) above, the following criteria should also be applied: (i)        Unless it can be shown that the failure of all three independent power sources required by paragraph (8) above is extremely improbable, following failure of these three independent power sources, a fourth independent power source should be available that is capable of providing power to the essential functions referred to in paragraph (7) for continued safe flight and landing to an adequate ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome (ii)       If the additional power source is provided by an APU, it should meet the criteria in paragraph (4). (iii)      If the additional power source is provided by a hydraulic system or ram air turbine, the provisions of paragraph (8) apply. (10)     It should be shown that adequate status monitoring information and procedures on all ETOPS significant systems are available for the flight crew to make pre-flight, in-flight go/no-go and diversion decisions. Adequate fuel quantity information should be available to the flight crew, including alerts, and advisories, that consider the fuel required to complete the flight, abnormal fuel management or transfer between tanks, and possible fuel leaks in the tanks, the fuel lines and other fuel system components and the engines. (11)     Fuel system (i)        The aeroplane fuel system should provide fuel pressure and flow to the engine(s) in accordance with CS 25.951 and 25.955 for any fuel pump power supply failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable. (ii)       The fuel necessary to complete the ETOPS mission or during a diversion should be available to the operating engine(s) under any failure condition, other than fuel boost pump failures, not shown to be extremely improbable[[4]](#_ftn4) (e.g. cross-feed valve failures, automatic fuel management system failures). (12)     Time-limited system In addition to the maximum approved diversion time, diversion time may also be limited by the capacity of the cargo hold fire suppression system or other ETOPS significant time-limited systems determined by considering other relevant failures, such as an engine inoperative, and combinations of failures not shown to be extremely improbable. Time-limited system capability, if any, must be defined and stated in the Aeroplane Flight Manual or AFM-supplement and CMP document. (13)     Operation in icing conditions Airframe and propulsion ice protection should be shown to provide adequate capability (aeroplane controllability, etc.) for the intended operation. This should account for prolonged exposure to lower altitudes associated with the single engine diversion, cruise, holding, approach and landing. (i)        The aeroplane should be certified for operation in icing conditions in accordance with CS 25.1419. (ii)       The aeroplane should be capable of continued safe flight and landing in icing conditions at depressurisation altitudes or engine inoperative altitudes. The extent of ice accumulation on unprotected surfaces should consider the maximum super cooled liquid water catch at one-engine inoperative and depressurisation cruise altitudes. Substantiated icing scenario(s) should be assumed to occur during the period of time when icing conditions are forecast. The icing episode(s) assumed should be agreed with EASA. The probability of icing longer than that assumed, and agreed for the icing episode(s), in combination with the probability of the aeroplane having to operate in icing conditions (e.g. engine in-flight shutdown or decompression) should be shown to be extremely improbable. (14)     Solutions to achieve required reliability The permanent solution to a problem should be, as far as possible, a hardware/design solution. However, if scheduled maintenance, replacement, and/or inspection are utilised to obtain type design approval for extended-range operation, and therefore are required in the CMP standard document, the specific maintenance information should be easily retrievable and clearly referenced and identified in an appropriate maintenance document. (15)     Engine condition monitoring Procedures for an engine condition monitoring process should be defined and validated for ETOPS. The engine condition monitoring process should be able to determine, if an engine is no longer capable of providing, within certified engine operating limits, the maximum thrust required for a single engine diversion. The effects of additional engine loading demands (e.g. anti-ice, electrical), which may be required during an engine inoperative diversion, should be accounted for. SECTION 8: ANALYSIS OF FAILURE EFFECTS AND RELIABILITY 8.1       General The analysis and demonstrations of airframe and propulsion system level of reliability and failure effects required by Section 6 and Section 7 should be based on the expected longest diversion time for extended-range routes likely to be flown with the aeroplane. However, in certain failure scenarios, it may be necessary to consider a shorter diversion time due to the time-limited systems. 8.2       Propulsion systems (i)        An assessment of the propulsion system’s reliability for particular airframe/engine combinations should be made in accordance with Section 6 and [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226). (ii)       The analysis should consider: (A)      Effects of operation with a single-propulsion system (i.e. high-power demands including extended use of MCT and bleed requirements, etc.) and include possible damage that could result from failure of the first propulsion system. (B)      Effects of the availability and management of fuel for propulsion system operation (i.e. cross-feed valve failures, fuel mismanagement, ability to detect and isolate leaks, etc.). (C)      Effects of other failures, external conditions, maintenance and crew errors, that could jeopardise the operation of the remaining propulsion system, should be examined. (D)      Effect of inadvertent thrust reverser deployment, if not shown to be extremely improbable (includes design and maintenance). 8.3       Airframe systems An assessment of the airframe system’s reliability for particular airframe/engine combinations should be made in accordance with Section 7 and [Appendix 2](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189228). The analysis should consider: (i)        Hydraulic Power and Flight Control An analysis should be carried out taking into account the criteria detailed in Section 7 paragraph (6). Consideration of these systems may be combined, since many commercial aeroplanes have full hydraulically powered controls. For aeroplanes with all flight controls being hydraulically powered, evaluation of hydraulic system redundancy should show that single failures or failure combinations, not shown to be extremely improbable, do not preclude continued safe flight and landing at an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome. As part of this evaluation, the loss of any parts of the hydraulic systems and any engine should be assumed to occur unless it is established during failure evaluation that there are no sources of damage or the location of the damage sources are such that this failure condition will not occur. Note: For 75 minutes or less ETOPS approval, additional analysis to show compliance with Section 7 will not be required for airframe systems, where for basic (non-ETOPS) Type Design Approval compliance with CS 25.1309, or its equivalent, has already been shown. (ii)       Services Provided by Electrical Power An analysis should show that the criteria detailed in Section 7 paragraphs (6), (7) and (8) are satisfied taking into account the exposure times established in paragraph (1). Note1:For 75 minutes or less ETOPS approval, additional analysis to show compliance with Section 7 will not be required for airframe systems, where for basic (non-ETOPS) Type Design Approval (TDA), compliance with CS 25.1309, or its equivalent, has already been shown. Note 2:For ETOPS approval above 180 minutes, the analysis should also show that the criteria detailed in Section 7 paragraph (9) are satisfied. (iii)      Equipment Cooling An analysis should establish that the equipment (including avionics) necessary for extended-range operation has the ability to operate acceptably following failure modes in the cooling system not shown to be extremely improbable. Adequate indication of the proper functioning of the cooling system should be demonstrated to ensure system operation prior to dispatch and during flight. Note:For 75 minutes or less ETOPS approval, additional analysis to show compliance with Section 7 will not be required for airframe systems, where for basic (non-ETOPS) type design approval (TDA), compliance with CS 25.1309, or its equivalent, has already been shown. (iv)      Cargo Compartment It should be shown that the cargo compartment design and fire protection system capability (where applicable) is consistent with the following: (A)      Design The cargo compartment fire protection system integrity and reliability should be suitable for the intended operation considering fire detection sensors, liner materials, etc. (B)      Fire Protection The capacity/endurance of the cargo compartment fire suppression system should be established. (v)       Cabin Pressurisation Authority/EASA-approved aeroplane performance data should be available to verify the ability to continue safe flight and landing after loss of pressure and subsequent operation at a lower altitude (see also Section 7 paragraph (6)). (vi)      Cockpit and Cabin Environment The analysis should show that an adequate cockpit and cabin environment is preserved following all combinations of propulsion and electrical system failures which are not shown to be extremely improbable, e.g. when the aeroplane is operating on standby electrical power only. Note:For 75 minutes or less ETOPS approval, additional analysis to show compliance with Section 7 will not be required for airframe systems, where for basic (non-ETOPS) type design approval (TDA), compliance with CS 25.1309, or its equivalent, has already been shown. SECTION 9: ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE CONDITIONS In assessing the fail-safe features and effects of failure conditions, account should be taken of: (1)       The variations in the performance of the system, the probability of the failure(s), the complexity of the crew action. (2)       Factors alleviating or aggravating the direct effects of the initial failure condition, including consequential or related conditions existing within the aeroplane which may affect the ability of the crew to deal with direct effects, such as the presence of smoke, aeroplane accelerations, interruption of air-to-ground communication, cabin pressurisation problems, etc. (3)       A flight test should be conducted by the (S)TC holders and witnessed by EASA to validate expected aeroplane flying qualities and performance considering propulsion system failure, electrical power losses, etc. The adequacy of remaining aeroplane systems and performance and flight crew ability to deal with the emergency, considering remaining flight deck information, will be assessed in all phases of flight and anticipated operating conditions. Depending on the scope, content, and review by EASA of the (S)TC holders database, this flight test could also be used as a means for approving the basic aerodynamic and engine performance data used to establish the aeroplane performance identified in Chapter III. (4)       Safety assessments should consider the flight consequences of single or multiple system failures leading to a diversion, and the probability and consequences of subsequent failures or exhaustion of the capacity of time-limited systems that might occur during the diversion. Safety assessments should determine: (i)        The effect of the initial failure condition on the capability of the aeroplane to cope with adverse conditions at the diversion airport, and (ii)       The means available to the crew to assess the extent and evolution of the situation during a prolonged diversion. The aeroplane flight manual and the flight crew warning and alerting and display systems should provide clear information to enable the flight crew to determine when failure conditions are such that a diversion is necessary. The assessment of the reliability of propulsion and airframe systems for a particular airframe/engine combination will be contained in EASA-approved Aeroplane Assessment Report. In the case EASA is validating the approval issued by a third-country certification authority, the report may incorporate the assessment report established by the latter. Following approval of the report, the propulsion and airframe system recommendations will be included in an EASA-approved CMP document that establishes the CMP standard requirements for the candidate engine or airframe/engine combination. This document will then be referenced in the Operation Specification and the Aircraft Flight Manual or AFM-Supplement. SECTION 10: ISSUE OF THE ETOPS TYPE DESIGN APPROVAL Upon satisfactory completion of the aeroplane evaluation through an engineering inspection and test programme consistent with the type certification procedures of EASA and sufficient in-service experience data (see Appendices[1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226)and[2](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189228)): (1)       The type design approval, the maximum approved diversion time and demonstrated capability of any time-limited systems will be reflected in the approved AFM or AFM-Supplement, and the aeroplane and engine type certification data sheet or supplemental type certificate which contain directly or by reference the following pertinent information, as applicable: (i)        special limitations (if necessary), including any limitations associated with a maximum diversion time established in accordance with Section 8 paragraph (1) and time-limited systems (for example, the endurance of cargo hold fire suppression systems); (ii)       additional markings or placards (if required); (iii)      revision to the performance section of the AFM to include the data required by [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189232) paragraph 10; (iv)      the airborne equipment, installation, and flight crew procedures required for extended‑range operations; (v)       description or reference to the CMP document containing the approved aeroplane standards for extended-range operations; (vi)      a statement to the effect that: ‘The Type design, systems reliability and performance of the considered aeroplane/engine models combinations have been evaluated by EASA in accordance with CS-25, CS-E and AMC 20-6 and have been found suitable for ETOPS operations when configured, maintained and operated in accordance with this document. This finding does not constitute an approval to conduct ETOPS operations.’ (2)       The engine ETOPS type design approval and maximum approved diversion time will be reflected in the engine type certification data sheet or supplemental type certificate which contain directly or by referencing the following pertinent information, as applicable: (i)        special limitations (if necessary), including any limitations associated with the maximum approved diversion time should be established; (ii)       additional markings or placards (if required); (iii)      description or reference to a document containing the approved engine configuration. SECTION 11: CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS OF THE ETOPS TYPE DESIGN APPROVAL (1)       EASA will include the consideration of extended-range operation in its normal surveillance and design change approval functions. (2)       The (S)TC holders whose approval includes a type design ETOPS approval, as well as EASA, should periodically and individually review the in-service reliability of the airframe/engine combination and of the engine. Further to these reviews and each time that an urgent problem makes it necessary, in order to achieve and maintain the desired level of reliability and therefore the safety of ETOPS, EASA may: — require that the type design standard be revised; for example, by the issuance of an airworthiness directive, or, — issue an emergency conformity information[[5]](#_ftn5). (3)       The Reliability Tracking Board will periodically check that the airframe/propulsion system reliability requirements for extended-range operation are achieved or maintained. For mature ETOPS products, the RTB may be replaced by the process to monitor their reliability as defined in [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226), Section 6.b and [Appendix 2](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189228), Section 5.c. Note: Periodically means in this context 2 years. (4)       Any significant problems which adversely affect extended-range operation will be corrected. Modifications or maintenance actions to achieve or maintain the reliability objective of extended-range operations for the airframe/engine combination will be incorporated into the CMP document. EASA will co-ordinate this action with the affected (S)TC holder. (5)       The CMP document which establishes the suitability of an engine or airframe/engine combination for extended-range operation defines the minimum standards for the operation. Chapter III OPERATIONAL APPROVAL CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 1: APPLICABILITY This acceptable means of compliance is for operators seeking an ETOPS operational approval to operate: (1)       Two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum passenger seating configuration of 20 or more, in excess of 60 minutes at the approved one-engine-inoperative speed (under standard conditions in still air) from an adequate aerodrome; (2)       or Two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum passenger seating configuration of 19 or less, in excess of 180 minutes at the approved one-engine-inoperative speed (in still air) from an adequate aerodrome. SECTION 2: COMPETENT AUTHORITY The competent authority for the issue of an ETOPS operational approval to an operator is the authority that has issued its Air Operator Certificate. Nevertheless, as the operational approval requires the operator to comply with the continuing airworthiness requirements of [Appendix 8](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189227)to this AMC, the operator has to ensure that the specific ETOPS elements related to continuing airworthiness are approved by the competent authority designated in Annex I (Part-M) to [Regulation (EU) 1321/2014](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R1321&qid=1659625007071). SECTION 3: APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS This chapter details the approval process required for ETOPS in accordance with the operational requirements. SECTION 4: METHODS FOR OBTAINING ETOPS OPERATIONS APPROVAL There are two methods for obtaining an ETOPS approval, depending on the availability and amount of prior experience with the candidate airframe/engine combination: — ‘Accelerated ETOPS approval’ that does not require prior in-service experience with the candidate airframe/engine combination; — ‘In-service ETOPS Approval’, based on a prerequisite amount of prior in-service experience with the candidate airframe/engine combination. Elements from the ‘accelerated ETOPS approval’ method may be used to reduce the amount of prior in-service experience. SECTION 5: ACCELERATED ETOPS APPROVAL The criteria defined in this section permit approval of ETOPS operations up to 180 minutes, when the operator has established that those processes that are necessary for successful ETOPS are in place and are proven to be reliable. The basis of the accelerated approval is that the operator will meet equivalent levels of safety and satisfy the objectives of this AMC. The accelerated ETOPS approval process includes the following phases: — Application phase — Validation of the operator’s ETOPS processes — Validation of operator ETOPS continuing airworthiness and operations capability — Issue of ETOPS operations approval by the competent authority 5.1       Application phase The operator should submit an accelerated ETOPS operations approval plan to the authority 6 months before the proposed start of ETOPS. This time will permit the competent authority to review the documented plans and ensure adequate ETOPS processes are in place. (A)      Accelerated ETOPS operations approval plan: The accelerated ETOPS operations approval plan should define: 1.         The proposed routes and the ETOPS diversion time necessary to support those routes; 2.         The proposed one-engine-inoperative cruise speed, which may be area-specific depending upon anticipated aeroplane loading and likely fuel penalties associated with the planned procedures; 3.         How to comply with the ETOPS Processes listed in paragraph (B); 4.         The resources allocated to each ETOPS process to initiate and sustain ETOPS operations in a manner that demonstrates commitment by management and all personnel involved in ETOPS continuing airworthiness and operational support; 5.         How to establish compliance with the build standard required for type design approval, e.g. CMP document compliance; 6.         Review gates: A review gate is a milestone of the tracking plan to allow for the orderly tracking and documentation of specific provisions of this section. Normally, the review gate process will start 6 months before the proposed start of ETOPS and should continue until at least 6 months after the start of ETOPS. The review gate process will help ensure that the proven processes comply with the provisions of this AMC and are capable of continued ETOPS operations. (B)       Operator ETOPS process elements The operator that seeks Accelerated ETOPS operations approval should also demonstrate to the competent authority that it has established an ETOPS process that includes the following ETOPS elements: 1.         Airframe/engine combination and engine compliance with ETOPS Type Design Build Standard (CMP); 2.         Compliance with the continuing airworthiness requirements as defined in [Appendix 8](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189227), which should include: a.         A maintenance programme; b.         A proven ETOPS reliability programme; c.         A proven oil consumption monitoring programme; d.         A proven engine condition monitoring and reporting system; e.         A propulsion system monitoring programme; f.          An ETOPS parts control programme; g.         A proven plan for resolution of aeroplane discrepancies. 3.         ETOPS Operations Manual supplement or its equivalent in the Operations Manual; 4.         The operator should establish a programme that results in a high degree of confidence that the propulsion system reliability that is appropriate to the ETOPS diversion time would be maintained; 5.         Initial and recurrent training and qualification programmes in place for ETOPS related personnel, including flight crew and all other operations personnel; 6.         Compliance with the Flight Operations Programme as defined in this AMC; 7.         Proven flight planning and dispatch programmes that are appropriate to ETOPS; 8.         Procedures to ensure the availability of meteorological information and MEL that are appropriate to ETOPS; and 9.         Flight crew and dispatch personnel familiar with the ETOPS routes to be flown; in particular, the requirements for, and selection of ETOPS en-route alternate aerodromes. (C)       Process elements documentation: Documentation should be provided for the following elements: 1.         Technology that is new to the operator and significant differences in ETOPS significant systems (engines, electrical, hydraulic and pneumatic), compared to the aeroplanes currently operated and the aeroplane for which the operator is seeking Accelerated ETOPS operations approval; 2.         The plan to train the flight and continuing airworthiness personnel to the different ETOPS process elements; 3.         The plan to use proven or manufacturer-validated training and maintenance and operations manual procedures relevant to ETOPS for the aeroplane for which the operator is seeking accelerated ETOPS operations approval; 4.         Changes to any previously proven or manufacturer-validated training, maintenance or operations manual procedures described above. Depending on the nature of any changes, the operator may be required to provide a plan for validating such changes; 5.         The validation plan for any additional operator unique training and procedures relevant to ETOPS, if any; 6.         Details of any ETOPS support programme from the airframe/engine combination or engine (S)TC holder, other operators or any third-country authority or other competent authority; and 7.         The control procedures when a contracted maintenance organisation or flight dispatch organisation is used. 5.2       Validation of the operator’s ETOPS processes This section identifies process elements that need to be validated and approved prior to the start of accelerated ETOPS. For a process to be considered proven, the process should first be described, including a flow chart of process elements. The roles and responsibilities of the personnel that manage the process should be defined including any training requirement. The operator should demonstrate that the process is in place and functions as intended. This may be accomplished by providing data, documentation and analysis results and/or by demonstrating in practise that the process works and consistently provides the intended results. The operator should also demonstrate that a feedback loop exists to facilitate the surveillance of the process, based on in-service experience. If any operator is currently approved for conducting ETOPS with a different engine and/or airframe/engine combination, it may be able to document proven ETOPS processes. In this case, only minimal further validation may be necessary. It will be necessary to demonstrate that processes are in place to assure equivalent results on the engine and/or airframe/engine combination being proposed for Accelerated ETOPS Operations Approval. (A)      Reduction in the validation requirements: The following elements will be useful or beneficial in justifying a reduction by the competent authority in the validation requirements of ETOPS processes: 1.         Experience with other airframes and/or engines; 2.         Previous ETOPS experience; 3.         Experience with long-range, over-water operations with two, three or four engine aeroplanes; 4.         Any experience gained by flight crews, continuing airworthiness personnel and flight dispatch personnel, while working with other ETOPS approved operators, particularly when such experience is with the same airframe or airframe/engine combination. Process validation may be done on the airframe/engine combination, which will be used in Accelerated ETOPS operation or on a different aeroplane type than that for which approval is being sought. (B)       Validation programme: A process could be validated by demonstrating that it produces equivalent results on a different aeroplane type or airframe/engine combination. In this case, the validation programme should address the following: 1.         The operator should show that the ETOPS validation programme can be executed in a safe manner; 2.         The operator should state in its application any policy guidance to personnel involved in the ETOPS process validation programme. Such guidance should clearly state that ETOPS process validation exercises should not be allowed to adversely impact the safety of actual operations, especially during periods of abnormal, emergency, or high cockpit workload operations. It should emphasise that during periods of abnormal or emergency operation or high cockpit workload ETOPS process validation exercises may be terminated; 3.         The validation scenario should be of sufficient frequency and operational exposure to validate maintenance and operational support systems not validated by other means; 4.         A means should be established to monitor and report performance with respect to accomplishment of tasks associated with ETOPS process elements. Any recommended changes that result from the validation programme to ETOPS continuing airworthiness and/or operational process elements should be defined. (C)       Documentation requirements for the process validation The operator should: 1.         document how each element of the ETOPS process was utilised during the validation; 2.         document any shortcomings with the process elements and measures in place to correct such shortcomings; 3.         document any changes to ETOPS processes, which were required after an in-flight shutdown (IFSD), unscheduled engine removals, or any other significant operational events; 4.         provide periodic process validation reports to the competent authority (this may be addressed during review gates). (D)      Validation programme information Prior to the start of the validation process, the following information should be submitted to the competent authority: 1.         Validation periods, including start dates and proposed completion dates; 2.         Definition of aeroplane to be used in the validation (the list should include registration numbers, manufacturer and serial number and model of the airframe and engines); 3.         Description of the areas of operation (if relevant to validation) proposed for validation and actual operations; 4.         Definition of designated ETOPS validation routes. The routes should be of duration required to ensure necessary process validation occurs; 5.         Process validation reporting. The operator should compile results of ETOPS process validation. 5.3       Validation of operator ETOPS continuing airworthiness and operations capability The operator should demonstrate competence to safely conduct and adequately support the intended operation. Prior to ETOPS approval, the operator should demonstrate that the ETOPS continuing airworthiness processes are being properly conducted. The operator should also demonstrate that ETOPS flight dispatch and release practices, policies, and procedures are established for operations. An operational validation flight may be required so that the operator can demonstrate dispatch and normal in-flight procedures. The content of this validation flight will be determined by the competent authority based on the previous experience of the operator. Upon successful completion of the validation flight, when required, the operator should modify the operational manuals to include approval for ETOPS as applicable 5.4       ETOPS operations approval issued by the competent authority Operations approvals granted with reduced in-service experience may be limited to those areas determined by the competent authority at time of issue. An application for a change is required for new areas to be added. The approval issued by the competent authority for ETOPS up to 180 minutes should be based on the information required in [Appendix 3](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189231)Section 3. SECTION 6: IN-SERVICE ETOPS APPROVAL Approval based on in-service experience on the particular airframe/engine combination. 6.1       Application Any operator applying for ETOPS approval should submit a request, with the required supporting data, to the competent authority at least 3 months prior to the proposed start of ETOPS with the specific airframe/engine combination. 6.2       Operator experience Each operator seeking approval via the in-service route should provide a report to the competent authority, indicating the operator’s capability to maintain and operate the specific airframe/engine combination for the intended extended-range operation. This report should include experience with the engine type or related engine types, experience with the aeroplane systems or related aeroplane systems, or experience with the particular airframe/engine combination on non-extended range routes. Approval would be based on a review of this information. Each operator that requests Approval to conduct ETOPS beyond 180 minutes should already have ETOPS experience and hold a 180-minute ETOPS approval. Note 1: The operator’s authorised maximum diversion time may be progressively increased by the competent authority as the operator gains experience on the particular airframe/engine combination. Not less than 12 consecutive months experience will normally be required before authorisation of ETOPS up to 180 minutes maximum diversion time, unless the operator can demonstrate compensating factors. The factors to consider may include duration of experience, total number of flights, operator’s diversion events, record of the airframe/engine combination with other operators, quality of operator’s programmes and route structure. However, the operator will still need, in the latter case, to demonstrate the capability to maintain and operate the new airframe/engine combination at a similar level of reliability. In considering an application from an operator to conduct extended-range operations, an assessment should be made of the operator’s overall safety record, past performance, flight crew training and experience, and maintenance programme. The data provided with the request should substantiate the operator’s ability and competence to safely conduct and support these operations and should include the means used to satisfy the considerations outlined in this paragraph. (Any reliability assessment obtained, either through analysis or service experience, should be used as guidance in support of operational judgements regarding the suitability of the intended operation.) 6.3       Assessment of the operator's propulsion system reliability Following the accumulation of adequate operating experience by the world fleet of the specified airframe/engine combination and the establishment of an IFSD rate objective in accordance with [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226) for use in ensuring the propulsion system reliability necessary for extended‑range operations, an assessment should be made of the applicant’s ability to achieve and maintain this level of propulsion system reliability. This assessment should include trend comparisons of the operator’s data with other operators as well as the world fleet average values, and the application of a qualitative judgement that considers all the relevant factors. The operator’s past record of propulsion system reliability with related types of power units should also be reviewed, as well as its record of achieved systems reliability with the airframe/engine combination for which authorisation is sought to conduct extended-range operations. Note: Where statistical assessment alone may not be applicable, e.g. when the fleet size is small, the applicant’s experience will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. 6.4       Validation of operator ETOPS continuing airworthiness and operations capability The operator should demonstrate competence to safely conduct and adequately support the intended operation. Prior to ETOPS approval, the operator should demonstrate that the ETOPS continuing airworthiness processes are being properly conducted. The operator should also demonstrate that ETOPS flight dispatch and release practices, policies, and procedures are established for operations. An operational validation flight may be required so that the operator can demonstrate dispatch and normal in-flight procedures. The content of this validation flight will be determined by the competent authority based on the previous experience of the operator. Upon successful completion of a validation flight, where required, the operational specifications and manuals should be modified accordingly to include approval for ETOPS as applicable. 6.5       ETOPS operations approval issued by the competent authority Operations approvals based on in-service experience are limited to those areas agreed by the competentauthority at time of issue. Additional approval is required for new areas to be added. The approval issued by the competent authority for ETOPS should specifically include provisions as described in [Appendix 3](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189231)Section 4. SECTION 7: ETOPS APPROVAL CATEGORIES There are four approval categories: — Approval for 90 minutes or less diversion time — Approval for diversion time above 90 minutes up to 180 minutes — Approval for diversion time above 180 minutes — Approval for diversion times above 180 minutes of operators of two-engine aeroplanes with a maximum passenger seating configuration of 19 or less An operator that seeks ETOPS approval in one of the above categories should comply with the requirements that are common to all categories and the specific requirements of the particular category for which approval is sought. 7.1       REQUIREMENTS COMMON TO ALL ETOPS APPROVAL CATEGORIES: (i)        Continuing Airworthiness The operator should comply with the continuing airworthiness considerations of [Appendix 8](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189227). (ii)       Release Considerations (A)      Minimum equipment list (MEL) Aeroplanes should only be operated in accordance with the provisions of the approved minimum equipment list (MEL). (B)      Weather To forecast terminal and en-route weather, an operator should only use weather information systems that are sufficiently reliable and accurate in the proposed area of operation. (C)      Fuel Fuel should be sufficient to comply with the critical fuel scenario as described in [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189232) to this AMC. (iii)      Flight Planning The effects of wind and temperature at the one-engine-inoperative cruise altitude should be accounted for in the calculation of equal-time point. In addition to the nominated ETOPS en-route alternates, the operator should provide flight crews with information on adequate aerodromes on the route to be flown which are not forecast to meet the ETOPS en-route alternate weather minima. Aerodrome facility information and other appropriate planning data concerning these aerodromes should be provided before commencement of the flight to flight crews for use when executing a diversion. (iv)      Flight Crew Training The operator’s ETOPS training programme should provide initial and recurrent training for flight crew in accordance with [Appendix 6](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189233). (v)       En-route Alternate [Appendix 5](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189230) to this AMC should be implemented when establishing the company operational procedures for ETOPS. (vi)      Communications Equipment (VHF/HF, Data Link, Satellite Communications) For all routes where voice communication facilities are available, the communication equipment required by operational requirements should include at least one voice-based system. 7.2       SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: 7.2.1   APPROVAL FOR 90 MINUTES OR LESS DIVERSION TIME The operator’s approved diversion time is an operational limit that should not exceed either: — the maximum approved diversion time,or — the time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes. If the airframe/engine combination does not yet have a type design approval for at least 90 minutes diversion time, the aircraft should satisfy the relevant ETOPS design requirements. Consideration may be given to the approval of ETOPS up to 90 minutes for operators with minimal or no in-service experience with the airframe/engine combination. This determination considers such factors as the proposed area of operations, the operator's demonstrated ability to successfully introduce aeroplanes into operations and the quality of the proposed continuing airworthiness and operations programmes. Minimum equipment list (MEL) restrictions for 120 minutes ETOPS should be used unless there are specific restrictions for 90 minutes or less. 7.2.2   APPROVAL FOR DIVERSION TIME ABOVE 90 MINUTES UP TO 180 MINUTES Prior to approval, the operator’s capability to conduct operations and implement effective ETOPS programmes, in accordance with the criteria detailed in this AMC and the relevant appendices, will be examined. The operator’s approved diversion time is an operational limit that should not exceed either: — the maximum approved diversion time, or — the time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes. i)          Additional Considerations for aircraft with 120 minutes Maximum Approved Diversion Time In the case of an aircraft approved for 120 minutes maximum approved diversion time, an operator may request an increase in the operator’s approved diversion time for specific routes provided: 1.         The requested operator’s approved diversion time does not exceed either: — 115% of the maximum approved diversion time or, — the time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes. 2.         The aeroplane fuel carriage supports the requested operator’s approved diversion time. 3.         It can be shown that the resulting routing will not reduce the overall safety of the operation. Such increases will require: (A)      EASA to assess overall type design including time-limited systems, demonstrated reliability; and (B)       the development of an appropriate MEL related to the diversion time required. ii)         Additional Considerations for aircraft with 180 minutes Maximum Approved Diversion Time In the case of an aircraft certified for 180 minutes maximum approved diversion time, an operator may request an increase in the operator’s approved diversion time for specific routes provided: 1.         The requested operator’s approved diversion time does not exceed either: — 115% of the maximum approved diversion time or, — the time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes 2.         The aeroplane fuel carriage supports the requested operator’s approved diversion time diversion time. 3.         It can be shown that the resulting routing will not reduce the overall safety of the operation. Such increases will require: (A)      EASA to assess overall type design including time-limited systems, demonstrated reliability; and (B)       the development of an appropriate MEL related to the diversion time required. 7.2.3   APPROVAL FOR DIVERSION TIME ABOVE 180 MINUTES Approval to conduct operations with diversion times exceeding 180 minutes may be granted to operators with previous ETOPS experience on the particular engine/airframe combination and an existing 180-minute ETOPS approval on the airframe/engine combination listed in their application. Operators should minimise diversion time along the preferred track. Increases in diversion time by disregarding ETOPS adequate aerodromes along the route should only be planned in the interest of the overall safety of the operation. The approval to operate more than 180 minutes from an adequate aerodrome shall be area-specific, based on the availability of adequate ETOPS en-route alternate aerodromes. (i)        Operating limitations In view of the long diversion time involved (above 180 minutes), the operator is responsible for ensuring at flight planning stage, that on any given day in the forecast conditions, such as prevailing winds, temperature and applicable diversion procedures, a diversion to an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome will not exceed the: (A)      Engine-related time-limited systems capability minus 15 minutes at the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed; and (B)       Non-engine-related time-limited system capability minus 15 minutes, such as cargo fire suppression, or other non-engine-related system capability at the all-engine-operative cruise speed. (ii)       Communications Equipment (VHF/HF, Data Link and Satellite-based communications) Operators should use any or all these forms of communications to ensure communications capability when operating ETOPS in excess of 180 minutes. 7.2.4   APPROVAL FOR DIVERSION TIMES ABOVE 180 MINUTES OF OPERATORS OF TWO-ENGINE AEROPLANES WITH A MAXIMUM PASSENGER SEATING CONFIGURATION OF 19 OR LESS AND A MAXIMUM TAKE-OFF MASS LESS THAN 45 360 KG (i)        Type Design The airframe/engine combination should have the appropriate type design approval for the requested maximum diversion times in accordance with the criteria in CS 25.1535 and Chapter II ‘Type Design Approval Considerations’ of this AMC. (ii)       Operations Approval Approval to conduct operations with diversion times exceeding 180 minutes may be granted to operators with experience on the particular airframe/engine combination or existing ETOPS approval on a different airframe/engine combination, or equivalent experience. Operators should minimise diversion time along the preferred track to 180 minutes or less whenever possible. The approval to operate more than 180 minutes from an adequate aerodrome shall be area‑specific, based on the availability of alternate aerodromes, the diversion to which would not compromise safety. Note: Exceptionally for this type of aeroplanes, operators may use the accelerated ETOPS approval method to gain ETOPS approval. This method is described in Section 5. SECTION 8:ETOPS OPERATIONS MANUAL SUPPLEMENT The ETOPS Operations Manual supplement or its equivalent material in the Operations Manual, and any subsequent amendments, are subject to approval by the competent authority. The authority will review the actual ETOPS in-service operation. Amendments to the Operations Manual may be required as a result. Operators should provide information for and participate in such reviews, with reference to the (S)TC holder where necessary. The information resulting from these reviews should be used to modify or update flight crew training programmes, operations manuals and checklists, as necessary. An example outline of ETOPS Operations Manual Supplement content is provided in [Appendix 7](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189229) to this AMC. SECTION 9: FLIGHT PREPARATION AND IN-FLIGHT PROCEDURES The operator should establish pre-flight planning and dispatch procedures for ETOPS and they should be listed in the Operations Manual. These procedures should include, but not be limited to, the gathering and dissemination of forecast and actual weather information, both along the route and at the proposed ETOPS alternate aerodromes. Procedures should also be established to ensure that the requirements of the critical fuel scenario are included in the fuel planning for the flight. The procedures and manual should require that sufficient information is available for the aeroplane pilot-in-command, to satisfy him or her that the status of the aeroplane and relevant airborne systems is appropriate for the intended operation. The manual should also include guidance on diversion decision-making and en-route weather monitoring. Additional guidance on the content of the ‘Flight preparation and in-flight procedures’ section of the Operations Manual is provided in [Appendix 4](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189232) to this AMC. SECTION 10: OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS The operational limitations to the area of operations and the Operator’s approved diversion time are detailed in [Appendix 3](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189231) to this AMC – ‘Operational Limitations’. SECTION 11: ETOPS EN-ROUTE ALTERNATE AERODROMES An operator should select ETOPS en-route alternate aerodromes in accordance with the applicable operational requirements and [Appendix 5](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189230) to this AMC –En-route alternate. SECTION 12: INITIAL/RECURRENT TRAINING An operator should ensure that prior to conducting ETOPS, each crew member has completed successfully ETOPS training and checking in accordance with a syllabus compliant with [Appendix 7](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189229) to this AMC, approved by the competent authority and detailed in the Operations Manual. This training should be type- and area-specific in accordance with the applicable operational requirements. The operator should ensure that crew members are not assigned to operate ETOPS routes for which they have not successfully passed the training. SECTION 13: CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE The fleet-average IFSD rate for the specified airframe/engine combination will continue to be monitored in accordance with Appendices [1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226), [2](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189228) and [8](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189227). As with all other operations, the competent authority should also monitor all aspects of the extended-range operations that it has authorised to ensure that the levels of reliability achieved in extended-range operations remain at the necessary levels as provided in [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1926189226), and that the operation continues to be conducted safely. In the event that an acceptable level of reliability is not maintained, if significant adverse trends exist, or if significant deficiencies are detected in the type design or the conduct of the ETOPS operation, then the appropriate competent authority should initiate a special evaluation, impose operational restrictions if necessary, and stipulate corrective action for the operator to adopt in order to resolve the problems in a timely manner. The appropriate authority should alert the certification authority when a special evaluation is initiated and make provisions for their participation. [Amdt 20/7] [Amdt 20/21] --- [[4]](#_ftnref4)     Extremely improbable is defined in CS 25.1309 and AMC to CS 25.1309. [[5]](#_ftnref5)     See EASA Airworthiness Directive Policy reference C.Y001-01 (28.07.08).