CS 29.672 Stability augmentation, automatic, and power-operated systems

• ED Decision 2003/16/RM found in: CS-29 Amdt 10 - Large Rotercraft (Jan 2023)

CS 29.672 Stability augmentation, automatic, and power-operated systems ED Decision 2003/16/RM If the functioning of stability augmentation or other automatic or power-operated system is necessary to show compliance with flight characteristics requirements of CS-29, the system must comply with [CS 29.671](#_DxCrossRefBm1513259484) and the following: (a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring the pilot’s attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot is unaware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems. (b) The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or power-operated system must allow initial counteraction of failures without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by overriding the failure by moving the flight controls in the normal sense, and by deactivating the failed system. (c) It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system or any other automatic or power-operated system: (1) The rotorcraft is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations; (2) The controllability and manoeuvrability requirements of CS-29 are met within a practical operational flight envelope (for example, speed, altitude, normal acceleration, and rotorcraft configurations) which is described in the rotorcraft flight manual; and (3) The trim and stability characteristics are not impaired below a level needed to allow continued safe flight and landing. CS 29.672 Stability augmentation, automatic, and power-operated systems ED Decision 2003/16/RM If the functioning of stability augmentation or other automatic or power-operated system is necessary to show compliance with flight characteristics requirements of CS-29, the system must comply with [CS 29.671](#_DxCrossRefBm1178331881) and the following: (a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring the pilot’s attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot is unaware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems. (b) The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or power-operated system must allow initial counteraction of failures without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by overriding the failure by moving the flight controls in the normal sense, and by deactivating the failed system. (c) It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system or any other automatic or power-operated system: (1) The rotorcraft is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations; (2) The controllability and manoeuvrability requirements of CS-29 are met within a practical operational flight envelope (for example, speed, altitude, normal acceleration, and rotorcraft configurations) which is described in the rotorcraft flight manual; and (3) The trim and stability characteristics are not impaired below a level needed to allow continued safe flight and landing. #### CS 29.672 Stability augmentation, automatic, and power-operated systems *ED Decision 2003/16/RM* If the functioning of stability augmentation or other automatic or power-operated system is necessary to show compliance with flight characteristics requirements of CS-29, the system must comply with [CS 29.671](#_DxCrossRefBm1685772346) and the following: (a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring the pilot’s attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot is unaware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems. (b) The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or power-operated system must allow initial counteraction of failures without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by overriding the failure by moving the flight controls in the normal sense, and by deactivating the failed system. (c) It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system or any other automatic or power-operated system: (1) The rotorcraft is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations; (2) The controllability and manoeuvrability requirements of CS-29 are met within a practical operational flight envelope (for example, speed, altitude, normal acceleration, and rotorcraft configurations) which is described in the rotorcraft flight manual; and (3) The trim and stability characteristics are not impaired below a level needed to allow continued safe flight and landing.