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GM1 MMEL.145(c) Justification of MMEL items
Available versions for ERULES-1963177438-4144
ED Decision 2014/004/R
found in: CS-MMEL Issue 2 - Master Minimum Equipment List (Aug 2020)
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GM1 MMEL.145(c) Justification of MMEL items ED Decision 2014/004/R QUALITATIVE SAFETY ASSESSMENT – LATENT FAILURES Regarding MMEL dispatch configuration leaving the aircraft two failures away from a catastrophic failure condition, particular attention should be paid to combinations involving one failure which is latent for more than one flight. Whenever practical, such combinations should be avoided per MMEL dispatch condition (e.g. verification task clearing the latent failure prior to each flight). Where these latent failures are not avoided, these combinations of failures should be reported and reviewed with the Agency.
GM1 MMEL.145(c) Justification of MMEL items ED Decision 2014/004/R QUALITATIVE SAFETY ASSESSMENT – LATENT FAILURES Regarding MMEL dispatch configuration leaving the aircraft two failures away from a catastrophic failure condition, particular attention should be paid to combinations involving one failure which is latent for more than one flight. Whenever practical, such combinations should be avoided per MMEL dispatch condition (e.g. verification task clearing the latent failure prior to each flight). Where these latent failures are not avoided, these combinations of failures should be reported and reviewed with the Agency.