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AMC1 ATS.OR.205(b)(3) Safety assessment and assurance of changes to the functional system
Available versions for ERULES-1963177438-3300
ED Decision 2017/001/R
found in: ATM/ANS Provision of Services (2017/373) (Mar 2025)
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AMC1 ATS.OR.205(b)(3) Safety assessment and assurance of changes to the functional system ED Decision 2017/001/R COMPLETENESS OF RISK ANALYSIS The air traffic services provider should ensure that the risk analysis is carried out by personnel trained and competent to perform this task and should also ensure that: (a) a complete list of harmful effects in relation to the identified: (1) hazards, when the safety criteria are expressed in terms of safety risk, or proxies, when the safety criteria are expressed in relation to proxies; and (2) hazards introduced due to implementation is produced; and (b) the risk contributions of all hazards and proxies are evaluated; and (c) risk analysis is conducted in terms of risk or in terms of proxies or a combination of them, using specific measurable properties that are related to operational safety risk; and (d) results can be compared against the safety criteria.
AMC1 ATS.OR.205(b)(3) Safety assessment and assurance of changes to the functional system ED Decision 2017/001/R COMPLETENESS OF RISK ANALYSIS The air traffic services provider should ensure that the risk analysis is carried out by personnel trained and competent to perform this task and should also ensure that: (a) a complete list of harmful effects in relation to the identified: (1) hazards, when the safety criteria are expressed in terms of safety risk, or proxies, when the safety criteria are expressed in relation to proxies; and (2) hazards introduced due to implementation is produced; and (b) the risk contributions of all hazards and proxies are evaluated; and (c) risk analysis is conducted in terms of risk or in terms of proxies or a combination of them, using specific measurable properties that are related to operational safety risk; and (d) results can be compared against the safety criteria.