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GM3 IS.D.OR. 215(a)&(b) Information security internal reporting scheme
Available versions for ERULES-1963177438-21675
ED Decision 2023/009/R
found in: Information Security (2023/203 and 2022/1645) Part-IS (Jun 2024)
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GM3 IS.D.OR. 215(a)&(b) Information security internal reporting scheme ED Decision 2023/009/R RELEVANT INFORMATION FOR INCIDENTS AND VULNERABILITIES Understanding the causes of, and contributing factors to, information security incidents and vulnerabilities relevant to Part-IS allows lessons learned to be gained and to introduce corrections to processes and asset design. However, understanding causes and contributing factors may not always be possible or may not aid in continuous improvement of aviation safety. Where vulnerabilities arise from assets developed solely or primarily for aviation, it is expected to be possible to perform the necessary investigation on the root causes. These root causes will inform the affected organisation(s) to improve processes and asset design to remediate vulnerability and to ensure that such vulnerabilities are not introduced in other assets. Understanding the root causes of vulnerabilities also allows the aviation community to learn and thus avoid similar vulnerabilities in the future.
##### GM3 IS.D.OR. 215(a)&(b) Information security internal reporting scheme *ED Decision 2023/009/R* **RELEVANT INFORMATION FOR INCIDENTS AND VULNERABILITIES** Understanding the causes of, and contributing factors to, information security incidents and vulnerabilities relevant to Part-IS allows lessons learned to be gained and to introduce corrections to processes and asset design. However, understanding causes and contributing factors may not always be possible or may not aid in continuous improvement of aviation safety. Where vulnerabilities arise from assets developed solely or primarily for aviation, it is expected to be possible to perform the necessary investigation on the root causes. These root causes will inform the affected organisation(s) to improve processes and asset design to remediate vulnerability and to ensure that such vulnerabilities are not introduced in other assets. Understanding the root causes of vulnerabilities also allows the aviation community to learn and thus avoid similar vulnerabilities in the future.