AMC1 29.1529 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

• ED Decision 2023/001/R found in: CS-29 Amdt 11 - Large Rotercraft (Feb 2023)

AMC1 29.1529 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness ED Decision 2023/001/R (a) Introduction This AMC supplements FAA AC 29-2C, § AC 29.1529 and should be used in conjunction with that AC when demonstrating compliance with [CS 29.1529](#_DxCrossRefBm1178331852). (b) Abnormal events The ICA should include instructions that ensure that operators conduct appropriate inspections or other actions following abnormal events in operation, maintenance or during transportation of components. Abnormal events that should be considered include hard landings, severe gust encounters, lightning strike, exposure to high winds when parked and dropping components during maintenance or transport. The instructions should consider the nature of the components, including but not limited to critical parts, and in particular the possibility of damage that can occur during impact or overload events that may not be detectable but could subsequently lead to premature failure in operation. In such cases, scrapping the component or parts of it may be the only appropriate action to take. (c) Time between overhaul (TBO) development (1) Explanation The purpose of this AMC is to provide guidance for establishing a TBO for rotorcraft drive system gearboxes at type certificate approval and to increase it during the service life of the product. A rotorcraft rotor drive system gearbox is usually a complex assembly composed of many parts of which a significant proportion can be critical parts. Many are rotating parts which are subject to high torque and fatigue loads, such as bearings, shafts, gears, and free wheels with the primary function of transmitting power from the engine to the rotors. Non-rotating components have other functions such as support, lubrication, load transfer or condition monitoring. Most gearbox components are enclosed inside the housings, which prevents the possibility of detailed maintenance inspections without disassembly. As a result, to ensure that the internal gearbox components remain in serviceable condition, periodic overhauls of the assembly are typically scheduled. Overhaul allows an in-depth and periodic inspection of gearbox components, controlling and limiting the development of degradation and build-up of debris, as well as checking for cracks and other damages that may be developing. In addition, the inspection findings can determine whether parts are sufficiently protected and whether they remain in serviceable condition. In summary, the overhaul of the gearbox is intended to verify the condition of its elements, restore them to a serviceable condition or replace them where needed, and ensure that the gearbox will be safe for operation until the following overhaul. The TBO is the periodic interval between two overhauls and is traditionally defined in flight hours and calendar time. During the type-certification process, rotorcraft drive system gearbox components are subject to various forms of analyses and tests, which assess their criticality, integrity and reliability. These assessments rely on a number of assumptions regarding the condition of the components during their service life and have an impact on aspects such as contact conditions between elements, fretting, wear, loads and environmental deterioration. The applicant should consider that the continued validity of these assumptions is typically linked to an appropriate TBO. As a result, the validation of these assumptions and the development of the TBO are processes that should be progressed in parallel after entry into service (EIS). The final and mature TBO should normally be based on the results of investigations from in-service aircraft, overhauled gearboxes and data acquired during development, certification, and maturity tests substantiating the reliability of the parts and their capability to operate safely. However, until this data becomes available, the applicant should maintain a conservative TBO, extending it throughout the life of the product as positive supporting data from service becomes available. (2) Guidance For drive system gearboxes that are essential to drive the rotors, EASA considers that the initial TBO at EIS and the plan to increase it in service should be justified. For this purpose, the following should be considered by the applicant: — Initial TBO (applicable at EIS) At EIS, the available data supporting the justification of the TBO of a rotor drive system gearbox is typically limited. The applicant should, therefore, propose a conservative initial TBO supported by the data coming from: the endurance test, flight tests, other relevant tests, and experience on similar design having the same characteristics. The applicant should take into account that, in general, only limited experience of the real operating environment and conditions for a new gearbox is available at EIS. This initial TBO should ensure enough opportunities to verify the condition of internal gearbox components in order to validate the assumptions made at the time of certification, preventing that any compromised assumption may lead to an in-service catastrophic or hazardous failure. — TBO step increase The increase of a gearbox TBO in service should be accomplished in steps providing confidence progressively in the validity of the certification assumptions. Each TBO step increase should: — only be proposed when the current TBO is supported by a sufficient number of gearbox overhaul inspection results; — be based on a sufficient number of gearboxes from the fleet to be inspected, and take into account the representativeness of operational and environmental aspects of the selected samples to represent the full spectrum of gearbox usage; — be based on technical justifications from overhauled gearboxes (e.g. condition of inspected parts, evidence from similar designs, etc.), maturity testing and in-service feedback (incidents, health and usage monitoring system (HUMS) data, etc.); and — be completed prior to formally increasing the TBO to verify acceptable behaviour and condition of the gearbox components prior to starting a new increase phase. — Management of TBO steps The process for managing the evolution of the TBO of drive system gearboxes should be documented in a TBO maturity plan. This should include: — planned increase steps and target TBO, technical criteria for the validation of the steps planned and justification of the proposed plan (see note 1); — definition of the number of gearboxes and selection criteria considering operation and environment (see note 1); — definition of responsible parties for performing the TBO step increase validation inspections, activities involved and information to be reported; — proposed analysis process of the inspection results, responsible parties and methods of analysis; and — the TBO step increase validation process and associated deliverables (see note 2). Any findings arising from the TBO development process which might bring into question the suitability of the current TBO or impair the capability of the gearbox to reach the planned increase in TBO should be reported to the Agency. Finally, if a major change is introduced to or affecting a drive system gearbox, the applicant should evaluate the need to revise the TBO and incorporate additional steps in the gearbox TBO maturity plan. Note 1: The TBO maturity plan and the associated TBO increase validation criteria should be defined by the applicant and provided to the Agency during the certification process. The results of the process of validation of each step might lead to revisions of the maturity plan. Note 2: The acceptance of each individual step as well as the closure of the maturity plan should be formally endorsed by the applicant and duly documented. [Amdt No: 29/11] ##### AMC1 29.1529 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness *ED Decision 2023/001/R* (a) Introduction This AMC supplements FAA AC 29-2C, § AC 29.1529 and should be used in conjunction with that AC when demonstrating compliance with [CS 29.1529](#_DxCrossRefBm1685772317). (b) Abnormal events The ICA should include instructions that ensure that operators conduct appropriate inspections or other actions following abnormal events in operation, maintenance or during transportation of components. Abnormal events that should be considered include hard landings, severe gust encounters, lightning strike, exposure to high winds when parked and dropping components during maintenance or transport. The instructions should consider the nature of the components, including but not limited to critical parts, and in particular the possibility of damage that can occur during impact or overload events that may not be detectable but could subsequently lead to premature failure in operation. In such cases, scrapping the component or parts of it may be the only appropriate action to take. (c) Time between overhaul (TBO) development (1) Explanation The purpose of this AMC is to provide guidance for establishing a TBO for rotorcraft drive system gearboxes at type certificate approval and to increase it during the service life of the product. A rotorcraft rotor drive system gearbox is usually a complex assembly composed of many parts of which a significant proportion can be critical parts. Many are rotating parts which are subject to high torque and fatigue loads, such as bearings, shafts, gears, and free wheels with the primary function of transmitting power from the engine to the rotors. Non-rotating components have other functions such as support, lubrication, load transfer or condition monitoring. Most gearbox components are enclosed inside the housings, which prevents the possibility of detailed maintenance inspections without disassembly. As a result, to ensure that the internal gearbox components remain in serviceable condition, periodic overhauls of the assembly are typically scheduled. Overhaul allows an in-depth and periodic inspection of gearbox components, controlling and limiting the development of degradation and build-up of debris, as well as checking for cracks and other damages that may be developing. In addition, the inspection findings can determine whether parts are sufficiently protected and whether they remain in serviceable condition. In summary, the overhaul of the gearbox is intended to verify the condition of its elements, restore them to a serviceable condition or replace them where needed, and ensure that the gearbox will be safe for operation until the following overhaul. The TBO is the periodic interval between two overhauls and is traditionally defined in flight hours and calendar time. During the type-certification process, rotorcraft drive system gearbox components are subject to various forms of analyses and tests, which assess their criticality, integrity and reliability. These assessments rely on a number of assumptions regarding the condition of the components during their service life and have an impact on aspects such as contact conditions between elements, fretting, wear, loads and environmental deterioration. The applicant should consider that the continued validity of these assumptions is typically linked to an appropriate TBO. As a result, the validation of these assumptions and the development of the TBO are processes that should be progressed in parallel after entry into service (EIS). The final and mature TBO should normally be based on the results of investigations from in-service aircraft, overhauled gearboxes and data acquired during development, certification, and maturity tests substantiating the reliability of the parts and their capability to operate safely. However, until this data becomes available, the applicant should maintain a conservative TBO, extending it throughout the life of the product as positive supporting data from service becomes available. (2) Guidance For drive system gearboxes that are essential to drive the rotors, EASA considers that the initial TBO at EIS and the plan to increase it in service should be justified. For this purpose, the following should be considered by the applicant: — Initial TBO (applicable at EIS) At EIS, the available data supporting the justification of the TBO of a rotor drive system gearbox is typically limited. The applicant should, therefore, propose a conservative initial TBO supported by the data coming from: the endurance test, flight tests, other relevant tests, and experience on similar design having the same characteristics. The applicant should take into account that, in general, only limited experience of the real operating environment and conditions for a new gearbox is available at EIS. This initial TBO should ensure enough opportunities to verify the condition of internal gearbox components in order to validate the assumptions made at the time of certification, preventing that any compromised assumption may lead to an in-service catastrophic or hazardous failure. — TBO step increase The increase of a gearbox TBO in service should be accomplished in steps providing confidence progressively in the validity of the certification assumptions. Each TBO step increase should: — only be proposed when the current TBO is supported by a sufficient number of gearbox overhaul inspection results; — be based on a sufficient number of gearboxes from the fleet to be inspected, and take into account the representativeness of operational and environmental aspects of the selected samples to represent the full spectrum of gearbox usage; — be based on technical justifications from overhauled gearboxes (e.g. condition of inspected parts, evidence from similar designs, etc.), maturity testing and in-service feedback (incidents, health and usage monitoring system (HUMS) data, etc.); and — be completed prior to formally increasing the TBO to verify acceptable behaviour and condition of the gearbox components prior to starting a new increase phase. — Management of TBO steps The process for managing the evolution of the TBO of drive system gearboxes should be documented in a TBO maturity plan. This should include: — planned increase steps and target TBO, technical criteria for the validation of the steps planned and justification of the proposed plan (see note 1); — definition of the number of gearboxes and selection criteria considering operation and environment (see note 1); — definition of responsible parties for performing the TBO step increase validation inspections, activities involved and information to be reported; — proposed analysis process of the inspection results, responsible parties and methods of analysis; and — the TBO step increase validation process and associated deliverables (see note 2). Any findings arising from the TBO development process which might bring into question the suitability of the current TBO or impair the capability of the gearbox to reach the planned increase in TBO should be reported to the Agency. Finally, if a major change is introduced to or affecting a drive system gearbox, the applicant should evaluate the need to revise the TBO and incorporate additional steps in the gearbox TBO maturity plan. *Note 1: The TBO maturity plan and the associated TBO increase validation criteria should be defined by the applicant and provided to the Agency during the certification process. The results of the process of validation of each step might lead to revisions of the maturity plan.* *Note 2: The acceptance of each individual step as well as the closure of the maturity plan should be formally endorsed by the applicant and duly documented.* [Amdt No: 29/11]