GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.192(d) Selection of aerodromes and operating sites -- helicopters

• ED Decision 2022/012/R found in: Air Operations (965/2012) Part-ARO Part-ORO Part-CAT Part-SPA Part-NCC Part-NCO Part-SPO (Feb 2025)

GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.192(d) Selection of aerodromes and operating sites — helicopters ED Decision 2022/012/R GNSS ROBUSTNESS AGAINST LOSS OF CAPABILITY — HELICOPTERS (a) Redundancy of on-board systems ensures that no single on-board equipment failure (e.g. antenna, GNSS receiver, FMS, or navigation display failure) results in the loss of the GNSS capability. (b) Any shadowing of the GNSS signal or jamming of all GNSS frequencies from the ground is expected to be of a very short duration and affect a very small area. Additional sensors or functions, such as inertial coasting, may be used during jamming events. Jamming should be considered on all segments of the intended route, including the approach. (c) The availability of GNSS signals can be compromised if space weather events cause ‘loss of lock’ conditions and more than one satellite signal may be lost on a given GNSS frequency. Until space weather forecasts are available, the operator may use ‘nowcasts’ as short-term predictions for helicopter flights of short durations. (d) SBAS also contributes to the mitigation of space weather effects, by both providing integrity messages and correcting ionosphere-induced errors. (e) Even though SBAS should be available and used, RAIM should remain available autonomously. In case of loss of SBAS, the route and the approach to the destination or alternate aerodrome should still be flown with an available RAIM function. (f) When available, GNSS based on more than one constellation and more than one frequency may provide better integrity and redundancy regarding failures in the space segment of GNSS, jamming, and resilience to space weather events. GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.192(d) Selection of aerodromes and operating sites — helicopters ED Decision 2022/012/R GNSS ROBUSTNESS AGAINST LOSS OF CAPABILITY — HELICOPTERS (a) Redundancy of on-board systems ensures that no single on-board equipment failure (e.g. antenna, GNSS receiver, FMS, or navigation display failure) results in the loss of the GNSS capability. (b) Any shadowing of the GNSS signal or jamming of all GNSS frequencies from the ground is expected to be of a very short duration and affect a very small area. Additional sensors or functions, such as inertial coasting, may be used during jamming events. Jamming should be considered on all segments of the intended route, including the approach. (c) The availability of GNSS signals can be compromised if space weather events cause ‘loss of lock’ conditions and more than one satellite signal may be lost on a given GNSS frequency. Until space weather forecasts are available, the operator may use ‘nowcasts’ as short-term predictions for helicopter flights of short durations. (d) SBAS also contributes to the mitigation of space weather effects, by both providing integrity messages and correcting ionosphere-induced errors. (e) Even though SBAS should be available and used, RAIM should remain available autonomously. In case of loss of SBAS, the route and the approach to the destination or alternate aerodrome should still be flown with an available RAIM function. (f) When available, GNSS based on more than one constellation and more than one frequency may provide better integrity and redundancy regarding failures in the space segment of GNSS, jamming, and resilience to space weather events. ##### GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.192(d) Selection of aerodromes and operating sites — helicopters *ED Decision 2022/012/R* **GNSS ROBUSTNESS AGAINST LOSS OF CAPABILITY — HELICOPTERS** (a) Redundancy of on-board systems ensures that no single on-board equipment failure (e.g. antenna, GNSS receiver, FMS, or navigation display failure) results in the loss of the GNSS capability. (b) Any shadowing of the GNSS signal or jamming of all GNSS frequencies from the ground is expected to be of a very short duration and affect a very small area. Additional sensors or functions, such as inertial coasting, may be used during jamming events. Jamming should be considered on all segments of the intended route, including the approach. (c) The availability of GNSS signals can be compromised if space weather events cause ‘loss of lock’ conditions and more than one satellite signal may be lost on a given GNSS frequency. Until space weather forecasts are available, the operator may use ‘nowcasts’ as short-term predictions for helicopter flights of short durations. (d) SBAS also contributes to the mitigation of space weather effects, by both providing integrity messages and correcting ionosphere-induced errors. (e) Even though SBAS should be available and used, RAIM should remain available autonomously. In case of loss of SBAS, the route and the approach to the destination or alternate aerodrome should still be flown with an available RAIM function. (f) When available, GNSS based on more than one constellation and more than one frequency may provide better integrity and redundancy regarding failures in the space segment of GNSS, jamming, and resilience to space weather events.