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GM1 ACNS.E.LAD.620 Integrity
Available versions for ERULES-1963177438-19328
ED Decision 2021/008/R
found in: GM Remote Aerodrome Air Traffic Services (ED 2019/004/R) Issue 2 (Jul 2020)
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GM Remote Aerodrom... (Jul 2020)
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GM1 ACNS.E.LAD.620 Integrity ED Decision 2021/008/R COMMON GUIDANCE APPLICABLE TO ALL SOLUTIONS (a) The failure condition of point (a) of [AMC1 ACNS.E.LAD.620](#_DxCrossRefBm573002971) for the case of erroneous automatic activation is intended to prevent that a large number of false alerts are caused by erroneous automatic activation of the system and have a significant and worldwide impact on SAR authorities. (b) A piece of equipment that is part of the system and that contributes to the failure condition of point (a) of [AMC1 ACNS.E.LAD.620](#_DxCrossRefBm573002971) could be inactive when the system is not activated, including when the system is armed. This piece of equipment could be, for example, a processor in sleep mode or an ELT. If errors in the design of the software or of the electronic hardware of such piece of equipment do not cause undesirable automatic activation of the system when that piece of equipment is inactive, that software and electronic hardware may be developed in accordance with design assurance level (DAL) D. [Issue: CS-ACNS/3]