AMC 25.1309 System design and analysis

• ED Decision 2021/015/R found in: CS-25 Amdt 27 - Large Aeroplanes (Jan 2023)

AMC 25.1309 System design and analysis ED Decision 2021/015/R **Table of Contents** 1. PURPOSE 2. RESERVED 3. RELATED DOCUMENTS a. Advisory Circulars, Acceptable Means of Compliance b. Industry Documents 4. APPLICABILITY OF CS 25.1309 5. DEFINITIONS 6. BACKGROUND a. General b. Fail-Safe Design Concept c. Development of Aeroplane and System Functions 7. FAILURE CONDITION CLASSIFICATIONS AND PROBABILITY TERMS a. Classifications b. Qualitative Probability Terms c. Quantitative Probability Terms 8. SAFETY OBJECTIVE 9. COMPLIANCE WITH CS 25.1309 a. Compliance with CS 25.1309(a) b. Compliance with CS 25.1309(b) (1) General (2) Planning (3) Availability of Industry Standards and Guidance Materials (4) Acceptable Application of Development Assurance Methods (5) Crew and Maintenance Actions (6) Significant Latent Failures c. Compliance with CS 25.1309(c) 10. IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE CONDITIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS WHEN ASSESSING THEIR EFFECTS a. Identification of Failure Conditions b. Identification of Failure Conditions Using a Functional Hazard Assessment c. Considerations When Assessing Failure Condition Effects 11. ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE CONDITION PROBABILITIES AND ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS a. Assessment of Failure Condition Probabilities b. Single Failure Considerations c. Common-Cause Failure Considerations d. Depth of Analysis e. Calculation of Average Probability per Flight Hour (Quantitative Analysis) f. Integrated Systems g. Operational or Environmental Conditions h. Justification of Assumptions, Data Sources and Analytical Techniques 12. OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE CONSIDERATIONS a. Flight Crew Action b. Maintenance Action c. Candidate Certification Maintenance Requirements d. Flight with Equipment or Functions known to be Inoperative 13. ASSESSMENT OF MODIFICATIONS TO PREVIOUSLY CERTIFIED AEROPLANES APPENDIX 1. ASSESSMENT METHODS APPENDIX 2. SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW APPENDIX 3. CALCULATION OF THE AVERAGE PROBABILITY PER FLIGHT HOUR APPENDIX 4. ALLOWABLE PROBABILITIES APPENDIX 5. EXAMPLE OF LIMIT LATENCY AND RESIDUAL PROBABILITY ANALYSIS 1. PURPOSE. a. This AMC describes acceptable means for showing compliance with the requirements of [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691). These means are intended to provide guidance to supplement the engineering and operational judgement that must form the basis of any compliance demonstration. b. The extent to which the more structured methods and guidelines contained in this AMC should be applied is a function of systems complexity and systems failure consequence. In general, the extent and structure of the analyses required to show compliance with [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) will be greater when the system is more complex and the effects of the Failure Conditions are more severe. This AMC is not intended to require that the more structured techniques introduced in this revision be applied where traditional techniques have been shown to be acceptable for more traditional systems designs. The means described in this AMC are not mandatory. Other means may be used if they show compliance with [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691). 2. RESERVED. 3. RELATED DOCUMENTS. The following guidance and advisory materials are referenced herein: a. Advisory Circulars, Acceptable Means of Compliance. (1) [AMC 25.1322](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821145) Alerting Systems. (2) AC 25.19/[AMC 25.19](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821408) Certification Maintenance Requirements. (3) AMC 20-115 Software Considerations for Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification (4) [AMC 25.901(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821380) Safety Assessment of Powerplant Installations. b. Industry documents. (1) RTCA, Inc., Document No. DO-160D/EUROCAE ED-14G, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment. (2) Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4754A/EUROCAE ED-79A, Guidelines for development of civil aircraft and systems. (3) Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment. 4. APPLICABILITY OF [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691). Paragraph [25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) is intended as a general requirement that should be applied to any equipment or system as installed, in addition to specific systems requirements, except as indicated below. a. While [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) does not apply to the performance and flight characteristics of Subpart B and structural requirements of Subparts C and D, it does apply to any system on which compliance with any of those requirements is based. For example, it does not apply to an aeroplane's inherent stall characteristics or their evaluation, but it does apply to a stall warning system used to enable compliance with [CS 25.207](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820666). b. Jams of flight control surfaces or pilot controls that are covered by [CS 25.671(c)(3)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820687) are excepted from the requirements of [CS 25.1309(b)(1)(ii](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691)). c. Certain single failures covered by [CS 25.735(b)(1)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821158) are excepted from the requirements of [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691). The reason concerns the brake system requirement that limits the effect of a single failure to doubling the brake roll stopping distance. This requirement has been shown to provide a satisfactory level of safety without the need to analyse the particular circumstances and conditions under which the single failure occurs. d. The failure conditions covered by [CS 25.810](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821268) and [CS 25.812](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821204) are excepted from the requirements of [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691). These failure conditions related to loss of function are associated with varied evacuation scenarios for which the probability cannot be determined. It has not been proven possible to define appropriate scenarios under which compliance with [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) can be demonstrated. It is therefore considered more practical to require particular design features or specific reliability demonstrations as described in [CS 25.810](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821268) and [CS 25.812](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821204). Traditionally, this approach has been found to be acceptable. e. The requirements of [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) are generally applicable to engine, propeller, and propulsion system installations. The specific applicability and exceptions are stated in [CS 25.901(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820973). f. Some systems and some functions already receive an evaluation to show compliance with specific requirements for specific failure conditions and, therefore, meet the intent of [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) without the need for additional analysis for those specific failure conditions. g. The safety assessment process should consider all phases during flight and on ground when the aeroplane is in service. While this includes the conditions associated with the pre-flight preparation, embarkation and disembarkation, taxi phase, etc., it, therefore, does not include periods of shop maintenance, storage, or other out-of-service activities. Where relevant, the effects on persons other than the aeroplane occupants should be taken into account when assessing failure conditions in compliance with CS 25.1309. 5. DEFINITIONS. The following definitions apply to the system design and analysis requirements of [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) and the guidance material provided in this AMC. They should not be assumed to apply to the same or similar terms used in other regulations or AMCs. Terms for which standard dictionary definitions apply are not defined herein. a. *Analysis.* The terms "analysis" and "assessment" are used throughout. Each has a broad definition and the two terms are to some extent interchangeable. However, the term analysis generally implies a more specific, more detailed evaluation, while the term assessment may be a more general or broader evaluation but may include one or more types of analysis. In practice, the meaning comes from the specific application, e.g., fault tree analysis, Markov analysis, Preliminary System Safety Assessment, etc. b. *Assessment.* See the definition of analysis above. c. *At-Risk Time.* The period of time during which an item must fail in order to cause the failure effect in question. This is usually associated with the final fault in a fault sequence leading to a specific failure condition. d. *Average Probability Per Flight Hour.* For the purpose of this AMC, is a representation of the number of times the subject Failure Condition is predicted to occur during the entire operating life of all aeroplanes of the type divided by the anticipated total operating hours of all aeroplanes of that type (Note: The Average Probability Per Flight Hour is normally calculated as the probability of a Failure Condition occurring during a typical flight of mean duration divided by that mean duration). e. *Candidate Certification Maintenance Requirements (CCMR).* A periodic maintenance or flight crew check may be used in a safety analysis to help demonstrate compliance with [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) for hazardous and catastrophic failure conditions. Where such checks cannot be accepted as basic servicing or airmanship they become Candidate Certification Maintenance Requirements (CCMRs). [AMC 25.19](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821408) defines a method by which Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) are identified from the candidates. A CMR becomes a required periodic maintenance check identified as an operating limitation of the type certificate for the aeroplane. f. *Check.* An examination (e.g., an inspection or test) to determine the physical integrity and/or functional capability of an item. g. *Complex.* A system is Complex when its operation, failure modes, or failure effects are difficult to comprehend without the aid of analytical methods. h. *Complexity*. An attribute of functions, systems or items, which makes their operation, failure modes, or failure effects difficult to comprehend without the aid of analytical methods. i. *Conventional.* A system is considered to be Conventional if its functionality, the technological means used to implement its functionality, and its intended usage are all the same as, or closely similar to, that of previously approved systems that are commonly-used. j. *Design Appraisal.* This is a qualitative appraisal of the integrity and safety of the system design. k. *Development Assurance.* All those planned and systematic actions used to substantiate, to an adequate level of confidence, that errors in requirements, design, and implementation have been identified and corrected such that the system satisfies the applicable certification basis. l. Development Error. A mistake in requirements, design, or implementation. m. *Error*. An omission or incorrect action by a crewmember or maintenance personnel, or a development error (e.g. mistake in requirements determination, design, or implementation). n. *Event.* An occurrence which has its origin distinct from the aeroplane, such as atmospheric conditions (e.g. gusts, temperature variations, icing and lightning strikes), runway conditions, conditions of communication, navigation, and surveillance services, bird-strike, cabin and baggage fires. The term is not intended to cover sabotage. o. *Exposure Time.* The period of time between the time when an item was last known to be operating properly and the time when it will be known to be operating properly again. p. *Failure.* An occurrence, which affects the operation of a component, part, or element such that it can no longer function as intended, (this includes both loss of function and malfunction). Note: Errors may cause Failures, but are not considered to be Failures. q. *Failure Condition.* A condition having an effect on the aeroplane and/or its occupants, either direct or consequential, which is caused or contributed to by one or more failures or errors, considering flight phase and relevant adverse operational or environmental conditions, or external events. r. *Installation Appraisal.* This is a qualitative appraisal of the integrity and safety of the installation. Any deviations from normal, industry-accepted installation practices, such as clearances or tolerances, should be evaluated, especially when appraising modifications made after entry into service. s. Item. A hardware or software element having bounded and well-defined interfaces. t. *Latent Failure.* A failure is latent until it is made known to the flight crew or maintenance personnel. u. *Qualitative.* Those analytical processes that assess system and aeroplane safety in an objective, nonnumerical manner. v. *Quantitative.* Those analytical processes that apply mathematical methods to assess system and aeroplane safety. w. *Redundancy.* The presence of more than one independent means for accomplishing a given function or flight operation. x. *Significant Latent Failure.* A latent failure that would, in combination with one or more specific failure(s) or event(s), result in a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition. y. *System*. A combination of interrelated items arranged to perform one or more specific functions. 6. BACKGROUND a. General For a number of years aeroplane systems were evaluated to specific requirements, to the ~~"~~ʽsingle fault’~~"~~ criterion, or to the fail-safe design concept. As later-generation aeroplanes developed, more safety-critical functions were required to be performed, which generally resulted in an increase in the complexity of the systems designed to perform these functions. The potential hazards to the aeroplane and its occupants which could arise in the event of loss of one or more functions provided by a system or that system's malfunction had to be considered, as also did the interaction between systems performing different functions. This has led to the general principle that an inverse relationship should exist between the probability of a failure condition and its effect on the aeroplane and/or its occupants (see Figure 1). In assessing the acceptability of a design it was recognised that rational probability values would have to be established. Historical evidence indicated that the probability of a serious accident due to operational and airframe-related causes was approximately one per million hours of flight. Furthermore, about 10 % of the total were attributed to failure conditions caused by the aeroplane's systems. It seems reasonable that serious accidents caused by systems should not be allowed a higher probability than this in new aeroplane designs. It is reasonable to expect that the probability of a serious accident from all such failure conditions be not greater than one per ten million flight hours or 1 × 10-7 per flight hour for a newly designed aeroplane. The difficulty with this is that it is not possible to say whether the target has been met until all the systems on the aeroplane are collectively analysed numerically. For this reason it was assumed, arbitrarily, that there are about one hundred potential failure conditions in an aeroplane, which could be ~~C~~catastrophic. The target allowable average probability per flight hour of 1 × 10-7 was thus apportioned equally among these failure conditions, resulting in an allocation of not greater than 1 × 10-9 to each. The upper limit for the average probability per flight hour for catastrophic failure conditions would be 1 × 10-9, which establishes an approximate probability value for the term ʽextremely improbable’. Failure conditions having less severe effects could be relatively more likely to occur. b. Fail-Safe Design Concept. The CS-25 airworthiness standards are based on, and incorporate, the objectives and principles or techniques of the fail-safe design concept, which considers the effects of failures and combinations of failures in defining a safe design. (1) The following basic objectives pertaining to failures apply: (i) In any system or subsystem, the failure of any single element, component, or connection during any one flight should be assumed, regardless of its probability. Such single failures should not be catastrophic. (ii) Subsequent failures of related systems during the same flight, whether detected or latent, and combinations thereof, should also be considered. (2) The fail-safe design concept uses the following design principles or techniques in order to ensure a safe design. The use of only one of these principles or techniques is seldom adequate. A combination of two or more is usually needed to provide a fail-safe design; i.e. to ensure that major failure conditions are remote, hazardous failure conditions are extremely remote, and catastrophic failure conditions are extremely improbable: (i) *Designed Integrity and Quality,* including *Life Limits*, to ensure intended function and prevent failures. (ii) *Redundancy* or *Backup Systems* to enable continued function after any single (or other defined number of) failure(s); e.g., two or more engines, hydraulic systems, flight control systems, etc. (iii) *Isolation and/or Segregation of Systems, Components, and Elements* so that the failure of one does not cause the failure of another. (iv) *Proven Reliability* so that multiple, independent failures are unlikely to occur during the same flight. (v) *Failure Warning or Indication* to provide detection. (vi) *Flight crew Procedures* specifying corrective action for use after failure detection. (vii) *Checkability:* the capability to check a component's condition. (viii) *Designed Failure Effect Limits*, including the capability to sustain damage, to limit the safety impact or effects of a failure. (ix) *Designed Failure Path* to control and direct the effects of a failure in a way that limits its safety impact. (x) *Margins or Factors of Safety* to allow for any undefined or unforeseeable adverse conditions. (xi) *Error-Tolerance* that considers adverse effects of foreseeable errors during the aeroplane's design, test, manufacture, operation, and maintenance. c. Development of Aeroplane and System Functions. (1) A concern arose regarding the efficiency and coverage of the techniques used for assessing safety aspects of aeroplane and systems functions implemented through the use of electronic technology and software-based techniques. The concern is that design and analysis techniques traditionally applied to deterministic risks or to conventional, non-complex systems may not provide adequate safety coverage for these aeroplane and system functions. Thus, other assurance techniques, such as development assurance utilising a combination of integral processes (e.g. process assurance, configuration management, requirement validation and implementation verification), or structured analysis or assessment techniques applied at the aeroplane level and across integrated or interacting systems, have been requested. Their systematic use increases confidence that development errors and integration or interaction effects have been adequately identified and corrected. (2) Considering the above developments, as well as revisions made to the [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691), this AMC was revised to include new approaches, both qualitative and quantitative, which may be used to assist in determining safety requirements and establishing compliance with these requirements, and to reflect revisions in the rule, considering the whole aeroplane and its systems. It also provides guidance for determining when, or if, particular analyses or development assurance actions should be conducted in the frame of the development and safety assessment processes. Numerical values are assigned to the probabilistic terms included in the requirements for use in those cases where the impact of system failures is examined by quantitative methods of analysis. The analytical tools used in determining numerical values are intended to supplement, but not replace, qualitative methods based on engineering and operational judgement. 7. FAILURE CONDITION CLASSIFICATIONS AND PROBABILITY TERMS a. Classifications. Failure conditions may be classified according to the severity of their effects as follows: (1) *No Safety Effect*: Failure conditions that would have no effect on safety; for example, failure conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the aeroplane or increase crew workload. (2) *Minor*: Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce aeroplane safety, and which involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions may include, for example, a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a slight increase in crew workload, such as routine flight plan changes, or some physical discomfort to passengers or cabin crew. (3) *Major*: Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency, or discomfort to the flight crew, or physical distress to passengers or cabin crew, possibly including injuries. (4) *Hazardous*: Failure conditions~~,~~ which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating~~,~~ conditions to the extent that there would be: (i) A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities; (ii) Physical distress or excessive workload such that the flight crew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely; or (iii) Serious or fatal injury to a relatively small number of the occupants other than the flight crew. (5) *Catastrophic*: Failure conditions~~,~~ which would result in multiple fatalities, usually with the loss of the aeroplane. (Note: A failure condition which would prevent continued safe flight and landing should be classified catastrophic unless otherwise defined in other specific AMCs. For flight control systems, continued safe flight and landing is defined in [AMC 25.671, paragraphs 4 and 7](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821111).) b. Qualitative Probability Terms. When using qualitative analyses to determine compliance with [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691), the following descriptions of the probability terms used in [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) and this AMC have become commonly accepted as aids to engineering judgement: (1) Probable failure conditions are those anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire operational life of each aeroplane. (2) Remote failure conditions are those unlikely to occur to each aeroplane during its total life, but which may occur several times when considering the total operational life of a number of aeroplanes of the type. (3) Extremely remote failure conditions are those not anticipated to occur to each aeroplane during its total life but which may occur a few times when considering the total operational life of all aeroplanes of the type. (4) Extremely improbable failure conditions are those so unlikely that they are not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all aeroplanes of one type. c. Quantitative Probability Terms. When using quantitative analyses to help determine compliance with [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691), the following descriptions of the probability terms used in this requirement and this AMC have become commonly accepted as aids to engineering judgement. They are expressed in terms of acceptable ranges for the average probability per flight hour. (1) Probability Ranges. (i) Probable failure conditions are those having average probability per flight hour greater than of the order of 1 × 10-5. (ii) Remote failure conditions are those having an average probability per flight hour of the order of 1 × 10-5 or less, but greater than of the order of 1 × 10-7. (iii) Extremely remote failure conditions are those having an average probability per flight hour of the order of 1 × 10-7 or less, but greater than of the order of 1 × 10-9. (iv) Extremely improbable failure conditions are those having an average probability per flight hour of the order of 1 × 10-9 or less. 8. SAFETY OBJECTIVE. a. The objective of [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) is to ensure an acceptable safety level for equipment and systems as installed on the aeroplane. A logical and acceptable inverse relationship must exist between the average probability per flight hour and the severity of failure condition effects, as shown in Figure 1, such that: (1) Failure conditions with no safety effect have no probability requirement. (2) Minor failure conditions may be probable. (3) Major failure conditions must be no more frequent than remote. (4) Hazardous failure conditions must be no more frequent than extremely remote. (5) Catastrophic failure conditions must be extremely improbable. Figure 1: Relationship between Probability and Severity of Failure Condition Effects  b. The classification of the failure conditions associated with the severity of their effects are described in Figure 2a. The safety objectives associated with failure conditions are described in Figure 2b. Figure 2a: Relationship Between Severity of the Effects and Classification of Failure Conditions <table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="606"><tr><td rowspan="3" valign="top" width="29"><p>Severity of the Effects</p></td><td valign="top" width="84"><p>Effect on Aeroplane</p></td><td valign="top" width="96"><p>No effect on operational capabilities or safety</p></td><td valign="top" width="95"><p>Slight reduction in functional capabilities or safety margins</p></td><td valign="top" width="104"><p>Significant reduction in functional capabilities or safety margins</p></td><td valign="top" width="105"><p>Large reduction in functional capabilities or safety margins</p></td><td valign="top" width="92"><p>Normally with hull loss</p></td></tr><tr><td valign="top" width="84"><p>Effect on Occupants excluding Flight Crew</p></td><td valign="top" width="96"><p>Inconvenience</p></td><td valign="top" width="95"><p>Physical discomfort</p></td><td valign="top" width="104"><p>Physical distress, possibly including injuries</p></td><td valign="top" width="105"><p>Serious or fatal injury to a small number of passengers or cabin crew</p></td><td valign="top" width="92"><p>Multiple fatalities</p></td></tr><tr><td valign="top" width="84"><p>Effect on Flight Crew</p></td><td valign="top" width="96"><p>No effect on flight crew</p></td><td valign="top" width="95"><p>Slight increase in workload</p></td><td valign="top" width="104"><p>Physical discomfort or a significant increase in workload</p></td><td valign="top" width="105"><p>Physical distress or excessive workload impairs ability to perform tasks</p></td><td valign="top" width="92"><p>Fatalities or incapacitation</p></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" valign="top" width="113"><p>Classification of Failure Conditions</p></td><td valign="top" width="96"><p>No Safety Effect</p></td><td valign="top" width="95"><p>Minor</p></td><td valign="top" width="104"><p>Major</p></td><td valign="top" width="105"><p>Hazardous</p></td><td valign="top" width="92"><p>Catastrophic</p></td></tr></table> Figure 2b: Relationship Between Classification of Failure Conditions and Probability <table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="606"><tr><td valign="top" width="122"><p>Classification of Failure Conditions</p></td><td valign="top" width="93"><p>No Safety Effect</p></td><td valign="top" width="103"><p>Minor</p></td><td valign="top" width="98"><p>Major</p></td><td valign="top" width="104"><p>Hazardous</p></td><td valign="top" width="86"><p>Catastrophic</p></td></tr><tr><td valign="top" width="122"><p>Allowable</p><p>Qualitative Probability </p></td><td valign="top" width="93"><p>No Probability Requirement</p></td><td valign="top" width="103"><p>&lt;-Probable-&gt;</p></td><td valign="top" width="98"><p>&lt;--Remote--&gt;</p></td><td valign="top" width="104"><p>Extremely</p><p>&lt;--------------&gt;</p><p>Remote</p></td><td valign="top" width="86"><p>Extremely Improbable</p></td></tr><tr><td valign="top" width="122"><p>Allowable Quantitative Probability: Average Probability per Flight Hour on the Order of:</p></td><td valign="top" width="93"><p>No Probability Requirement</p></td><td valign="top" width="103"><p>&lt;--------------&gt;</p><p>&lt;10-³</p><p>Note 1</p></td><td valign="top" width="98"><p>&lt;--------------&gt;</p><p>&lt;10^-5</p></td><td valign="top" width="104"><p>&lt;--------------&gt;</p><p>&lt;10^-7</p></td><td valign="top" width="86"><p>&lt;10^-9</p></td></tr><tr><td colspan="6" valign="top" width="606"><p>Note 1: A numerical probability range is provided here as a reference. The applicant is not required to perform a quantitative analysis, nor substantiate by such an analysis, that this numerical criteria has been met for Minor Failure Conditions. Current transport category aeroplane products are regarded as meeting this standard simply by using current commonly‑accepted industry practice.</p></td></tr></table> c. The safety objectives associated with catastrophic failure conditions must be satisfied by demonstrating that: (1) No single failure will result in a catastrophic failure condition; and (2) Each catastrophic failure condition is extremely improbable; and (3) Given that a single latent failure has occurred on a given flight, each catastrophic failure condition, resulting from two failures, either of which is latent for more than one flight, is remote. 9. COMPLIANCE WITH [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691). This paragraph describes specific means of compliance for [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691). The applicant should obtain early concurrence of the certification authority on the choice of an acceptable means of compliance. a. Compliance with [CS 25.1309(a)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691). (1) Equipment covered by CS 25.1309(a)(1) must be shown to function properly when installed. The aeroplane operating and environmental conditions over which proper functioning of the equipment, systems, and installation is required to be considered includes the full normal envelope of the aeroplane as defined by the Aeroplane Flight Manual operating limitations together with any modification to that envelope associated with abnormal or emergency procedures. Other external environmental conditions such as atmospheric turbulence, HIRF, lightning, and precipitation, which the aeroplane is reasonably expected to encounter, should also be considered. The severity of the external environmental conditions, which should be considered, are limited to those established by certification standards and precedence. (2) In addition to the external operating and environmental conditions, the effect of the environment within the aeroplane should be considered. These effects should include vibration and acceleration loads, variations in fluid pressure and electrical power, fluid or vapour contamination, due either to the normal environment or accidental leaks or spillage and handling by personnel. Document referenced in paragraph 3b(1) defines a series of standard environmental test conditions and procedures, which may be used to support compliance. Equipment covered by (CS) Technical Standard Orders containing environmental test procedures or equipment qualified to other environmental test standards can be used to support compliance. The conditions under which the installed equipment will be operated should be equal to or less severe than the environment for which the equipment is qualified. (3) The required substantiation of the proper functioning of equipment, systems, and installations under the operating and environmental conditions approved for the aeroplane may be shown by test and/or analysis or reference to comparable service experience on other aeroplanes. It must be shown that the comparable service experience is valid for the proposed installation. For the equipment systems and installations covered by [CS 25.1309(a)(1)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691), the compliance demonstration should also confirm that the normal functioning of such equipment, systems, and installations does not interfere with the proper functioning of other equipment, systems, or installations covered by CS 25.1309(a)(1). (4) The equipment, systems, and installations covered by [CS 25.1309(a)(2)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) are typically those associated with amenities for passengers such as passenger entertainment systems, in-flight telephones, etc., whose failure or improper functioning in itself should not affect the safety of the aeroplane. Operational and environmental qualification requirements for those equipment, systems, and installations are reduced to the tests that are necessary to show that their normal or abnormal functioning does not adversely affect the proper functioning of the equipment, systems, or installations covered by CS 25.1309(a)(1) and does not otherwise adversely influence the safety of the aeroplane or its occupants. Examples of adverse influences are: fire, explosion, exposing passengers to high voltages, etc. Normal installation practices should result in sufficiently obvious isolation so that substantiation can be based on a relatively simple qualitative installation evaluation. If the possible impacts, including failure modes or effects, are questionable, or isolation between systems is provided by complex means, more formal structured evaluation methods may be necessary. b. Compliance with [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691). Paragraph [25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) requires that the aeroplane systems and associated components, considered separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that any catastrophic failure condition is extremely improbable and does not result from a single failure. It also requires that any hazardous failure condition is extremely remote, and that any major failure condition is remote. An analysis should always consider the application of the fail-safe design concept described in paragraph 6.b, and give special attention to ensuring the effective use of design techniques that would prevent single failures or other events from damaging or otherwise adversely affecting more than one redundant system channel or more than one system performing operationally similar functions. (1) *General.* Compliance with the requirements of [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) should be shown by analysis and, where necessary, by appropriate ground, flight, or simulator tests. Failure conditions should be identified and their effects assessed. The maximum allowable probability of the occurrence of each failure condition is determined from the failure condition’s effects, and when assessing the probabilities of failure conditions, appropriate analysis considerations should be accounted for. Any analysis must consider: (i) Possible failure conditions and their causes, modes of failure, and damage from sources external to the system. (ii) The possibility of multiple failures and undetected failures. (iii) The possibility of requirement, design and implementation errors. (iv) The effect of reasonably anticipated crew errors after the occurrence of a failure or failure condition. (v) The effect of reasonably anticipated errors when performing maintenance actions. (vi) The crew alerting cues, corrective action required, and the capability of detecting faults. (vii) The resulting effects on the aeroplane and occupants, considering the stage of flight, the sequence of events/failures occurrence when relevant, and operating and environmental conditions. (2) Planning. This AMC provides guidance on methods of accomplishing the safety objective. The detailed methodology needed to achieve this safety objective will depend on many factors, in particular the degree of systems complexity and integration. For aeroplanes containing many complex or integrated systems, it is likely that a plan will need to be developed to describe the intended process. This plan should include consideration of the following aspects: (i) Functional and physical interrelationships of systems. (ii) Determination of detailed means of compliance, which should include development assurance activities. (iii) Means for establishing the accomplishment of the plan. (3) *Availability of Industry Standards and Guidance Materials*. There are a variety of acceptable techniques currently being used in industry, which may or may not be reflected in the documents referenced in paragraphs 3.b(2) and 3.b(3). This AMC is not intended to compel the use of these documents during the definition of the particular method of satisfying the objectives of this AMC. However, these documents do contain material and methods of performing the system safety assessment. These methods, when correctly applied, are recognised by EASA as valid for showing compliance with [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691). In addition, the Document referenced in paragraph 3.b(3) contains tutorial information on applying specific engineering methods (e.g. Markov analysis, fault tree analysis) that may be utilised in whole or in part. (4) *Acceptable Application of Development Assurance Methods*. Paragraph 9.b(1)(iii) above requires that any analysis necessary to demonstrate compliance with [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) must consider the possibility of development errors. Errors made during the design and development of systems have traditionally been detected and corrected by exhaustive tests conducted on the system and its components, by direct inspection, and by other direct verification methods capable of completely characterising the performance of the system. These direct techniques may still be appropriate for systems containing non-complex items (i.e. items that are fully assured by a combination of testing and analysis) that perform a limited number of functions and that are not highly integrated with other aeroplane systems. For more complex or integrated systems, exhaustive testing may either be impossible because all of the system states cannot be determined or impractical because of the number of tests that must be accomplished. For these types of systems, compliance may be demonstrated by the use of development assurance. The level of development assurance (function development assurance level (FDAL)/item development assurance level (IDAL)) should be commensurate with the severity of the failure conditions the system is contributing to. Guidelines, which may be used for the assignment of development assurance levels to aeroplanes and system functions (FDAL) and to items (IDAL), are described in the Document referenced in 3.b(2) above. Through this Document, EASA recognises that credit can be taken from system architecture (e.g. functional or item development independence) for the FDAL/IDAL assignment process. Guidelines, which may be used for providing development assurance, are described for aeroplane and system development in the Document referenced in 3.b(2), and for software in the Document referenced in 3.a(3) above. (There is currently no agreed development assurance standard for airborne electronic hardware.) (5) Crew and Maintenance Actions. (i) Where an analysis identifies some indication to, and/or action by, the flight crew, cabin crew, or maintenance personnel, the following activities should be accomplished: 1 Verify that any identified indications are actually provided by the system. This includes the verification that the elements that provide detection (e.g. sensors, logic) properly trigger the indication under the relevant situations considering various causes, flight phases, operating conditions, operational sequences, and environments. 2 Verify that any identified indications will, in fact, be recognised. 3 Verify that any actions required have a reasonable expectation of being accomplished successfully and in a timely manner. (ii) These verification activities should be accomplished by consulting with engineers, pilots, flight attendants, maintenance personnel, and human factors specialists, as appropriate, taking due consideration of any relevant service experience and the consequences if the assumed action is not performed or performed improperly. (iii) In complex situations, the results of the review by specialists may need to be confirmed by simulator, ground tests, or flight tests. However, quantitative assessments of the probabilities of crew or maintenance errors are not currently considered feasible. If the failure indications are considered to be recognisable and the required actions do not cause an excessive workload, then for the purposes of the analysis, such corrective actions can be considered to be satisfactorily accomplished. If the necessary actions cannot be satisfactorily accomplished, the tasks and/or the systems need to be modified. (6) Significant Latent Failures. (i) Compliance with [CS 25.1309(b)(4)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) For compliance with CS 25.1309(b)(4), the hereafter systematic approach should be followed: 1. The applicant must first eliminate significant latent failures to the maximum practical extent utilising the current state-of-the-art technology, e.g. implement practical and reliable failure monitoring and flight crew indication systems to detect failures that would otherwise be latent for more than one flight. Additional guidance is provided in AMC 25-19 Section 8, Design Considerations Related to Significant Latent Failures. 2. For each significant latent failure which cannot reasonably be eliminated, the applicant must minimise the exposure time by design utilising current state-of-the-art technology rather than relying on scheduled maintenance tasks at lengthy intervals, i.e. implementing pilot-initiated checks, or self-initiated checks (e.g. first flight of the day check, power-up built-in tests, other system automated checks). 3. When relying on scheduled maintenance tasks, quantitative as well as qualitative aspects need to be addressed when limiting the latency. Additional guidance is provided in AMC 25-19 Section 10, Identification of Candidate CMRs (CCMRs). Note: For turbojet thrust reversing systems, the design configurations in paragraphs 8.b(2) and 8.b(3) of [AMC 25.933(a)(1)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821406) have traditionally been considered to be acceptable to EASA for compliance with CS 25.1309(b)(4). (ii) Compliance with [CS 25.1309(b)(5)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) When a catastrophic failure condition involves two failures, either one of which is latent for more than one flight, and cannot reasonably be eliminated, compliance with CS 25.1309(b)(5) is required. Following the proper application of CS 25.1309(b)(4), the failure conditions involving multiple significant latent failures are expected to be sufficiently unlikely such that the dual-failure situations addressed in CS 25.1309(b)(5) are the only remaining significant latent failures of concern. These significant latent failures of concern should be highlighted to EASA as early as possible. The system safety assessment should explain why avoidance is not practical, and provide supporting rationale for the acceptability. Rationale should be based on the proposed design being state-of-the-art, past experience, sound engineering judgment, or other arguments, which led to the decision not to implement other potential means of avoidance (e.g. eliminating the significant latent failure or adding redundancy). Two criteria are implemented in [CS 25.1309(b)(5)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691): limit latency and limit residual probability. Limit latency is intended to limit the time of operating with one evident failure away from a catastrophic failure condition. This is achieved by requiring that the sum of the probabilities of the latent failures, which are combined with each evident failure, does not exceed 1/1 000. Taking one catastrophic failure condition at a time, — in case an evident failure is combined only once in a dual failure combination of concern, the probability of the individual latent failure needs to comply with the 1/1 000 criterion; — in case an evident failure is combined in multiple dual failure combinations of concern, the combined probabilities of the latent failures need to comply with the 1/1 000 criterion. Limit residual probability is intended to limit the average probability per flight hour of the failure condition given the presence of a single latent failure. This is achieved by defining the residual probability to be ‘remote’. Residual probability is the combined average probability per flight hour of all the single active failures that result in the catastrophic failure condition assuming one single latent failure has occurred. These requirements are applied in addition to CS 25.1309(b)(1), which requires that catastrophic failure conditions be shown to be extremely improbable and do not result from a single failure. Appendix 5 provides simplified examples explaining how the limit latency and limit residual probability analysis might be applied. For compliance with the 1/1 000 criterion, the probability of the latent failures of concern should be derived from the probability of the worst-case flight, i.e. the probability where the evident failure occurs in the last flight before the scheduled maintenance inspection, while the latent failure may have occurred in any flight between two consecutive scheduled maintenance inspections. When dealing with constant failure rates, the probability of the latent failure should be computed as the product of the maximum time during which the failure may be present (i.e. exposure time) and its failure rate, if this probability is less than or equal to 0.1. c. Compliance with [CS 25.1309(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691). [CS 25.1309(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) requires that information concerning unsafe system operating conditions must be provided to the crew to enable them to take appropriate corrective action in a timely manner, thereby mitigating the effects to an acceptable level. Any system operating condition that, if not detected and properly accommodated by flight crew action, would contribute to or cause a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition should be considered to be an ‘unsafe system operating condition’. Compliance with this requirement is usually demonstrated by the analysis identified in paragraph 9.b(1) above, which also includes consideration of crew alerting cues, corrective action required, and the capability of detecting faults. The required information may be provided by dedicated indication and/or annunciation or made apparent to the flight crew by the inherent aeroplane/systems responses. When flight crew alerting is required, it must be provided in compliance with [CS 25.1322](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821114). CS 25.1309(c) also requires that installed systems and equipment for use by the flight crew, including flight deck controls and information, be designed to minimise flight crew errors that could create additional hazards (in compliance with [CS 25.1302](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821571)). (1) The required information will depend on the degree of urgency for recognition and corrective action by the crew. It should be in the form of: (i) a warning, if immediate recognition and corrective or compensatory action by the crew is required; (ii) a caution if immediate crew awareness is required and subsequent crew action will be required; (iii) an advisory, if crew awareness is required and subsequent crew action may be required; (iv) a message in the other cases. [CS 25.1322](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821114) (and [AMC 25.1322](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821145)) give further requirements (and guidance) on the characteristics of the information required (visual, aural) based on those different categories. (2) When failure monitoring and indication are provided by a system, its reliability should be compatible with the safety objectives associated with the system function for which it provides that indication. For example, if the effects of having a system failure and not annunciating that system failure are catastrophic, the combination of the system failure with the failure of its annunciation must be extremely improbable. The loss of annunciation itself should be considered a failure condition, and particular attention should be paid to the impact on the ability of the flight crew to cope with the subject system failure. In addition, unwanted operation (e.g. nuisance warnings) should be assessed. The failure monitoring and indication should be reliable, technologically feasible, and economically practical. Reliable failure monitoring and indication should utilise current state-of-the-art technology to maximise the probability of detecting and indicating genuine failures while minimising the probability of falsely detecting and indicating non-existent failures. Any indication should be timely, obvious, clear, and unambiguous. (3) In the case of aeroplane conditions requiring immediate crew action, a suitable warning indication must be provided to the crew, if not provided by inherent aeroplane characteristics. In either case, any warning should be rousing and should occur at a point in a potentially catastrophic sequence where the aeroplane's capability and the crew's ability still remain sufficient for effective crew action. (4) Unless they are accepted as normal airmanship, procedures for the crew to follow after the occurrence of failure warning should be described in the approved Aeroplane Flight Manual (AFM) or AFM revision or supplement. (5) Even if operation or performance is unaffected or insignificantly affected at the time of failure, information to the crew is required if it is considered necessary for the crew to take any action or observe any precautions. Some examples include reconfiguring a system, being aware of a reduction in safety margins, changing the flight plan or regime, or making an unscheduled landing to reduce exposure to a more severe failure condition that would result from subsequent failures or operational or environmental conditions. Information is also required if a failure must be corrected before a subsequent flight. If operation or performance is unaffected or insignificantly affected, information and alerting indications may be inhibited during specific phases of flight where corrective action by the crew is considered more hazardous than no action. (6) The use of periodic maintenance or flight crew checks to detect significant latent failures when they occur is undesirable and should not be used in lieu of practical and reliable failure monitoring and indications. When this is not accomplished, refer to paragraph 9.b(6) for guidance. Paragraph 12 provides further guidance on the use of periodic maintenance or flight crew checks. Comparison with similar, previously approved systems is sometimes helpful. However, if a new technical solution allows practical and reliable failure monitoring and indications, this should be preferred in lieu of periodic maintenance or flight crew checks. (7) Particular attention should be given to the placement of switches or other control devices, relative to one another, so as to minimise the potential for inadvertent incorrect crew action, especially during emergencies or periods of high workload. Extra protection, such as the use of guarded switches, may sometimes be needed. 10. IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE CONDITIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS WHEN ASSESSING THEIR EFFECTS. a. Identification of Failure Conditions. Failure conditions should be identified by considering the potential effects of failures on the aeroplane and occupants. These should be considered from two perspectives: (1) by considering failures of aeroplane-level functions — failure conditions identified at this level are not dependent on the way the functions are implemented and the systems' architecture. (2) by considering failures of functions at the system level — these failure conditions are identified through examination of the way that functions are implemented and the systems' architectures. It should be noted that a failure condition might result from a combination of lower-level failure conditions. This requires that the analysis of complex, highly integrated systems, in particular, should be conducted in a highly methodical and structured manner to ensure that all significant failure conditions, that arise from multiple failures and combinations of lower-level failure conditions, are properly identified and accounted for. The relevant combinations of failures and failure conditions should be determined by the whole safety assessment process that encompasses the aeroplane and system level functional hazard assessments and common-cause analyses. The overall effect on the aeroplane of a combination of individual system failure conditions occurring as a result of a common or cascade failure, may be more severe than the individual system effect. For example, failure conditions classified as minor or major by themselves may have hazardous effects at an aeroplane level, when considered in combination. b. Identification of Failure Conditions Using a Functional Hazard Assessment. (1) Before a detailed safety assessment is proceeded with, a functional hazard assessment (FHA) of the aeroplane and system functions to determine the need for and scope of subsequent analysis should be prepared. This assessment may be conducted using service experience, engineering and operational judgement, and/or a top-down deductive qualitative examination of each function. An FHA is a systematic, comprehensive examination of aeroplane and system functions to identify potential minor, major, hazardous, and catastrophic failure conditions that may arise, not only as a result of malfunctions or failure to function, but also as a result of normal responses to unusual or abnormal external factors. It is concerned with the operational vulnerabilities of systems rather than with a detailed analysis of the actual implementation. (2) Each system function should be examined with respect to the other functions performed by the system, because the loss or malfunction of all functions performed by the system may result in a more severe failure condition than the loss of a single function. In addition, each system function should be examined with respect to functions performed by other aeroplane systems, because the loss or malfunction of different but related functions, provided by separate systems may affect the severity of Failure Conditions postulated for a particular system. (3) The FHA is an engineering tool, which should be performed early in the design and updated as necessary. It is used to define the high-level aeroplane or system safety objectives that must be considered in the proposed system architectures. It should also be used to assist in determining the development assurance levels for the systems. Many systems may need only a simple review of the system design by the applicant to determine the hazard classification. An FHA requires experienced engineering judgement and early co-ordination between the applicant and the certification authority. (4) Depending on the extent of functions to be examined and the relationship between functions and systems, different approaches to FHA may be taken. Where there is a clear correlation between functions and systems, and where system, and hence function, interrelationships are relatively simple, it may be feasible to conduct separate FHAs for each system, providing any interface aspects are properly considered and are easily understood. Where system and function interrelationships are more complex, a top-down approach, from an aeroplane-level perspective, should be taken in planning and conducting FHAs However, with the increasing integrated system architectures, this traditional top-down approach should be performed in conjunction with common-cause considerations (e.g. common resources) in order to properly address the cases where one system contributes to several aeroplane-level functions. c. Considerations When Assessing Failure Condition Effects. The requirements of [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) are intended to ensure an orderly and thorough evaluation of the effects on safety of foreseeable failures or other events, such as errors or external circumstances, separately or in combination, involving one or more system functions. The interactions of these factors within a system and among relevant systems should be considered. In assessing the effects of a failure condition, factors which might alleviate or intensify the direct effects of the initial failure condition should be considered. Some of these factors include consequent or related conditions existing within the aeroplane that may affect the ability of the crew to deal with direct effects, such as the presence of smoke, acceleration effects, interruption of communication, interference with cabin pressurisation, etc. When assessing the consequences of a given failure condition, account should be taken of the failure information provided, the complexity of the crew action, and the relevant crew training. The number of overall failure conditions involving other than instinctive crew actions may influence the flight crew performance that can be expected. Training recommendations may need to be identified in some cases. (1) The severity of failure conditions should be evaluated according to the following: (i) Effects on the aeroplane, such as reductions in safety margins, degradation in performance, loss of capability to conduct certain flight operations, reduction in environmental protection, or potential or consequential effects on structural integrity. When the effects of a failure condition are difficult to assess, the hazard classification may need to be validated by tests, simulation, or other appropriate analytical techniques. (ii) Effects on the crewmembers, such as increases above their normal workload that would affect their ability to cope with adverse operational or environmental conditions or subsequent failures. (iii) Effects on the occupants, i.e., passengers and crewmembers. (2) For convenience in conducting design assessments, failure conditions may be classified according to the severity of their effects as ‘no safety effect’, ‘minor’, ‘major’, ‘hazardous’, or ‘catastrophic’. Paragraph 7.a above provides accepted definitions of these terms. (i) The classification of failure conditions does not depend on whether or not a system or function is the subject of a specific requirement or regulation. Some ʽrequired’ systems, such as transponders, position lights, and public address systems, may have the potential for only minor failure conditions. Conversely, other systems which are not ʽrequired’, such as auto-flight systems, may have the potential for ‘major’, ‘hazardous’, or ‘catastrophic failure conditions’. (ii) Regardless of the types of assessment used, the classification of failure conditions should always be accomplished with consideration of all relevant factors; e.g.~~,~~ system, crew, performance, operational, external. It is particularly important to consider factors that would alleviate or intensify the severity of a failure condition. When flight duration, flight phase, or diversion time can adversely affect the classification of failure conditions, they must be considered to be intensifying factors. Other intensifying factors include conditions that are not related to the failure (such as weather or adverse operational or environmental conditions), and which reduce the ability of the flight crew to cope with a failure condition. An example of an alleviating factor would be the continued performance of identical or operationally similar functions by other systems not affected by the failure condition. Another example of an alleviating factor is the ability of the flight crew to recognise the failure condition and take action to mitigate its effects. Whenever this is taken into account, particular attention should be paid to the detection means to ensure that the ability of the flight crew (including physical ability and timeliness of the response) to detect the failure condition and take the necessary corrective action(s) is sufficient. Refer to [CS 25.1309(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) and paragraph 9.c of this AMC for more detailed guidance on crew annunciations and crew response evaluation. Combinations of intensifying or alleviating factors need to be considered only if they are anticipated to occur together. 11. ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE CONDITION PROBABILITIES AND ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS. After the failure conditions have been identified and the severity of the effects of the failure conditions have been assessed, there is a responsibility to determine how to show compliance with the requirement and obtain the concurrence of EASA. Design and installation reviews, analyses, flight tests, ground tests, simulator tests, or other approved means may be used. a. Assessment of Failure Condition Probabilities. (1) The probability that a failure condition would occur may be assessed as probable, remote, extremely remote, or extremely improbable. These terms are defined in paragraph 7. Each failure condition should have a probability that is inversely related to the severity of its effects as described in paragraph 8. (2) When a system provides protection from events (e.g.~~,~~ cargo compartment fire, gusts), its reliability should be compatible with the safety objectives necessary for the failure condition associated with the failure of the protection system and the probability of such events. (See paragraph 11g of this AMC and Appendix 4.) (3) An assessment to identify and classify failure conditions is necessarily qualitative. On the other hand, an assessment of the probability of a failure condition may be either qualitative or quantitative. An analysis may range from a simple report that interprets test results or compares two similar systems to a detailed analysis that may or may not include estimated numerical probabilities. The depth and scope of an analysis depends on the types of functions performed by the system, the severity of failure conditions, and whether or not the system is complex. (4) Experienced engineering and operational judgement should be applied when determining whether or not a system is complex. Comparison with similar, previously approved systems is sometimes helpful. All relevant systems’ attributes should be considered; however, the complexity of the software and hardware item need not be a dominant factor in the determination of complexity at the system level. b. Single Failure Considerations. (1) According to the requirements of [CS 25.1309(b)(1)(ii)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691), a catastrophic failure condition must not result from the failure of a single component, part, or element of a system. Failure containment should be provided by the system design to limit the propagation of the effects of any single failure to preclude catastrophic failure conditions. In addition, there must be no common-cause failure, which could affect both the single component, part, or element, and its failure containment provisions. A single failure includes any set of failures, which cannot be shown to be independent from each other. Common-cause failures (including common mode failures) and cascading failures should be evaluated as dependent failures from the point of the root cause or the initiator. Errors in development, manufacturing, installation, and maintenance can result in common-cause failures (including common mode failures) and cascading failures. They should, therefore, be assessed and mitigated in the frame of the common-cause and cascading failures consideration. Appendix 1 and the Document referenced in paragraph 3.b(3) describe types of common-cause analyses that may be conducted~~,~~ to assure that independence is maintained. Failure containment techniques available to establish independence may include partitioning, separation, and isolation. (2) While single failures must normally be assumed to occur, there are cases where it is obvious that, from a realistic and practical viewpoint, any knowledgeable, experienced person would unequivocally conclude that a failure mode simply would not occur, unless it is associated with a wholly unrelated failure condition that would itself be catastrophic. Once identified and accepted, such cases need not be considered failures in the context of [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691). For example, with simply loaded static elements, any failure mode, resulting from fatigue fracture, can be assumed to be prevented if this element is shown to meet the damage tolerance requirements of [CS 25.571](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820942). c. Common Cause Failure Considerations. An analysis should consider the application of the fail-safe design concept described in paragraph 6b and give special attention to ensure the effective use of design and installation techniques that would prevent single failures or other events from damaging or otherwise adversely affecting more than one redundant system channel, more than one system performing operationally similar functions, or any system and an associated safeguard. When considering such common-cause failures or other events, consequential or cascading effects should be taken into account. Some examples of such potential common cause failures or other events would include rapid release of energy from concentrated sources such as uncontained failures of rotating parts (other than engines and propellers) or pressure vessels, pressure differentials, non-catastrophic structural failures, loss of environmental conditioning, disconnection of more than one subsystem or component by over temperature protection devices, contamination by fluids, damage from localised fires, loss of power supply or return (e.g. mechanical damage or deterioration of connections), excessive voltage, physical or environmental interactions among parts, errors, or events external to the system or to the aeroplane (see Document referenced in paragraph 3b(3)). d. *Depth of Analysis*. The following identifies the depth of analysis expected based on the classification of a failure condition. (1) *No Safety Effect Failure Conditions*. An FHA, with a design and installation appraisal, to establish independence from other functions is necessary for the safety assessment of these failure conditions. If it is chosen not to do an FHA, the safety effects may be derived from the design and installation appraisal. (2) *Minor Failure Conditions*. An FHA, with a design and installation appraisal, to establish independence from other functions is necessary for the safety assessment of these failure conditions. Combinations of failure condition effects, as noted in paragraph 10 above, must also be considered. If it is chosen not to do an FHA, the safety effects may be derived from the design and installation appraisal. (3) *Major Failure Conditions*. Major failure conditions must be remote: (i) If the system is similar in its relevant attributes to those used in other aeroplanes and the effects of failure would be the same, then design and installation appraisals (as described in [Appendix 1](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821197)), and satisfactory service history of the equipment being analysed, or of similar design, will usually be acceptable for showing compliance. (ii) For systems that are not complex, where similarity cannot be used as the basis for compliance, then compliance may be shown by means of a qualitative assessment that shows that the system-level major failure conditions, of the system as installed, are consistent with the FHA and are remote, e.g. redundant systems. (iii) For complex systems without redundancy, compliance may be shown as in paragraph 11.d(3)(ii) of this AMC. To show that malfunctions are indeed remote in systems of high complexity without redundancy (for example, a system with a self-monitoring microprocessor), it is sometimes necessary to conduct a qualitative functional failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) supported by failure rate data and fault detection coverage analysis. (iv) An analysis of a redundant system is usually complete if it shows isolation between redundant system channels and satisfactory reliability for each channel. For complex systems where functional redundancy is required, a qualitative FMEA and qualitative fault tree analysis may be necessary to determine that redundancy actually exists (e.g. no single failure affects all functional channels). (4) *Hazardous and Catastrophic Failure Conditions*. Hazardous failure conditions must be extremely remote, and catastrophic failure conditions must be extremely improbable: (i) Except as specified in paragraph 11.d(4)(ii) below, a detailed safety analysis will be necessary for each hazardous and catastrophic failure condition identified by the FHA. The analysis will usually be a combination of qualitative and quantitative assessment of the design. (ii) For very simple and conventional installations, i.e. low complexity and similarity in relevant attributes, it may be possible to assess a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition as being extremely remote or extremely improbable, respectively, on the basis of experienced engineering judgement, using only qualitative analysis. The basis for the assessment will be the degree of redundancy, the established independence and isolation of the channels and the reliability record of the technology involved. Satisfactory service experience on similar systems commonly used in many aeroplanes may be sufficient when a close similarity is established in respect of both the system design and operating conditions. (iii) For complex systems where true similarity in all relevant attributes, including installation attributes, can be rigorously established, it may be also possible to assess a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition as being extremely remote or extremely improbable, respectively, on the basis of experienced engineering judgement, using only qualitative analysis. A high degree of similarity in both design and application is required to be substantiated. e. Calculation of Average Probability per Flight Hour (Quantitative Analysis). (1) The average probability per flight hour is the probability of occurrence, normalised by the flight time, of a failure condition during a flight, which can be seen as an average over all possible flights of the fleet of aeroplane to be certified. The calculation of the average probability per flight hour for a failure condition should consider: (i) the average flight duration and the average flight profile for the aeroplane type to be certified, (ii) all combinations of failures and events that contribute to the failure condition, (iii) the conditional probability if a sequence of events is necessary to produce the failure condition, (iv) the relevant ʽat risk’ time if an event is only relevant during certain flight phases, and (v) the exposure time if the failure can persist for multiple flights. (2) The details how to calculate the average probability per flight hour for a failure condition are given in Appendix 3 of this AMC. (3) If the probability of a subject failure condition occurring during a typical flight of mean duration for the aeroplane type divided by the flight’s mean duration in hours is likely to be significantly different from the predicted average rate of occurrence of that failure condition during the entire operational life of all aeroplanes of that type, then a risk model that better reflects the failure condition should be used. (4) It is recognised that, for various reasons, component failure rate data are not precise enough to enable accurate estimates of the probabilities of failure conditions. This results in some degree of uncertainty, as indicated by the wide line in Figure 1, and the expression ʽon the order of’ in the descriptions of the quantitative probability terms that are provided above. When calculating the estimated probability of each failure condition, this uncertainty should be accounted for in a way that does not compromise safety. f. *Integrated Systems.* Interconnections between systems have been a feature of aeroplane design for many years and [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) recognises this in requiring systems to be considered in relation to other systems. Providing the interfaces between systems are relatively few and simple, and hence readily understandable, compliance may often be demonstrated through a series of system safety assessments, each of which deals with a particular failure condition (or more likely a group of failure conditions) associated with a system and, where necessary, takes account of failures arising at the interface with other systems. This procedure has been found to be acceptable in many past certification programmes. However, where the systems and their interfaces become more complex and extensive, the task of demonstrating compliance may become more complex. It is therefore essential that the means of compliance be considered early in the design phase to ensure that the design can be supported by a viable safety assessment strategy. Aspects of the guidance material covered elsewhere in this AMC and which should be given particular consideration are as follows: (1) planning the proposed means of compliance; this should include development assurance activities to mitigate the occurrence of errors in the design, (2) considering the importance of architectural design in limiting the impact and propagation of failures, (3) the potential for common-cause failures and cascade effects and the possible need to assess combinations of multiple lower-level (e.g. major) failure conditions, (4) the importance of multidisciplinary teams in identifying and classifying significant failure conditions, (5) effect of crew and maintenance procedures in limiting the impact and propagation of failures. In addition, rigorous and well-structured design and development procedures play an essential role in facilitating a methodical safety assessment process and providing visibility to the means of compliance. Document referenced in paragraph 3b(2) may be helpful in the certification of highly integrated or complex aircraft systems. g. *Operational or Environmental Conditions*. A probability of one should usually be used for encountering a discrete condition for which the aeroplane is designed, such as instrument meteorological conditions or Category III weather operations. However, Appendix 4 contains allowable probabilities, which may be assigned to various operational and environmental conditions for use in computing the average probability per flight hour of failure conditions without further justification. Single failures, which, in combination with operational or environmental conditions, lead to catastrophic failure conditions, are, in general, not acceptable. Limited cases that are properly justified may be considered on a case-by-case basis (e.g. operational events or environmental conditions that are extremely remote). Appendix 4 is provided for guidance and is not intended to be exhaustive or prescriptive. At this time, a number of items have no accepted standard statistical data from which to derive a probability figure. However, these items are included for either future consideration or as items for which the applicant may propose a probability figure supported by statistically valid data or supporting service experience. The applicant may propose additional conditions or different probabilities from those in Appendix 4 provided they are based on statistically valid data or supporting service experience. The applicant should obtain early concurrence of EASA when such conditions are to be included in an analysis. When combining the probability of such a random condition with that of a system failure, care should be taken to ensure that the condition and the system failure are independent of one another, or that any dependencies are properly accounted for. h. Justification of Assumptions, Data Sources and Analytical Techniques. (1) Any analysis is only as accurate as the assumptions, data, and analytical techniques it uses. Therefore, to show compliance with the requirements, the underlying assumptions, data, and analytic techniques should be identified and justified to assure that the conclusions of the analysis are valid. Variability may be inherent in elements such as failure modes, failure effects, failure rates, failure probability distribution functions, failure exposure times, failure detection methods, fault independence, limitation of analytical methods, processes, and assumptions. The justification of the assumptions made with respect to the above items should be an integral part of the analysis. Assumptions can be validated by using experience with identical or similar systems or components with due allowance made for differences of design, duty cycle and environment. Where it is not possible to fully justify the adequacy of the safety analysis and where data or assumptions are critical to the acceptability of the Failure Condition, extra conservatism should be built into either the analysis or the design. Alternatively any uncertainty in the data and assumptions should be evaluated to the degree necessary to demonstrate that the analysis conclusions are insensitive to that uncertainty. (2) Where adequate validation data is not available (e.g., new or novel systems), and extra conservatism is built into the analysis, then the normal post-certification in-service follow-up may be performed to obtain the data necessary to alleviate any consequence of the extra conservatism. This data may be used, for example, to extend system check intervals. 12. OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE CONSIDERATIONS. This AMC addresses only those operational and maintenance considerations that are directly related to compliance with [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691); other operational and maintenance considerations are not discussed herein. Flight crew and maintenance tasks related to compliance with this requirement should be appropriate and reasonable. However, quantitative assessments of crew errors are not considered feasible. Therefore, reasonable tasks are those for which full credit can be taken because they can realistically be anticipated to be performed correctly when they are required or scheduled. In addition, based on experienced engineering and operational judgement, the discovery of obvious failures during normal operation or maintenance of the aeroplane may be assumed, even though identification of such failures is not the primary purpose of the operational or maintenance actions. a. Flight Crew Action. When assessing the ability of the flight crew to cope with a failure condition, the information provided to the crew and the complexity of the required action should be considered. When considering the information provided to the flight crew, refer also to paragraph 9.c (compliance with [CS 25.1309(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691)). Credit for flight crew actions, and considerations of flight crew errors, should be consistent with relevant service experience and acceptable human factors evaluations. If the evaluation indicates that a potential failure condition can be alleviated or overcome without jeopardising other safety-related flight crew tasks and without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, credit may be taken for both qualitative and quantitative assessments. Similarly, credit may be taken for correct flight crew performance of the periodic checks required to demonstrate compliance with [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) provided overall flight crew workload during the time available to perform them is not excessive and they do not require exceptional pilot skill or strength. Unless flight crew actions are accepted as normal airmanship, they should be described in the approved Aeroplane Flight Manual in compliance with CS 25.1585. The applicant should provide a means to ensure that the AFM will contain the required flight crew actions that have been used as mitigation factors in the hazard classification or that have been taken as assumptions to limit the exposure time of failures. *b. Maintenance Action.* Credit may be taken for the correct accomplishment of reasonable maintenance tasks, for both qualitative and quantitative assessments. The maintenance tasks needed to demonstrate compliance with [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) should be established. In doing this, the following maintenance scenarios can be used: (1) For failures known to the flight crew, refer to paragraph 12.d. (2) Latent failures will be identified by a scheduled maintenance task. If this approach is taken, and the failure condition is hazardous or catastrophic, then a CCMR maintenance task should be established. Some latent failures can be assumed to be identified based upon return to service test on the LRU following its removal and repair (component mean time between failures (MTBF) should be the basis for the check interval time). c. Candidate Certification Maintenance Requirements. (1) By detecting the presence of, and thereby limiting the exposure time to significant latent failures that would, in combination with one or more other specific failures or events identified by safety analysis, result in a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition, periodic maintenance or flight crew checks may be used to help show compliance with [CS 25.1309(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691). Where such checks cannot be accepted as basic servicing or airmanship they become CCMRs. [AMC 25.19](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821408) details the handling of CCMRs. (2) Rational methods, which usually involve quantitative analysis, or relevant service experience should be used to determine check intervals. This analysis contains inherent uncertainties as discussed in paragraph 11e(3). Where periodic checks become CMRs these uncertainties justify the controlled escalation or exceptional short-term extensions to individual CMRs allowed under [AMC 25.19](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821408). d. Flight with Equipment or Functions known to be Inoperative. An applicant may elect to develop a list of equipment and functions that need not be operative for flight, based on stated compensating precautions that should be taken, e.g. operational or time limitations, flight crew procedures, or ground crew checks. The documents used to demonstrate compliance with [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691), together with any other relevant information, should be considered in the development of this list. Experienced engineering and operational judgement should be applied during the development of this list. When operation is envisaged with equipment that is known to be inoperative, and this equipment affects the probabilities associated with hazardous and/or catastrophic failure conditions, limitations may be needed on the number of flights and/or the allowed operation time with such inoperative equipment. These limitations should be established in accordance with the recommendations contained in CS-MMEL. 13. ASSESSMENT OF MODIFICATIONS TO PREVIOUSLY CERTIFICATED AEROPLANES. The means to assure continuing compliance with [CS 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820691) for modifications to previously certificated aeroplanes should be determined on a case-by-case basis and will depend on the applicable aeroplane certification basis and the extent of the change being considered. The change could be a simple modification affecting only one system or a major redesign of many systems, possibly incorporating new technologies. The minimal effort for demonstrating compliance to 25.1309 for any modification is an assessment of the impact on the original system safety assessment. The result of this assessment may range from a simple statement that the existing system safety assessment still applies to the modified system in accordance with the original means of compliance, to the need for new means of compliance encompassing the plan referred to in paragraph 9b. (STC applicants, if the TC holder is unwilling to release or transfer proprietary data in this regard, the STC applicant may have to create the System Safety Assessment. Further guidance may be found in paragraph 6 of Document referenced in paragraph 3b(2).) It is recommended that the Agency be contacted early to obtain agreement on the means of compliance. [Amdt 25/2] [Amdt 25/4] [Amdt 25/8] [Amdt 25/11] [Amdt 25/12] [Amdt 25/14] [Amdt 25/19] [Amdt 25/24] [Amdt 25/27]