Article 11 -- Incentive schemes

• Regulation (EU) 2019/317 found in: SKPI (2019/317) Safety Key Performance Indicators (Dec 2020)

Article 11 — Incentive schemes Regulation (EU) 2019/317 1. The incentive schemes contained in the performance plans as adopted by the Member States shall: (a) set out incentives of financial nature for the achievement of the performance targets in the key performance areas of cost-efficiency and capacity in an effective and proportional manner; (b) apply during the entire period covered by the performance plan; (c) be non-discriminatory, transparent and effective; (d) apply to *en route* and terminal air navigation services. 2. The incentive schemes on performance targets in the key performance area of cost-efficiency shall be governed by Articles 27 and 28. 3. The incentive schemes on performance targets in the key performance area of capacity shall in addition to the principles set out in paragraph 1, meet the following principles: (a) they shall be proportionate to the level of ATFM delay and consist of financial advantages and financial disadvantages having material impact on revenue at risk; (b) they shall be set so that the maximum financial disadvantages are at least equal to the maximum financial advantages; The national supervisory authority shall define the maximum fixed percentages referred to in the second subparagraphs of points 2.1(a) and 2.2(a) of [Annex XIII](#_DxCrossRefBm1409943983) and in the second subparagraphs of points 2.1(b) and 2.2(b) of Annex XIII for the calculation of the financial advantages and disadvantages, subject to consultation of airspace users' representatives and of air navigation service providers concerned. In respect to the maximum fixed percentages referred to in the second subparagraphs of points 2.1(a) and 2.2(a) of [Annex XIII](#_DxCrossRefBm1409943983) for the calculation of the financial advantages, those percentages shall not exceed 2 %; (c) for the purpose of calculating the financial advantages or disadvantages, pivot values shall be used; The national supervisory authority shall decide, before the start of the reference period, whether those pivot values are to be based: (i) on the performance targets at national level, broken down at the level of each individual air navigation service provider; or (ii) on modulated performance targets at national level, broken down at the level of each individual air navigation service provider, set annually by the national supervisory authority for the following year in accordance with point 1 of [Annex XIII](#_DxCrossRefBm1409943983) and subject to consultation of airspace users' representatives and of air navigation service providers concerned. The modulation mechanism shall be defined in the performance plan and shall apply for each year of the reference period and shall not be changed during the reference period. The national supervisory authority shall inform the Commission about the pivot values annually; (d) there shall be a symmetric range around the pivot value set by the national supervisory authority, subject to consultation of airspace users' representatives and of air navigation service providers concerned, to ensure that minor variations in ATFM delay do not lead to any financial advantages or disadvantages; (e) where the actual average ATFM delay per flight in year n is lower than the pivot value set for year n and beyond the range referred to in point (d), this shall result in a financial advantage through an increase of the unit rate in year n+2 in accordance with point 2 of [Annex XIII](#_DxCrossRefBm1409943983); (f) where the actual average ATFM delay per flight in year n is higher than the pivot value set for year n and beyond the range referred to in point (d), this shall result in a financial disadvantage through a reduction of the unit rate in year n+2 in accordance with point 2 of [Annex XIII](#_DxCrossRefBm1409943983); (g) for the *en route* targets in the key performance area of capacity and where the performance plan is established at functional airspace block level, the following provisions shall apply, in additional to the principles referred to in points (a) to (f): (i) the national supervisory authorities concerned shall break down the FAB performance target referred to in point 3.1(a) of Section 2 of [Annex I](#_DxCrossRefBm1409943975) at the level of each individual air navigation service provider concerned, for the purpose of setting incentives at national level. The resulting values shall form the basis for pivot values referred to in point (c); (ii) the national supervisory authorities concerned shall apply the same incentive scheme, in a consistent manner to all air navigation service providers concerned; (iii) pivot values for the functional airspace block shall also be used in addition to pivot values at the level of each individual air navigation service provider referred to in point (i), and shall be based either: — on the performance targets at functional airspace block level, or — on modulated performance targets at functional airspace block level in accordance with point 1 of Annex XIII and subject to consultation of airspace users' representatives and of air navigation service providers concerned; (iv) by way of derogation from point (c), all national supervisory authorities concerned shall jointly decide on whether the pivot values at the level of each individual air navigation service provider and functional airspace block level are to be modulated or not. This decision shall apply in a uniform manner to all pivot values at the level of each individual air navigation service provider and functional airspace block level, for the entire duration of the reference period; (v) where performance targets at national and functional airspace block level are to be modulated, the same modulation mechanism shall apply to performance targets at national level and functional airspace block level; (vi) where the total *en route* ATFM delay per flight in year n at the functional airspace block level is higher than the pivot value set for year n referred to in point (iii) and beyond the range referred to in point (d) of paragraph 3, point (e) of paragraph 3 shall not apply and point (f) of paragraph 3 shall apply only to those air navigation service providers for which the actual ATFM delay per flight in year n is higher than the pivot value set for year n and beyond the range referred to in point (d); (vii) where the total *en route* ATFM delay per flight in year n at the functional airspace block level is lower than the pivot value set for year n referred to in point (iii) and beyond the range referred to in point (d) of paragraph 3, point (f) of paragraph 3 shall not apply and point (e) of paragraph 3 shall apply only to those air navigation service providers for which the actual ATFM delay per flight in year n is lower than the pivot value set for year n and beyond the range referred to in point (d). 4. The incentive schemes contained in the performance plans as adopted by the Member States may also set out incentives of financial nature for the achievement of the performance targets in the key performance area of environment or for the achievement of the additional performance targets referred to in Article 10(3) in line with points (b) and (c) of paragraph 1, provided that they are effective and proportional. Those incentive schemes should be applied in addition to and independently from the incentive schemes referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3. The aggregated financial advantage or financial disadvantage from those incentive schemes shall not exceed 2 % and 4 % of the determined costs of year n respectively.