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GM4 to AMC2 ATS.TR.255 Operations on parallel or near-parallel runways
Available versions for ERULES-1963177438-17304
ED Decision 2020/008/R
found in: ATM/ANS Provision of Services (2017/373) (Feb 2023)
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GM4 to AMC2 ATS.TR.255 Operations on parallel or near-parallel runways ED Decision 2020/008/R PRECISION APPROACH PROCEDURE — DEMONSTRATION OF SAFETY With reference to point (d)(3) of [AMC2 ATS.TR.255](#_DxCrossRefBm1726555585), the demonstration of the safety of an APV procedure designed using either RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH navigation specification during simultaneous approaches may consider, inter alia: (a) the collision risk from normal and residual (not mitigated) atypical errors; (b) likelihood of ACAS nuisance alerting during normal operations; (c) wake hazard; (d) monitoring and available levels of system automation; (e) data base management; (f) flight management system input and related crew workload; (g) impacts of meteorological conditions and other environmental factors; and (h) training and published ATC break-out procedures.
GM4 to AMC2 ATS.TR.255 Operations on parallel or near-parallel runways ED Decision 2020/008/R PRECISION APPROACH PROCEDURE — DEMONSTRATION OF SAFETY With reference to point (d)(3) of [AMC2 ATS.TR.255](#_DxCrossRefBm647742763), the demonstration of the safety of an APV procedure designed using either RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH navigation specification during simultaneous approaches may consider, inter alia: (a) the collision risk from normal and residual (not mitigated) atypical errors; (b) likelihood of ACAS nuisance alerting during normal operations; (c) wake hazard; (d) monitoring and available levels of system automation; (e) data base management; (f) flight management system input and related crew workload; (g) impacts of meteorological conditions and other environmental factors; and (h) training and published ATC break-out procedures.