GM1 NCC.OP.220 Airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS)

• ED Decision 2019/019/R found in: Air Operations (965/2012) Part-ARO Part-ORO Part-CAT Part-SPA Part-NCC Part-NCO Part-SPO (Feb 2025)

GM1 NCC.OP.220 Airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) ED Decision 2019/019/R GENERAL (a) The ACAS operational procedures and training programmes established by the operator should take into account this Guidance Material. It incorporates advice contained in: (1) ICAO Annex 10, Volume IV; (2) ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS), Volume III; and (3) ICAO PANS-ATM. (b) Additional guidance material on ACAS may be referred to, including information available from such sources as EUROCONTROL. ACAS FLIGHT CREW TRAINING (c) During the implementation of ACAS, several operational issues were identified that had been attributed to deficiencies in flight crew training programmes. As a result, the issue of flight crew training has been discussed within the ICAO, which has developed guidelines for operators to use when designing training programmes. (d) This Guidance Material contains performance-based training objectives for ACAS II flight crew training. Information contained here related to traffic advisories (TAs) is also applicable to ACAS I and ACAS II users. The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight operations; general in-flight operations; response to TAs; and response to resolution advisories (RAs). (e) The information provided is valid for version 7 and 7.1 (ACAS II). Where differences arise, these are identified. (f) The performance-based training objectives are further divided into the areas of: academic training; manoeuvre training; initial evaluation and recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas, the training material has been separated into those items which are considered essential training items and those which are considered desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable performance criteria are defined. (g) ACAS academic training (1) This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests or through providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions. (2) Essential items (i) Theory of operation. The flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of ACAS II operation and the criteria used for issuing TAs and RAs. This training should address the following topics: (A) System operation Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of how ACAS functions. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the following functions: (a) Surveillance (1) ACAS interrogates other transponder-equipped aircraft within a nominal range of 14 NM. (2) ACAS surveillance range can be reduced in geographic areas with a large number of ground interrogators and/or ACAS II-equipped aircraft. (3) If the operator's ACAS implementation provides for the use of the Mode S extended squitter, the normal surveillance range may be increased beyond the nominal 14 NM. However, this information is not used for collision avoidance purposes. (b) Collision avoidance (1) TAs can be issued against any transponder-equipped aircraft that responds to the ICAO Mode C interrogations, even if the aircraft does not have altitude reporting capability. (2) RAs can be issued only against aircraft that are reporting altitude and in the vertical plane only. (3) RAs issued against an ACAS-equipped intruder are co-ordinated to ensure complementary RAs are issued. (4) Failure to respond to an RA deprives own aircraft of the collision protection provided by own ACAS. (5) Additionally, in ACAS-ACAS encounters, failure to respond to an RA also restricts the choices available to the other aircraft's ACAS and thus renders the other aircraft's ACAS less effective than if own aircraft were not ACAS equipped. (B) Advisory thresholds Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following: (a) ACAS advisories are based on time to closest point of approach (CPA) rather than distance. The time should be short and vertical separation should be small, or projected to be small, before an advisory can be issued. The separation standards provided by ATS are different from the miss distances against which ACAS issues alerts. (b) Thresholds for issuing a TA or an RA vary with altitude. The thresholds are larger at higher altitudes. (c) A TA occurs from 15 to 48 seconds and an RA from 15 to 35 seconds before the projected CPA. (d) RAs are chosen to provide the desired vertical miss distance at CPA. As a result, RAs can instruct a climb or descent through the intruder aircraft's altitude. (C) ACAS limitations Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the limitations of ACAS. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of ACAS limitations, including the following: (a) ACAS will neither track nor display non-transponder-equipped aircraft, nor aircraft not responding to ACAS Mode C interrogations. (b) ACAS will automatically fail if the input from the aircraft’s barometric altimeter, radio altimeter or transponder is lost. (1) In some installations, the loss of information from other on board systems such as an inertial reference system (IRS) or attitude heading reference system (AHRS) may result in an ACAS failure. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crews are aware of the types of failure which will result in an ACAS failure. (2) ACAS may react in an improper manner when false altitude information is provided to own ACAS or transmitted by another aircraft. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crew are aware of the types of unsafe conditions which can arise. Flight crew members should ensure that when they are advised, if their own aircraft is transmitting false altitude reports, an alternative altitude reporting source is selected, or altitude reporting is switched off. (c) Some aeroplanes within 380 ft above ground level (AGL) (nominal value) are deemed to be ‘on ground’ and will not be displayed. If ACAS is able to determine an aircraft below this altitude is airborne, it will be displayed. (d) ACAS may not display all proximate transponder-equipped aircraft in areas of high density traffic. (e) The bearing displayed by ACAS is not sufficiently accurate to support the initiation of horizontal manoeuvres based solely on the traffic display. (f) ACAS will neither track nor display intruders with a vertical speed in excess of 10 000 ft/min. In addition, the design implementation may result in some short-term errors in the tracked vertical speed of an intruder during periods of high vertical acceleration by the intruder. (g) Ground proximity warning systems/ground collision avoidance systems (GPWSs/GCASs) warnings and wind shear warnings take precedence over ACAS advisories. When either a GPWS/GCAS or wind shear warning is active, ACAS aural annunciations will be inhibited and ACAS will automatically switch to the 'TA only' mode of operation. (D) ACAS inhibits Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the conditions under which certain functions of ACAS are inhibited. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the various ACAS inhibits, including the following: (a) ‘Increase Descent’ RAs are inhibited below 1 450 ft AGL. (b) ‘Descend’ RAs are inhibited below 1 100 ft AGL. (c) All RAs are inhibited below 1 000 ft AGL. (d) All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL. (e) Altitude and configuration under which ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are inhibited. ACAS can still issue ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs when operating at the aeroplane's certified ceiling. (In some aircraft types, ‘Climb’ or ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are never inhibited.) (ii) Operating procedures The flight crew member should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate the ACAS avionics and interpret the information presented by ACAS. This training should address the following: (A) Use of controls Objective: to verify that the pilot can properly operate all ACAS and display controls. Criteria: demonstrate the proper use of controls, including the following: (a) Aircraft configuration required to initiate a self-test. (b) Steps required to initiate a self-test. (c) Recognising when the self-test was successful and when it was unsuccessful. When the self-test is unsuccessful, recognising the reason for the failure and, if possible, correcting the problem. (d) Recommended usage of range selection. Low ranges are used in the terminal area and the higher display ranges are used in the en-route environment and in the transition between the terminal and en-route environment. (e) Recognising that the configuration of the display does not affect the ACAS surveillance volume. (f) Selection of lower ranges when an advisory is issued, to increase display resolution. (g) Proper configuration to display the appropriate ACAS information without eliminating the display of other needed information. (h) If available, recommended usage of the above/below mode selector. The above mode should be used during climb and the below mode should be used during descent. (i) If available, proper selection of the display of absolute or relative altitude and the limitations of using this display if a barometric correction is not provided to ACAS. (B) Display interpretation Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands the meaning of all information that can be displayed by ACAS. The wide variety of display implementations require the tailoring of some criteria. When the training programme is developed, these criteria should be expanded to cover details for the operator's specific display implementation. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the ability to properly interpret information displayed by ACAS, including the following: (a) Other traffic, i.e. traffic within the selected display range that is not proximate traffic, or causing a TA or RA to be issued. (b) Proximate traffic, i.e. traffic that is within 6 NM and ± 1 200 ft. (c) Non-altitude reporting traffic. (d) No bearing TAs and RAs. (e) Off-scale TAs and RAs: the selected range should be changed to ensure that all available information on the intruder is displayed. (f) TAs: the minimum available display range that allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution. (g) RAs (traffic display): the minimum available display range of the traffic display that allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution. (h) RAs (RA display): flight crew members should demonstrate knowledge of the meaning of the red and green areas or the meaning of pitch or flight path angle cues displayed on the RA display. Flight crew members should also demonstrate an understanding of the RA display limitations, i.e. if a vertical speed tape is used and the range of the tape is less than 2 500 ft/min, an increase rate RA cannot be properly displayed. (i) If appropriate, awareness that navigation displays oriented on ‘Track-Up’ may require a flight crew member to make a mental adjustment for drift angle when assessing the bearing of proximate traffic. (C) Use of the TA only mode Objective: to verify that a flight crew member understands the appropriate times to select the TA only mode of operation and the limitations associated with using this mode. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following: (a) Knowledge of the operator's guidance for the use of TA only. (b) Reasons for using this mode. If TA only is not selected when an airport is conducting simultaneous operations from parallel runways separated by less than 1 200 ft, and to some intersecting runways, RAs can be expected. If, for any reason, TA only is not selected and an RA is received in these situations, the response should comply with the operator's approved procedures. (c) All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL. As a result, TAs issued below 500 ft AGL may not be noticed unless the TA display is included in the routine instrument scan. (D) Crew coordination Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands how ACAS advisories will be handled. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of the crew procedures that should be used when responding to TAs and RAs, including the following: (a) task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring; (b) expected call-outs; and (c) communications with ATC. (E) Phraseology rules Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the controller. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following: (a) the use of the phraseology contained in ICAO PANS-OPS; (b) an understanding of the procedures contained in ICAO PANS-ATM and ICAO Annex 2; and (c) the understanding that verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate ATC unit: (1) whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance; (2) when, subsequent to a manoeuvre that has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance, the aeroplane has returned to a flight path that complies with the clearance; and/or (3) when air traffic issue instructions that, if followed, would cause the crew to manoeuvre the aircraft contrary to an RA with which they are complying. (F) Reporting rules Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the operator. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of where information can be obtained regarding the need for making written reports to various States when an RA is issued. Various States have different reporting rules and the material available to the flight crew member should be tailored to the operator’s operating environment. This responsibility is satisfied by the flight crew member reporting to the operator according to the applicable reporting rules. (3) Non-essential items: advisory thresholds Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following: (i) The minimum and maximum altitudes below/above which TAs will not be issued. (ii) When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be less than the ACAS-desired separation, a corrective RA that requires a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 300 ft at low altitude to a maximum of 700 ft at high altitude. (iii) When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be just outside the ACAS-desired separation, a preventive RA that does not require a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 600 to 800 ft. (iv) RA fixed range thresholds vary between 0.2 and 1.1 NM. (h) ACAS manoeuvre training (1) Demonstration of the flight crew member’s ability to use ACAS displayed information to properly respond to TAs and RAs should be carried out in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. If a full flight simulator is utilised, crew resource management (CRM) should be practised during this training. (2) Alternatively, the required demonstrations can be carried out by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made. The flight crew member should be informed whether or not the responses made were correct. If the response was incorrect or inappropriate, the CBT should show what the correct response should be. (3) The scenarios included in the manoeuvre training should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-aircraft encounters. The consequences of failure to respond correctly should be demonstrated by reference to actual incidents such as those publicised in EUROCONTROL ACAS II Bulletins (available on the EUROCONTROL website). (i) TA responses Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to TAs. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following: (A) Proper division of responsibilities between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should fly the aircraft using any type-specific procedures and be prepared to respond to any RA that might follow. For aircraft without an RA pitch display, the pilot flying should consider the likely magnitude of an appropriate pitch change. The pilot monitoring should provide updates on the traffic location shown on the ACAS display, using this information to help visually acquire the intruder. (B) Proper interpretation of the displayed information. Flight crew members should confirm that the aircraft they have visually acquired is that which has caused the TA to be issued. Use should be made of all information shown on the display, note being taken of the bearing and range of the intruder (amber circle), whether it is above or below (data tag), and its vertical speed direction (trend arrow). (C) Other available information should be used to assist in visual acquisition, including ATC ‘party-line’ information, traffic flow in use, etc. (D) Because of the limitations described, the pilot flying should not manoeuvre the aircraft based solely on the information shown on the ACAS display. No attempt should be made to adjust the current flight path in anticipation of what an RA would advise, except that if own aircraft is approaching its cleared level at a high vertical rate with a TA present, vertical rate should be reduced to less than 1 500 ft/min. (E) When visual acquisition is attained, and as long as no RA is received, normal right of way rules should be used to maintain or attain safe separation. No unnecessary manoeuvres should be initiated. The limitations of making manoeuvres based solely on visual acquisition, especially at high altitude or at night, or without a definite horizon should be demonstrated as being understood. (ii) RA responses Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to RAs. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following: (A) Proper response to the RA, even if it is in conflict with an ATC instruction and even if the pilot believes that there is no threat present. (B) Proper task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should respond to a corrective RA with appropriate control inputs. The pilot monitoring should monitor the response to the RA and should provide updates on the traffic location by checking the traffic display. Proper CRM should be used. (C) Proper interpretation of the displayed information. The pilot should recognise the intruder causing the RA to be issued (red square on display). The pilot should respond appropriately. (D) For corrective RAs, the response should be initiated in the proper direction within 5 seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ¼ g (gravitational acceleration of 9.81 m/sec²). (E) Recognition of the initially displayed RA being modified. Response to the modified RA should be properly accomplished, as follows: (a) For increase rate RAs, the vertical speed change should be started within 2½ seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ⅓ g. (b) For RA reversals, the vertical speed reversal should be started within 2½ seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ⅓ g. (c) For RA weakenings, the vertical speed should be modified to initiate a return towards the original clearance. (d) An acceleration of approximately ¼ g will be achieved if the change in pitch attitude corresponding to a change in vertical speed of 1 500 ft/min is accomplished in approximately 5 seconds, and of ⅓ g if the change is accomplished in approximately 3 seconds. The change in pitch attitude required to establish a rate of climb or descent of 1 500 ft/min from level flight will be approximately 6° when the true airspeed (TAS) is 150 kt, 4° at 250 kt, and 2° at 500 kt. (These angles are derived from the formula: 1 000 divided by TAS.). (F) Recognition of altitude crossing encounters and the proper response to these RAs. (G) For preventive RAs, the vertical speed needle or pitch attitude indication should remain outside the red area on the RA display. (H) For maintain rate RAs, the vertical speed should not be reduced. Pilots should recognise that a maintain rate RA may result in crossing through the intruder's altitude. (I) When the RA weakens, or when the green 'fly to' indicator changes position, the pilot should initiate a return towards the original clearance, and when ‘clear of conflict’ is annunciated, the pilot should complete the return to the original clearance. (J) The controller should be informed of the RA as soon as time and workload permit, using the standard phraseology. (K) When possible, an ATC clearance should be complied with while responding to an RA. For example, if the aircraft can level at the assigned altitude while responding to RA (an ‘adjust vertical speed’ RA (version 7) or ‘level off’ (version 7.1)), it should be done; the horizontal (turn) element of an ATC instruction should be followed. (L) Knowledge of the ACAS multi-aircraft logic and its limitations, and that ACAS can optimise separations from two aircraft by climbing or descending towards one of them. For example, ACAS only considers intruders that it considers to be a threat when selecting an RA. As such, it is possible for ACAS to issue an RA against one intruder that results in a manoeuvre towards another intruder that is not classified as a threat. If the second intruder becomes a threat, the RA will be modified to provide separation from that intruder. (i) ACAS initial evaluation (1) The flight crew member’s understanding of the academic training items should be assessed by means of a written test or interactive CBT that records correct and incorrect responses to phrased questions. (2) The flight crew member’s understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be assessed in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the flight crew member will fly, and the results assessed by a qualified instructor, inspector, or check airman. The range of scenarios should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-threat encounters. The scenarios should also include demonstrations of the consequences of not responding to RAs, slow or late responses, and manoeuvring opposite to the direction called for by the displayed RA. (3) Alternatively, exposure to these scenarios can be conducted by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the pilot will fly. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made and a record made of whether or not each response was correct. (j) ACAS recurrent training (1) ACAS recurrent training ensures that flight crew members maintain the appropriate ACAS knowledge and skills. ACAS recurrent training should be integrated into and/or conducted in conjunction with other established recurrent training programmes. An essential item of recurrent training is the discussion of any significant issues and operational concerns that have been identified by the operator. Recurrent training should also address changes to ACAS logic, parameters or procedures and to any unique ACAS characteristics which flight crew members should be made aware of. (2) It is recommended that operator's recurrent training programmes using full flight simulators include encounters with conflicting traffic when these simulators are equipped with ACAS. The full range of likely scenarios may be spread over a 2 year period. If a full flight simulator, as described above, is not available, use should be made of an interactive CBT that is capable of presenting scenarios to which pilot responses should be made in real-time. GM1 NCC.OP.220 Airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) ED Decision 2019/019/R GENERAL (a) The ACAS operational procedures and training programmes established by the operator should take into account this Guidance Material. It incorporates advice contained in: (1) ICAO Annex 10, Volume IV; (2) ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS), Volume III; and (3) ICAO PANS-ATM. (b) Additional guidance material on ACAS may be referred to, including information available from such sources as EUROCONTROL. ACAS FLIGHT CREW TRAINING (c) During the implementation of ACAS, several operational issues were identified that had been attributed to deficiencies in flight crew training programmes. As a result, the issue of flight crew training has been discussed within the ICAO, which has developed guidelines for operators to use when designing training programmes. (d) This Guidance Material contains performance-based training objectives for ACAS II flight crew training. Information contained here related to traffic advisories (TAs) is also applicable to ACAS I and ACAS II users. The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight operations; general in-flight operations; response to TAs; and response to resolution advisories (RAs). (e) The information provided is valid for version 7 and 7.1 (ACAS II). Where differences arise, these are identified. (f) The performance-based training objectives are further divided into the areas of: academic training; manoeuvre training; initial evaluation and recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas, the training material has been separated into those items which are considered essential training items and those which are considered desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable performance criteria are defined. (g) ACAS academic training (1) This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests or through providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions. (2) Essential items (i) Theory of operation. The flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of ACAS II operation and the criteria used for issuing TAs and RAs. This training should address the following topics: (A) System operation Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of how ACAS functions. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the following functions: (a) Surveillance (1) ACAS interrogates other transponder-equipped aircraft within a nominal range of 14 NM. (2) ACAS surveillance range can be reduced in geographic areas with a large number of ground interrogators and/or ACAS II-equipped aircraft. (3) If the operator's ACAS implementation provides for the use of the Mode S extended squitter, the normal surveillance range may be increased beyond the nominal 14 NM. However, this information is not used for collision avoidance purposes. (b) Collision avoidance (1) TAs can be issued against any transponder-equipped aircraft that responds to the ICAO Mode C interrogations, even if the aircraft does not have altitude reporting capability. (2) RAs can be issued only against aircraft that are reporting altitude and in the vertical plane only. (3) RAs issued against an ACAS-equipped intruder are co-ordinated to ensure complementary RAs are issued. (4) Failure to respond to an RA deprives own aircraft of the collision protection provided by own ACAS. (5) Additionally, in ACAS-ACAS encounters, failure to respond to an RA also restricts the choices available to the other aircraft's ACAS and thus renders the other aircraft's ACAS less effective than if own aircraft were not ACAS equipped. (B) Advisory thresholds Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following: (a) ACAS advisories are based on time to closest point of approach (CPA) rather than distance. The time should be short and vertical separation should be small, or projected to be small, before an advisory can be issued. The separation standards provided by ATS are different from the miss distances against which ACAS issues alerts. (b) Thresholds for issuing a TA or an RA vary with altitude. The thresholds are larger at higher altitudes. (c) A TA occurs from 15 to 48 seconds and an RA from 15 to 35 seconds before the projected CPA. (d) RAs are chosen to provide the desired vertical miss distance at CPA. As a result, RAs can instruct a climb or descent through the intruder aircraft's altitude. (C) ACAS limitations Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the limitations of ACAS. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of ACAS limitations, including the following: (a) ACAS will neither track nor display non-transponder-equipped aircraft, nor aircraft not responding to ACAS Mode C interrogations. (b) ACAS will automatically fail if the input from the aircraft’s barometric altimeter, radio altimeter or transponder is lost. (1) In some installations, the loss of information from other on board systems such as an inertial reference system (IRS) or attitude heading reference system (AHRS) may result in an ACAS failure. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crews are aware of the types of failure which will result in an ACAS failure. (2) ACAS may react in an improper manner when false altitude information is provided to own ACAS or transmitted by another aircraft. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crew are aware of the types of unsafe conditions which can arise. Flight crew members should ensure that when they are advised, if their own aircraft is transmitting false altitude reports, an alternative altitude reporting source is selected, or altitude reporting is switched off. (c) Some aeroplanes within 380 ft above ground level (AGL) (nominal value) are deemed to be ‘on ground’ and will not be displayed. If ACAS is able to determine an aircraft below this altitude is airborne, it will be displayed. (d) ACAS may not display all proximate transponder-equipped aircraft in areas of high density traffic. (e) The bearing displayed by ACAS is not sufficiently accurate to support the initiation of horizontal manoeuvres based solely on the traffic display. (f) ACAS will neither track nor display intruders with a vertical speed in excess of 10 000 ft/min. In addition, the design implementation may result in some short-term errors in the tracked vertical speed of an intruder during periods of high vertical acceleration by the intruder. (g) Ground proximity warning systems/ground collision avoidance systems (GPWSs/GCASs) warnings and wind shear warnings take precedence over ACAS advisories. When either a GPWS/GCAS or wind shear warning is active, ACAS aural annunciations will be inhibited and ACAS will automatically switch to the 'TA only' mode of operation. (D) ACAS inhibits Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the conditions under which certain functions of ACAS are inhibited. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the various ACAS inhibits, including the following: (a) ‘Increase Descent’ RAs are inhibited below 1 450 ft AGL. (b) ‘Descend’ RAs are inhibited below 1 100 ft AGL. (c) All RAs are inhibited below 1 000 ft AGL. (d) All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL. (e) Altitude and configuration under which ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are inhibited. ACAS can still issue ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs when operating at the aeroplane's certified ceiling. (In some aircraft types, ‘Climb’ or ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are never inhibited.) (ii) Operating procedures The flight crew member should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate the ACAS avionics and interpret the information presented by ACAS. This training should address the following: (A) Use of controls Objective: to verify that the pilot can properly operate all ACAS and display controls. Criteria: demonstrate the proper use of controls, including the following: (a) Aircraft configuration required to initiate a self-test. (b) Steps required to initiate a self-test. (c) Recognising when the self-test was successful and when it was unsuccessful. When the self-test is unsuccessful, recognising the reason for the failure and, if possible, correcting the problem. (d) Recommended usage of range selection. Low ranges are used in the terminal area and the higher display ranges are used in the en-route environment and in the transition between the terminal and en-route environment. (e) Recognising that the configuration of the display does not affect the ACAS surveillance volume. (f) Selection of lower ranges when an advisory is issued, to increase display resolution. (g) Proper configuration to display the appropriate ACAS information without eliminating the display of other needed information. (h) If available, recommended usage of the above/below mode selector. The above mode should be used during climb and the below mode should be used during descent. (i) If available, proper selection of the display of absolute or relative altitude and the limitations of using this display if a barometric correction is not provided to ACAS. (B) Display interpretation Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands the meaning of all information that can be displayed by ACAS. The wide variety of display implementations require the tailoring of some criteria. When the training programme is developed, these criteria should be expanded to cover details for the operator's specific display implementation. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the ability to properly interpret information displayed by ACAS, including the following: (a) Other traffic, i.e. traffic within the selected display range that is not proximate traffic, or causing a TA or RA to be issued. (b) Proximate traffic, i.e. traffic that is within 6 NM and ± 1 200 ft. (c) Non-altitude reporting traffic. (d) No bearing TAs and RAs. (e) Off-scale TAs and RAs: the selected range should be changed to ensure that all available information on the intruder is displayed. (f) TAs: the minimum available display range that allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution. (g) RAs (traffic display): the minimum available display range of the traffic display that allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution. (h) RAs (RA display): flight crew members should demonstrate knowledge of the meaning of the red and green areas or the meaning of pitch or flight path angle cues displayed on the RA display. Flight crew members should also demonstrate an understanding of the RA display limitations, i.e. if a vertical speed tape is used and the range of the tape is less than 2 500 ft/min, an increase rate RA cannot be properly displayed. (i) If appropriate, awareness that navigation displays oriented on ‘Track-Up’ may require a flight crew member to make a mental adjustment for drift angle when assessing the bearing of proximate traffic. (C) Use of the TA only mode Objective: to verify that a flight crew member understands the appropriate times to select the TA only mode of operation and the limitations associated with using this mode. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following: (a) Knowledge of the operator's guidance for the use of TA only. (b) Reasons for using this mode. If TA only is not selected when an airport is conducting simultaneous operations from parallel runways separated by less than 1 200 ft, and to some intersecting runways, RAs can be expected. If, for any reason, TA only is not selected and an RA is received in these situations, the response should comply with the operator's approved procedures. (c) All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL. As a result, TAs issued below 500 ft AGL may not be noticed unless the TA display is included in the routine instrument scan. (D) Crew coordination Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands how ACAS advisories will be handled. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of the crew procedures that should be used when responding to TAs and RAs, including the following: (a) task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring; (b) expected call-outs; and (c) communications with ATC. (E) Phraseology rules Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the controller. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following: (a) the use of the phraseology contained in ICAO PANS-OPS; (b) an understanding of the procedures contained in ICAO PANS-ATM and ICAO Annex 2; and (c) the understanding that verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate ATC unit: (1) whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance; (2) when, subsequent to a manoeuvre that has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance, the aeroplane has returned to a flight path that complies with the clearance; and/or (3) when air traffic issue instructions that, if followed, would cause the crew to manoeuvre the aircraft contrary to an RA with which they are complying. (F) Reporting rules Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the operator. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of where information can be obtained regarding the need for making written reports to various States when an RA is issued. Various States have different reporting rules and the material available to the flight crew member should be tailored to the operator’s operating environment. This responsibility is satisfied by the flight crew member reporting to the operator according to the applicable reporting rules. (3) Non-essential items: advisory thresholds Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following: (i) The minimum and maximum altitudes below/above which TAs will not be issued. (ii) When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be less than the ACAS-desired separation, a corrective RA that requires a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 300 ft at low altitude to a maximum of 700 ft at high altitude. (iii) When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be just outside the ACAS-desired separation, a preventive RA that does not require a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 600 to 800 ft. (iv) RA fixed range thresholds vary between 0.2 and 1.1 NM. (h) ACAS manoeuvre training (1) Demonstration of the flight crew member’s ability to use ACAS displayed information to properly respond to TAs and RAs should be carried out in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. If a full flight simulator is utilised, crew resource management (CRM) should be practised during this training. (2) Alternatively, the required demonstrations can be carried out by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made. The flight crew member should be informed whether or not the responses made were correct. If the response was incorrect or inappropriate, the CBT should show what the correct response should be. (3) The scenarios included in the manoeuvre training should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-aircraft encounters. The consequences of failure to respond correctly should be demonstrated by reference to actual incidents such as those publicised in EUROCONTROL ACAS II Bulletins (available on the EUROCONTROL website). (i) TA responses Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to TAs. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following: (A) Proper division of responsibilities between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should fly the aircraft using any type-specific procedures and be prepared to respond to any RA that might follow. For aircraft without an RA pitch display, the pilot flying should consider the likely magnitude of an appropriate pitch change. The pilot monitoring should provide updates on the traffic location shown on the ACAS display, using this information to help visually acquire the intruder. (B) Proper interpretation of the displayed information. Flight crew members should confirm that the aircraft they have visually acquired is that which has caused the TA to be issued. Use should be made of all information shown on the display, note being taken of the bearing and range of the intruder (amber circle), whether it is above or below (data tag), and its vertical speed direction (trend arrow). (C) Other available information should be used to assist in visual acquisition, including ATC ‘party-line’ information, traffic flow in use, etc. (D) Because of the limitations described, the pilot flying should not manoeuvre the aircraft based solely on the information shown on the ACAS display. No attempt should be made to adjust the current flight path in anticipation of what an RA would advise, except that if own aircraft is approaching its cleared level at a high vertical rate with a TA present, vertical rate should be reduced to less than 1 500 ft/min. (E) When visual acquisition is attained, and as long as no RA is received, normal right of way rules should be used to maintain or attain safe separation. No unnecessary manoeuvres should be initiated. The limitations of making manoeuvres based solely on visual acquisition, especially at high altitude or at night, or without a definite horizon should be demonstrated as being understood. (ii) RA responses Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to RAs. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following: (A) Proper response to the RA, even if it is in conflict with an ATC instruction and even if the pilot believes that there is no threat present. (B) Proper task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should respond to a corrective RA with appropriate control inputs. The pilot monitoring should monitor the response to the RA and should provide updates on the traffic location by checking the traffic display. Proper CRM should be used. (C) Proper interpretation of the displayed information. The pilot should recognise the intruder causing the RA to be issued (red square on display). The pilot should respond appropriately. (D) For corrective RAs, the response should be initiated in the proper direction within 5 seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ¼ g (gravitational acceleration of 9.81 m/sec²). (E) Recognition of the initially displayed RA being modified. Response to the modified RA should be properly accomplished, as follows: (a) For increase rate RAs, the vertical speed change should be started within 2½ seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ⅓ g. (b) For RA reversals, the vertical speed reversal should be started within 2½ seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ⅓ g. (c) For RA weakenings, the vertical speed should be modified to initiate a return towards the original clearance. (d) An acceleration of approximately ¼ g will be achieved if the change in pitch attitude corresponding to a change in vertical speed of 1 500 ft/min is accomplished in approximately 5 seconds, and of ⅓ g if the change is accomplished in approximately 3 seconds. The change in pitch attitude required to establish a rate of climb or descent of 1 500 ft/min from level flight will be approximately 6° when the true airspeed (TAS) is 150 kt, 4° at 250 kt, and 2° at 500 kt. (These angles are derived from the formula: 1 000 divided by TAS.). (F) Recognition of altitude crossing encounters and the proper response to these RAs. (G) For preventive RAs, the vertical speed needle or pitch attitude indication should remain outside the red area on the RA display. (H) For maintain rate RAs, the vertical speed should not be reduced. Pilots should recognise that a maintain rate RA may result in crossing through the intruder's altitude. (I) When the RA weakens, or when the green 'fly to' indicator changes position, the pilot should initiate a return towards the original clearance, and when ‘clear of conflict’ is annunciated, the pilot should complete the return to the original clearance. (J) The controller should be informed of the RA as soon as time and workload permit, using the standard phraseology. (K) When possible, an ATC clearance should be complied with while responding to an RA. For example, if the aircraft can level at the assigned altitude while responding to RA (an ‘adjust vertical speed’ RA (version 7) or ‘level off’ (version 7.1)), it should be done; the horizontal (turn) element of an ATC instruction should be followed. (L) Knowledge of the ACAS multi-aircraft logic and its limitations, and that ACAS can optimise separations from two aircraft by climbing or descending towards one of them. For example, ACAS only considers intruders that it considers to be a threat when selecting an RA. As such, it is possible for ACAS to issue an RA against one intruder that results in a manoeuvre towards another intruder that is not classified as a threat. If the second intruder becomes a threat, the RA will be modified to provide separation from that intruder. (i) ACAS initial evaluation (1) The flight crew member’s understanding of the academic training items should be assessed by means of a written test or interactive CBT that records correct and incorrect responses to phrased questions. (2) The flight crew member’s understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be assessed in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the flight crew member will fly, and the results assessed by a qualified instructor, inspector, or check airman. The range of scenarios should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-threat encounters. The scenarios should also include demonstrations of the consequences of not responding to RAs, slow or late responses, and manoeuvring opposite to the direction called for by the displayed RA. (3) Alternatively, exposure to these scenarios can be conducted by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the pilot will fly. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made and a record made of whether or not each response was correct. (j) ACAS recurrent training (1) ACAS recurrent training ensures that flight crew members maintain the appropriate ACAS knowledge and skills. ACAS recurrent training should be integrated into and/or conducted in conjunction with other established recurrent training programmes. An essential item of recurrent training is the discussion of any significant issues and operational concerns that have been identified by the operator. Recurrent training should also address changes to ACAS logic, parameters or procedures and to any unique ACAS characteristics which flight crew members should be made aware of. (2) It is recommended that operator's recurrent training programmes using full flight simulators include encounters with conflicting traffic when these simulators are equipped with ACAS. The full range of likely scenarios may be spread over a 2 year period. If a full flight simulator, as described above, is not available, use should be made of an interactive CBT that is capable of presenting scenarios to which pilot responses should be made in real-time. ##### GM1 NCC.OP.220 Airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) *ED Decision 2019/019/R* **GENERAL** (a) The ACAS operational procedures and training programmes established by the operator should take into account this Guidance Material. It incorporates advice contained in: (1) ICAO Annex 10, Volume IV; (2) ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS), Volume III; and (3) ICAO PANS-ATM. (b) Additional guidance material on ACAS may be referred to, including information available from such sources as EUROCONTROL. **ACAS FLIGHT CREW TRAINING** (c) During the implementation of ACAS, several operational issues were identified that had been attributed to deficiencies in flight crew training programmes. As a result, the issue of flight crew training has been discussed within the ICAO, which has developed guidelines for operators to use when designing training programmes. (d) This Guidance Material contains performance-based training objectives for ACAS II flight crew training. Information contained here related to traffic advisories (TAs) is also applicable to ACAS I and ACAS II users. The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight operations; general in-flight operations; response to TAs; and response to resolution advisories (RAs). (e) The information provided is valid for version 7 and 7.1 (ACAS II). Where differences arise, these are identified. (f) The performance-based training objectives are further divided into the areas of: academic training; manoeuvre training; initial evaluation and recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas, the training material has been separated into those items which are considered essential training items and those which are considered desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable performance criteria are defined. (g) ACAS academic training (1) This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests or through providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions. (2) Essential items (i) Theory of operation. The flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of ACAS II operation and the criteria used for issuing TAs and RAs. This training should address the following topics: (A) System operation Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of how ACAS functions. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the following functions: (a) Surveillance (1) ACAS interrogates other transponder-equipped aircraft within a nominal range of 14 NM. (2) ACAS surveillance range can be reduced in geographic areas with a large number of ground interrogators and/or ACAS II-equipped aircraft. (3) If the operator's ACAS implementation provides for the use of the Mode S extended squitter, the normal surveillance range may be increased beyond the nominal 14 NM. However, this information is not used for collision avoidance purposes. (b) Collision avoidance (1) TAs can be issued against any transponder-equipped aircraft that responds to the ICAO Mode C interrogations, even if the aircraft does not have altitude reporting capability. (2) RAs can be issued only against aircraft that are reporting altitude and in the vertical plane only. (3) RAs issued against an ACAS-equipped intruder are co-ordinated to ensure complementary RAs are issued. (4) Failure to respond to an RA deprives own aircraft of the collision protection provided by own ACAS. (5) Additionally, in ACAS-ACAS encounters, failure to respond to an RA also restricts the choices available to the other aircraft's ACAS and thus renders the other aircraft's ACAS less effective than if own aircraft were not ACAS equipped. (B) Advisory thresholds Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following: (a) ACAS advisories are based on time to closest point of approach (CPA) rather than distance. The time should be short and vertical separation should be small, or projected to be small, before an advisory can be issued. The separation standards provided by ATS are different from the miss distances against which ACAS issues alerts. (b) Thresholds for issuing a TA or an RA vary with altitude. The thresholds are larger at higher altitudes. (c) A TA occurs from 15 to 48 seconds and an RA from 15 to 35 seconds before the projected CPA. (d) RAs are chosen to provide the desired vertical miss distance at CPA. As a result, RAs can instruct a climb or descent through the intruder aircraft's altitude. (C) ACAS limitations Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the limitations of ACAS. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of ACAS limitations, including the following: (a) ACAS will neither track nor display non-transponder-equipped aircraft, nor aircraft not responding to ACAS Mode C interrogations. (b) ACAS will automatically fail if the input from the aircraft’s barometric altimeter, radio altimeter or transponder is lost. (1) In some installations, the loss of information from other on board systems such as an inertial reference system (IRS) or attitude heading reference system (AHRS) may result in an ACAS failure. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crews are aware of the types of failure which will result in an ACAS failure. (2) ACAS may react in an improper manner when false altitude information is provided to own ACAS or transmitted by another aircraft. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crew are aware of the types of unsafe conditions which can arise. Flight crew members should ensure that when they are advised, if their own aircraft is transmitting false altitude reports, an alternative altitude reporting source is selected, or altitude reporting is switched off. (c) Some aeroplanes within 380 ft above ground level (AGL) (nominal value) are deemed to be ‘on ground’ and will not be displayed. If ACAS is able to determine an aircraft below this altitude is airborne, it will be displayed. (d) ACAS may not display all proximate transponder-equipped aircraft in areas of high density traffic. (e) The bearing displayed by ACAS is not sufficiently accurate to support the initiation of horizontal manoeuvres based solely on the traffic display. (f) ACAS will neither track nor display intruders with a vertical speed in excess of 10 000 ft/min. In addition, the design implementation may result in some short-term errors in the tracked vertical speed of an intruder during periods of high vertical acceleration by the intruder. (g) Ground proximity warning systems/ground collision avoidance systems (GPWSs/GCASs) warnings and wind shear warnings take precedence over ACAS advisories. When either a GPWS/GCAS or wind shear warning is active, ACAS aural annunciations will be inhibited and ACAS will automatically switch to the 'TA only' mode of operation. (D) ACAS inhibits Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the conditions under which certain functions of ACAS are inhibited. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the various ACAS inhibits, including the following: (a) ‘Increase Descent’ RAs are inhibited below 1 450 ft AGL. (b) ‘Descend’ RAs are inhibited below 1 100 ft AGL. (c) All RAs are inhibited below 1 000 ft AGL. (d) All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL. (e) Altitude and configuration under which ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are inhibited. ACAS can still issue ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs when operating at the aeroplane's certified ceiling. (In some aircraft types, ‘Climb’ or ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are never inhibited.) (ii) Operating procedures The flight crew member should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate the ACAS avionics and interpret the information presented by ACAS. This training should address the following: (A) Use of controls Objective: to verify that the pilot can properly operate all ACAS and display controls. Criteria: demonstrate the proper use of controls, including the following: (a) Aircraft configuration required to initiate a self-test. (b) Steps required to initiate a self-test. (c) Recognising when the self-test was successful and when it was unsuccessful. When the self-test is unsuccessful, recognising the reason for the failure and, if possible, correcting the problem. (d) Recommended usage of range selection. Low ranges are used in the terminal area and the higher display ranges are used in the en-route environment and in the transition between the terminal and en-route environment. (e) Recognising that the configuration of the display does not affect the ACAS surveillance volume. (f) Selection of lower ranges when an advisory is issued, to increase display resolution. (g) Proper configuration to display the appropriate ACAS information without eliminating the display of other needed information. (h) If available, recommended usage of the above/below mode selector. The above mode should be used during climb and the below mode should be used during descent. (i) If available, proper selection of the display of absolute or relative altitude and the limitations of using this display if a barometric correction is not provided to ACAS. (B) Display interpretation Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands the meaning of all information that can be displayed by ACAS. The wide variety of display implementations require the tailoring of some criteria. When the training programme is developed, these criteria should be expanded to cover details for the operator's specific display implementation. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the ability to properly interpret information displayed by ACAS, including the following: (a) Other traffic, i.e. traffic within the selected display range that is not proximate traffic, or causing a TA or RA to be issued. (b) Proximate traffic, i.e. traffic that is within 6 NM and ± 1 200 ft. (c) Non-altitude reporting traffic. (d) No bearing TAs and RAs. (e) Off-scale TAs and RAs: the selected range should be changed to ensure that all available information on the intruder is displayed. (f) TAs: the minimum available display range that allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution. (g) RAs (traffic display): the minimum available display range of the traffic display that allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution. (h) RAs (RA display): flight crew members should demonstrate knowledge of the meaning of the red and green areas or the meaning of pitch or flight path angle cues displayed on the RA display. Flight crew members should also demonstrate an understanding of the RA display limitations, i.e. if a vertical speed tape is used and the range of the tape is less than 2 500 ft/min, an increase rate RA cannot be properly displayed. (i) If appropriate, awareness that navigation displays oriented on ‘Track-Up’ may require a flight crew member to make a mental adjustment for drift angle when assessing the bearing of proximate traffic. (C) Use of the TA only mode Objective: to verify that a flight crew member understands the appropriate times to select the TA only mode of operation and the limitations associated with using this mode. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following: (a) Knowledge of the operator's guidance for the use of TA only. (b) Reasons for using this mode. If TA only is not selected when an airport is conducting simultaneous operations from parallel runways separated by less than 1 200 ft, and to some intersecting runways, RAs can be expected. If, for any reason, TA only is not selected and an RA is received in these situations, the response should comply with the operator's approved procedures. (c) All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL. As a result, TAs issued below 500 ft AGL may not be noticed unless the TA display is included in the routine instrument scan. (D) Crew coordination Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands how ACAS advisories will be handled. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of the crew procedures that should be used when responding to TAs and RAs, including the following: (a) task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring; (b) expected call-outs; and (c) communications with ATC. (E) Phraseology rules Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the controller. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following: (a) the use of the phraseology contained in ICAO PANS-OPS; (b) an understanding of the procedures contained in ICAO PANS-ATM and ICAO Annex 2; and (c) the understanding that verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate ATC unit: (1) whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance; (2) when, subsequent to a manoeuvre that has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance, the aeroplane has returned to a flight path that complies with the clearance; and/or (3) when air traffic issue instructions that, if followed, would cause the crew to manoeuvre the aircraft contrary to an RA with which they are complying. (F) Reporting rules Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the operator. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of where information can be obtained regarding the need for making written reports to various States when an RA is issued. Various States have different reporting rules and the material available to the flight crew member should be tailored to the operator’s operating environment. This responsibility is satisfied by the flight crew member reporting to the operator according to the applicable reporting rules. (3) Non-essential items: advisory thresholds Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs. Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following: (i) The minimum and maximum altitudes below/above which TAs will not be issued. (ii) When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be less than the ACAS-desired separation, a corrective RA that requires a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 300 ft at low altitude to a maximum of 700 ft at high altitude. (iii) When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be just outside the ACAS-desired separation, a preventive RA that does not require a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 600 to 800 ft. (iv) RA fixed range thresholds vary between 0.2 and 1.1 NM. (h) ACAS manoeuvre training (1) Demonstration of the flight crew member’s ability to use ACAS displayed information to properly respond to TAs and RAs should be carried out in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. If a full flight simulator is utilised, crew resource management (CRM) should be practised during this training. (2) Alternatively, the required demonstrations can be carried out by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made. The flight crew member should be informed whether or not the responses made were correct. If the response was incorrect or inappropriate, the CBT should show what the correct response should be. (3) The scenarios included in the manoeuvre training should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-aircraft encounters. The consequences of failure to respond correctly should be demonstrated by reference to actual incidents such as those publicised in EUROCONTROL ACAS II Bulletins (available on the EUROCONTROL website). (i) TA responses Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to TAs. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following: (A) Proper division of responsibilities between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should fly the aircraft using any type-specific procedures and be prepared to respond to any RA that might follow. For aircraft without an RA pitch display, the pilot flying should consider the likely magnitude of an appropriate pitch change. The pilot monitoring should provide updates on the traffic location shown on the ACAS display, using this information to help visually acquire the intruder. (B) Proper interpretation of the displayed information. Flight crew members should confirm that the aircraft they have visually acquired is that which has caused the TA to be issued. Use should be made of all information shown on the display, note being taken of the bearing and range of the intruder (amber circle), whether it is above or below (data tag), and its vertical speed direction (trend arrow). (C) Other available information should be used to assist in visual acquisition, including ATC ‘party-line’ information, traffic flow in use, etc. (D) Because of the limitations described, the pilot flying should not manoeuvre the aircraft based solely on the information shown on the ACAS display. No attempt should be made to adjust the current flight path in anticipation of what an RA would advise, except that if own aircraft is approaching its cleared level at a high vertical rate with a TA present, vertical rate should be reduced to less than 1 500 ft/min. (E) When visual acquisition is attained, and as long as no RA is received, normal right of way rules should be used to maintain or attain safe separation. No unnecessary manoeuvres should be initiated. The limitations of making manoeuvres based solely on visual acquisition, especially at high altitude or at night, or without a definite horizon should be demonstrated as being understood. (ii) RA responses Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to RAs. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following: (A) Proper response to the RA, even if it is in conflict with an ATC instruction and even if the pilot believes that there is no threat present. (B) Proper task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should respond to a corrective RA with appropriate control inputs. The pilot monitoring should monitor the response to the RA and should provide updates on the traffic location by checking the traffic display. Proper CRM should be used. (C) Proper interpretation of the displayed information. The pilot should recognise the intruder causing the RA to be issued (red square on display). The pilot should respond appropriately. (D) For corrective RAs, the response should be initiated in the proper direction within 5 seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ¼ g (gravitational acceleration of 9.81 m/sec²). (E) Recognition of the initially displayed RA being modified. Response to the modified RA should be properly accomplished, as follows: (a) For increase rate RAs, the vertical speed change should be started within 2½ seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ⅓ g. (b) For RA reversals, the vertical speed reversal should be started within 2½ seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ⅓ g. (c) For RA weakenings, the vertical speed should be modified to initiate a return towards the original clearance. (d) An acceleration of approximately ¼ g will be achieved if the change in pitch attitude corresponding to a change in vertical speed of 1 500 ft/min is accomplished in approximately 5 seconds, and of ⅓ g if the change is accomplished in approximately 3 seconds. The change in pitch attitude required to establish a rate of climb or descent of 1 500 ft/min from level flight will be approximately 6° when the true airspeed (TAS) is 150 kt, 4° at 250 kt, and 2° at 500 kt. (These angles are derived from the formula: 1 000 divided by TAS.). (F) Recognition of altitude crossing encounters and the proper response to these RAs. (G) For preventive RAs, the vertical speed needle or pitch attitude indication should remain outside the red area on the RA display. (H) For maintain rate RAs, the vertical speed should not be reduced. Pilots should recognise that a maintain rate RA may result in crossing through the intruder's altitude. (I) When the RA weakens, or when the green 'fly to' indicator changes position, the pilot should initiate a return towards the original clearance, and when ‘clear of conflict’ is annunciated, the pilot should complete the return to the original clearance. (J) The controller should be informed of the RA as soon as time and workload permit, using the standard phraseology. (K) When possible, an ATC clearance should be complied with while responding to an RA. For example, if the aircraft can level at the assigned altitude while responding to RA (an ‘adjust vertical speed’ RA (version 7) or ‘level off’ (version 7.1)), it should be done; the horizontal (turn) element of an ATC instruction should be followed. (L) Knowledge of the ACAS multi-aircraft logic and its limitations, and that ACAS can optimise separations from two aircraft by climbing or descending towards one of them. For example, ACAS only considers intruders that it considers to be a threat when selecting an RA. As such, it is possible for ACAS to issue an RA against one intruder that results in a manoeuvre towards another intruder that is not classified as a threat. If the second intruder becomes a threat, the RA will be modified to provide separation from that intruder. (i) ACAS initial evaluation (1) The flight crew member’s understanding of the academic training items should be assessed by means of a written test or interactive CBT that records correct and incorrect responses to phrased questions. (2) The flight crew member’s understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be assessed in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the flight crew member will fly, and the results assessed by a qualified instructor, inspector, or check airman. The range of scenarios should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-threat encounters. The scenarios should also include demonstrations of the consequences of not responding to RAs, slow or late responses, and manoeuvring opposite to the direction called for by the displayed RA. (3) Alternatively, exposure to these scenarios can be conducted by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the pilot will fly. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made and a record made of whether or not each response was correct. (j) ACAS recurrent training (1) ACAS recurrent training ensures that flight crew members maintain the appropriate ACAS knowledge and skills. ACAS recurrent training should be integrated into and/or conducted in conjunction with other established recurrent training programmes. An essential item of recurrent training is the discussion of any significant issues and operational concerns that have been identified by the operator. Recurrent training should also address changes to ACAS logic, parameters or procedures and to any unique ACAS characteristics which flight crew members should be made aware of. (2) It is recommended that operator's recurrent training programmes using full flight simulators include encounters with conflicting traffic when these simulators are equipped with ACAS. The full range of likely scenarios may be spread over a 2 year period. If a full flight simulator, as described above, is not available, use should be made of an interactive CBT that is capable of presenting scenarios to which pilot responses should be made in real-time.