AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(d) PBN operational approval

• ED Decision 2016/020/R found in: Air Operations (965/2012) Part-ARO Part-ORO Part-CAT Part-SPA Part-NCC Part-NCO Part-SPO (Feb 2025)

AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(d) PBN operational approval ED Decision 2016/020/R OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RNP AR APCH (a) MEL (1) The operator’s MEL should be developed/revised to address the equipment provisions for RNP AR APCH operations. (2) An operational TAWS Class A should be available for all RNP AR APCH operations. The TAWS should use altitude values that are compensated for local pressure and temperature effects (e.g. corrected barometric and GNSS altitude), and include significant terrain and obstacle data. (b) Autopilot and flight director (1) For RNP AR APCH operations with RNP values less than RNP 0.3 or with RF legs, the autopilot or flight director driven by the area navigation system should be used. Thus, the flight crew should check that the autopilot/flight director is installed and operational. (c) Preflight RNP assessment (1) The operator should have a predictive performance capability, which can determine if the specified RNP will be available at the time and location of a desired RNP operation. This capability can be a ground service and need not be resident in the aircraft’s avionics equipment. The operator should establish procedures requiring use of this capability as both a preflight preparation tool and as a flight-following tool in the event of reported failures. (2) This predictive capability should account for known and predicted outages of GNSS satellites or other impacts on the navigation system’s sensors. The prediction programme should not use a mask angle below 5 degrees, as operational experience indicates that satellite signals at low elevations are not reliable. The prediction should use the actual GNSS constellation with the RAIM (or equivalent) algorithm identical to or more conservative than that used in the actual equipment. (3) The RNP assessment should consider the specific combination of the aircraft capability (sensors and integration), as well as their availability. (d) NAVAID exclusion (1) The operator should establish procedures to exclude NAVAID facilities in accordance with NOTAMs (e.g. DMEs, VORs, localisers). Internal avionics reasonableness checks may not be adequate for RNP operations. (e) Navigation database currency (1) During system initialisation, the flight crew should confirm that the navigation database is current. Navigation databases should be current for the duration of the flight. If the AIRAC cycle is due to change during flight, the flight crew should follow procedures established by the operator to ensure the accuracy of navigation data. (2) The operator should not allow the flight crew to use an expired database. AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(d) PBN operational approval ED Decision 2016/020/R OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RNP AR APCH (a) MEL (1) The operator’s MEL should be developed/revised to address the equipment provisions for RNP AR APCH operations. (2) An operational TAWS Class A should be available for all RNP AR APCH operations. The TAWS should use altitude values that are compensated for local pressure and temperature effects (e.g. corrected barometric and GNSS altitude), and include significant terrain and obstacle data. (b) Autopilot and flight director (1) For RNP AR APCH operations with RNP values less than RNP 0.3 or with RF legs, the autopilot or flight director driven by the area navigation system should be used. Thus, the flight crew should check that the autopilot/flight director is installed and operational. (c) Preflight RNP assessment (1) The operator should have a predictive performance capability, which can determine if the specified RNP will be available at the time and location of a desired RNP operation. This capability can be a ground service and need not be resident in the aircraft’s avionics equipment. The operator should establish procedures requiring use of this capability as both a preflight preparation tool and as a flight-following tool in the event of reported failures. (2) This predictive capability should account for known and predicted outages of GNSS satellites or other impacts on the navigation system’s sensors. The prediction programme should not use a mask angle below 5 degrees, as operational experience indicates that satellite signals at low elevations are not reliable. The prediction should use the actual GNSS constellation with the RAIM (or equivalent) algorithm identical to or more conservative than that used in the actual equipment. (3) The RNP assessment should consider the specific combination of the aircraft capability (sensors and integration), as well as their availability. (d) NAVAID exclusion (1) The operator should establish procedures to exclude NAVAID facilities in accordance with NOTAMs (e.g. DMEs, VORs, localisers). Internal avionics reasonableness checks may not be adequate for RNP operations. (e) Navigation database currency (1) During system initialisation, the flight crew should confirm that the navigation database is current. Navigation databases should be current for the duration of the flight. If the AIRAC cycle is due to change during flight, the flight crew should follow procedures established by the operator to ensure the accuracy of navigation data. (2) The operator should not allow the flight crew to use an expired database. ##### AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(d) PBN operational approval *ED Decision 2016/020/R* **OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RNP AR APCH** (a) MEL (1) The operator’s MEL should be developed/revised to address the equipment provisions for RNP AR APCH operations. (2) An operational TAWS Class A should be available for all RNP AR APCH operations. The TAWS should use altitude values that are compensated for local pressure and temperature effects (e.g. corrected barometric and GNSS altitude), and include significant terrain and obstacle data. (b) Autopilot and flight director (1) For RNP AR APCH operations with RNP values less than RNP 0.3 or with RF legs, the autopilot or flight director driven by the area navigation system should be used. Thus, the flight crew should check that the autopilot/flight director is installed and operational. (c) Preflight RNP assessment (1) The operator should have a predictive performance capability, which can determine if the specified RNP will be available at the time and location of a desired RNP operation. This capability can be a ground service and need not be resident in the aircraft’s avionics equipment. The operator should establish procedures requiring use of this capability as both a preflight preparation tool and as a flight-following tool in the event of reported failures. (2) This predictive capability should account for known and predicted outages of GNSS satellites or other impacts on the navigation system’s sensors. The prediction programme should not use a mask angle below 5 degrees, as operational experience indicates that satellite signals at low elevations are not reliable. The prediction should use the actual GNSS constellation with the RAIM (or equivalent) algorithm identical to or more conservative than that used in the actual equipment. (3) The RNP assessment should consider the specific combination of the aircraft capability (sensors and integration), as well as their availability. (d) NAVAID exclusion (1) The operator should establish procedures to exclude NAVAID facilities in accordance with NOTAMs (e.g. DMEs, VORs, localisers). Internal avionics reasonableness checks may not be adequate for RNP operations. (e) Navigation database currency (1) During system initialisation, the flight crew should confirm that the navigation database is current. Navigation databases should be current for the duration of the flight. If the AIRAC cycle is due to change during flight, the flight crew should follow procedures established by the operator to ensure the accuracy of navigation data. (2) The operator should not allow the flight crew to use an expired database.