AMC1 ORO.FC.230 Recurrent training and checking

• ED Decision 2022/014/R found in: Air Operations (965/2012) Part-ARO Part-ORO Part-CAT Part-SPA Part-NCC Part-NCO Part-SPO (Feb 2025)
• ED Decision 2025/002/R found in: Air Operations Revision 24 Part-ARO Part-ORO Part-CAT Part-SPA Part-NCC Part-NCO Part-SPO (Mar 2026)

AMC1 ORO.FC.230 Recurrent training and checking ED Decision 2022/014/R RECURRENT TRAINING AND CHECKING SYLLABUS (a) Recurrent training Recurrent training should comprise the following: (1) Ground training (i) The ground training programme should include: (A) aircraft systems; (B) normal procedures, which include flight planning and ground-handling and flight operations, including performance, mass and balance, fuel schemes, selection of alternates, and ground de-icing/anti-icing; (C) abnormal and emergency procedures, which include pilot incapacitation as applicable; (D) a review of relevant samples of accident/incident and occurrences to increase awareness of the occurrences that may be relevant for the intended operation. (ii) Knowledge of the ground training should be verified by a questionnaire or other suitable methods. (2) Emergency and safety equipment training (i) Emergency and safety equipment training may be combined with emergency and safety equipment checking and should be conducted in an aircraft or a suitable alternative training device. (ii) Every year the emergency and safety equipment training programme should include the following: (A) actual donning of a life-jacket, where fitted; (B) actual donning of protective breathing equipment, where fitted; (C) actual handling of fire extinguishers of the type used; (D) instruction on the location and use of all emergency and safety equipment carried on the aircraft; (E) instruction on the location and use of all types of exits; (F) security procedures. (iii) Every 3 years the programme of training should include the following: (A) actual operation of all types of exits; (B) demonstration of the method used to operate a slide where fitted; (C) actual fire-fighting using equipment representative of that carried in the aircraft on an actual or simulated fire except that, with Halon extinguishers, an alternative extinguisher may be used; (D) the effects of smoke in an enclosed area and actual use of all relevant equipment in a simulated smoke-filled environment; (E) actual handling of pyrotechnics, real or simulated, where applicable; (F) demonstration in the use of the life-rafts where fitted. In the case of helicopters involved in extended over water operations, demonstration and use of the life-rafts. Helicopter water survival training Where life-rafts are fitted for helicopter extended overwater operations (such as sea pilot transfer, offshore operations, regular, or scheduled, coast-to-coast overwater operations), a comprehensive wet drill to cover all ditching procedures should be practised by aircraft crew. This wet drill should include, as appropriate, practice of the actual donning and inflation of a life-jacket, together with a demonstration or audio-visual presentation of the inflation of life-rafts. Crews should board the same (or similar) life-rafts from the water whilst wearing a life-jacket. Training should include the use of all survival equipment carried on board life-rafts and any additional survival equipment carried separately on board the aircraft; — consideration should be given to the provision of further specialist training such as underwater escape training. Where operations are predominately conducted offshore, operators should conduct 3-yearly helicopter underwater escape training at an appropriate facility; — wet practice drill should always be given in initial training unless the crew member concerned has received similar training provided by another operator; (G) particularly in the case where no cabin crew is required, first-aid, appropriate to the aircraft type, the kind of operation and crew complement. (iv) The successful resolution of aircraft emergencies requires interaction between flight crew and cabin/technical crew and emphasis should be placed on the importance of effective coordination and two-way communication between all crew members in various emergency situations. (v) Emergency and safety equipment training should include joint practice in aircraft evacuations so that all who are involved are aware of the duties other crew members should perform. When such practice is not possible, combined flight crew and cabin/technical crew training should include joint discussion of emergency scenarios. (vi) Emergency and safety equipment training should, as far as practicable, take place in conjunction with cabin/technical crew undergoing similar training with emphasis on coordinated procedures and two-way communication between the flight crew compartment and the cabin. (3) CRM Elements of CRM training, as specified in Table 1 of [AMC1 ORO.FC.115](#_DxCrossRefBm927677954), should be integrated into all appropriate phases of recurrent training. (4) Aircraft/FSTD training (i) General (A) The aircraft/FSTD training programme should be established in a way that all major failures of aircraft systems and associated procedures will have been trained in the preceding 3-year period. (B) When engine-out manoeuvres are carried out in an aircraft, the engine failure should be simulated. (C) The recurrent aircraft/FSTD training of a single task or manoeuvre should be separate from, and should not take place at the same time as, an operator proficiency check of the item. (ii) Helicopters (A) If the operator is able to demonstrate, on the basis of a compliance and risk assessment, that alternating the use of an FSTD with the use of an aircraft for this training provides equivalent standards of training with safety levels similar to those achieved using an FSTD, the aircraft may be used (alternating with the use of an FSTD) for this training to the extent necessary. (B) Where a suitable FSTD is available and accessible, it should be used to complete the following additional items: — settling with power and vortex ring; — loss of tail rotor effectiveness. (5) For operations with other-than-complex motor-powered aeroplanes, all training and checking should be relevant to the type of operation and class of aeroplane on which the flight crew member operates with due account taken of any specialised equipment used. (b) Recurrent checking Recurrent checking should comprise the following: (1) Operator proficiency checks (i) Aeroplanes Operator proficiency checks should take place as part of the normal crew complement and should include, where applicable, the following manoeuvres as pilot flying: (A) rejected take-off when an FSTD is available to represent that specific aeroplane, otherwise touch drills only; (B) take-off with engine failure between V1 and V2 (take-off safety speed) or, if carried out in an aeroplane, at a safe speed above V2; (C) 3D approach operation to minima with, in the case of multi-engined aeroplanes, one-engine-inoperative; (D) 2D approach operation to minima; (E) at least one of the 3D or 2D approach operations should be an RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH operation; (F) missed approach on instruments from minima with, in the case of multi-engined aeroplanes, one-engine-inoperative; (G) landing with one-engine-inoperative. For single-engined aeroplanes, a practice forced landing is required. (ii) Helicopters (A) The aircraft/FSTD checking programme should be established in a way that all major failures of aircraft systems and associated procedures will have been checked in the preceding 3-year period. The operator should define which failures are major for the purpose of the operator proficiency check based on a risk assessment, taking the following into account: (a) cautions or warnings associated with the failure; (b) the criticality of the situation or failure; (c) the outcome of the procedure (land immediately or as soon as possible as opposed to land as soon as practical); (d) when available, manufacturer documentation; and (e) the list of abnormal/emergency procedures described in [point (e)(1) of AMC1 ORO.FC.220](#_DxCrossRefBm927678032). In addition, for single-engined helicopters, each operator proficiency check should include at least the following procedures: (f) engine failure; (g) directional control failures and malfunctions; and (h) hydraulic failure as applicable. (B) When a group of single-engine turbine or single-engine piston helicopter types is defined for the purpose of extending the validity of the operator proficiency check, all major system failures should nevertheless be checked on every type within a 3-year cycle unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with [Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32012R0748&qid=1667384845880) for the relevant types or variants. (C) For pilots required to engage in IFR operations, proficiency checks include the following additional normal/abnormal/emergency procedures: — 3D approach operation to minima; — go-around on instruments; — 2D approach operation to minima; — if relevant, at least one of the 3D or 2D approach operations should be an RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH operation; — in the case of multi-engined helicopters, a simulated failure of one engine to be included in either the 3D or 2D approach operation to minima; — where appropriate to the helicopter type, approach with flight control system/flight director system malfunctions, flight instrument and navigation equipment failures. (D) Before a flight crew member without a valid instrument rating is allowed to operate in VMC at night, they should be required to undergo a proficiency check at night. Thereafter, each second proficiency check should be conducted at night. (E) Operator proficiency checks should be conducted with two qualified pilots in multi-pilot operations, and one qualified pilot in single-pilot operations. A pilot flying both single-pilot and multi-pilot operations should be checked in multi-pilot conditions with the essential malfunctions or manoeuvres below being also checked in the single-pilot role: (a) at least two abnormal or emergency manoeuvres relevant to the type based on a risk assessment; (b) one instrument approach for IFR operations. (F) The flight crew should be assessed on their CRM skills in accordance with the methodology described in [AMC1](#_DxCrossRefBm927677954) and [AMC2 ORO.FC.115](#_DxCrossRefBm927677956) and as specified in the operations manual. (G) If the operator is able to demonstrate, on the basis of a compliance and risk assessment, that alternating the use of an FSTD with the use of an aircraft for this training provides equivalent standards of checking with safety levels similar to those achieved using an FSTD, the aircraft may be used (alternating with the use of an FSTD) for this checking to the extent necessary. (iii) The checks prescribed in (b)(1) may be combined with the skill test or proficiency check required for the issue, the revalidation or renewal of the aircraft type rating and with the skill test required for the issue of the ATPL licence. (2) Emergency and safety equipment checks The items to be checked should be those for which training has been carried out in accordance with (a)(2). (3) Line checks (i) A line check should establish the ability to perform satisfactorily a complete line operation, including pre-flight and post-flight procedures and use of the equipment provided, as specified in the operations manual. The route chosen should be such as to give adequate representation of the scope of a pilot’s normal operations. When weather conditions preclude a manual landing, an automatic landing is acceptable. The commander, or any pilot who may be required to relieve the commander, should also demonstrate their ability to ‘manage’ the operation and take appropriate command decisions. (ii) The flight crew should be assessed on their CRM skills in accordance with the methodology described in [AMC1 ORO.FC.115](#_DxCrossRefBm927677954) and as specified in the operations manual. (iii) CRM assessment should not be used as a reason for a failure of the line check, unless the observed behaviour could lead to an unacceptable reduction in safety margin. (iv) When pilots are assigned duties as pilot flying and pilot monitoring, they should be checked in both functions. (v) A line check should be conducted by a commander nominated by the operator. The operator should maintain a list of nominated commanders and inform the competent authority about the persons nominated. The person conducting the line check should occupy an observer’s seat where installed. (A) For aeroplanes, in the case of long-haul operations where additional operating flight crew are carried, the person conducting the line check may fulfil the function of a cruise relief pilot and should not occupy either pilot’s seat during take-off, departure, initial cruise, descent, approach and landing. (B) If an observer’s seat is not installed but a forward-facing passenger seat allows a good view and sound of the cockpit and the crew, this seat should be used as an observer’s seat. (C) If an observer’s seat is not available and cannot be installed, the commander nominated by the operator should occupy a pilot seat to conduct the line check. (vi) CRM assessment during the line check (A) The CRM assessment taking place during the line check should be solely based on observations made during the initial briefing, cabin briefing, flight crew compartment briefing and those phases where the line checker occupies the observer’s seat. (B) If an observer’s seat is not available and cannot be installed, then the operator should define the best way to assess CRM taking into account the CRM principles above. (vii) Complementary CRM assessment If a suitable FSTD is available and accessible for operator proficiency checks or FSTD training, then a CRM assessment should take place in a line-oriented flight scenario (LOFT or line-oriented section of the OPC) of an FSTD session. This assessment complements the CRM assessment taking place during the line check, but is not part of the line check. (viii) Where a pilot is required to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring, they should be checked on one flight sector as pilot flying and on another flight sector as pilot monitoring. (4) In the case of single-pilot operations, the recurrent checks referred to in (b)(1) and (3) should be performed in the single-pilot role in an environment representative of the operation. (c) Flight crew incapacitation training, except single-pilot operations (1) Procedures should be established to train flight crew to recognise and handle flight crew incapacitation. This training should be conducted every year and can form part of other recurrent training. It should take the form of classroom instruction, discussion, audio-visual presentation or other similar means. (2) If an FSTD is available for the type of aircraft operated, practical training on flight crew incapacitation should be carried out at intervals not exceeding 3 years. (d) Use of FSTD (1) Training and checking provide an opportunity to practise abnormal/emergency procedures that rarely arise in normal operations and should be part of a structured programme of recurrent training. This should be carried out in an FSTD when available and accessible. (2) The line check should be performed in the aircraft. All other training and checking should be performed in an FSTD, or, if it is not reasonably practicable to gain access to such devices, in an aircraft of the same type or in the case of emergency and safety equipment training, in a representative training device. The type of equipment used for training and checking should be representative of the instrumentation, equipment and layout of the aircraft type operated by the flight crew member. (3) Because of the unacceptable risk when simulating emergencies such as engine failure, icing problems, certain types of engine(s) (e.g. during continued take-off or go-around, total hydraulic failure), or because of environmental considerations associated with some emergencies (e.g. fuel dumping) these emergencies should preferably be covered in an FSTD. If no FSTD is available, these emergencies may be covered in the aircraft using a safe airborne simulation, bearing in mind the effect of any subsequent failure, and the exercise must be preceded by a comprehensive briefing. AMC1 ORO.FC.230 Recurrent training and checking ED Decision 2022/014/R RECURRENT TRAINING AND CHECKING SYLLABUS (a) Recurrent training Recurrent training should comprise the following: (1) Ground training (i) The ground training programme should include: (A) aircraft systems; (B) normal procedures, which include flight planning and ground-handling and flight operations, including performance, mass and balance, fuel schemes, selection of alternates, and ground de-icing/anti-icing; (C) abnormal and emergency procedures, which include pilot incapacitation as applicable; (D) a review of relevant samples of accident/incident and occurrences to increase awareness of the occurrences that may be relevant for the intended operation. (ii) Knowledge of the ground training should be verified by a questionnaire or other suitable methods. (2) Emergency and safety equipment training (i) Emergency and safety equipment training may be combined with emergency and safety equipment checking and should be conducted in an aircraft or a suitable alternative training device. (ii) Every year the emergency and safety equipment training programme should include the following: (A) actual donning of a life-jacket, where fitted; (B) actual donning of protective breathing equipment, where fitted; (C) actual handling of fire extinguishers of the type used; (D) instruction on the location and use of all emergency and safety equipment carried on the aircraft; (E) instruction on the location and use of all types of exits; (F) security procedures. (iii) Every 3 years the programme of training should include the following: (A) actual operation of all types of exits; (B) demonstration of the method used to operate a slide where fitted; (C) actual fire-fighting using equipment representative of that carried in the aircraft on an actual or simulated fire except that, with Halon extinguishers, an alternative extinguisher may be used; (D) the effects of smoke in an enclosed area and actual use of all relevant equipment in a simulated smoke-filled environment; (E) actual handling of pyrotechnics, real or simulated, where applicable; (F) demonstration in the use of the life-rafts where fitted. In the case of helicopters involved in extended over water operations, demonstration and use of the life-rafts. Helicopter water survival training Where life-rafts are fitted for helicopter extended overwater operations (such as sea pilot transfer, offshore operations, regular, or scheduled, coast-to-coast overwater operations), a comprehensive wet drill to cover all ditching procedures should be practised by aircraft crew. This wet drill should include, as appropriate, practice of the actual donning and inflation of a life-jacket, together with a demonstration or audio-visual presentation of the inflation of life-rafts. Crews should board the same (or similar) life-rafts from the water whilst wearing a life-jacket. Training should include the use of all survival equipment carried on board life-rafts and any additional survival equipment carried separately on board the aircraft; — consideration should be given to the provision of further specialist training such as underwater escape training. Where operations are predominately conducted offshore, operators should conduct 3-yearly helicopter underwater escape training at an appropriate facility; — wet practice drill should always be given in initial training unless the crew member concerned has received similar training provided by another operator; (G) particularly in the case where no cabin crew is required, first-aid, appropriate to the aircraft type, the kind of operation and crew complement. (iv) The successful resolution of aircraft emergencies requires interaction between flight crew and cabin/technical crew and emphasis should be placed on the importance of effective coordination and two-way communication between all crew members in various emergency situations. (v) Emergency and safety equipment training should include joint practice in aircraft evacuations so that all who are involved are aware of the duties other crew members should perform. When such practice is not possible, combined flight crew and cabin/technical crew training should include joint discussion of emergency scenarios. (vi) Emergency and safety equipment training should, as far as practicable, take place in conjunction with cabin/technical crew undergoing similar training with emphasis on coordinated procedures and two-way communication between the flight crew compartment and the cabin. (3) CRM Elements of CRM training, as specified in Table 1 of [AMC1 ORO.FC.115](#_DxCrossRefBm318085582), should be integrated into all appropriate phases of recurrent training. (4) Aircraft/FSTD training (i) General (A) The aircraft/FSTD training programme should be established in a way that all major failures of aircraft systems and associated procedures will have been trained in the preceding 3-year period. (B) When engine-out manoeuvres are carried out in an aircraft, the engine failure should be simulated. (C) The recurrent aircraft/FSTD training of a single task or manoeuvre should be separate from, and should not take place at the same time as, an operator proficiency check of the item. (ii) Helicopters (A) If the operator is able to demonstrate, on the basis of a compliance and risk assessment, that alternating the use of an FSTD with the use of an aircraft for this training provides equivalent standards of training with safety levels similar to those achieved using an FSTD, the aircraft may be used (alternating with the use of an FSTD) for this training to the extent necessary. (B) Where a suitable FSTD is available and accessible, it should be used to complete the following additional items: — settling with power and vortex ring; — loss of tail rotor effectiveness. (5) For operations with other-than-complex motor-powered aeroplanes, all training and checking should be relevant to the type of operation and class of aeroplane on which the flight crew member operates with due account taken of any specialised equipment used. (b) Recurrent checking Recurrent checking should comprise the following: (1) Operator proficiency checks (i) Aeroplanes Operator proficiency checks should take place as part of the normal crew complement and should include, where applicable, the following manoeuvres as pilot flying: (A) rejected take-off when an FSTD is available to represent that specific aeroplane, otherwise touch drills only; (B) take-off with engine failure between V1 and V2 (take-off safety speed) or, if carried out in an aeroplane, at a safe speed above V2; (C) 3D approach operation to minima with, in the case of multi-engined aeroplanes, one-engine-inoperative; (D) 2D approach operation to minima; (E) at least one of the 3D or 2D approach operations should be an RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH operation; (F) missed approach on instruments from minima with, in the case of multi-engined aeroplanes, one-engine-inoperative; (G) landing with one-engine-inoperative. For single-engined aeroplanes, a practice forced landing is required. (ii) Helicopters (A) The aircraft/FSTD checking programme should be established in a way that all major failures of aircraft systems and associated procedures will have been checked in the preceding 3-year period. The operator should define which failures are major for the purpose of the operator proficiency check based on a risk assessment, taking the following into account: (a) cautions or warnings associated with the failure; (b) the criticality of the situation or failure; (c) the outcome of the procedure (land immediately or as soon as possible as opposed to land as soon as practical); (d) when available, manufacturer documentation; and (e) the list of abnormal/emergency procedures described in [point (e)(1) of AMC1 ORO.FC.220](#_DxCrossRefBm318085660). In addition, for single-engined helicopters, each operator proficiency check should include at least the following procedures: (f) engine failure; (g) directional control failures and malfunctions; and (h) hydraulic failure as applicable. (B) When a group of single-engine turbine or single-engine piston helicopter types is defined for the purpose of extending the validity of the operator proficiency check, all major system failures should nevertheless be checked on every type within a 3-year cycle unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with [Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32012R0748&qid=1667384845880) for the relevant types or variants. (C) For pilots required to engage in IFR operations, proficiency checks include the following additional normal/abnormal/emergency procedures: — 3D approach operation to minima; — go-around on instruments; — 2D approach operation to minima; — if relevant, at least one of the 3D or 2D approach operations should be an RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH operation; — in the case of multi-engined helicopters, a simulated failure of one engine to be included in either the 3D or 2D approach operation to minima; — where appropriate to the helicopter type, approach with flight control system/flight director system malfunctions, flight instrument and navigation equipment failures. (D) Before a flight crew member without a valid instrument rating is allowed to operate in VMC at night, they should be required to undergo a proficiency check at night. Thereafter, each second proficiency check should be conducted at night. (E) Operator proficiency checks should be conducted with two qualified pilots in multi-pilot operations, and one qualified pilot in single-pilot operations. A pilot flying both single-pilot and multi-pilot operations should be checked in multi-pilot conditions with the essential malfunctions or manoeuvres below being also checked in the single-pilot role: (a) at least two abnormal or emergency manoeuvres relevant to the type based on a risk assessment; (b) one instrument approach for IFR operations. (F) The flight crew should be assessed on their CRM skills in accordance with the methodology described in [AMC1](#_DxCrossRefBm318085582) and [AMC2 ORO.FC.115](#_DxCrossRefBm318085584) and as specified in the operations manual. (G) If the operator is able to demonstrate, on the basis of a compliance and risk assessment, that alternating the use of an FSTD with the use of an aircraft for this training provides equivalent standards of checking with safety levels similar to those achieved using an FSTD, the aircraft may be used (alternating with the use of an FSTD) for this checking to the extent necessary. (iii) The checks prescribed in (b)(1) may be combined with the skill test or proficiency check required for the issue, the revalidation or renewal of the aircraft type rating and with the skill test required for the issue of the ATPL licence. (2) Emergency and safety equipment checks The items to be checked should be those for which training has been carried out in accordance with (a)(2). (3) Line checks (i) A line check should establish the ability to perform satisfactorily a complete line operation, including pre-flight and post-flight procedures and use of the equipment provided, as specified in the operations manual. The route chosen should be such as to give adequate representation of the scope of a pilot’s normal operations. When weather conditions preclude a manual landing, an automatic landing is acceptable. The commander, or any pilot who may be required to relieve the commander, should also demonstrate their ability to ‘manage’ the operation and take appropriate command decisions. (ii) The flight crew should be assessed on their CRM skills in accordance with the methodology described in [AMC1 ORO.FC.115](#_DxCrossRefBm318085582) and as specified in the operations manual. (iii) CRM assessment should not be used as a reason for a failure of the line check, unless the observed behaviour could lead to an unacceptable reduction in safety margin. (iv) When pilots are assigned duties as pilot flying and pilot monitoring, they should be checked in both functions. (v) A line check should be conducted by a commander nominated by the operator. The operator should maintain a list of nominated commanders and inform the competent authority about the persons nominated. The person conducting the line check should occupy an observer’s seat where installed. (A) For aeroplanes, in the case of long-haul operations where additional operating flight crew are carried, the person conducting the line check may fulfil the function of a cruise relief pilot and should not occupy either pilot’s seat during take-off, departure, initial cruise, descent, approach and landing. (B) If an observer’s seat is not installed but a forward-facing passenger seat allows a good view and sound of the cockpit and the crew, this seat should be used as an observer’s seat. (C) If an observer’s seat is not available and cannot be installed, the commander nominated by the operator should occupy a pilot seat to conduct the line check. (vi) CRM assessment during the line check (A) The CRM assessment taking place during the line check should be solely based on observations made during the initial briefing, cabin briefing, flight crew compartment briefing and those phases where the line checker occupies the observer’s seat. (B) If an observer’s seat is not available and cannot be installed, then the operator should define the best way to assess CRM taking into account the CRM principles above. (vii) Complementary CRM assessment If a suitable FSTD is available and accessible for operator proficiency checks or FSTD training, then a CRM assessment should take place in a line-oriented flight scenario (LOFT or line-oriented section of the OPC) of an FSTD session. This assessment complements the CRM assessment taking place during the line check, but is not part of the line check. (viii) Where a pilot is required to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring, they should be checked on one flight sector as pilot flying and on another flight sector as pilot monitoring. (4) In the case of single-pilot operations, the recurrent checks referred to in (b)(1) and (3) should be performed in the single-pilot role in an environment representative of the operation. (c) Flight crew incapacitation training, except single-pilot operations (1) Procedures should be established to train flight crew to recognise and handle flight crew incapacitation. This training should be conducted every year and can form part of other recurrent training. It should take the form of classroom instruction, discussion, audio-visual presentation or other similar means. (2) If an FSTD is available for the type of aircraft operated, practical training on flight crew incapacitation should be carried out at intervals not exceeding 3 years. (d) Use of FSTD (1) Training and checking provide an opportunity to practise abnormal/emergency procedures that rarely arise in normal operations and should be part of a structured programme of recurrent training. This should be carried out in an FSTD when available and accessible. (2) The line check should be performed in the aircraft. All other training and checking should be performed in an FSTD, or, if it is not reasonably practicable to gain access to such devices, in an aircraft of the same type or in the case of emergency and safety equipment training, in a representative training device. The type of equipment used for training and checking should be representative of the instrumentation, equipment and layout of the aircraft type operated by the flight crew member. (3) Because of the unacceptable risk when simulating emergencies such as engine failure, icing problems, certain types of engine(s) (e.g. during continued take-off or go-around, total hydraulic failure), or because of environmental considerations associated with some emergencies (e.g. fuel dumping) these emergencies should preferably be covered in an FSTD. If no FSTD is available, these emergencies may be covered in the aircraft using a safe airborne simulation, bearing in mind the effect of any subsequent failure, and the exercise must be preceded by a comprehensive briefing. ##### AMC1 ORO.FC.230 Recurrent training and checking *ED Decision 2025/002/R* **RECURRENT TRAINING AND CHECKING SYLLABUS** (a) Recurrent training Recurrent training should comprise the following: (1) Ground training (i) The ground training programme should include: (A) aircraft systems; (B) normal procedures, which include flight planning and ground-handling and flight operations, including performance, mass and balance, fuel schemes, selection of alternates, and ground de-icing/anti-icing; (C) abnormal and emergency procedures, which include pilot incapacitation as applicable; (D) a review of relevant samples of accident/incident and occurrences to increase awareness of the occurrences that may be relevant for the intended operation. (ii) Knowledge of the ground training should be verified by a questionnaire or other suitable methods. (2) Emergency and safety equipment training (i) Emergency and safety equipment training may be combined with emergency and safety equipment checking and should be conducted in an aircraft or a suitable alternative training device. (ii) Every year the emergency and safety equipment training programme should include the following: (A) actual donning of a life-jacket, where fitted; (B) actual donning of protective breathing equipment, where fitted; (C) actual handling of fire extinguishers of the type used; (D) instruction on the location and use of all emergency and safety equipment carried on the aircraft; (E) instruction on the location and use of all types of exits; (F) security procedures. (iii) Every 3 years the programme of training should include the following: (A) actual operation of all types of exits; (B) demonstration of the method used to operate a slide where fitted; (C) actual fire-fighting using equipment representative of that carried in the aircraft on an actual or simulated fire except that, with Halon extinguishers, an alternative extinguisher may be used; (D) the effects of smoke in an enclosed area and actual use of all relevant equipment in a simulated smoke-filled environment; (E) actual handling of pyrotechnics, real or simulated, where applicable; (F) demonstration in the use of the life-rafts where fitted. In the case of helicopters involved in extended over water operations, demonstration and use of the life-rafts. Helicopter water survival training Where life-rafts are fitted for helicopter extended overwater operations (such as sea pilot transfer, offshore operations, regular, or scheduled, coast-to-coast overwater operations), a comprehensive wet drill to cover all ditching procedures should be practised by aircraft crew. This wet drill should include, as appropriate, practice of the actual donning and inflation of a life-jacket, together with a demonstration or audio-visual presentation of the inflation of life-rafts. Crews should board the same (or similar) life-rafts from the water whilst wearing a life-jacket. Training should include the use of all survival equipment carried on board life-rafts and any additional survival equipment carried separately on board the aircraft; — consideration should be given to the provision of further specialist training such as underwater escape training. Where operations are predominately conducted offshore, operators should conduct 3-yearly helicopter underwater escape training at an appropriate facility; — wet practice drill should always be given in initial training unless the crew member concerned has received similar training provided by another operator; (G) particularly in the case where no cabin crew is required, first-aid, appropriate to the aircraft type, the kind of operation and crew complement. (iv) The successful resolution of aircraft emergencies requires interaction between flight crew and cabin/technical crew and emphasis should be placed on the importance of effective coordination and two-way communication between all crew members in various emergency situations. (v) Emergency and safety equipment training should include joint practice in aircraft evacuations so that all who are involved are aware of the duties other crew members should perform. When such practice is not possible, combined flight crew and cabin/technical crew training should include joint discussion of emergency scenarios. (vi) Emergency and safety equipment training should, as far as practicable, take place in conjunction with cabin/technical crew undergoing similar training with emphasis on coordinated procedures and two-way communication between the flight crew compartment and the cabin. (3) CRM Elements of CRM training, as specified in Table 1 of [AMC1 ORO.FC.115](#_DxCrossRefBm523087484), should be integrated into all appropriate phases of recurrent training. (4) Aircraft/FSTD training (i) General (A) The aircraft/FSTD training programme should be established in a way that all major failures of aircraft systems and associated procedures will have been trained in the preceding 3-year period. (B) When engine-out manoeuvres are carried out in an aircraft, the engine failure should be simulated. (C) The recurrent aircraft/FSTD training of a single task or manoeuvre should be separate from, and should not take place at the same time as, an operator proficiency check of the item. (ii) Helicopters (A) If the operator is able to demonstrate, on the basis of a compliance and risk assessment, that alternating the use of an FSTD with the use of an aircraft for this training provides equivalent standards of training with safety levels similar to those achieved using an FSTD, the aircraft may be used (alternating with the use of an FSTD) for this training to the extent necessary. (B) Where a suitable FSTD is available and accessible, it should be used to complete the following additional items: — settling with power and vortex ring; — unanticipated yaw (loss of tail rotor effectiveness). Note: Additional guidance on how to deliver training on the recognition of and recovery from the incipient vortex ring state can be found in the EASA Together4Safety Helicopter Flight Instructor Guide. (5) For operations with other-than-complex motor-powered aeroplanes, all training and checking should be relevant to the type of operation and class of aeroplane on which the flight crew member operates with due account taken of any specialised equipment used. (b) Recurrent checking Recurrent checking should comprise the following: (1) Operator proficiency checks (i) Aeroplanes Operator proficiency checks should take place as part of the normal crew complement and should include, where applicable, the following manoeuvres as pilot flying: (A) rejected take-off when an FSTD is available to represent that specific aeroplane, otherwise touch drills only; (B) take-off with engine failure between V1 and V2 (take-off safety speed) or, if carried out in an aeroplane, at a safe speed above V2; (C) 3D approach operation to minima with, in the case of multi-engined aeroplanes, one-engine-inoperative; (D) 2D approach operation to minima; (E) at least one of the 3D or 2D approach operations should be an RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH operation; (F) missed approach on instruments from minima with, in the case of multi-engined aeroplanes, one-engine-inoperative; (G) landing with one-engine-inoperative. For single-engined aeroplanes, a practice forced landing is required. (ii) Helicopters (A) The aircraft/FSTD checking programme should be established in a way that all major failures of aircraft systems and associated procedures will have been checked in the preceding 3-year period. The operator should define which failures are major for the purpose of the operator proficiency check based on a risk assessment, taking the following into account: (a) cautions or warnings associated with the failure; (b) the criticality of the situation or failure; (c) the outcome of the procedure (land immediately or as soon as possible as opposed to land as soon as practical); (d) when available, manufacturer documentation; and (e) the list of abnormal/emergency procedures described in [point (e)(1) of AMC1 ORO.FC.220](#_DxCrossRefBm523087568). In addition, for single-engined helicopters, each operator proficiency check should include at least the following procedures: (f) engine failure; (g) directional control failures and malfunctions; and (h) hydraulic failure as applicable. (B) When a group of single-engine turbine or single-engine piston helicopter types is defined for the purpose of extending the validity of the operator proficiency check, all major system failures should nevertheless be checked on every type within a 3-year cycle unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with [Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32012R0748&qid=1667384845880) for the relevant types or variants. (C) For pilots required to engage in IFR operations, proficiency checks include the following additional normal/abnormal/emergency procedures: — 3D approach operation to minima; — go-around on instruments; — 2D approach operation to minima; — if relevant, at least one of the 3D or 2D approach operations should be an RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH operation; — in the case of multi-engined helicopters, a simulated failure of one engine to be included in either the 3D or 2D approach operation to minima; — where appropriate to the helicopter type, approach with flight control system/flight director system malfunctions, flight instrument and navigation equipment failures. (D) Before a flight crew member without a valid instrument rating is allowed to operate in VMC at night, they should be required to undergo a proficiency check at night. Thereafter, each second proficiency check should be conducted at night. (E) Operator proficiency checks should be conducted with two qualified pilots in multi-pilot operations, and one qualified pilot in single-pilot operations. A pilot flying both single-pilot and multi-pilot operations should be checked in multi-pilot conditions with the essential malfunctions or manoeuvres below being also checked in the single-pilot role: (a) at least two abnormal or emergency manoeuvres relevant to the type based on a risk assessment; (b) one instrument approach for IFR operations. (F) The flight crew should be assessed on their CRM skills in accordance with the methodology described in [AMC1](#_DxCrossRefBm523087484) and [AMC2 ORO.FC.115](#_DxCrossRefBm523087486) and as specified in the operations manual. (G) If the operator is able to demonstrate, on the basis of a compliance and risk assessment, that alternating the use of an FSTD with the use of an aircraft for this training provides equivalent standards of checking with safety levels similar to those achieved using an FSTD, the aircraft may be used (alternating with the use of an FSTD) for this checking to the extent necessary. (iii) The checks prescribed in (b)(1) may be combined with the skill test or proficiency check required for the issue, the revalidation or renewal of the aircraft type rating and with the skill test required for the issue of the ATPL licence. (2) Emergency and safety equipment checks The items to be checked should be those for which training has been carried out in accordance with (a)(2). (3) Line checks (i) A line check should establish the ability to perform satisfactorily a complete line operation, including pre-flight and post-flight procedures and use of the equipment provided, as specified in the operations manual. The route chosen should be such as to give adequate representation of the scope of a pilot’s normal operations. When weather conditions preclude a manual landing, an automatic landing is acceptable. The commander, or any pilot who may be required to relieve the commander, should also demonstrate their ability to ‘manage’ the operation and take appropriate command decisions. (ii) The flight crew should be assessed on their CRM skills in accordance with the methodology described in [AMC1 ORO.FC.115](#_DxCrossRefBm523087484) and as specified in the operations manual. (iii) CRM assessment should not be used as a reason for a failure of the line check, unless the observed behaviour could lead to an unacceptable reduction in safety margin. (iv) When pilots are assigned duties as pilot flying and pilot monitoring, they should be checked in both functions. (v) A line check should be conducted by a commander nominated by the operator. The operator should maintain a list of nominated commanders and inform the competent authority about the persons nominated. The person conducting the line check should occupy an observer’s seat where installed. (A) For aeroplanes, in the case of long-haul operations where additional operating flight crew are carried, the person conducting the line check may fulfil the function of a cruise relief pilot and should not occupy either pilot’s seat during take-off, departure, initial cruise, descent, approach and landing. (B) If an observer’s seat is not installed but a forward-facing passenger seat allows a good view and sound of the cockpit and the crew, this seat should be used as an observer’s seat. (C) If an observer’s seat is not available and cannot be installed, the commander nominated by the operator should occupy a pilot seat to conduct the line check. (vi) CRM assessment during the line check (A) The CRM assessment taking place during the line check should be solely based on observations made during the initial briefing, cabin briefing, flight crew compartment briefing and those phases where the line checker occupies the observer’s seat. (B) If an observer’s seat is not available and cannot be installed, then the operator should define the best way to assess CRM taking into account the CRM principles above. (vii) Complementary CRM assessment If a suitable FSTD is available and accessible for operator proficiency checks or FSTD training, then a CRM assessment should take place in a line-oriented flight scenario (LOFT or line-oriented section of the OPC) of an FSTD session. This assessment complements the CRM assessment taking place during the line check, but is not part of the line check. (viii) Where a pilot is required to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring, they should be checked on one flight sector as pilot flying and on another flight sector as pilot monitoring. (4) In the case of single-pilot operations, the recurrent checks referred to in (b)(1) and (3) should be performed in the single-pilot role in an environment representative of the operation. (c) Flight crew incapacitation training, except single-pilot operations (1) Procedures should be established to train flight crew to recognise and handle flight crew incapacitation. This training should be conducted every year and can form part of other recurrent training. It should take the form of classroom instruction, discussion, audio-visual presentation or other similar means. (2) If an FSTD is available for the type of aircraft operated, practical training on flight crew incapacitation should be carried out at intervals not exceeding 3 years. (d) Use of FSTD (1) Training and checking provide an opportunity to practise abnormal/emergency procedures that rarely arise in normal operations and should be part of a structured programme of recurrent training. This should be carried out in an FSTD when available and accessible. (2) The line check should be performed in the aircraft. All other training and checking should be performed in an FSTD, or, if it is not reasonably practicable to gain access to such devices, in an aircraft of the same type or in the case of emergency and safety equipment training, in a representative training device. The type of equipment used for training and checking should be representative of the instrumentation, equipment and layout of the aircraft type operated by the flight crew member. (3) Because of the unacceptable risk when simulating emergencies such as engine failure, icing problems, certain types of engine(s) (e.g. during continued take-off or go-around, total hydraulic failure), or because of environmental considerations associated with some emergencies (e.g. fuel dumping) these emergencies should preferably be covered in an FSTD. If no FSTD is available, these emergencies may be covered in the aircraft using a safe airborne simulation, bearing in mind the effect of any subsequent failure, and the exercise must be preceded by a comprehensive briefing.