AMC No 2 to CS 27.865 External loads

• ED Decision 2018/015/R found in: CS-27 Amdt 10 - Small Rotorcraft (Feb 2023)

AMC No 2 to CS 27.865 External loads ED Decision 2018/015/R/R a. Explanation (1) This AMC contains guidance for the certification of helicopter external-load attaching means and load-carrying systems to be used in conjunction with operating rules, such as Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations[[12]](#_ftn12). Also, paragraph [CS 27.25](#_DxCrossRefBm8893783) concerns, in part, jettisonable external cargo. (2) [CS 27.865](#_DxCrossRefBm8893784) provides a minimum level of safety for small rotorcraft designs to be used with operating rules, such as Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations. Certain aspects of operations, such as microwave tower and high-line wirework, may also be regulated separately by other national rules. For applications that could fall under the scope of applicability of several regulations, special certification emphasis will be required by both the applicant and the approving authority to assure all relevant safety requirements are identified and met. Potential additional requirements, where thought to exist, are noted herein. (3) The CS 27.865 provisions for external loads do not discern the difference between a crew member and a compensating passenger when either is carried external to the rotorcraft. Both are considered to be HEC. b. Definitions (1) Backup quick-release subsystem (BQRS): the secondary or ‘second choice’ subsystem used to perform a normal or emergency jettison of external cargo. (2) Cargo: the part of any rotorcraft-load combination that is removable, changeable, and is attached to the rotorcraft by an approved means. For certification purposes, ‘cargo’ applies to HEC and non-human external cargo (NHEC). (3) Cargo hook: a hook that can be rated for both HEC and NHEC. It is typically used by being fixed directly to a designated hard point on the rotorcraft. (4) Dual actuation device (DAD): this is a sequential control that requires two distinct actions in series for actuation. One example is the removal of a lock pin followed by the activation of a ‘then free’ switch or lever for load release to occur (in this scenario, a load release switch protected only by an uncovered switch guard is not acceptable). For jettisonable HEC applications, a simple, covered switch does not qualify as a DAD. Familiarity with covered switches allows the pilot to both open and activate the switch in one motion. This has led to inadvertent load release. (5) Emergency jettison (or complete load release): the intentional, instantaneous release of NHEC or HEC in a preset sequence by the quick-release system (QRS) that is normally performed to achieve safer aircraft operation in an emergency. (6) External fixture: a structure external to and in addition to the basic airframe that does not have true jettison capability and has no significant payload capability in addition to its own weight. An example is an agricultural spray boom. These configurations are not approvable as ‘External Loads’ under [CS 27.865](#_DxCrossRefBm8893784). (7) External Load System. The entire installation related to the carriage of external loads to include not only the hoist or hook, but also the structural provisions and release systems. A complex PCDS is also considered to be part of the external load system. (8) Hoist: a hoist is a device that exerts a vertical pull, usually through a cable and drum system (i.e. a pull that does not typically exceed a 30-degree cone measured around the z-rotorcraft axis). (9) Hoist demonstration cycle (or ‘one cycle’): the complete extension and retraction of at least 95 % of the actual cable length, or 100 % of the cable length capable of being used in service (i.e. that would activate any extension or retraction limiting devices), whichever is greater. (10) Hoist load-speed combinations: some hoists are designed so that the extension and retraction speed slows as the load increases or nears the end of a cable extension. Other hoist designs maintain a constant speed as the load is varied. In the latter designs, the load-speed combination simply means the variation in load at the constant design speed of the hoist. (11) Human external cargo (HEC): a person (or persons) who, at some point in the operation, is (are) carried external to the rotorcraft. (12) Non-human external cargo (NHEC): any external cargo operation that does not at any time involve a person (or persons) carried external to the rotorcraft. (13) Normal jettison (or selective load release): the intentional release, normally at optimum jettison conditions, of NHEC. (14) Personnel-carrying device system (PCDS) is a device that has the structural capability and features needed to transport occupants external to the helicopter during HEC or helicopter hoist operations. A PCDS includes but is not limited to life safety harnesses (including, if applicable, a quick-release and strop with a connector ring), rigid baskets and cages that are either attached to a hoist or cargo hook or mounted to the rotorcraft airframe. (15) Primary quick-release subsystem (PQRS): the primary or ‘first choice’ subsystem used to perform a normal or emergency jettison of external cargo. (16) Quick-release system (QRS): the entire release system for jettisonable external cargo (i.e. the sum total of both the primary and backup quick-release subsystem). The QRS consists of all the components including the controls, the release devices, and everything in between. (17) Rescue hook (or hook): a hook that can be rated for both HEC and NHEC. It is typically used in conjunction with a hoist or equivalent system. (18) Rotorcraft-load combination (RLC): the combination of a rotorcraft and an external load, including the external-load attaching means. (19) Spider: a spider is a system of attaching a lowering cable or rope or a harness to an NHEC (or HEC) RLC to eliminate undesirable flight dynamics during operations. A spider usually has four or more legs (or load paths) that connect to various points of a PCDS to equalise loading and prevent spinning, twisting, or other undesirable flight dynamics. (20) True jettison capability: the ability to safely release an external load using an approved QRS in 30 seconds or less. NOTE: In all cases, a PQRS should release the external load in less than 5 seconds. Many PQRSs will release the external load in milliseconds, once the activation device is triggered. However, a manual BQRS, such as a set of cable cutters, could take as much as 30 seconds to release the external load. The 30 seconds would be measured starting from the time the release command was given and ending when the external load was cut loose. (21) True payload capability: the ability of an external device or tank to carry a significant payload in addition to its own weight. If little or no payload can be carried, the external device or tank is an external fixture (see definition above). (22) Winch: a winch is a device that can employ a cable and drum or other means to exert a horizontal (i.e. x-rotorcraft axis) pull. However, in designs that utilise a winch to perform a hoist function by use of a 90-degree cable direction change device (such as a pulley or pulley system), the winch system is considered to be a hoist. c. Procedures The following certification procedures are provided in the most general form. Where there are significant differences between the cargo types, these differences are highlighted. (1) General Compliance Procedures for [CS 27.865](#_DxCrossRefBm8893784): The applicant should clearly identify the applicable cargo types (NHEC or HEC) for which an application is being made. The structural loads and operating envelopes for each applicable cargo type should be determined and used to formulate the flight manual supplement and basic loads report. The applicant should show by analysis, test, or both, that the rotorcraft structure, the external-load attaching means, and the complex PCDS, if applicable, meet the specific requirements of [CS 27.865](#_DxCrossRefBm8893784) and any other relevant requirements of CS-27 for the proposed operating envelope. NOTE: the approved maximum internal gross weight should never be exceeded for any approved HEC configuration (or simultaneous NHEC and HEC configuration). (2) Reliability of the external load system, including the QRS. (i) The hoist, QRS, and rescue hook system should be reliable for all phases of flight and the applicable configurations for those phases (i.e. operating, stowed, or unstowed) for which approval is sought. The hoist should be disabled (or an overriding, fail-safe mechanical safety device such as either a flagged removableshear pin or a load-lowering brake should be utilised) to prevent inadvertent load unspooling or release during any extended flight phases in which hoist operation is not intended. Loss of hoist operational control should also be considered. (ii) A failure of the external load system, (including QRS, hook, complex PCDS where applicable, and attachments to the rotorcraft) should be shown to be extremely improbable (i.e. 1 × 10-9 failures per flight) for all failure modes that could cause a catastrophic failure, serious injury or a fatality anywhere in the total airborne system. Uncontrolled high-speed descent of the hoist cable would fall into this category. All significant failure modes of lesser consequence should be evaluated and shown to be at least improbable (i.e. 1 × 10-5 failures per flight). (iii) The reliability of the system should be demonstrated by completion and approval of the following: (A) A functional hazard assessment (FHA) to determine the hazard severity of failures associated with the external load system. The effect of the flailing cable after a load release should be considered. (B) A fault tree analysis (FTA) or equivalent to verify that the hazard classification of the FHA has been met. (C) A system safety assessment (SSA) to demonstrate compliance with the applicable certification requirements. (D) An analysis of the non-redundant external load system components that constitute the primary load path (e.g., beam, cable, hook), to demonstrate compliance with the applicable structural requirements. (E) A repetitive test of all functional devices that cycles these devices under critical structural conditions, operational conditions, or a combination of both, at least 10 times each for NHEC and 30 times for HEC. This is applicable to both primary and backup subsystems. It is assumed that only one hoist cycle will typically occur per flight. This rationale has been used to determine the 10 demonstration cycles for NHEC applications and 30 demonstration cycles for HEC applications. However, if a particular application requires more than one hoist cycle per flight, then the number of demonstration cycles should be increased accordingly by multiplying the test cycles by the intended higher cycle number per flight. These repetitive tests may be conducted on the rotorcraft or by using a bench simulation that accurately replicates the rotorcraft installation. (F) An environmental qualification for the proposed operating environment. This review includes consideration of low and high temperatures (typically – 40 °C (– 40 °F) to + 65.6 °C (+ 150 °F), altitudes to 12 000 feet, humidity, salt spray, sand and dust, vibration, shock, rain, fungus, and acceleration. The appropriate rotorcraft sections of RTCA Document DO-160/ EUROCAE ED-14 for high and low temperature and vibration are considered to be acceptable for environmental qualification. The environmental qualification will address icing for those external load systems installed on rotorcraft approved for flight into icing conditions. (G) Qualification of the hoist itself to the appropriate electromagnetic interference (EMI) and lightning threat levels specified for NHEC or HEC, as applicable. This qualification can occur separately or as part of the entire on-board QRS. (3) Testing. (i) Hoist system load-speed combination ground tests: the load versus-speed combinations of the hoist should be demonstrated on the ground (either using an accurate engineering mock-up or a rotorcraft) by showing repeatability of the no load-speed combination, the 50 per cent load-speed combination, the 75 per cent load-speed combination, and the 100 per cent (i.e. system rated limit) load-speed combination. If more than one operational speed range exists, the preceding tests should be performed at the most critical speed. (A) At least 1/10 of the hoist demonstration cycles (see definition) should include the maximum aft angular displacement of the load from the vertical, applied for under CS 27.865(a). (B) A minimum of six consecutive, complete operation cycles should be conducted at the system's 100 per cent (i.e. system limit rated) load-speed combination. (C) In addition, the demonstration should cover all normal and emergency modes of intended operation and should include operation of all control devices such as limit switches, braking devices, and overload sensors in the system. (D) All quick disconnect devices and cable cutters should be demonstrated at 0 per cent, 25 per cent, 50 per cent, 75 per cent, and 100 per cent of system limit load or at the most critical percentage of limit load. Note: some hoist designs have built-in cable tensioning devices that function at the no load-speed combination, as well as at other load-speed combinations. This device should work during the no load-speed and other load-speed cable-cutting combinations. (E) Any devices or methods used to increase the mechanical advantage of the hoist should also be demonstrated. (F) During a portion of each demonstration cycle, the hoist should be operated from each station from which it can be controlled. (ii) Hoist and rescue hook systems or cargo hook systems flight test: an in-flight demonstration test of the hoist system should be conducted for helicopters designed to carry NHEC or HEC. The rotorcraft should be flown to the extremes of the applicable manoeuvre flight envelope and to all conditions that are critical to strength, manoeuvrability, stability, and control, or any other factor affecting airworthiness. Unless a lesser load is determined to be more critical for either dynamic stability or other reasons, the maximum hoist system rated load or, if less, the maximum load requested for approval (and the associated limit load data placards) should be used for these tests. The minimum hoist system load (or zero load) should also be demonstrated in these tests. (iii) CS 27.865(d) Flight test Verification Work: flight test verification work that thoroughly examines the operational envelope should be conducted with the external cargo carriage device for which approval is requested (especially those that involve HEC). The flight test programme should show that all aspects of the operations applied for are safe, uncomplicated, and can be conducted by a qualified flight crew under the most critical service environment, and, in the case of HEC, under emergency conditions. Flight tests should be conducted for the simulated representative NHEC and HEC loads to demonstrate their in-flight handling and separation characteristics. Each placard, marking, and flight manual supplement should be validated during flight testing. (A) General: flight testing or an equivalent combination of analysis, ground tests, and flight tests should be conducted under the critical combinations of configurations and operating conditions for which basic type certification approval is sought. The critical load condition of the intended cargo (e.g. rocks, lumber, radio towers, HEC) may be defined by a heavy weight and low area cargo or a low weight and high area cargo. The effects of these load conditions should be evaluated throughout the operational aspects of cargo loading, take-off, cruise up to maximum allowable speed with cargo, jettison, and landing. The helicopter handling with different cable conditions should include lateral transitions and quick stops up to the helicopter approved low airspeed limitations. Additional combinations of external load and operating conditions may be subsequently approved under relevant operational requirements as long as the structural limits and reliability considerations of the basic certification approval are not exceeded (i.e. equivalent safety is maintained). The qualification flight test of this subparagraph is intended to be accomplished primarily by analysis or bench testing. However, at least one in-flight, limit load drop test should be conducted for the critical load case. If one critical load case cannot be clearly identified, then more than one drop test might be necessary. Also, in-flight tests for the minimum load case (i.e. typically the cable hook itself) with the load trailing both in the minimum and maximum cable length configurations should be conducted. Any safety-of-flight limitations should be documented and placed in the RFM or RFMS. In certain low-gross weight, jettisonable HEC configurations, the complex PCDS may act as a trailing aerofoil that could result in entangling the complex PCDS with the rotorcraft. These configurations should be assessed on a case-by-case basis by analysis or flight test to ensure that any safety-of-flight limitations are clearly identified and placed in the RFM or RFMS (also see PCDS). (B) Separation characteristics of jettisonable external loads: for all jettisonable RLCs of any applicable cargo type, satisfactory post-jettison separation characteristics of all loads should meet the minimum criteria that follow: (1) Separate functioning of the PQRS and BQRS resulting in a complete, immediate release of the external load without interference by the rotorcraft or external load system. (2) No damage to the helicopter during or following actuation of the QRS and load jettisoning. (3) A jettison trajectory that is clear of the helicopter. (4) No inherent instability of the jettisonable (or just jettisoned) HEC or NHEC while in proximity to the helicopter. (5) No adverse or uncontrollable helicopter reactions at the time of jettison. (6) Stability and control characteristics after jettison that are within the originally approved limits. (7) No adverse degradation on helicopter performance characteristics after jettison. (C) Jettison requirements for jettisonable external loads: for representative cargo types (low, medium, and high-density loads on long and short lines), emergency and normal jettison procedures should be demonstrated (by a combination of analysis, ground tests, and flight tests) in sufficient combinations of flight conditions to establish a jettison envelope that should be placed in the flight manual. (D) QRS demonstration; repetitive jettison demonstrations that use the PQRS, which may be accomplished during ground or flight tests, should be conducted. The BQRS should be utilised at least once. (E) QRS reliability (i.e. failure modes) affecting flight performance: the FHA of the QRS (see paragraph c.(2) above) should show that any single system failure will not result in unsatisfactory flight characteristics, including any QRS failures resulting in asymmetric loading conditions. (F) Flight test weight and CG locations: all flight tests should be conducted at the extreme or critical combinations of weight and longitudinal and lateral CG conditions within the applied-for flight envelope. Typically the two load conditions would be a heavy weight and low area cargo, and a low weight and high area cargo. The rotorcraft should remain within approved weight and CG limits, both with the external load applied, and after jettison of the load. (G) Jettison Envelopes: emergency and normal jettison demonstrations should be performed at sufficient airspeeds and descent rates to establish any restrictions for satisfactory separation characteristics. Both the maximum and minimum airspeed limits and the maximum descent rate for safe separation should be determined. The sideslip envelope as a function of airspeed should be determined. (H) Altitude: emergency and normal jettison demonstrations should be performed at altitudes that are consistent with the approvable operational envelope and with the manoeuvres necessary to overcome any adverse effects of the jettison. (I) Attitude: emergency and normal jettison demonstrations should be performed from all attitudes that are appropriate to normal and emergency operational usage. Where the attitudes of HEC or NHEC with respect to the helicopter may be varied, the most critical attitude should be demonstrated. This demonstration would normally be accomplished by bench testing. (4) Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) and Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement (RFMS): (i) General. (A) Present appropriate flight manual procedures and limitations for all HEC operations. (1) The approval of an external loads equipment design in accordance with CS 27.865 does not provide an approval to conduct external loads operations. Therefore, the following should be included as a limitation in the RFM or RFMS: — The external load equipment certification approval does not constitute an operational approval; an operational approval for external load operations must be granted by the competent authority. (2) The RFM or RFMS that will be approved through the certification activity should not contain any references to the previously used RLC classes. (B) For non-HEC designs, the following limitation should be included within the RFM or RFMS: — The external load system does not comply with the CS-27 certification provisions for Human External Cargo (HEC). (C) The RFM or RFMS may contain suitable text to clarify whether the external load system meets the applicable certification provisions for lifting an external load free of land or water, and whether the load is jettisonable. (D) The RFM or RFMS should contain emergency procedures detailing the steps to be taken by the flight crew during emergencies such as an engine failure, hoist failure, flight director or autopilot failure, etc. (E) The RFM or RFMS normal procedures should explain the required procedures to conduct a safe external load operation. Such information may include the methods for attachment and normal release of the external load. (ii) HEC installations. (A) For HEC installations, the following additional information/limitation should be included in the RFM or RFMS: (1) That the external load system meets the CS-27 certification specifications for Human External Cargo (HEC). (2) Operation of the external load equipment with HEC requires the use of an approved Personnel Carrying Device Systems (PCDS). NOTE: for a simple PCDS, also refer to AMC No. 3 to 27.865 (B) Crew member communications. (1) The flight manual should clearly define the method of communication between the flight crew and the HEC. These instructions and manuals should be validated during flight testing. (2) If the external load system does not include equipment to allow direct intercommunication among required crew members and external occupants, the following limitation may be included within the limitations section of the RFM or RFMS: — This external load system does not include equipment to allow direct intercommunication among required crew members and external occupants. Operating this external load equipment with HEC is not authorised unless appropriate equipment to allow direct intercommunication between required crew members and external occupants has an airworthiness approval. (iii) Additional RFM or RFMS requirements are contained within each applicable paragraph of this AMC. (5) Continued airworthiness. (i) Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: maintenance manuals (and RFM supplements) developed by applicants for external load applications should be presented for approval and should include all appropriate inspection and maintenance procedures. The applicant should provide sufficient data and other information to establish the frequency, extent, and methods of inspection of critical structure, systems, and components. CS 27.1529 and Appendix A to CS-27 requires this information to be included in the maintenance manual. For example, maintenance requirements for sensitive QRS squibs should be carefully determined, documented, approved during certification, and included as specific mandatory scheduled maintenance requirements that may require either ‘daily’ or ‘pre-flight’ checks (especially for HEC applications). (ii) Hoist system continued airworthiness. The design life of the hoist system and any limited life components should be clearly identified, and the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the maintenance manual should include these requirements. For STCs, a maintenance manual supplement should be provided that includes these requirements. Note: the design life of a hoist and cable system is typically between 5 000 and 8 000 cycles. Some hoist systems have usage time meters installed. Others may have cycle counters installed. Cycle counters should be considered for HEC operations and high-load or other operations that may cause low-cycle fatigue failures. (6) [CS 27.865(a)](#_DxCrossRefBm8893784) Static Structural Substantiation and CS 27.865(f) Fatigue Substantiation Procedures: The following static structural substantiation methods and fatigue substantiation should be used: (i) Critical Basic Load Determination. The critical basic loads and corresponding flight envelope are determined by statically substantiating the gross weight range limits, the corresponding vertical limit load factors (NZW) and the safety factors applicable for the type of external load for which the application is being made. NOTE: in cases where NHEC or HEC can have more than one shape, centre of gravity, centre of lift, or be carried at more than one distance in-flight from the rotorcraft attachment, a critical configuration for certification purposes may not be determinable. If such a critical configuration can be determined, it may be examined for approval as a ‘worst case’ to satisfy a particular certification criterion or several criteria, as appropriate. If such a critical configuration cannot be determined, the extreme points of the operational external load configuration envelope should be examined, with consideration given to any other points within the envelope that experience or any other rationale indicates as points that need to be investigated. (ii) Vertical Limit and Ultimate Load Factors. The basic NZW is converted to the ultimate load by multiplying the maximum vertical limit load by the appropriate safety factor (for restricted category approvals, see the guidance in paragraph AC 27 MG 5 of FAA AC 27-1B Change 7). This ultimate load is used to substantiate all the existing structure affected by, and all the added structure associated with, the load-carrying device, its attachments and its cargo. Casting factors, fitting factors, and other dynamic load factors should be applied where appropriate. (A) NHEC applications. In most cases, it is acceptable to perform a standard static analysis to show compliance. A vertical limit load factor (NZW) of 2.5 g is typical for heavy gross weight NHEC hauling configurations (ref.: [CS 27.337](#_DxCrossRefBm8893833)). This vertical load factor should be applied to the maximum external load for which the application is being made, together with a minimum safety factor of 1.5. (B) HEC applications. (1) If a safety factor of 3.0 or more is used, it is acceptable to perform a standard static analysis to show compliance. The safety factor should be applied to the yield strength of the weakest component in the system (QRS, complex PCDS, and attachment load path). If a safety factor of less than 3.0 is used, both an analysis and a full-scale ultimate load test of the relevant parts of the system should be performed. (2) Since HEC applications typically involve lower gross weight configurations, a higher vertical limit load factor is required to assure that the limit load is not exceeded in service. The applicant should use either the conservative value of 3.5 g or an analytically derived maximum vertical limit load factor for the requested operating envelope. Linear interpolation between the vertical load factors of the maximum and minimum design weights may be used. However, in no case may the vertical limit load factor be less than 2.5 g for any HEC application. (3) For the purpose of structural analysis or test, applicants should assume a 101.2-kg (223-pound) man as the minimum weight of each occupant carried as HEC. NOTE: if the HEC is engaged in work tasks that employ devices of significant added weight (e.g. heavy backpacks, tools, fire extinguishers, etc.), the total weight of the 101.2-kg (223-pound) man and their equipment should be assumed in the structural analysis or test. (iii) Critical Structural Case. For applications involving more than one RLC class or cargo type, the structural substantiation is required only for the most critical case. The most critical case should be determined by rational analysis. (iv) Jettisonable Loads. For the substantiating analyses or tests of all jettisonable external loads, including HEC, the maximum external load should be applied at the maximum angle that can be achieved in service, but not less than 30 degrees. The angle should be measured from the sling-load-line to the rotorcraft vertical axis (z axis) and may be in any direction that can be achieved in service. The 30-degree angle may be reduced in some or all directions if it is impossible to obtain due to physical constraints or operating limitations. The maximum allowable cable angle should be determined and approved. The angle approved should be based on structural requirements, mechanical interference limits, and flight-handling characteristics over the most critical conditions and combinations of conditions in the approved flight envelope. (v) Hoist System Limit Load. NOTE: if a hoist cable or a long-line cable is utilised, a new dynamic system is established. The characteristics of the system should be evaluated to assure that either no hazardous failure modes exist or that they are acceptably minimised. For example, the hoist cable or long-line cable may exhibit a natural frequency that could be excited by sources internal to the overall structural system (i.e. the rotorcraft) or by sources external to the system. Another example is the loading effect of the cable acting as a spring between the rotorcraft and the suspended external load. (A) Determine the basic loads that would result in the failure or unspooling of the hoist or its installation, respectively. NOTE: This determination should be based on static strength and any significant dynamic load magnification factors. (B) Select the lower of the two values as the ultimate load of the hoist system installation. (C) Divide the selected ultimate load by 1.5 to determine the true structural limit load of the system. (D) Determine the manufacturer’s approved ‘limit design safety factor’ (or that which the applicant has applied for). Divide this factor into the true structural limit load (from (C) above) to determine the hoist system’s working (or placarded) limit load. (E) Compare the system’s derived limit load to that applied for one ‘g’ payload multiplied by the maximum downward vertical load factor (NZWMAX) to determine the critical payload’s limit value. (F) The critical payload limit should be equal to or less than the system’s derived limit load for the installation to be approvable. (vi) Fatigue Substantiation Procedures NOTE: the term ‘hazard to the rotorcraft’ is defined to include all hazards to either the rotorcraft, to the occupants thereof, or both. (A) Fatigue evaluation of NHEC applications. Any critical components of the suspended system and their attachments (e.g. the cargo hook, or bolted or pinned truss attachments), the failure of which could result in a hazard to the rotorcraft, should be included in an acceptable fatigue analysis. (B) Fatigue evaluation of HEC applications. The entire external load system, including the complex PCDS, should be reviewed on a component-by-component basis to determine which, if any, components are fatigue critical. These components should be analysed or tested to ensure that their fatigue life limits are properly determined, and the limits should then be placed in the limited life section of the maintenance manual. (7) [CS 27.865(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm8893784) and CS 27.865(c) Procedures for Quick-Release Systems and Cargo Hooks: for jettisonable RLCs of any applicable cargo type, both a primary quick-release system (PQRS) and a backup quick-release system (BQRS) are required. Features that should be considered are: (i) The PQRS, BQRS and their load-release devices and subsystems (such as electronically actuated guillotines) should be separate (i.e. physically, systematically, and functionally redundant). (ii) The controls for the PQRS should be installed on one of the pilot’s primary controls, or in an equivalently accessible location. The use of an ‘equivalent accessible location’ should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis and utilised only where equivalent safety is clearly maintained. (iii) The controls for the BQRS may be less sophisticated than those of the PQRS. For instance, manual cable cutters are acceptable provided they are listed in the flight manual as a required device and have a dedicated, placarded storage location. (iv) The PQRS should release the external load in less than 5 seconds. The BQRS should release the external load in less than 30 seconds. This time interval begins the moment an emergency is declared and ends when the load is released. (v) Each quick-release device should be designed and located to allow the pilot or a crew member to accomplish the release of the external cargo release without hazardously limiting the ability to control the rotorcraft during emergency situations. The flight manual should reflect the requirement for a crew member and their related functions. (vi) CS 27.865(c)(1) QRS Requirements for Jettisonable HEC Operations. (A) For jettisonable HEC operations, both the PQRS and BQRS are required to have a dual actuation device (DAD) for external cargo release. The DAD should be designed to require two actions with a definite change of direction of movement, such as opening a switch or pushbutton cover followed by a definite change of direction in order to activate the release switch or pushbutton. Any possibility of opening the switch cover and inadvertently releasing the load with a single motion is not acceptable. An additional level of safety may also be provided through the use of Advisory and Caution messages. For example, an advisory ‘ON’ message might be illuminated when the pilot energises (but not arms) the system with a master switch. A cautionary ‘ARMED’ message would then illuminate when the pilot opens the switch guard. In this case, a possible unwanted flip of the switch guard would be immediately recognised by the crew. The switch design should be evaluated by ground or flight test. The RFM or RFMS should contain a clear description of the DAD functionality that includes the associated safety features, normal and emergency procedures, and applicable advisory and caution messages. (B) The DAD is intended for emergency use during the phases of flight in which the HEC is carried or retrieved. The DAD can be used for both NHEC and HEC operations. However, because it can be used for HEC, the instructions for continued airworthiness should be carefully reviewed and documented. The DAD can be operated by the pilot from a primary control, or, after a command is given by the pilot, by a crew member from a remote location. Additional safety precautions (such as a lock wire) should be considered for a remote hoist console in the cabin. Any emergency release function provided by a remote hoist console should also be designed to protect against inadvertent activation during the hoist operation. If the backup DAD is a cable cutter, it should be properly secured, placarded and readily accessible to the crew member who is intended to use it. (vii) CS 27.865(b)(3)(ii) Electromagnetic Interference. Protection of the QRS against potential internal and external sources of EMI and lightning is required. This is necessary to prevent an inadvertent load release from sources such as lightning strikes, stray electromagnetic signals, and static electricity. (A) Jettisonable NHEC systems should not be adversely affected when exposed to the electrical field of a minimum of 20 volts per metre (i.e. CAT U or equivalent) radio-frequency (RF) field strength per RTCA Document DO-160/ EUROCAE ED-14. (B) Jettisonable HEC systems should not be adversely affected when exposed to the electrical field of a minimum of 200 volts per metre (i.e. CAT Y) RF field strength per RTCA Document DO-160/ EUROCAE ED-14. (1) These RF field threat levels may need to be increased for certain special applications such as microwave tower and high voltage high line repairs. Separate criteria for special applications under multi-agency regulation (such as IEEE or OSHA standards) should also be addressed, as applicable, during certification. When necessary, the Special Condition process can be used to establish a practicable level of safety for specific high voltage or other special application conditions. The helicopter High-intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) safety assessment should consider the effects on helicopter flight safety due to a HIRF-induced failure or a malfunction of external load systems, such as an uncommanded hoist winch activation without the ability to jettison, or an uncommanded load jettison. The appropriate failure effect classification should be assigned based on this assessment, and compliance should be demonstrated with CS 27.1317 and the guidance in AMC 20-158. This should not be limited to the cable cutter devices or load jettison subsystems only. In some designs, an uncommanded load release or a hoist winch activation could also result from a failure of the command and control circuits of the system. (2) An approved standard rotorcraft test, which includes the full HIRF frequency and amplitude external and internal environments, on the QRS and any applicable complex PCDS, or the entire rotorcraft including the QRS and any applicable complex PCDS, could be substituted for the jettisonable NHEC and HEC systems tests as long as the RF field strengths directly on the QRS and PCDS are shown to equal or exceed those defined by paragraphs c.(7)(vii)(A) and c.(7)(vii)(B) above for NHEC and HEC respectively. (3) The EMI levels specified in paragraphs c.(7)(vii)(A) and c.(7)(vii)(B) above are total EMI levels to be applied to the QRS (and affected QRS component) boundary. The total EMI level applied should include the effects of both external EMI sources and internal EMI sources. All aspects of internally generated EMI should be carefully considered, including peaks that could occur from time-to-time due to any combination of on-board systems being operated. For example, special attention should be given to EMI from hoist operations that involve the switching of very high currents. Those currents can generate significant voltages in closely spaced wiring that, if allowed to reach some squib designs, could activate the device. Shielding, bonding, and grounding of wiring associated with operation of the hoist and the quick-release mechanism should be clearly and adequately evaluated in design and certification. When recognised good practices for such installation are applied, an analysis may be sufficient to highlight that the maximum possible pulse generated into the squib circuit will have an energy content orders of magnitude below the squib no-fire energy. If insufficient data is available for the installation and/or the squib no-fire energy, this evaluation may require testing. One acceptable test method to demonstrate the adequacy of QRS shielding, bonding, and grounding would be to actuate the hoist under maximum load, together with likely critical combinations of other aircraft electrical loads, and demonstrate that the test squibs (which are more EMI sensitive than the squibs specified for use in the QRS) do not inadvertently operate during the test. (8) Cargo Hooks or Equivalent Devices and their Related Systems. All cargo hooks or equivalent devices should be approved to acceptable aircraft industry standards. The applicant should present these standards, and any related manufacturer’s certificates of production or qualification, as part of the approval package. (i) General. Cargo hook systems should have the same reliability goals and should be functionally demonstrated under the critical loads for NHEC and HEC, as appropriate. All engagement and release modes should be demonstrated. If the hook is used as a quick-release device, then the release of critical loads should be demonstrated under conditions that simulate the maximum allowable bank angles and speeds and any other critical operating conditions. Demonstration of any re-latching features and any safety or warning devices should also be conducted. Demonstration of actual in-flight emergency quick-release capability may not be necessary if the quick-release capability can be acceptably simulated by other means. NOTE: Cargo hook manufacturers specify particular shapes, sizes, and cross sections for lifting eyes to assure compatibility with their hook design (e.g. Breeze Eastern Service Bulletin CAB-100-41). Experience has shown that, under certain conditions, a load may inadvertently hang up because of improper geometry at the hook-to-eye interface that will not allow the eye to slide off an open hook as intended. For both NHEC and HEC designs, the phenomenon of hook dynamic roll-out (inadvertent opening of the hook latch and subsequent release of the load) should be considered to assure that QRS reliability goals are not compromised. This is of particular concern for HEC applications. Hook dynamic roll-out occurs during certain ground-handling and flight conditions that may allow the lifting eye to work its way out of the hook. Hook dynamic roll-out typically occurs when either the RLC’s sling or harness is not properly attached to the hook, is blown by down draft, is dragged along the ground or through water, or is otherwise placed into a dangerous hook-to-eye configuration. The potential for hook dynamic roll-out can be minimised in design by specifying particular hook-and-eye shape and cross-section combinations. For non-jettisonable RLCs, a pin can be used to lock the hook-keeper in place during operations. Some cargo hook systems may employ two or more cargo hooks for safety. These systems are approvable. However, a loss of any load by a single hook should be shown to not result in a loss of control of the rotorcraft. In a dual hook system, if the hook itself is the quick-release device (i.e. if a single release point does not exist in the load path between the rotorcraft and the dual hooks), the pilot should have a dual PQRS that includes selectable, co-located individual quick releases that are independent for each hook used. A BQRS should also be present for each hook. For cargo hook systems with more than two hooks, either a single release point should be present in the load path between the rotorcraft and the multiple hook system, or multiple PQRSs and BQRSs should be present. (ii) Jettisonable Cargo Hook Systems. For jettisonable applications, each cargo hook: (A) should have a sufficient amount of slack in the control cable to permit cargo hook movement without tripping the hook release; (B) should be shown to be reliable (see paragraph c(1)); (C) for HEC systems, unless the cargo hook is to be the primary quick-release device, each cargo hook should be designed so that operationally induced loads cannot inadvertently release the load. For example, a simple cargo hook should have a one-way, spring-loaded gate (i.e. ‘snap hook’) that allows load attachment going into the gate but does not allow the gate to open (and subsequently lose the HEC) when an operationally induced load is applied in the opposite direction. For HEC applications, cargo hooks that also serve as quick-release devices should be carefully reviewed to assure they are reliable. (iii) Other Load Release Types. In some current configurations, such as those used for high-line operations, a load release may be present that is not on the rotorcraft but is on the PCDS itself. Examples are a tension-release device that lets out line under an operationally induced load, or a personal rope cutter. For long-line/sling operations, a load release may also be present that is not on the rotorcraft but is a remote release system. The long-line remote release allows the pilot to not release the line itself during repetitive loading operations. The release of the load by a dedicated switch at the pilot controls, through the secondary hook on a long line, presents additional risks due to the possibility of the long line impacting the tail or the main rotor after a release, due to its elasticity. These devices are acceptable if: (A) The off-rotorcraft release is considered to be a ‘third release’ means. This type of release is not a substitute for a required release (i.e. PQRS or BQRS); (B) The cargo hook release and the long line remote release are placed on the primary controls in a way that avoids confusion during operation. One example of compliance would be to place the cargo hook release on the cyclic, and the long line remote release on the collective, to avoid any possible confusion in the operation; (C) The RFM or RFMS includes a description of the new control in the cockpit, and its function and an RFM or RFMS note to the pilot is included, indicating that the helicopter hook emergency release procedures are fully applicable; (D) The release meets all the other relevant requirements of CS 27.865 and the methods of this AMC or equivalent methods; and (E) The release has no operational or failure modes that would affect continued safe flight and landing under any operations, critical failure modes, conditions, or combinations of these. For long-line remote release, the following points should be considered: (1) The long line should not be of an elastic material that allows spring up/rebound when unloaded, or elevated dynamics when loaded. (2) The long line should have a residual weight that allows its release from the helicopter hook when the long line is unloaded. (3) The RFM or RFMS should include all operating procedures to ensure that the long line does not impact the rotors after cargo release or during unloaded flight phases. (4) The hook should be designed to minimise inadvertent activation. An example may be a protective device (cage) around the locking mechanism of the long line hook. (5) A means should be provided to prevent any fouling of cables in the event of a rotation of the external load. An example may be the inclusion of a swivel or slip ring. (6) Installation of a long line that is provided with electrical wiring to control the hook will generally represent a new electromagnetic coupling path from the external area to the internal systems that may not have been considered for type certification. As such, the impact of this installation on the coupling to helicopter systems, due to direct connection or cross talk to wiring, should be addressed as part of compliance with CS 27.610, 27.1316 and 27.1317. (9) Cable (i) Cable attachment. Either the cable should be positively attached to the hoist drum and this attachment should have ultimate load capability, or an equivalent means should be provided to minimise the possibility of inadvertent, complete cable unspooling. (ii) Cable length and marking. A length of cable closest to the cable's attachment to the hoist drum should be visually marked to indicate to the operator that the cable is near full extension. The length of the cable to be marked is a function of the maximum extension speed of the system and the operator's reaction time needed to prevent cable run out. It should be determined during certification demonstration tests. In no case should the length be less than 3.5 drum circumferences. (iii) Cable stops. Means should be present to automatically stop cable movement quickly when the system's extension and retraction operational limits are reached. (10) CS 27.865(c)(2) PCDS: for all HEC applications that use complex PCDSs, an approval is required. The complex PCDS may be either previously approved or is required to be approved during certification. In either case, its installation should be approved. NOTE: Complex PCDS designs can include relatively complex devices such as multiple occupant cages or gondolas. The purpose of the complex PCDS is to provide a minimum acceptable level of safety for personnel being transported outside the rotorcraft. The personnel being transported may be healthy or injured, conscious or unconscious. (i) Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations contains the minimum performance specifications and standards for simple PCDSs, such as HEC body harnesses. (ii) Static Strength. The complex PCDS should be substantiated for the allowable ultimate load and loading conditions as determined under paragraph c(6) above. (iii) Fatigue. The complex PCDSs should be substantiated for fatigue as determined under paragraph c(6) above. (iv) Personnel Safety. For each complex PCDS design, the applicant should submit a design evaluation that assures the necessary level of personnel safety is provided. As a minimum, the following should be evaluated: (A) The complex PCDS should be easily and readily entered or exited. (B) It should be placarded with its proper capacity, the internal arrangement and location of occupants, and ingress and egress instructions. (C) For door latch fail-safety, more than one fastener or closure device should be used. The latch device design should provide direct visual inspectability to assure it is fastened and secured. (D) Any fabric used should be durable and should be at least flame-resistant. (E) Reserved (F) Occupant retention devices and the related design safety features should be used as necessary. In simple designs, rounded corners and edges with adequate strapping (or other means of HEC retention relative to the complex PCDS) and head supports or pads may be all the safety features that are necessary. Complex PCDS designs may require safety features such as seat belts, handholds, shoulder harnesses, placards, or other personnel safety standards. (v) EMI and Lightning Protection. All essential, affected components of the complex PCDS, such as intercommunication equipment, should be protected against RF field strengths to a minimum of RTCA Document DO-160/ EUROCAE ED-14 CAT Y. (vi) Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. All instructions and documents necessary for continued airworthiness, normal operations and emergency operations should be completed, reviewed and approved during the certification process. There should be clear instructions to describe when the complex PCDS is no longer serviceable and should be replaced in part or as a whole due to wear, impact damage, fraying of fibres, or other forms of degradation. In addition, any life limitations resulting from compliance with paragraphs c (10)(ii) and (iii) should be provided. (vii) Flotation Devices. Complex PCDSs that are intended to have a dual role as flotation devices or life preservers should meet the relevant requirements for ‘Life Preservers’. Also, any PCDS design to be used in the water should have a flotation kit. The flotation kit should support the weight of the maximum number of occupants and the complex PCDS in the water and minimise the possibility of the occupants floating face down. (viii) Considerations for flight testing. It should be shown by flight tests that the device is safely controllable and manoeuvrable during all requested flight regimes without requiring exceptional piloting skill. The flight tests should entail the complex PCDS weighted to the most critical weight. Some complex PCDS designs may spin, twist or otherwise respond unacceptably in flight. Each of these designs should be structurally restrained with a device such as a spider, a harness, or an equivalent device to minimise undesirable flight dynamics. (ix) Medical Design Considerations. Complex PCDSs should be designed to the maximum practicable extent and placarded to maximise the HEC’s protection from medical considerations such as blocked air passages induced by improper body configurations and excessive losses of body heat during operations. Injured or water-soaked persons may be exposed to high body heat losses from sources such as rotor washes and the airstreams. The safety of occupants of complex PCDSs from transit-induced medical considerations can be greatly increased by proper design. (x) Hoist operator safety device. When hoisting operations require the presence of a hoist operator on board, appropriate provisions should be provided to allow the hoist operator to perform their task safely. These provisions shall include an appropriate hoist operator restraint system. This safety device is typically composed of a safety harness and a strap attached to the cabin, used to adequately restrain the hoist operator inside the cabin while operating the hoist. For certification approval, the hoist operator safety device should comply with CS 27.561(b)(3) for personnel safety. The applicant should submit a design evaluation that assures the necessary level of personnel safety is provided. As a minimum, the following should be evaluated: (A) The strap attaching point on the body harness should be appropriately located in order to minimise, as far as is practicable, the likelihood of injury to the wearer in the case of a fall or crash. (B) The safety device should be designed to be adjustable so that the strap is tightened behind the hoist operator. (C) The strap should allow the hoist operator to detach themselves quickly from the cabin in emergency conditions (e.g. crash, ditching). For that purpose, it should include a QRS including a DAD. (D) The safety device should be easily and readily donned or doffed. (E) It should be placarded with its proper capacity and lifetime limitation. (F) Any fabric used should be durable and should be at least flame resistant. (11) CS 27.865(c)(4) Intercom Systems for HEC Operations: for all HEC operations, the rotorcraft is required to be equipped for, or otherwise allow, direct intercommunication under any operational conditions among crew members and the HEC. An intercommunications system may also be approved as part of the external load system, or alternatively, a limitation may be placed in the RFM or RFMS as described under paragraph c.(4)(ii)(B)(2) of this AMC. (12) CS 27.865(e) External Loads Placards and Markings: placards and markings should be installed next to the external-load attaching means, in a clearly noticeable location, that state the primary operational limitations — specifically including the maximum authorised external load. Not all operational limitations need be stated on the placard (or equivalent markings); only those that are clearly necessary for immediate reference in operations. Other more detailed operational limitations of lesser immediate importance should be stated either directly in the RFM or in an RFM supplement. (13) Other Considerations (i) Agricultural Installations (AIs): AIs can be approved for either jettisonable or non-jettisonable NHEC or HEC operations as long as they meet relevant certification and operations requirements and follow appropriate compliance methods. However, most current AI designs are external fixtures (see definition), not external loads. External fixtures are not approvable as jettisonable external cargo because they do not have a true payload (see definition), true jettison capability (see definition), or a complete QRS. Many AI designs can dump their solid or liquid chemical loads by use of a ‘purge port’ release over a relatively long time period (i.e. greater than 30 seconds). This is not considered to be a true jettison capability (see definition) since the external load is not released by a QRS and since the release time span is typically greater than 30 seconds (ref.: b(20) and c(7)). Thus, these types of AIs should be approved as non-jettisonable external loads. However, other designs that have the entire AI (or significant portions thereof) attached to the rotorcraft, that have short time frame jettison (or release) capabilities provided by QRSs that meet the definitions herein and that have no post-jettison characteristics that would endanger continued safe flight and landing may be approved as jettisonable external loads. For example, if all the relevant criteria are properly met, a jettisonable fluid load can be approved as an NHEC external cargo. FAA AC 27-1B Change 7 AC 27 MG 5 discusses other AI certification methodologies. (ii) External Tanks: external tank configurations that have true payload (see definition) and true jettison capabilities (see definition) should be approved as jettisonable NHEC. External tank configurations that have true payload capabilities but do not have true jettison capabilities should be approved as non-jettisonable NHEC. An external tank that has neither a true payload capability nor true jettison capability is an external fixture; it should not be approved as an external load under [CS 27.865](#_DxCrossRefBm8893784). If an external tank is to be jettisoned in flight, it should have a QRS that is approved for the maximum jettisonable external tank payload and is either inoperable or is otherwise rendered reliable to minimise inadvertent jettisons above the maximum jettisonable external tank payload. (iii) Logging Operations: These operations are very susceptible to low-cycle fatigue because of the large loads and relatively high load cycles that are common to this industry. It is recommended that load-measuring devices (such as load cells) be used to assure that no unrecorded overloads occur and to assure that cycles producing high fatigue damage are properly considered. Cycle counters are recommended to assure that acceptable cumulative fatigue damage levels are identifiable and are not exceeded. As either a supplementary method or an alternate method, maintenance instructions should be considered to assure proper cycle counting and load recording during operations. [Amdt No: 27/5] [Amdt No: 27/6] --- [[12]](#_ftnref12) Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1). AMC No 2 to CS 27.865 External loads ED Decision 2018/015/R/R a. Explanation (1) This AMC contains guidance for the certification of helicopter external-load attaching means and load-carrying systems to be used in conjunction with operating rules, such as Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations[[12]](#_ftn12). Also, paragraph [CS 27.25](#_DxCrossRefBm472493225) concerns, in part, jettisonable external cargo. (2) [CS 27.865](#_DxCrossRefBm472493226) provides a minimum level of safety for small rotorcraft designs to be used with operating rules, such as Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations. Certain aspects of operations, such as microwave tower and high-line wirework, may also be regulated separately by other national rules. For applications that could fall under the scope of applicability of several regulations, special certification emphasis will be required by both the applicant and the approving authority to assure all relevant safety requirements are identified and met. Potential additional requirements, where thought to exist, are noted herein. (3) The CS 27.865 provisions for external loads do not discern the difference between a crew member and a compensating passenger when either is carried external to the rotorcraft. Both are considered to be HEC. b. Definitions (1) Backup quick-release subsystem (BQRS): the secondary or ‘second choice’ subsystem used to perform a normal or emergency jettison of external cargo. (2) Cargo: the part of any rotorcraft-load combination that is removable, changeable, and is attached to the rotorcraft by an approved means. For certification purposes, ‘cargo’ applies to HEC and non-human external cargo (NHEC). (3) Cargo hook: a hook that can be rated for both HEC and NHEC. It is typically used by being fixed directly to a designated hard point on the rotorcraft. (4) Dual actuation device (DAD): this is a sequential control that requires two distinct actions in series for actuation. One example is the removal of a lock pin followed by the activation of a ‘then free’ switch or lever for load release to occur (in this scenario, a load release switch protected only by an uncovered switch guard is not acceptable). For jettisonable HEC applications, a simple, covered switch does not qualify as a DAD. Familiarity with covered switches allows the pilot to both open and activate the switch in one motion. This has led to inadvertent load release. (5) Emergency jettison (or complete load release): the intentional, instantaneous release of NHEC or HEC in a preset sequence by the quick-release system (QRS) that is normally performed to achieve safer aircraft operation in an emergency. (6) External fixture: a structure external to and in addition to the basic airframe that does not have true jettison capability and has no significant payload capability in addition to its own weight. An example is an agricultural spray boom. These configurations are not approvable as ‘External Loads’ under [CS 27.865](#_DxCrossRefBm472493226). (7) External Load System. The entire installation related to the carriage of external loads to include not only the hoist or hook, but also the structural provisions and release systems. A complex PCDS is also considered to be part of the external load system. (8) Hoist: a hoist is a device that exerts a vertical pull, usually through a cable and drum system (i.e. a pull that does not typically exceed a 30-degree cone measured around the z-rotorcraft axis). (9) Hoist demonstration cycle (or ‘one cycle’): the complete extension and retraction of at least 95 % of the actual cable length, or 100 % of the cable length capable of being used in service (i.e. that would activate any extension or retraction limiting devices), whichever is greater. (10) Hoist load-speed combinations: some hoists are designed so that the extension and retraction speed slows as the load increases or nears the end of a cable extension. Other hoist designs maintain a constant speed as the load is varied. In the latter designs, the load-speed combination simply means the variation in load at the constant design speed of the hoist. (11) Human external cargo (HEC): a person (or persons) who, at some point in the operation, is (are) carried external to the rotorcraft. (12) Non-human external cargo (NHEC): any external cargo operation that does not at any time involve a person (or persons) carried external to the rotorcraft. (13) Normal jettison (or selective load release): the intentional release, normally at optimum jettison conditions, of NHEC. (14) Personnel-carrying device system (PCDS) is a device that has the structural capability and features needed to transport occupants external to the helicopter during HEC or helicopter hoist operations. A PCDS includes but is not limited to life safety harnesses (including, if applicable, a quick-release and strop with a connector ring), rigid baskets and cages that are either attached to a hoist or cargo hook or mounted to the rotorcraft airframe. (15) Primary quick-release subsystem (PQRS): the primary or ‘first choice’ subsystem used to perform a normal or emergency jettison of external cargo. (16) Quick-release system (QRS): the entire release system for jettisonable external cargo (i.e. the sum total of both the primary and backup quick-release subsystem). The QRS consists of all the components including the controls, the release devices, and everything in between. (17) Rescue hook (or hook): a hook that can be rated for both HEC and NHEC. It is typically used in conjunction with a hoist or equivalent system. (18) Rotorcraft-load combination (RLC): the combination of a rotorcraft and an external load, including the external-load attaching means. (19) Spider: a spider is a system of attaching a lowering cable or rope or a harness to an NHEC (or HEC) RLC to eliminate undesirable flight dynamics during operations. A spider usually has four or more legs (or load paths) that connect to various points of a PCDS to equalise loading and prevent spinning, twisting, or other undesirable flight dynamics. (20) True jettison capability: the ability to safely release an external load using an approved QRS in 30 seconds or less. NOTE: In all cases, a PQRS should release the external load in less than 5 seconds. Many PQRSs will release the external load in milliseconds, once the activation device is triggered. However, a manual BQRS, such as a set of cable cutters, could take as much as 30 seconds to release the external load. The 30 seconds would be measured starting from the time the release command was given and ending when the external load was cut loose. (21) True payload capability: the ability of an external device or tank to carry a significant payload in addition to its own weight. If little or no payload can be carried, the external device or tank is an external fixture (see definition above). (22) Winch: a winch is a device that can employ a cable and drum or other means to exert a horizontal (i.e. x-rotorcraft axis) pull. However, in designs that utilise a winch to perform a hoist function by use of a 90-degree cable direction change device (such as a pulley or pulley system), the winch system is considered to be a hoist. c. Procedures The following certification procedures are provided in the most general form. Where there are significant differences between the cargo types, these differences are highlighted. (1) General Compliance Procedures for [CS 27.865](#_DxCrossRefBm472493226): The applicant should clearly identify the applicable cargo types (NHEC or HEC) for which an application is being made. The structural loads and operating envelopes for each applicable cargo type should be determined and used to formulate the flight manual supplement and basic loads report. The applicant should show by analysis, test, or both, that the rotorcraft structure, the external-load attaching means, and the complex PCDS, if applicable, meet the specific requirements of [CS 27.865](#_DxCrossRefBm472493226) and any other relevant requirements of CS-27 for the proposed operating envelope. NOTE: the approved maximum internal gross weight should never be exceeded for any approved HEC configuration (or simultaneous NHEC and HEC configuration). (2) Reliability of the external load system, including the QRS. (i) The hoist, QRS, and rescue hook system should be reliable for all phases of flight and the applicable configurations for those phases (i.e. operating, stowed, or unstowed) for which approval is sought. The hoist should be disabled (or an overriding, fail-safe mechanical safety device such as either a flagged removableshear pin or a load-lowering brake should be utilised) to prevent inadvertent load unspooling or release during any extended flight phases in which hoist operation is not intended. Loss of hoist operational control should also be considered. (ii) A failure of the external load system, (including QRS, hook, complex PCDS where applicable, and attachments to the rotorcraft) should be shown to be extremely improbable (i.e. 1 × 10-9 failures per flight) for all failure modes that could cause a catastrophic failure, serious injury or a fatality anywhere in the total airborne system. Uncontrolled high-speed descent of the hoist cable would fall into this category. All significant failure modes of lesser consequence should be evaluated and shown to be at least improbable (i.e. 1 × 10-5 failures per flight). (iii) The reliability of the system should be demonstrated by completion and approval of the following: (A) A functional hazard assessment (FHA) to determine the hazard severity of failures associated with the external load system. The effect of the flailing cable after a load release should be considered. (B) A fault tree analysis (FTA) or equivalent to verify that the hazard classification of the FHA has been met. (C) A system safety assessment (SSA) to demonstrate compliance with the applicable certification requirements. (D) An analysis of the non-redundant external load system components that constitute the primary load path (e.g., beam, cable, hook), to demonstrate compliance with the applicable structural requirements. (E) A repetitive test of all functional devices that cycles these devices under critical structural conditions, operational conditions, or a combination of both, at least 10 times each for NHEC and 30 times for HEC. This is applicable to both primary and backup subsystems. It is assumed that only one hoist cycle will typically occur per flight. This rationale has been used to determine the 10 demonstration cycles for NHEC applications and 30 demonstration cycles for HEC applications. However, if a particular application requires more than one hoist cycle per flight, then the number of demonstration cycles should be increased accordingly by multiplying the test cycles by the intended higher cycle number per flight. These repetitive tests may be conducted on the rotorcraft or by using a bench simulation that accurately replicates the rotorcraft installation. (F) An environmental qualification for the proposed operating environment. This review includes consideration of low and high temperatures (typically – 40 °C (– 40 °F) to + 65.6 °C (+ 150 °F), altitudes to 12 000 feet, humidity, salt spray, sand and dust, vibration, shock, rain, fungus, and acceleration. The appropriate rotorcraft sections of RTCA Document DO-160/ EUROCAE ED-14 for high and low temperature and vibration are considered to be acceptable for environmental qualification. The environmental qualification will address icing for those external load systems installed on rotorcraft approved for flight into icing conditions. (G) Qualification of the hoist itself to the appropriate electromagnetic interference (EMI) and lightning threat levels specified for NHEC or HEC, as applicable. This qualification can occur separately or as part of the entire on-board QRS. (3) Testing. (i) Hoist system load-speed combination ground tests: the load versus-speed combinations of the hoist should be demonstrated on the ground (either using an accurate engineering mock-up or a rotorcraft) by showing repeatability of the no load-speed combination, the 50 per cent load-speed combination, the 75 per cent load-speed combination, and the 100 per cent (i.e. system rated limit) load-speed combination. If more than one operational speed range exists, the preceding tests should be performed at the most critical speed. (A) At least 1/10 of the hoist demonstration cycles (see definition) should include the maximum aft angular displacement of the load from the vertical, applied for under CS 27.865(a). (B) A minimum of six consecutive, complete operation cycles should be conducted at the system's 100 per cent (i.e. system limit rated) load-speed combination. (C) In addition, the demonstration should cover all normal and emergency modes of intended operation and should include operation of all control devices such as limit switches, braking devices, and overload sensors in the system. (D) All quick disconnect devices and cable cutters should be demonstrated at 0 per cent, 25 per cent, 50 per cent, 75 per cent, and 100 per cent of system limit load or at the most critical percentage of limit load. Note: some hoist designs have built-in cable tensioning devices that function at the no load-speed combination, as well as at other load-speed combinations. This device should work during the no load-speed and other load-speed cable-cutting combinations. (E) Any devices or methods used to increase the mechanical advantage of the hoist should also be demonstrated. (F) During a portion of each demonstration cycle, the hoist should be operated from each station from which it can be controlled. (ii) Hoist and rescue hook systems or cargo hook systems flight test: an in-flight demonstration test of the hoist system should be conducted for helicopters designed to carry NHEC or HEC. The rotorcraft should be flown to the extremes of the applicable manoeuvre flight envelope and to all conditions that are critical to strength, manoeuvrability, stability, and control, or any other factor affecting airworthiness. Unless a lesser load is determined to be more critical for either dynamic stability or other reasons, the maximum hoist system rated load or, if less, the maximum load requested for approval (and the associated limit load data placards) should be used for these tests. The minimum hoist system load (or zero load) should also be demonstrated in these tests. (iii) CS 27.865(d) Flight test Verification Work: flight test verification work that thoroughly examines the operational envelope should be conducted with the external cargo carriage device for which approval is requested (especially those that involve HEC). The flight test programme should show that all aspects of the operations applied for are safe, uncomplicated, and can be conducted by a qualified flight crew under the most critical service environment, and, in the case of HEC, under emergency conditions. Flight tests should be conducted for the simulated representative NHEC and HEC loads to demonstrate their in-flight handling and separation characteristics. Each placard, marking, and flight manual supplement should be validated during flight testing. (A) General: flight testing or an equivalent combination of analysis, ground tests, and flight tests should be conducted under the critical combinations of configurations and operating conditions for which basic type certification approval is sought. The critical load condition of the intended cargo (e.g. rocks, lumber, radio towers, HEC) may be defined by a heavy weight and low area cargo or a low weight and high area cargo. The effects of these load conditions should be evaluated throughout the operational aspects of cargo loading, take-off, cruise up to maximum allowable speed with cargo, jettison, and landing. The helicopter handling with different cable conditions should include lateral transitions and quick stops up to the helicopter approved low airspeed limitations. Additional combinations of external load and operating conditions may be subsequently approved under relevant operational requirements as long as the structural limits and reliability considerations of the basic certification approval are not exceeded (i.e. equivalent safety is maintained). The qualification flight test of this subparagraph is intended to be accomplished primarily by analysis or bench testing. However, at least one in-flight, limit load drop test should be conducted for the critical load case. If one critical load case cannot be clearly identified, then more than one drop test might be necessary. Also, in-flight tests for the minimum load case (i.e. typically the cable hook itself) with the load trailing both in the minimum and maximum cable length configurations should be conducted. Any safety-of-flight limitations should be documented and placed in the RFM or RFMS. In certain low-gross weight, jettisonable HEC configurations, the complex PCDS may act as a trailing aerofoil that could result in entangling the complex PCDS with the rotorcraft. These configurations should be assessed on a case-by-case basis by analysis or flight test to ensure that any safety-of-flight limitations are clearly identified and placed in the RFM or RFMS (also see PCDS). (B) Separation characteristics of jettisonable external loads: for all jettisonable RLCs of any applicable cargo type, satisfactory post-jettison separation characteristics of all loads should meet the minimum criteria that follow: (1) Separate functioning of the PQRS and BQRS resulting in a complete, immediate release of the external load without interference by the rotorcraft or external load system. (2) No damage to the helicopter during or following actuation of the QRS and load jettisoning. (3) A jettison trajectory that is clear of the helicopter. (4) No inherent instability of the jettisonable (or just jettisoned) HEC or NHEC while in proximity to the helicopter. (5) No adverse or uncontrollable helicopter reactions at the time of jettison. (6) Stability and control characteristics after jettison that are within the originally approved limits. (7) No adverse degradation on helicopter performance characteristics after jettison. (C) Jettison requirements for jettisonable external loads: for representative cargo types (low, medium, and high-density loads on long and short lines), emergency and normal jettison procedures should be demonstrated (by a combination of analysis, ground tests, and flight tests) in sufficient combinations of flight conditions to establish a jettison envelope that should be placed in the flight manual. (D) QRS demonstration; repetitive jettison demonstrations that use the PQRS, which may be accomplished during ground or flight tests, should be conducted. The BQRS should be utilised at least once. (E) QRS reliability (i.e. failure modes) affecting flight performance: the FHA of the QRS (see paragraph c.(2) above) should show that any single system failure will not result in unsatisfactory flight characteristics, including any QRS failures resulting in asymmetric loading conditions. (F) Flight test weight and CG locations: all flight tests should be conducted at the extreme or critical combinations of weight and longitudinal and lateral CG conditions within the applied-for flight envelope. Typically the two load conditions would be a heavy weight and low area cargo, and a low weight and high area cargo. The rotorcraft should remain within approved weight and CG limits, both with the external load applied, and after jettison of the load. (G) Jettison Envelopes: emergency and normal jettison demonstrations should be performed at sufficient airspeeds and descent rates to establish any restrictions for satisfactory separation characteristics. Both the maximum and minimum airspeed limits and the maximum descent rate for safe separation should be determined. The sideslip envelope as a function of airspeed should be determined. (H) Altitude: emergency and normal jettison demonstrations should be performed at altitudes that are consistent with the approvable operational envelope and with the manoeuvres necessary to overcome any adverse effects of the jettison. (I) Attitude: emergency and normal jettison demonstrations should be performed from all attitudes that are appropriate to normal and emergency operational usage. Where the attitudes of HEC or NHEC with respect to the helicopter may be varied, the most critical attitude should be demonstrated. This demonstration would normally be accomplished by bench testing. (4) Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) and Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement (RFMS): (i) General. (A) Present appropriate flight manual procedures and limitations for all HEC operations. (1) The approval of an external loads equipment design in accordance with CS 27.865 does not provide an approval to conduct external loads operations. Therefore, the following should be included as a limitation in the RFM or RFMS: — The external load equipment certification approval does not constitute an operational approval; an operational approval for external load operations must be granted by the competent authority. (2) The RFM or RFMS that will be approved through the certification activity should not contain any references to the previously used RLC classes. (B) For non-HEC designs, the following limitation should be included within the RFM or RFMS: — The external load system does not comply with the CS-27 certification provisions for Human External Cargo (HEC). (C) The RFM or RFMS may contain suitable text to clarify whether the external load system meets the applicable certification provisions for lifting an external load free of land or water, and whether the load is jettisonable. (D) The RFM or RFMS should contain emergency procedures detailing the steps to be taken by the flight crew during emergencies such as an engine failure, hoist failure, flight director or autopilot failure, etc. (E) The RFM or RFMS normal procedures should explain the required procedures to conduct a safe external load operation. Such information may include the methods for attachment and normal release of the external load. (ii) HEC installations. (A) For HEC installations, the following additional information/limitation should be included in the RFM or RFMS: (1) That the external load system meets the CS-27 certification specifications for Human External Cargo (HEC). (2) Operation of the external load equipment with HEC requires the use of an approved Personnel Carrying Device Systems (PCDS). NOTE: for a simple PCDS, also refer to AMC No. 3 to 27.865 (B) Crew member communications. (1) The flight manual should clearly define the method of communication between the flight crew and the HEC. These instructions and manuals should be validated during flight testing. (2) If the external load system does not include equipment to allow direct intercommunication among required crew members and external occupants, the following limitation may be included within the limitations section of the RFM or RFMS: — This external load system does not include equipment to allow direct intercommunication among required crew members and external occupants. Operating this external load equipment with HEC is not authorised unless appropriate equipment to allow direct intercommunication between required crew members and external occupants has an airworthiness approval. (iii) Additional RFM or RFMS requirements are contained within each applicable paragraph of this AMC. (5) Continued airworthiness. (i) Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: maintenance manuals (and RFM supplements) developed by applicants for external load applications should be presented for approval and should include all appropriate inspection and maintenance procedures. The applicant should provide sufficient data and other information to establish the frequency, extent, and methods of inspection of critical structure, systems, and components. CS 27.1529 and Appendix A to CS-27 requires this information to be included in the maintenance manual. For example, maintenance requirements for sensitive QRS squibs should be carefully determined, documented, approved during certification, and included as specific mandatory scheduled maintenance requirements that may require either ‘daily’ or ‘pre-flight’ checks (especially for HEC applications). (ii) Hoist system continued airworthiness. The design life of the hoist system and any limited life components should be clearly identified, and the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the maintenance manual should include these requirements. For STCs, a maintenance manual supplement should be provided that includes these requirements. Note: the design life of a hoist and cable system is typically between 5 000 and 8 000 cycles. Some hoist systems have usage time meters installed. Others may have cycle counters installed. Cycle counters should be considered for HEC operations and high-load or other operations that may cause low-cycle fatigue failures. (6) [CS 27.865(a)](#_DxCrossRefBm472493226) Static Structural Substantiation and CS 27.865(f) Fatigue Substantiation Procedures: The following static structural substantiation methods and fatigue substantiation should be used: (i) Critical Basic Load Determination. The critical basic loads and corresponding flight envelope are determined by statically substantiating the gross weight range limits, the corresponding vertical limit load factors (NZW) and the safety factors applicable for the type of external load for which the application is being made. NOTE: in cases where NHEC or HEC can have more than one shape, centre of gravity, centre of lift, or be carried at more than one distance in-flight from the rotorcraft attachment, a critical configuration for certification purposes may not be determinable. If such a critical configuration can be determined, it may be examined for approval as a ‘worst case’ to satisfy a particular certification criterion or several criteria, as appropriate. If such a critical configuration cannot be determined, the extreme points of the operational external load configuration envelope should be examined, with consideration given to any other points within the envelope that experience or any other rationale indicates as points that need to be investigated. (ii) Vertical Limit and Ultimate Load Factors. The basic NZW is converted to the ultimate load by multiplying the maximum vertical limit load by the appropriate safety factor (for restricted category approvals, see the guidance in paragraph AC 27 MG 5 of FAA AC 27-1B Change 7). This ultimate load is used to substantiate all the existing structure affected by, and all the added structure associated with, the load-carrying device, its attachments and its cargo. Casting factors, fitting factors, and other dynamic load factors should be applied where appropriate. (A) NHEC applications. In most cases, it is acceptable to perform a standard static analysis to show compliance. A vertical limit load factor (NZW) of 2.5 g is typical for heavy gross weight NHEC hauling configurations (ref.: [CS 27.337](#_DxCrossRefBm472493268)). This vertical load factor should be applied to the maximum external load for which the application is being made, together with a minimum safety factor of 1.5. (B) HEC applications. (1) If a safety factor of 3.0 or more is used, it is acceptable to perform a standard static analysis to show compliance. The safety factor should be applied to the yield strength of the weakest component in the system (QRS, complex PCDS, and attachment load path). If a safety factor of less than 3.0 is used, both an analysis and a full-scale ultimate load test of the relevant parts of the system should be performed. (2) Since HEC applications typically involve lower gross weight configurations, a higher vertical limit load factor is required to assure that the limit load is not exceeded in service. The applicant should use either the conservative value of 3.5 g or an analytically derived maximum vertical limit load factor for the requested operating envelope. Linear interpolation between the vertical load factors of the maximum and minimum design weights may be used. However, in no case may the vertical limit load factor be less than 2.5 g for any HEC application. (3) For the purpose of structural analysis or test, applicants should assume a 101.2-kg (223-pound) man as the minimum weight of each occupant carried as HEC. NOTE: if the HEC is engaged in work tasks that employ devices of significant added weight (e.g. heavy backpacks, tools, fire extinguishers, etc.), the total weight of the 101.2-kg (223-pound) man and their equipment should be assumed in the structural analysis or test. (iii) Critical Structural Case. For applications involving more than one RLC class or cargo type, the structural substantiation is required only for the most critical case. The most critical case should be determined by rational analysis. (iv) Jettisonable Loads. For the substantiating analyses or tests of all jettisonable external loads, including HEC, the maximum external load should be applied at the maximum angle that can be achieved in service, but not less than 30 degrees. The angle should be measured from the sling-load-line to the rotorcraft vertical axis (z axis) and may be in any direction that can be achieved in service. The 30-degree angle may be reduced in some or all directions if it is impossible to obtain due to physical constraints or operating limitations. The maximum allowable cable angle should be determined and approved. The angle approved should be based on structural requirements, mechanical interference limits, and flight-handling characteristics over the most critical conditions and combinations of conditions in the approved flight envelope. (v) Hoist System Limit Load. NOTE: if a hoist cable or a long-line cable is utilised, a new dynamic system is established. The characteristics of the system should be evaluated to assure that either no hazardous failure modes exist or that they are acceptably minimised. For example, the hoist cable or long-line cable may exhibit a natural frequency that could be excited by sources internal to the overall structural system (i.e. the rotorcraft) or by sources external to the system. Another example is the loading effect of the cable acting as a spring between the rotorcraft and the suspended external load. (A) Determine the basic loads that would result in the failure or unspooling of the hoist or its installation, respectively. NOTE: This determination should be based on static strength and any significant dynamic load magnification factors. (B) Select the lower of the two values as the ultimate load of the hoist system installation. (C) Divide the selected ultimate load by 1.5 to determine the true structural limit load of the system. (D) Determine the manufacturer’s approved ‘limit design safety factor’ (or that which the applicant has applied for). Divide this factor into the true structural limit load (from (C) above) to determine the hoist system’s working (or placarded) limit load. (E) Compare the system’s derived limit load to that applied for one ‘g’ payload multiplied by the maximum downward vertical load factor (NZWMAX) to determine the critical payload’s limit value. (F) The critical payload limit should be equal to or less than the system’s derived limit load for the installation to be approvable. (vi) Fatigue Substantiation Procedures NOTE: the term ‘hazard to the rotorcraft’ is defined to include all hazards to either the rotorcraft, to the occupants thereof, or both. (A) Fatigue evaluation of NHEC applications. Any critical components of the suspended system and their attachments (e.g. the cargo hook, or bolted or pinned truss attachments), the failure of which could result in a hazard to the rotorcraft, should be included in an acceptable fatigue analysis. (B) Fatigue evaluation of HEC applications. The entire external load system, including the complex PCDS, should be reviewed on a component-by-component basis to determine which, if any, components are fatigue critical. These components should be analysed or tested to ensure that their fatigue life limits are properly determined, and the limits should then be placed in the limited life section of the maintenance manual. (7) [CS 27.865(b)](#_DxCrossRefBm472493226) and CS 27.865(c) Procedures for Quick-Release Systems and Cargo Hooks: for jettisonable RLCs of any applicable cargo type, both a primary quick-release system (PQRS) and a backup quick-release system (BQRS) are required. Features that should be considered are: (i) The PQRS, BQRS and their load-release devices and subsystems (such as electronically actuated guillotines) should be separate (i.e. physically, systematically, and functionally redundant). (ii) The controls for the PQRS should be installed on one of the pilot’s primary controls, or in an equivalently accessible location. The use of an ‘equivalent accessible location’ should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis and utilised only where equivalent safety is clearly maintained. (iii) The controls for the BQRS may be less sophisticated than those of the PQRS. For instance, manual cable cutters are acceptable provided they are listed in the flight manual as a required device and have a dedicated, placarded storage location. (iv) The PQRS should release the external load in less than 5 seconds. The BQRS should release the external load in less than 30 seconds. This time interval begins the moment an emergency is declared and ends when the load is released. (v) Each quick-release device should be designed and located to allow the pilot or a crew member to accomplish the release of the external cargo release without hazardously limiting the ability to control the rotorcraft during emergency situations. The flight manual should reflect the requirement for a crew member and their related functions. (vi) CS 27.865(c)(1) QRS Requirements for Jettisonable HEC Operations. (A) For jettisonable HEC operations, both the PQRS and BQRS are required to have a dual actuation device (DAD) for external cargo release. The DAD should be designed to require two actions with a definite change of direction of movement, such as opening a switch or pushbutton cover followed by a definite change of direction in order to activate the release switch or pushbutton. Any possibility of opening the switch cover and inadvertently releasing the load with a single motion is not acceptable. An additional level of safety may also be provided through the use of Advisory and Caution messages. For example, an advisory ‘ON’ message might be illuminated when the pilot energises (but not arms) the system with a master switch. A cautionary ‘ARMED’ message would then illuminate when the pilot opens the switch guard. In this case, a possible unwanted flip of the switch guard would be immediately recognised by the crew. The switch design should be evaluated by ground or flight test. The RFM or RFMS should contain a clear description of the DAD functionality that includes the associated safety features, normal and emergency procedures, and applicable advisory and caution messages. (B) The DAD is intended for emergency use during the phases of flight in which the HEC is carried or retrieved. The DAD can be used for both NHEC and HEC operations. However, because it can be used for HEC, the instructions for continued airworthiness should be carefully reviewed and documented. The DAD can be operated by the pilot from a primary control, or, after a command is given by the pilot, by a crew member from a remote location. Additional safety precautions (such as a lock wire) should be considered for a remote hoist console in the cabin. Any emergency release function provided by a remote hoist console should also be designed to protect against inadvertent activation during the hoist operation. If the backup DAD is a cable cutter, it should be properly secured, placarded and readily accessible to the crew member who is intended to use it. (vii) CS 27.865(b)(3)(ii) Electromagnetic Interference. Protection of the QRS against potential internal and external sources of EMI and lightning is required. This is necessary to prevent an inadvertent load release from sources such as lightning strikes, stray electromagnetic signals, and static electricity. (A) Jettisonable NHEC systems should not be adversely affected when exposed to the electrical field of a minimum of 20 volts per metre (i.e. CAT U or equivalent) radio-frequency (RF) field strength per RTCA Document DO-160/ EUROCAE ED-14. (B) Jettisonable HEC systems should not be adversely affected when exposed to the electrical field of a minimum of 200 volts per metre (i.e. CAT Y) RF field strength per RTCA Document DO-160/ EUROCAE ED-14. (1) These RF field threat levels may need to be increased for certain special applications such as microwave tower and high voltage high line repairs. Separate criteria for special applications under multi-agency regulation (such as IEEE or OSHA standards) should also be addressed, as applicable, during certification. When necessary, the Special Condition process can be used to establish a practicable level of safety for specific high voltage or other special application conditions. The helicopter High-intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) safety assessment should consider the effects on helicopter flight safety due to a HIRF-induced failure or a malfunction of external load systems, such as an uncommanded hoist winch activation without the ability to jettison, or an uncommanded load jettison. The appropriate failure effect classification should be assigned based on this assessment, and compliance should be demonstrated with CS 27.1317 and the guidance in AMC 20-158. This should not be limited to the cable cutter devices or load jettison subsystems only. In some designs, an uncommanded load release or a hoist winch activation could also result from a failure of the command and control circuits of the system. (2) An approved standard rotorcraft test, which includes the full HIRF frequency and amplitude external and internal environments, on the QRS and any applicable complex PCDS, or the entire rotorcraft including the QRS and any applicable complex PCDS, could be substituted for the jettisonable NHEC and HEC systems tests as long as the RF field strengths directly on the QRS and PCDS are shown to equal or exceed those defined by paragraphs c.(7)(vii)(A) and c.(7)(vii)(B) above for NHEC and HEC respectively. (3) The EMI levels specified in paragraphs c.(7)(vii)(A) and c.(7)(vii)(B) above are total EMI levels to be applied to the QRS (and affected QRS component) boundary. The total EMI level applied should include the effects of both external EMI sources and internal EMI sources. All aspects of internally generated EMI should be carefully considered, including peaks that could occur from time-to-time due to any combination of on-board systems being operated. For example, special attention should be given to EMI from hoist operations that involve the switching of very high currents. Those currents can generate significant voltages in closely spaced wiring that, if allowed to reach some squib designs, could activate the device. Shielding, bonding, and grounding of wiring associated with operation of the hoist and the quick-release mechanism should be clearly and adequately evaluated in design and certification. When recognised good practices for such installation are applied, an analysis may be sufficient to highlight that the maximum possible pulse generated into the squib circuit will have an energy content orders of magnitude below the squib no-fire energy. If insufficient data is available for the installation and/or the squib no-fire energy, this evaluation may require testing. One acceptable test method to demonstrate the adequacy of QRS shielding, bonding, and grounding would be to actuate the hoist under maximum load, together with likely critical combinations of other aircraft electrical loads, and demonstrate that the test squibs (which are more EMI sensitive than the squibs specified for use in the QRS) do not inadvertently operate during the test. (8) Cargo Hooks or Equivalent Devices and their Related Systems. All cargo hooks or equivalent devices should be approved to acceptable aircraft industry standards. The applicant should present these standards, and any related manufacturer’s certificates of production or qualification, as part of the approval package. (i) General. Cargo hook systems should have the same reliability goals and should be functionally demonstrated under the critical loads for NHEC and HEC, as appropriate. All engagement and release modes should be demonstrated. If the hook is used as a quick-release device, then the release of critical loads should be demonstrated under conditions that simulate the maximum allowable bank angles and speeds and any other critical operating conditions. Demonstration of any re-latching features and any safety or warning devices should also be conducted. Demonstration of actual in-flight emergency quick-release capability may not be necessary if the quick-release capability can be acceptably simulated by other means. NOTE: Cargo hook manufacturers specify particular shapes, sizes, and cross sections for lifting eyes to assure compatibility with their hook design (e.g. Breeze Eastern Service Bulletin CAB-100-41). Experience has shown that, under certain conditions, a load may inadvertently hang up because of improper geometry at the hook-to-eye interface that will not allow the eye to slide off an open hook as intended. For both NHEC and HEC designs, the phenomenon of hook dynamic roll-out (inadvertent opening of the hook latch and subsequent release of the load) should be considered to assure that QRS reliability goals are not compromised. This is of particular concern for HEC applications. Hook dynamic roll-out occurs during certain ground-handling and flight conditions that may allow the lifting eye to work its way out of the hook. Hook dynamic roll-out typically occurs when either the RLC’s sling or harness is not properly attached to the hook, is blown by down draft, is dragged along the ground or through water, or is otherwise placed into a dangerous hook-to-eye configuration. The potential for hook dynamic roll-out can be minimised in design by specifying particular hook-and-eye shape and cross-section combinations. For non-jettisonable RLCs, a pin can be used to lock the hook-keeper in place during operations. Some cargo hook systems may employ two or more cargo hooks for safety. These systems are approvable. However, a loss of any load by a single hook should be shown to not result in a loss of control of the rotorcraft. In a dual hook system, if the hook itself is the quick-release device (i.e. if a single release point does not exist in the load path between the rotorcraft and the dual hooks), the pilot should have a dual PQRS that includes selectable, co-located individual quick releases that are independent for each hook used. A BQRS should also be present for each hook. For cargo hook systems with more than two hooks, either a single release point should be present in the load path between the rotorcraft and the multiple hook system, or multiple PQRSs and BQRSs should be present. (ii) Jettisonable Cargo Hook Systems. For jettisonable applications, each cargo hook: (A) should have a sufficient amount of slack in the control cable to permit cargo hook movement without tripping the hook release; (B) should be shown to be reliable (see paragraph c(1)); (C) for HEC systems, unless the cargo hook is to be the primary quick-release device, each cargo hook should be designed so that operationally induced loads cannot inadvertently release the load. For example, a simple cargo hook should have a one-way, spring-loaded gate (i.e. ‘snap hook’) that allows load attachment going into the gate but does not allow the gate to open (and subsequently lose the HEC) when an operationally induced load is applied in the opposite direction. For HEC applications, cargo hooks that also serve as quick-release devices should be carefully reviewed to assure they are reliable. (iii) Other Load Release Types. In some current configurations, such as those used for high-line operations, a load release may be present that is not on the rotorcraft but is on the PCDS itself. Examples are a tension-release device that lets out line under an operationally induced load, or a personal rope cutter. For long-line/sling operations, a load release may also be present that is not on the rotorcraft but is a remote release system. The long-line remote release allows the pilot to not release the line itself during repetitive loading operations. The release of the load by a dedicated switch at the pilot controls, through the secondary hook on a long line, presents additional risks due to the possibility of the long line impacting the tail or the main rotor after a release, due to its elasticity. These devices are acceptable if: (A) The off-rotorcraft release is considered to be a ‘third release’ means. This type of release is not a substitute for a required release (i.e. PQRS or BQRS); (B) The cargo hook release and the long line remote release are placed on the primary controls in a way that avoids confusion during operation. One example of compliance would be to place the cargo hook release on the cyclic, and the long line remote release on the collective, to avoid any possible confusion in the operation; (C) The RFM or RFMS includes a description of the new control in the cockpit, and its function and an RFM or RFMS note to the pilot is included, indicating that the helicopter hook emergency release procedures are fully applicable; (D) The release meets all the other relevant requirements of CS 27.865 and the methods of this AMC or equivalent methods; and (E) The release has no operational or failure modes that would affect continued safe flight and landing under any operations, critical failure modes, conditions, or combinations of these. For long-line remote release, the following points should be considered: (1) The long line should not be of an elastic material that allows spring up/rebound when unloaded, or elevated dynamics when loaded. (2) The long line should have a residual weight that allows its release from the helicopter hook when the long line is unloaded. (3) The RFM or RFMS should include all operating procedures to ensure that the long line does not impact the rotors after cargo release or during unloaded flight phases. (4) The hook should be designed to minimise inadvertent activation. An example may be a protective device (cage) around the locking mechanism of the long line hook. (5) A means should be provided to prevent any fouling of cables in the event of a rotation of the external load. An example may be the inclusion of a swivel or slip ring. (6) Installation of a long line that is provided with electrical wiring to control the hook will generally represent a new electromagnetic coupling path from the external area to the internal systems that may not have been considered for type certification. As such, the impact of this installation on the coupling to helicopter systems, due to direct connection or cross talk to wiring, should be addressed as part of compliance with CS 27.610, 27.1316 and 27.1317. (9) Cable (i) Cable attachment. Either the cable should be positively attached to the hoist drum and this attachment should have ultimate load capability, or an equivalent means should be provided to minimise the possibility of inadvertent, complete cable unspooling. (ii) Cable length and marking. A length of cable closest to the cable's attachment to the hoist drum should be visually marked to indicate to the operator that the cable is near full extension. The length of the cable to be marked is a function of the maximum extension speed of the system and the operator's reaction time needed to prevent cable run out. It should be determined during certification demonstration tests. In no case should the length be less than 3.5 drum circumferences. (iii) Cable stops. Means should be present to automatically stop cable movement quickly when the system's extension and retraction operational limits are reached. (10) CS 27.865(c)(2) PCDS: for all HEC applications that use complex PCDSs, an approval is required. The complex PCDS may be either previously approved or is required to be approved during certification. In either case, its installation should be approved. NOTE: Complex PCDS designs can include relatively complex devices such as multiple occupant cages or gondolas. The purpose of the complex PCDS is to provide a minimum acceptable level of safety for personnel being transported outside the rotorcraft. The personnel being transported may be healthy or injured, conscious or unconscious. (i) Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations contains the minimum performance specifications and standards for simple PCDSs, such as HEC body harnesses. (ii) Static Strength. The complex PCDS should be substantiated for the allowable ultimate load and loading conditions as determined under paragraph c(6) above. (iii) Fatigue. The complex PCDSs should be substantiated for fatigue as determined under paragraph c(6) above. (iv) Personnel Safety. For each complex PCDS design, the applicant should submit a design evaluation that assures the necessary level of personnel safety is provided. As a minimum, the following should be evaluated: (A) The complex PCDS should be easily and readily entered or exited. (B) It should be placarded with its proper capacity, the internal arrangement and location of occupants, and ingress and egress instructions. (C) For door latch fail-safety, more than one fastener or closure device should be used. The latch device design should provide direct visual inspectability to assure it is fastened and secured. (D) Any fabric used should be durable and should be at least flame-resistant. (E) Reserved (F) Occupant retention devices and the related design safety features should be used as necessary. In simple designs, rounded corners and edges with adequate strapping (or other means of HEC retention relative to the complex PCDS) and head supports or pads may be all the safety features that are necessary. Complex PCDS designs may require safety features such as seat belts, handholds, shoulder harnesses, placards, or other personnel safety standards. (v) EMI and Lightning Protection. All essential, affected components of the complex PCDS, such as intercommunication equipment, should be protected against RF field strengths to a minimum of RTCA Document DO-160/ EUROCAE ED-14 CAT Y. (vi) Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. All instructions and documents necessary for continued airworthiness, normal operations and emergency operations should be completed, reviewed and approved during the certification process. There should be clear instructions to describe when the complex PCDS is no longer serviceable and should be replaced in part or as a whole due to wear, impact damage, fraying of fibres, or other forms of degradation. In addition, any life limitations resulting from compliance with paragraphs c (10)(ii) and (iii) should be provided. (vii) Flotation Devices. Complex PCDSs that are intended to have a dual role as flotation devices or life preservers should meet the relevant requirements for ‘Life Preservers’. Also, any PCDS design to be used in the water should have a flotation kit. The flotation kit should support the weight of the maximum number of occupants and the complex PCDS in the water and minimise the possibility of the occupants floating face down. (viii) Considerations for flight testing. It should be shown by flight tests that the device is safely controllable and manoeuvrable during all requested flight regimes without requiring exceptional piloting skill. The flight tests should entail the complex PCDS weighted to the most critical weight. Some complex PCDS designs may spin, twist or otherwise respond unacceptably in flight. Each of these designs should be structurally restrained with a device such as a spider, a harness, or an equivalent device to minimise undesirable flight dynamics. (ix) Medical Design Considerations. Complex PCDSs should be designed to the maximum practicable extent and placarded to maximise the HEC’s protection from medical considerations such as blocked air passages induced by improper body configurations and excessive losses of body heat during operations. Injured or water-soaked persons may be exposed to high body heat losses from sources such as rotor washes and the airstreams. The safety of occupants of complex PCDSs from transit-induced medical considerations can be greatly increased by proper design. (x) Hoist operator safety device. When hoisting operations require the presence of a hoist operator on board, appropriate provisions should be provided to allow the hoist operator to perform their task safely. These provisions shall include an appropriate hoist operator restraint system. This safety device is typically composed of a safety harness and a strap attached to the cabin, used to adequately restrain the hoist operator inside the cabin while operating the hoist. For certification approval, the hoist operator safety device should comply with CS 27.561(b)(3) for personnel safety. The applicant should submit a design evaluation that assures the necessary level of personnel safety is provided. As a minimum, the following should be evaluated: (A) The strap attaching point on the body harness should be appropriately located in order to minimise, as far as is practicable, the likelihood of injury to the wearer in the case of a fall or crash. (B) The safety device should be designed to be adjustable so that the strap is tightened behind the hoist operator. (C) The strap should allow the hoist operator to detach themselves quickly from the cabin in emergency conditions (e.g. crash, ditching). For that purpose, it should include a QRS including a DAD. (D) The safety device should be easily and readily donned or doffed. (E) It should be placarded with its proper capacity and lifetime limitation. (F) Any fabric used should be durable and should be at least flame resistant. (11) CS 27.865(c)(4) Intercom Systems for HEC Operations: for all HEC operations, the rotorcraft is required to be equipped for, or otherwise allow, direct intercommunication under any operational conditions among crew members and the HEC. An intercommunications system may also be approved as part of the external load system, or alternatively, a limitation may be placed in the RFM or RFMS as described under paragraph c.(4)(ii)(B)(2) of this AMC. (12) CS 27.865(e) External Loads Placards and Markings: placards and markings should be installed next to the external-load attaching means, in a clearly noticeable location, that state the primary operational limitations — specifically including the maximum authorised external load. Not all operational limitations need be stated on the placard (or equivalent markings); only those that are clearly necessary for immediate reference in operations. Other more detailed operational limitations of lesser immediate importance should be stated either directly in the RFM or in an RFM supplement. (13) Other Considerations (i) Agricultural Installations (AIs): AIs can be approved for either jettisonable or non-jettisonable NHEC or HEC operations as long as they meet relevant certification and operations requirements and follow appropriate compliance methods. However, most current AI designs are external fixtures (see definition), not external loads. External fixtures are not approvable as jettisonable external cargo because they do not have a true payload (see definition), true jettison capability (see definition), or a complete QRS. Many AI designs can dump their solid or liquid chemical loads by use of a ‘purge port’ release over a relatively long time period (i.e. greater than 30 seconds). This is not considered to be a true jettison capability (see definition) since the external load is not released by a QRS and since the release time span is typically greater than 30 seconds (ref.: b(20) and c(7)). Thus, these types of AIs should be approved as non-jettisonable external loads. However, other designs that have the entire AI (or significant portions thereof) attached to the rotorcraft, that have short time frame jettison (or release) capabilities provided by QRSs that meet the definitions herein and that have no post-jettison characteristics that would endanger continued safe flight and landing may be approved as jettisonable external loads. For example, if all the relevant criteria are properly met, a jettisonable fluid load can be approved as an NHEC external cargo. FAA AC 27-1B Change 7 AC 27 MG 5 discusses other AI certification methodologies. (ii) External Tanks: external tank configurations that have true payload (see definition) and true jettison capabilities (see definition) should be approved as jettisonable NHEC. External tank configurations that have true payload capabilities but do not have true jettison capabilities should be approved as non-jettisonable NHEC. An external tank that has neither a true payload capability nor true jettison capability is an external fixture; it should not be approved as an external load under [CS 27.865](#_DxCrossRefBm472493226). If an external tank is to be jettisoned in flight, it should have a QRS that is approved for the maximum jettisonable external tank payload and is either inoperable or is otherwise rendered reliable to minimise inadvertent jettisons above the maximum jettisonable external tank payload. (iii) Logging Operations: These operations are very susceptible to low-cycle fatigue because of the large loads and relatively high load cycles that are common to this industry. It is recommended that load-measuring devices (such as load cells) be used to assure that no unrecorded overloads occur and to assure that cycles producing high fatigue damage are properly considered. Cycle counters are recommended to assure that acceptable cumulative fatigue damage levels are identifiable and are not exceeded. As either a supplementary method or an alternate method, maintenance instructions should be considered to assure proper cycle counting and load recording during operations. [Amdt No: 27/5] [Amdt No: 27/6] --- [[12]](#_ftnref12) Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1).