AMC 27.802 Emergency Flotation

• ED Decision 2018/007/R found in: CS-27 Amdt 9 - Small Rotorcraft (Dec 2021)

AMC 27.802 Emergency Flotation ED Decision 2018/007/R This AMC replaces FAA AC 27 MG 10. (a) Definitions (1) Ditching: a controlled emergency landing on the water, deliberately executed in accordance with rotorcraft flight manual (RFM) procedures, with the intent of abandoning the rotorcraft as soon as practicable. NOTE: Although the term ‘ditching’ is most commonly associated with the design standards related to [CS 27.801](#_DxCrossRefBm472493312), a rotorcraft equipped to the less demanding requirements of [CS 27.802](#_DxCrossRefBm472493311), when performing an emergency landing on water, would nevertheless be commonly described as carrying out the process of ditching. The term ‘ditching’ is therefore used in this AMC in this general sense. (2) Emergency flotation system (EFS): a system of floats and any associated parts (e.g. gas cylinders, means of deployment, pipework and electrical connections) that is designed and installed on a rotorcraft to provide buoyancy and flotation stability during and after ditching. (b) Explanation (1) Approval of emergency flotation equipment is performed only if requested by the applicant. Operational rules may accept that a helicopter conducts flights over certain sea areas provided it is fitted with approved emergency flotation equipment (i.e. an EFS), rather than being certified with full ditching provisions. (2) Emergency flotation certification encompasses emergency flotation system loads and design, and rotorcraft flotation stability. (3) Failure of the EFS to operate when required will lead to the rotorcraft rapidly capsizing and sinking. Operational experience has shown that localised damage or failure of a single component of an EFS can lead to the loss of the complete system. Therefore, the design of the EFS needs careful consideration. (4) The sea conditions, on which certification with emergency flotation is to be based, are selected by the applicant and should take into account the expected sea conditions in the intended areas of operation. Capsize resistance is required to meet the same requirements as for full ditching approval but with the allowable capsize probability being set at 10 %. The default wave climate specified in this requirement is that of the northern North Sea, as it represents a conservative condition. An applicant might consider this to be inappropriate, as it represents a hostile sea area. The applicant may therefore propose a different wave climate based on data from a non-hostile sea area. The associated certification will then be limited to the geographical region(s) thus represented. Alternatively, a non-hostile default wave climate might be agreed, with no associated need for geographical limits to the certification. The significant wave height, and any geographical limitations (if applicable, see the [AMC to 27.801(e) and 27.802(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm472493314)) should be included in the RFM as performance information. (5) During scale model testing, appropriate allowances should be made for probable structural damage and leakage. Previous model tests and other data from rotorcraft of similar configurations that have already been substantiated based on equivalent test conditions may be used to satisfy the emergency flotation requirements. In regard to flotation stability, test conditions should be equivalent to those defined in the [AMC to 27.801(e) and 27.802(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm472493314). (6) [CS 27.802](#_DxCrossRefBm472493311) requires that in sea conditions for which certification with emergency flotation is requested by the applicant, the probability of capsizing in a 5-minute exposure is acceptably low in order to allow the occupants to leave the rotorcraft and enter the life rafts. This should be interpreted to mean that up to and including the worst-case sea conditions for which certification with emergency flotation is requested by the applicant, the probability that the rotorcraft will capsize should be not higher than the target stated in [CS 27.802(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm472493311). An acceptable means of demonstrating post-ditching flotation stability is through scale model testing using irregular waves. The [AMC to 27.801(e) and 27.802(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm472493314) contains a test specification that has been developed for this purpose. (7) Providing a ‘wet floor’ concept (water in the cabin) by positioning the floats higher on the fuselage sides and allowing the rotorcraft to float lower in the water can be a way of increasing the stability of a ditched rotorcraft (although this would need to be verified for the individual rotorcraft type for all weight and loading conditions), or it may be desirable for other reasons. This is permissible provided that the mean static level of water in the cabin is limited to being lower than the upper surface of the seat cushion (for all rotorcraft mass and centre of gravity cases, with all flotation units intact), and that the presence of water will not unduly restrict the ability of occupants to evacuate the rotorcraft and enter the life raft. (8) The sea conditions approved for ditching should be stated in the performance information section of the RFM. (c) Procedures (1) Flotation system design (i) Structural integrity should be established in accordance with [CS 27.563](#_DxCrossRefBm472493310). [CS 27.802(a)](#_DxCrossRefBm472493311) only requires the floats and their attachments to the rotorcraft to be designed to withstand the load conditions defined in [CS 27.563](#_DxCrossRefBm472493310). Other parts of the rotorcraft (e.g. fuselage underside structure, chin windows, doors) do not need to be shown to be capable of withstanding these load conditions. (ii) Rotorcraft handling qualities should be verified to comply with the applicable certification specifications throughout the approved flight envelope with floats installed. Where floats are normally deflated and deployed in flight, the handling qualities should be verified for the approved operating envelopes with the floats in: (A) the deflated and stowed condition; (B) the fully inflated condition; and (C) the in-flight inflation condition; for float systems which may be inflated in flight, rotorcraft controllability should be verified by test or analysis taking into account all possible emergency flotation system inflation failures. (iii) Reliability should be considered in the basic design to assure approximately equal inflation of the floats to preclude excessive yaw, roll, or pitch in flight or in the water: (A) Maintenance procedures should not degrade the flotation system (e.g. introducing contaminants that could affect normal operation, etc.). (B) The flotation system design should preclude inadvertent damage due to normal personnel traffic flow and wear and tear. Protection covers should be evaluated for function and reliability. (C) The designs of the floats should provide means to minimise the likelihood of damage or tear propagation between compartments. Single compartment float designs should be avoided. (iv) The floats should be fabricated from highly conspicuous materials to assist in locating the rotorcraft following a ditching (and possible capsize). (2) Flotation system inflation Emergency flotation systems (EFSs) which are normally stowed in a deflated condition and are inflated either in flight or after water contact should be evaluated as follows: (i) The emergency flotation system should include a means to verify system integrity prior to each flight. (ii) If a manual means of inflation is provided, the float activation switch should be located on one of the primary flight controls and should be safeguarded against inadvertent actuation. (iii) The inflation system should be safeguarded against spontaneous or inadvertent actuation in flight conditions for which float deployment has not been demonstrated to be safe. (iv) The maximum airspeeds for intentional in-flight actuation of the emergency flotation system and for flight with the floats inflated should be established as limitations in the RFM unless in-flight actuation is prohibited by the RFM. (v) Activation of the emergency flotation system upon water entry (irrespective of whether or not inflation prior to water entry is the intended operation mode) should result in an inflation time short enough to prevent the rotorcraft from becoming excessively submerged. (vi) A means should be provided for checking the pressure of the gas stowage cylinders prior to take-off. A table of acceptable gas cylinder pressure variation with ambient temperature and altitude (if applicable) should be provided. (vii) A means should be provided to minimise the possibility of over-inflation of the flotation units under any reasonably probable actuation conditions. (viii) The ability of the floats to inflate without puncturing when subjected to actual water pressures should be substantiated. A demonstration of a full-scale float immersion in a calm body of water is one acceptable method of substantiation. Precautions should also be taken to avoid floats being punctured due to the proximity of sharp objects, during inflation in flight or with the helicopter in the water, and during subsequent movement of the helicopter in waves. Examples of objects that need to be considered are aerials, probes, overboard vents, unprotected split-pin tails, guttering and any projections sharper than a three-dimensional right angled corner. (3) Injury prevention during and following water entry. An assessment of the cabin and cockpit layouts should be undertaken to minimise the potential for injury to occupants in a ditching. This may be performed as part of the compliance with [CS 27.785](#_DxCrossRefBm472493377). Attention should be given to the avoidance of injuries due to leg/arm flailing, as these can be a significant impediment to occupant egress and subsequent survivability. Practical steps that could be taken include: (i) locating potentially hazardous items away from the occupants; (ii) installing energy-absorbing padding onto interior components; (iii) using frangible materials; and (iv) designs that exclude hard or sharp edges. (4) Water entry procedures. Tests or simulations (or a combination of both) should be conducted to establish procedures and techniques to be used for water entry. These tests/simulations should include determination of the optimum pitch attitude and forward velocity for ditching in a calm sea, as well as entry procedures for the most severe sea condition to be certified. Procedures for all failure conditions that may lead to a ‘land immediately’ action (e.g. one engine inoperative, all engines inoperative, tail rotor/drive failure) should be established. (5) Flotation stability tests. An acceptable means of flotation stability testing is contained in [AMC to 27.801(e) and 27.802(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm472493314). Note that model tests in a wave basin on a number of different rotorcraft types have indicated that an improvement in seakeeping performance can consistently be achieved by fitting float scoops. (6) Occupant egress and survival. The ability of the occupants to deploy life rafts, egress the rotorcraft, and board the life rafts should be evaluated. For configurations which are considered to have critical occupant egress capabilities due to the life raft locations or the emergency exit locations and the proximity of the float (or a combination of both), an actual demonstration of egress may be required. When a demonstration is required, it may be conducted on a full-scale rotorcraft actually immersed in a calm body of water or using any other rig or ground test facility shown to be representative. The demonstration should show that floats do not impede a satisfactory evacuation. Service experience has shown that it is possible foroccupants to have escaped from the cabin but to have not been able to board a life raft and to have had difficulty in finding handholds to stay afloat and together. Handholds or lifelines should be provided on appropriate parts of the rotorcraft. The normal attitude of the rotorcraft and the possibility of a capsize should be considered when positioning the handholds or lifelines. [Amdt No: 27/5] AMC 27.802 Emergency Flotation ED Decision 2018/007/R This AMC replaces FAA AC 27 MG 10. (a) Definitions (1) Ditching: a controlled emergency landing on the water, deliberately executed in accordance with rotorcraft flight manual (RFM) procedures, with the intent of abandoning the rotorcraft as soon as practicable. NOTE: Although the term ‘ditching’ is most commonly associated with the design standards related to [CS 27.801](#_DxCrossRefBm8893881), a rotorcraft equipped to the less demanding requirements of [CS 27.802](#_DxCrossRefBm8893880), when performing an emergency landing on water, would nevertheless be commonly described as carrying out the process of ditching. The term ‘ditching’ is therefore used in this AMC in this general sense. (2) Emergency flotation system (EFS): a system of floats and any associated parts (e.g. gas cylinders, means of deployment, pipework and electrical connections) that is designed and installed on a rotorcraft to provide buoyancy and flotation stability during and after ditching. (b) Explanation (1) Approval of emergency flotation equipment is performed only if requested by the applicant. Operational rules may accept that a helicopter conducts flights over certain sea areas provided it is fitted with approved emergency flotation equipment (i.e. an EFS), rather than being certified with full ditching provisions. (2) Emergency flotation certification encompasses emergency flotation system loads and design, and rotorcraft flotation stability. (3) Failure of the EFS to operate when required will lead to the rotorcraft rapidly capsizing and sinking. Operational experience has shown that localised damage or failure of a single component of an EFS can lead to the loss of the complete system. Therefore, the design of the EFS needs careful consideration. (4) The sea conditions, on which certification with emergency flotation is to be based, are selected by the applicant and should take into account the expected sea conditions in the intended areas of operation. Capsize resistance is required to meet the same requirements as for full ditching approval but with the allowable capsize probability being set at 10 %. The default wave climate specified in this requirement is that of the northern North Sea, as it represents a conservative condition. An applicant might consider this to be inappropriate, as it represents a hostile sea area. The applicant may therefore propose a different wave climate based on data from a non-hostile sea area. The associated certification will then be limited to the geographical region(s) thus represented. Alternatively, a non-hostile default wave climate might be agreed, with no associated need for geographical limits to the certification. The significant wave height, and any geographical limitations (if applicable, see the [AMC to 27.801(e) and 27.802(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm8893883)) should be included in the RFM as performance information. (5) During scale model testing, appropriate allowances should be made for probable structural damage and leakage. Previous model tests and other data from rotorcraft of similar configurations that have already been substantiated based on equivalent test conditions may be used to satisfy the emergency flotation requirements. In regard to flotation stability, test conditions should be equivalent to those defined in the [AMC to 27.801(e) and 27.802(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm8893883). (6) [CS 27.802](#_DxCrossRefBm8893880) requires that in sea conditions for which certification with emergency flotation is requested by the applicant, the probability of capsizing in a 5-minute exposure is acceptably low in order to allow the occupants to leave the rotorcraft and enter the life rafts. This should be interpreted to mean that up to and including the worst-case sea conditions for which certification with emergency flotation is requested by the applicant, the probability that the rotorcraft will capsize should be not higher than the target stated in [CS 27.802(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm8893880). An acceptable means of demonstrating post-ditching flotation stability is through scale model testing using irregular waves. The [AMC to 27.801(e) and 27.802(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm8893883) contains a test specification that has been developed for this purpose. (7) Providing a ‘wet floor’ concept (water in the cabin) by positioning the floats higher on the fuselage sides and allowing the rotorcraft to float lower in the water can be a way of increasing the stability of a ditched rotorcraft (although this would need to be verified for the individual rotorcraft type for all weight and loading conditions), or it may be desirable for other reasons. This is permissible provided that the mean static level of water in the cabin is limited to being lower than the upper surface of the seat cushion (for all rotorcraft mass and centre of gravity cases, with all flotation units intact), and that the presence of water will not unduly restrict the ability of occupants to evacuate the rotorcraft and enter the life raft. (8) The sea conditions approved for ditching should be stated in the performance information section of the RFM. (c) Procedures (1) Flotation system design (i) Structural integrity should be established in accordance with [CS 27.563](#_DxCrossRefBm8893879). [CS 27.802(a)](#_DxCrossRefBm8893880) only requires the floats and their attachments to the rotorcraft to be designed to withstand the load conditions defined in [CS 27.563](#_DxCrossRefBm8893879). Other parts of the rotorcraft (e.g. fuselage underside structure, chin windows, doors) do not need to be shown to be capable of withstanding these load conditions. (ii) Rotorcraft handling qualities should be verified to comply with the applicable certification specifications throughout the approved flight envelope with floats installed. Where floats are normally deflated and deployed in flight, the handling qualities should be verified for the approved operating envelopes with the floats in: (A) the deflated and stowed condition; (B) the fully inflated condition; and (C) the in-flight inflation condition; for float systems which may be inflated in flight, rotorcraft controllability should be verified by test or analysis taking into account all possible emergency flotation system inflation failures. (iii) Reliability should be considered in the basic design to assure approximately equal inflation of the floats to preclude excessive yaw, roll, or pitch in flight or in the water: (A) Maintenance procedures should not degrade the flotation system (e.g. introducing contaminants that could affect normal operation, etc.). (B) The flotation system design should preclude inadvertent damage due to normal personnel traffic flow and wear and tear. Protection covers should be evaluated for function and reliability. (C) The designs of the floats should provide means to minimise the likelihood of damage or tear propagation between compartments. Single compartment float designs should be avoided. (iv) The floats should be fabricated from highly conspicuous materials to assist in locating the rotorcraft following a ditching (and possible capsize). (2) Flotation system inflation Emergency flotation systems (EFSs) which are normally stowed in a deflated condition and are inflated either in flight or after water contact should be evaluated as follows: (i) The emergency flotation system should include a means to verify system integrity prior to each flight. (ii) If a manual means of inflation is provided, the float activation switch should be located on one of the primary flight controls and should be safeguarded against inadvertent actuation. (iii) The inflation system should be safeguarded against spontaneous or inadvertent actuation in flight conditions for which float deployment has not been demonstrated to be safe. (iv) The maximum airspeeds for intentional in-flight actuation of the emergency flotation system and for flight with the floats inflated should be established as limitations in the RFM unless in-flight actuation is prohibited by the RFM. (v) Activation of the emergency flotation system upon water entry (irrespective of whether or not inflation prior to water entry is the intended operation mode) should result in an inflation time short enough to prevent the rotorcraft from becoming excessively submerged. (vi) A means should be provided for checking the pressure of the gas stowage cylinders prior to take-off. A table of acceptable gas cylinder pressure variation with ambient temperature and altitude (if applicable) should be provided. (vii) A means should be provided to minimise the possibility of over-inflation of the flotation units under any reasonably probable actuation conditions. (viii) The ability of the floats to inflate without puncturing when subjected to actual water pressures should be substantiated. A demonstration of a full-scale float immersion in a calm body of water is one acceptable method of substantiation. Precautions should also be taken to avoid floats being punctured due to the proximity of sharp objects, during inflation in flight or with the helicopter in the water, and during subsequent movement of the helicopter in waves. Examples of objects that need to be considered are aerials, probes, overboard vents, unprotected split-pin tails, guttering and any projections sharper than a three-dimensional right angled corner. (3) Injury prevention during and following water entry. An assessment of the cabin and cockpit layouts should be undertaken to minimise the potential for injury to occupants in a ditching. This may be performed as part of the compliance with [CS 27.785](#_DxCrossRefBm8893830). Attention should be given to the avoidance of injuries due to leg/arm flailing, as these can be a significant impediment to occupant egress and subsequent survivability. Practical steps that could be taken include: (i) locating potentially hazardous items away from the occupants; (ii) installing energy-absorbing padding onto interior components; (iii) using frangible materials; and (iv) designs that exclude hard or sharp edges. (4) Water entry procedures. Tests or simulations (or a combination of both) should be conducted to establish procedures and techniques to be used for water entry. These tests/simulations should include determination of the optimum pitch attitude and forward velocity for ditching in a calm sea, as well as entry procedures for the most severe sea condition to be certified. Procedures for all failure conditions that may lead to a ‘land immediately’ action (e.g. one engine inoperative, all engines inoperative, tail rotor/drive failure) should be established. (5) Flotation stability tests. An acceptable means of flotation stability testing is contained in [AMC to 27.801(e) and 27.802(c)](#_DxCrossRefBm8893883). Note that model tests in a wave basin on a number of different rotorcraft types have indicated that an improvement in seakeeping performance can consistently be achieved by fitting float scoops. (6) Occupant egress and survival. The ability of the occupants to deploy life rafts, egress the rotorcraft, and board the life rafts should be evaluated. For configurations which are considered to have critical occupant egress capabilities due to the life raft locations or the emergency exit locations and the proximity of the float (or a combination of both), an actual demonstration of egress may be required. When a demonstration is required, it may be conducted on a full-scale rotorcraft actually immersed in a calm body of water or using any other rig or ground test facility shown to be representative. The demonstration should show that floats do not impede a satisfactory evacuation. Service experience has shown that it is possible foroccupants to have escaped from the cabin but to have not been able to board a life raft and to have had difficulty in finding handholds to stay afloat and together. Handholds or lifelines should be provided on appropriate parts of the rotorcraft. The normal attitude of the rotorcraft and the possibility of a capsize should be considered when positioning the handholds or lifelines. [Amdt No: 27/5]