AMC1 ARA.GEN.300(a)

• ED Decision 2020/018/R found in: Aircrew (1178/2011) Part-FCL Part-MED Part-CC Part-ARA Part-ORA Part-DTO (Aug 2023)

AMC1 ARA.GEN.300(a);(b);(c) Oversight ED Decision 2020/018/R EVALUATION OF APPROVED TRAINING ORGANISATIONS’ OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT As part of the initial certification or the continuing oversight of an ATO, the competent authority should normally evaluate its safety risk assessment processes related to hazards identified by the ATO as having an interface with its operations. These safety risk assessments should be identifiable processes of the ATO’s management system. As part of its continuing oversight, the competent authority should also remain satisfied as to the effectiveness of these safety risk assessments. (a) General methodology for operational hazards (1) The competent authority should establish a methodology for evaluating the safety risk assessment processes of the ATO’s management system. (2) When related to operational hazards, the competent authority’s evaluation under its normal oversight process should be considered satisfactory if the ATO demonstrates its competence and capability to: (i) understand the hazards identified and their consequences on its operations; (ii) be clear on where these hazards may exceed acceptable safety risk limits; (iii) identify and implement mitigations including suspension of operations where mitigation cannot reduce the risk to within safety risk limits; (iv) develop and execute effectively, robust procedures for the preparation and the safe operation of the flights subject to the hazards identified; (v) assess the competence and currency of its staff in relation to the duties for the intended operations and implement any necessary training; and (vi) ensure sufficient numbers of qualified and competent staff for such duties. (3) The competent authority should take into account: (i) the ATO’s recorded mitigations for each unacceptable risk identified are in place; (ii) the operational procedures specified by the ATO with the most significance to safety appear to be robust; and (iii) that the staff on which the ATO depends in respect of those duties necessary for the intended operations are trained and assessed as competent in the relevant procedures. EVALUATION OF APPROVED TRAINING ORGANISATIONS’ VOLCANIC ASH SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT (b) In addition to the general methodology for operational hazards, the competent authority’s evaluation under its normal oversight process should also assess the ATO’s competence and capability to: (1) choose the correct information sources to use to interpret the information related to volcanic ash contamination forecast and to resolve correctly any conflicts among such sources; and (2) take account of all information from its type certificate holders (TCHs) concerning volcanic ash-related airworthiness aspects of the aircraft it operates, and the related preflight, in-flight and post flight precautions to be observed. AMC1 ARA.GEN.300(a);(b);(c) Oversight ED Decision 2020/018/R EVALUATION OF APPROVED TRAINING ORGANISATIONS’ OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT As part of the initial certification or the continuing oversight of an ATO, the competent authority should normally evaluate its safety risk assessment processes related to hazards identified by the ATO as having an interface with its operations. These safety risk assessments should be identifiable processes of the ATO’s management system. As part of its continuing oversight, the competent authority should also remain satisfied as to the effectiveness of these safety risk assessments. (a)     General methodology for operational hazards (1)     The competent authority should establish a methodology for evaluating the safety risk assessment processes of the ATO’s management system. (2)     When related to operational hazards, the competent authority’s evaluation under its normal oversight process should be considered satisfactory if the ATO demonstrates its competence and capability to: (i)      understand the hazards identified and their consequences on its operations; (ii)     be clear on where these hazards may exceed acceptable safety risk limits; (iii)     identify and implement mitigations including suspension of operations where mitigation cannot reduce the risk to within safety risk limits; (iv)     develop and execute effectively, robust procedures for the preparation and the safe operation of the flights subject to the hazards identified; (v)      assess the competence and currency of its staff in relation to the duties for the intended operations and implement any necessary training; and (vi)     ensure sufficient numbers of qualified and competent staff for such duties. (3)     The competent authority should take into account: (i)      the ATO’s recorded mitigations for each unacceptable risk identified are in place; (ii)     the operational procedures specified by the ATO with the most significance to safety appear to be robust; and (iii)     that the staff on which the ATO depends in respect of those duties necessary for the intended operations are trained and assessed as competent in the relevant procedures. EVALUATION OF APPROVED TRAINING ORGANISATIONS’ VOLCANIC ASH SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT (b)     In addition to the general methodology for operational hazards, the competent authority’s evaluation under its normal oversight process should also assess the ATO’s competence and capability to: (1)     choose the correct information sources to use to interpret the information related to volcanic ash contamination forecast and to resolve correctly any conflicts among such sources; and (2)     take account of all information from its type certificate holders (TCHs) concerning volcanic ash-related airworthiness aspects of the aircraft it operates, and the related preflight, in-flight and post flight precautions to be observed. ##### AMC1 ARA.GEN.300(a);(b);(c) Oversight *ED Decision 2020/018/R* **EVALUATION OF APPROVED TRAINING ORGANISATIONS’ OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT** As part of the initial certification or the continuing oversight of an ATO, the competent authority should normally evaluate its safety risk assessment processes related to hazards identified by the ATO as having an interface with its operations. These safety risk assessments should be identifiable processes of the ATO’s management system. As part of its continuing oversight, the competent authority should also remain satisfied as to the effectiveness of these safety risk assessments. (a) General methodology for operational hazards (1) The competent authority should establish a methodology for evaluating the safety risk assessment processes of the ATO’s management system. (2) When related to operational hazards, the competent authority’s evaluation under its normal oversight process should be considered satisfactory if the ATO demonstrates its competence and capability to: (i) understand the hazards identified and their consequences on its operations; (ii) be clear on where these hazards may exceed acceptable safety risk limits; (iii) identify and implement mitigations including suspension of operations where mitigation cannot reduce the risk to within safety risk limits; (iv) develop and execute effectively, robust procedures for the preparation and the safe operation of the flights subject to the hazards identified; (v) assess the competence and currency of its staff in relation to the duties for the intended operations and implement any necessary training; and (vi) ensure sufficient numbers of qualified and competent staff for such duties. (3) The competent authority should take into account: (i) the ATO’s recorded mitigations for each unacceptable risk identified are in place; (ii) the operational procedures specified by the ATO with the most significance to safety appear to be robust; and (iii) that the staff on which the ATO depends in respect of those duties necessary for the intended operations are trained and assessed as competent in the relevant procedures. **EVALUATION OF APPROVED TRAINING ORGANISATIONS’ VOLCANIC ASH SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT** (b) In addition to the general methodology for operational hazards, the competent authority’s evaluation under its normal oversight process should also assess the ATO’s competence and capability to: (1) choose the correct information sources to use to interpret the information related to volcanic ash contamination forecast and to resolve correctly any conflicts among such sources; and (2) take account of all information from its type certificate holders (TCHs) concerning volcanic ash-related airworthiness aspects of the aircraft it operates, and the related preflight, in-flight and post flight precautions to be observed.