AMC to Appendix S, S25.10(a) Interior Doors on Non-Commercially Operated Aeroplanes

• ED Decision 2017/015/R found in: CS-25 Amdt 27 - Large Aeroplanes (Jan 2023)

AMC to Appendix S, S25.10(a) Interior Doors on Non-Commercially Operated Aeroplanes ED Decision 2017/015/R (1) The following provides acceptable means to ensure that a door is open before entering any of the taxiing, take-off, and landing phase, as required by [S25.10(a)(1)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709822024): (a) The door should be conspicuously placarded on both sides to be in the safe (i.e. open and secured) position during taxiing, take-off, and landing; (b) The operation of the door and the requirement that the door be secured open for taxiing, take-off, and landing must be the subject of a passenger briefing, and the requirement for this briefing must be part of the AFM; for the purpose of this briefing, a description of the operation of the internal door should be made available to the flight crew; and (c) There should be a means to signal to the flight crew in a timely manner if the door is not open and secured in a safe position before entering any of the taxiing, take-off, or landing phases. The indication should be triggered during the descent phase, early enough to enable the flight crew to take appropriate action before entering the approach phase, unless the aeroplane is required to have at least one cabin crew member on board. Appropriate procedures for crew action should be established. (2) The following provides acceptable means to ensure that the door remains open during taxiing, take-off, and landing, and especially during and after a crash landing, as required by [S25.10(a)(2)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709822024): (a) Dual means should be provided to secure the door in the open position for taxiing, take-off, and landing. Each of those dual means should be capable of reacting to the inertia loads specified in [CS 25.561](#_DxCrossRefBm1709820989); and (b) The indication to the flight crew mentioned in the above condition (1)(c) should be triggered without delay and remain active whenever the door is not in the safe position during any of the taxiing, take-off, and landing flight phases. Appropriate procedures for crew action should be established. (3) Regarding the indication mentioned in the above paragraphs (1)(c) and (2)(b), if several interior doors are installed, it might not be necessary to provide a distinct indication for each door on the flight deck. Door position indication in the cockpit may be achieved by means of a single visual indication serving all interior doors installed in the aeroplane, provided that at least one of the following two conditions is met: (a) The number and location of the interior doors is such that quick identification of the incorrectly positioned door can be made by cabin occupants. A cabin layout which may be accepted as meeting this condition may be one in which all interior doors can be easily viewed during a direct walk from the front to the rear of the cabin. (b) There is a simultaneous indication provided to a required cabin crew member which allows easy identification of the interior door in the incorrect position. An associated procedure for coordination between the flight and cabin crew should be included in the AFM. (4) The following provides acceptable means to comply with the requirement [S25.10(a)(3)](#_DxCrossRefBm1709822024): (a) In case the door is operated (opening, closing and/or latching) manually: the door should be easily operable from both sides, and if a latch is installed to restrain the door in the closed position, the door should be capable of being unlatched from both sides without the aid of any tool and without the need of any item (it is not acceptable to require the use of even common items such as coins, credit cards, pens, etc.); b) In case the door is operated (opening, closing and/or latching) electrically: there should be a manual override that satisfies the above condition (4)(a), unless the electrical opening and retention in the open and secured position continues to function following complete loss of normal electrical power, and it is demonstrated that following any probable electrical failure, the door defaults to the fully open and secured position; (c) The door should be frangible (or equivalent, e.g. it has a removable panel) in both directions. An assessment should be made of the moveable cabin features adjacent to the door in order to ensure that sufficient clearance on each side of the door, during all phases of flight, is assured by design such that the frangibility feature(s) will work as intended. Alternatively, it may be shown that, irrespective of the positioning of moveable cabin features, the overall frangibility objective is still achieved, e.g. by reaching through a reduced opening to easily move the feature before finishing the actions needed to provide the full opening intended. The frangibility should be demonstrated by test using a 5th percentile female, and the resulting aperture should be demonstrated to be large enough for a 95th percentile male to escape. The case of probable jamming in a non-fully closed position should be considered; (d) As an alternative to the above mentioned frangibility feature, it may be demonstrated, for example with double sliding doors, that following any probable failure or jamming of the door, a sufficient opening is still ensured that allows for passing through the doorway; ’sufficient opening’ would mean, in the case of a sliding door, an opening from floor to ceiling consistent with the minimum required width of aisle as prescribed by [CS 25.815](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821296) for a passenger seating capacity equal to the maximum expected number of passengers that would need to evacuate through the passenger egress path crossed by the door. (e) The pre-flight passenger briefing (as mentioned in condition (1)(b)) should contain instructions on how to restore a sufficient opening for evacuation (frangibility feature or alternative means) in case of failure or jamming of the door. For the definition of ‘probable failure or jamming of the door’, refer to the definition of ‘Probable Failure Conditions’ in [AMC 25.1309](#_DxCrossRefBm1709821113). [Amdt 25/19]