i.             

Flight test deployment at v_NE

X

ii.             

Flight test deployment in a stabilised turn at the most critical of the following combinations of bank angle and speed:

-             the maximum permissible bank angle at its maximum permissible speed

-             v_H or v_NE, whichever is lower, and its associated maximum bank angle

X

X

iii.             

Flight test deployment during stabilised hover

X

(see Note 1)

X

(see Note 1)

iv.             

Flight test deployment at maximum permissible vertical rate of descent (at zero forward speed)

X

X

X

v.             

Parachute drop test at maximum design altitude

X

X

X

vi.             

Parachute drop test at v_NE

X

X

X

vii.             

Ground test deployment at lowest temperature

X

X

viii.             

Ground test deployment at highest temperature

X

X

X

ix.             

Ground deployment/extraction test (zero height and speed), with increased mass of the rescue system according to maximum limit load factor n

X

X

x.             

Static strength test of parachute attachment to the airframe up to ultimate load, considering flight speed up to v_D.

X

X

X

X

Compliance with requirements in ‘non-activated‘ condition

The airworthiness requirements for the basic type design should be complied with to the full extent, as long as the aircraft rescue system is not activated.

Opening shock

Oscillation caused by the opening force should be sufficiently damped.

Strength of the parachute system

At critical aircraft masses the parachute system should comply correspondingly with the applicable requirements of ETSO-C23f, or any equivalent acknowledged requirement.

Application of opening shock into the aircraft structure

All textile components of a suspension system should have at least a safety factor of 2 against failure. A possibly asymmetric loading of the suspension system should be taken into account. Precautions should be taken to prevent possible damages of the APRS due to aircraft structure damages such as sharp edges or splintering.

Activation of the rescue system

The design should provide sufficient margin to prevent malfunction caused by stacking up of tolerances (due to manufacturing and installation processes), temperature effect, g-load or any other conditions encountered in the operational domain.

a) Manual operation of the rescue system should comply with VTOL.2510(a) and in addition should satisfy the following conditions:

1) The release should be done by a handle which is pulled for activation.

2) The handle should be (also under the expected acceleration conditions) well reachable and operable by pilots of differing size, by either right or left hand.

3) The handle should be conspicuously colour coded and clearly marked from the other operating knobs of the aircraft.

4) The handle should be large enough so that the necessary operating forces can be safely applied by the whole hand, even when gloves are worn.

Example: A handle which

- is located in a central position between the inceptor(s) (such as control stick or wheel) and the pilot,

- has a colour coding by yellow-black rings,

- is like a stiff loop handle (analogue to an ejection seat),

is considered compliant with the above-mentioned requirements.

b) Automatic operation of the rescue system should comply with VTOL.2510(a).

c) For the activation, a combination of points a) and b) is acceptable. Nevertheless, each paragraph needs to be fully complied with.

d) For points a) and b) the Flight Manual should describe in detail the required sequence of activation, the criteria for activation, the procedures to reconfigure the propulsion system in a secure manner and any related limitations and procedures, as applicable.

Assessment of normal and unintended/spurious activation

A safety assessment should be performed to assess the effect of system normal function and functional failures. It should not only address potential hazards to the occupants and people on the ground during normal activation, but also following unintended/spurious activations.

All failure conditions and their severity should be identified in line with VTOL.2510.

On most aircraft, unintended/spurious activation is likely to have catastrophic effects in some phases of operation.

Suitable precautions taken to ensure the system meets the safety objectives associated to these failure conditions should include all realistic conditions which occur during the

- operation

- rescue by first-aiders

- storage

- maintenance

- transportation

of the aircraft.

b) The status ‘secured’/’armed’ should be simply and unequivocally verifiable from the inside and outside of the cockpit.

Control forces and travel for the activation of the release mechanism

a) The operating force necessary for the release of the system should be:

- higher or equal to 10 daN, and,

- lesser or equal to 20 daN.

b) For the activation of the release mechanism, a defined positive travel of the release handle should be required

Mechanical integration of the rescue system into the aircraft

The integration of all components required for the successful functioning of the rescue system should be done in an area of the aircraft, the damaging of which is improbable in case of mid-air collisions and aerial disintegration.

Precautions against twisting of the parachute system

Suitable means should ensure that no twisting of the parachute lines occurs due to rotation.

Emissions

Emissions produced by the use of the rescue system should neither lead to severe health impairment of the occupants, nor to break-out of a fire.

Compliance with other requirements

Compliance with these requirements should not relieve from compliance of other related requirements. For instance, regulations for handling explosives must be observed.

Operating limitations and information

Operating information should be furnished which define the handling of the system during

- operation,

- rescue by first-aiders,

- storage,

- maintenance,

- transportation.