What is the minimum set of safety risk areas that operational procedures must provide mitigation measures for during turnaround?

The minimum safety risk areas are: inoperative beacon or beacon not turned on; use of beacon lights by flight crew other than for intended purpose when startup clearance is given but GH tasks not completed; poor communication between flight crew and GH persons before aircraft doors open/close; insufficient chocking or poor communication leading to unintentional aircraft rolling; lack of signal for 'aircraft under movement' during pushback/towing; lack of coordination between GSE operators/drivers during turnaround; and securing of GSE.

What risk is associated with the flight crew using beacon lights for purposes other than intended when startup clearance is given but GH operations tasks are incomplete?

The risk is that the beacon may be used as a signal for aircraft movement before GH tasks are completed, potentially leading to unsafe conditions for ground personnel.

What specific risk is identified regarding the beacon's intended purpose during pushback or towing operations?

The beacon is only intended for 'engine running', so it does not signal 'aircraft under movement' during pushback/towing, posing a risk. An additional signal for 'aircraft under movement' should be established and communicated to personnel involved.

What should be done to mitigate the risk of poor communication between flight crew and GH persons before aircraft doors open or close?

The operational procedures should provide mitigation measures for this risk area, as it is listed among the minimum safety risk areas.

What is the required mitigation for insufficient chocking or poor communication that could lead to unintentional aircraft rolling?

Operational procedures should provide mitigation measures for this risk area, as it is one of the minimum safety risk areas listed.

What risk is identified regarding lack of coordination between GSE operators or drivers during turnaround activities like fuelling, catering, and PRM handling?

Lack of coordination between GSE operators/drivers during aircraft turnaround is a safety risk area that operational procedures must provide mitigation measures for.

What does the section say about securing of ground support equipment (GSE)?

Securing of GSE is listed as one of the minimum safety risk areas for which operational procedures should provide mitigation measures.

AMC1 GH.OPS.300(b)(3) Safety on the apron

Q: What should operational procedures and safety training cover when aircraft engines are running or the aircraft is about to move with the anti-collision light on?

They should cover the safety risks of chocking of aircraft, provision of ground power unit when the aircraft's auxiliary power unit is inoperative, and other circumstances explicitly described in the GH organisation's GH manual.

Q: What mitigation measure is required for an inoperative beacon or a beacon not turned on?

Proper communication between cockpit and ground or an alternative procedure should be ensured.

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AMC1 GH.OPS.300(b)(3) Safety on the apron

ED Decision 2025/007/R

SAFETY RISK MITIGATION MEASURES FOR PERSONNEL MOVING AROUND THE AIRCRAFT DURING TURNAROUND

When the aircraft engines are running or the aircraft is about to move and the anti‑collision light is on:

(a) the operational procedures and safety training should cover the safety risks of the following activities:

(1) chocking of aircraft;

(2) provision of ground power unit when the aircraft’s auxiliary power unit is inoperative;

(3) other circumstances explicitly described in the GH organisation’s GH manual;

(b) the operational procedures should provide mitigation measures for the following safety risk areas as a minimum:

(1) inoperative beacon or beacon not turned on — proper communication between cockpit and ground or an alternative procedure should be ensured;

(2) use of beacon lights by the flight crew other than for the intended purpose when the startup clearance is given by air traffic control but the GH operations tasks have not been completed;

(3) poor communication between the flight crew and the GH persons before the aircraft doors open/close;

(4) insufficient chocking or poor communication leading to aircraft rolling unintentionally;

(5) lack of signal for ‘aircraft under movement’, as the beacon is only intended for ‘engine running’, posing risk during pushback/towing operations — an additional signal for ‘aircraft under movement’ should be established and communicated to the personnel involved;

(6) lack of coordination between GSE operators/drivers during aircraft turnaround (fuelling, catering, PRM handling, etc.);

(7) securing of GSE.

Details

Source-Title: AMC1 GH.OPS.300(b)(3) Safety on the apron View latest amendments

Erulesid: ERULES-1963177438-23478 Compare versions

Domain: Ground Handling

Amendedby: Issue 1

Applicabilitydate: 27 March, 2028

Entryintoforcedate: 8 July, 2025

Regulatorysource: ED Decision 2025/007/R Navigate

Regulatorysubject: Part-GH.OPS

Typeofcontent: AMC to DR

Origin: EASA

Category: EAR