[1] The published date represents the date when the consolidated version of the document was generated.

[2] Euro-Lex, Important Legal Notice: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/content/legal-notice/legal-notice.html.

[3] The published date represents the date when the consolidated version of the EAR book was generated.

[4] Euro-Lex, Important Legal Notice: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/content/legal-notice/legal-notice.html.

[5] It should be noted that rotorcraft tend to have a high centre of gravity due to the position of the engines and gearbox on top of the cabin. It therefore follows that most of the ballast is likely to be required to be installed in these high locations of the model.

[6] Rotors touching the waves can promote capsize, but they can also be a stabilising influence depending on the exact circumstances. Furthermore, rotor blades are often lost during the ditching due to contact with the sea. It is therefore considered acceptable to omit them from the model.

[7] In general the model cannot be permitted to float freely in the basin because in the necessarily long wave test durations, the model would otherwise drift down the basin and out of the calibrated wave region. Constraining the model to remain beam-on to the waves and not float freely is regarded as a conservative approach to the capsize test. . A free-floating test is optional after a specific capsize event, in order to investigate whether the restraint system contributed to the event. It may also be possible to perform a complete free-floating test campaign by combining many short exposures in a wave basin capable of demonstrating a large calibrated wave region.

[8] A sea anchor deployed from the rotorcraft nose is intended to improve stability by keeping the rotorcraft nose into the waves. However, such devices take a significant time to deploy and become effective, and so, their beneficial effect is to be ignored. The rotorcraft model will be restrained to remain beam-on to the waves.

[9] Wind generally has a tendency to redirect the rotorcraft nose into the wind/waves, thus reducing the likelihood of capsize. Therefore, this conservative testing approach does not include a wind simulation.

[10] Each 5-minute exposure might not be independent if, for example, there was flooding of the rotorcraft, progressively degrading its stability. However, in this context, it is considered that the assumption of independence is conservative.

[11] Commission Regulation (EU) No 744/2010 of 18 August 2010 amending Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on substances that deplete the ozone layer, with regard to the critical uses of halon (OJ L 218, 19.8.2010, p. 2).

[12] Council Directive 89/686/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to personal protective equipment (OJ L 399, 30.12.1989, p. 18).

[13] Regulation (EU) 2016/425 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on personal protective equipment and repealing Council Directive 89/686/EEC (OJ L 81, 31.3.2016, p. 51).

[14] Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1).

[15] Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on substances that deplete the ozone layer.

[16] Commission Regulation (EU) No 744/2010 of 18 August 2010 amending Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on substances that deplete the ozone layer, with regard to the critical uses of halon (OJ L 218, 19.8.2010, p. 2).

[17] This includes but is not limited to inspection intervals and life limits listed in the ALS of the ICA. Other examples include overhaul intervals, operating time limits and check or inspection intervals, typically listed in Chapter 5 of the ICA, that are essential towards ensuring the safety and reliability of the part/assembly in question.

[18] This refers to applications that are used to indicated to the crew whether, how and/or when specific actions need to be taken in flight, e.g. as a result of a detected incipient failure.

[19] The guidance within this section has been conceived as a reference approach that may be followed for any individual application for credit, focusing on applications that aim at obtaining the maximum credit possible (e.g. completely replace a maintenance task or extend an inspection interval as much as possible). Applicants should deem that commensurate adjustments relative to this guidance may be discussed, considering the specific details of the VHM application for credit, as well as when the same VHM system is used for a number of applications for credit.

[20] All possible functionalities of the ground segment of the VHM system should covered by the verification activities; tests are expected for these verifications.

[21] The VHM application described is depicted between Cases 1 and 2 in Figures 5 and 6 to indicate that some alleviating factors are included but without reaching those required for Case 2.

[22] This is based on the fact that 1E-07 per flight hour is acceptable when the Case 2 criterion for low probability of occurrence of any preceding degraded condition, 1E-05 per flight hour, is demonstrated. In this instance, a probability of occurrence of 1E-04 per flight hour is demonstrated, 1E-01 away from the target. Therefore, it would be reasonable to apply this delta to the proposed alleviated quantitative safety objective.

[23] The VHM application described is depicted between Cases 2 and 3 in Figures 5 and 6 to indicate that some alleviating factors beyond those required for Case 2 are included but without reaching those required for Case 3.