AMC1 27.801 Ditching

ED Decision 2018/007/R

This AMC replaces FAA AC 27.801.

(a)      Definitions

(1)     Ditching: a controlled emergency landing on water, deliberately executed in accordance with rotorcraft flight manual (RFM) procedures, with the intent of abandoning the rotorcraft as soon as practicable.

(2)      Emergency flotation system (EFS): a system of floats and any associated parts (e.g. gas cylinders, means of deployment, pipework and electrical connections) that is designed and installed on a rotorcraft to provide buoyancy and flotation stability in a ditching.

(b)     Explanation

(1)      Ditching certification is performed only if requested by the applicant.

(2)     For a rotorcraft to be certified for ditching, in addition to the other applicable requirements of CS-27, the rotorcraft must specifically satisfy CS 27.801 together with the requirements referenced in CS 27.801(a).

(3)     Ditching certification encompasses four primary areas of concern: rotorcraft water entry and flotation stability (including loads and flotation system design), occupant egress, and occupant survival. CS-27 Amendment 5 has developed enhanced standards in all of these areas.

(4)     The scope of the ditching requirements is expanded at Amendment 5 through a change in the ditching definition. All potential failure conditions that could result in a controlled ‘land immediately’ action by the pilot are now included. This primarily relates to changes in water entry conditions. While the limiting conditions for water entry have been retained (15.4 m/s (30 kt), 1.5 m/s (5 ft/s)), the alleviation that previously allowed less than 15.4 m/s (30 kt) forward speed to be used as the maximum applicable value has been removed (also from CS 27.563).

(5)      Flotation stability is enhanced through the introduction of a new standard based on a probabilistic approach to capsizes.

(6)      Failure of the EFS to operate when required will lead to the rotorcraft rapidly capsizing and sinking. Operational experience has shown that localised damage or failure of a single component of an EFS, or the failure of the flight crew to activate or deploy the EFS, can lead to the loss of the complete system. Therefore, the design of the EFS needs careful consideration; automatic deployment has been shown to be practicable and to offer a significant safety benefit.

(7)      The sea conditions, on which certification with ditching provisions is to be based, are selected by the applicant and should take into account the expected sea conditions in the intended areas of operation. The wave climate of the northern North Sea is adopted as the default wave climate as it represents a conservative condition. The applicant may select alternative/additional sea areas, with any associated certification then being limited to those geographical regions. The significant wave height, and any geographical limitations (if applicable – see the AMC to CS 27.801(e) and 27.802(c)) should be included in the RFM as performance information.

(8)      During scale model testing, appropriate allowances should be made for probable structural damage and leakage. Previous model tests and other data from rotorcraft of similar configurations that have already been substantiated, based on equivalent test conditions, may be used to satisfy the ditching requirements. In regard to flotation stability, the test conditions should be equivalent to those defined in the AMC to CS 27.801(e) and 27.802(c).

(9)      CS 27.801 requires that after ditching in sea conditions for which certification with ditching provisions is requested by the applicant, the probability of capsizing in a 5 minute exposure is acceptably low in order to allow the occupants to leave the rotorcraft and enter life rafts. This should be interpreted to mean that up to and including the worst-case sea conditions for which certification with ditching provisions is requested by the applicant, the probability that the rotorcraft will capsize should be not higher than the target stated in CS 27.801(e). An acceptable means of demonstrating post-ditching flotation stability is through scale model testing using irregular waves. The AMC to CS 27.801(e) and 27.802(c) contains a test specification that has been developed for this purpose.

(10)    Providing a ‘wet floor’ concept (water in the cabin) by positioning the floats higher on the fuselage sides and allowing the rotorcraft to float lower in the water can be a way of increasing the stability of a ditched rotorcraft (although this would need to be verified for the individual rotorcraft type for all weight and loading conditions), or it may be desirable for other reasons. This is permissible provided that the mean static level of water in the cabin is limited to being lower than the upper surface of the seat cushion (for all rotorcraft mass and centre of gravity cases, with all flotation units intact), and that the presence of water will not unduly restrict the ability of occupants to evacuate the rotorcraft and enter the life raft.

(11)    The sea conditions approved for ditching should be stated in the performance information section of the RFM.

(12)    Current practices allow wide latitude in the design of cabin interiors and, consequently, of stowage provisions for safety and ditching equipment. Rotorcraft manufacturers may deliver aircraft with unfinished (green) interiors that are to be completed by a modifier.

(i)       Segmented certification is permitted to accommodate this practice. That is, the rotorcraft manufacturer shows compliance with the flotation time, stability, and emergency exit requirements while a modifier shows compliance with the equipment requirements and egress requirements with the interior completed. This procedure requires close cooperation and coordination between the manufacturer, modifier, and EASA.

(ii)     The rotorcraft manufacturer may elect to establish a token interior for ditching certification. This interior may subsequently be modified by a supplemental type certificate (STC). The ditching provisions should be shown to be compliant with the applicable requirements after any interior configuration or limitation change.

(iii)     The RFM and any RFM supplements deserve special attention if a segmented certification procedure is pursued.

(c)      Procedures

(1)     Flotation system design

(i)       Structural integrity should be established in accordance with CS 27.563.

(ii)      Rotorcraft handling qualities should be verified to comply with the applicable certification specifications throughout the approved flight envelope with floats installed. Where floats are normally deflated, and deployed in flight, the handling qualities should be verified for the approved operating envelopes with the floats in:

(A)     the deflated and stowed condition;

(B)     the fully inflated condition; and

(C)     the in-flight inflation condition; for float systems which may be inflated in flight, rotorcraft controllability should be verified by test or analysis taking into account all possible emergency flotation system inflation failures.

(iii)     Reliability should be considered in the basic design to assure approximately equal inflation of the floats to preclude excessive yaw, roll, or pitch in flight or in the water:

(A)     Maintenance procedures should not degrade the flotation system (e.g. by introducing contaminants that could affect normal operation, etc.).

(B)     The flotation system design should preclude inadvertent damage due to normal personnel traffic flow and wear and tear. Protection covers should be evaluated for function and reliability.

(C)     The designs of the floats should provide means to minimise the likelihood of damage or tear propagation between compartments. Single compartment float designs should be avoided.

(D)     When showing compliance with CS 27.801(c)(1), and where practicable, the design of the flotation system should consider the likely effects of water impact (i.e. crash) loads. For example:

(a)      locate system components away from the major effects of structural deformation;

(b)      use flexible pipes/hoses; and

(c)      avoid passing pipes/hoses or electrical wires through bulkheads that could act as a ‘guillotine’ when the structure is subject to water impact loads.

(iv)     The floats should be fabricated from highly conspicuous material of to assist in locating the rotorcraft following a ditching (and possible capsize).

(2)     Flotation system inflation.

         Emergency flotation systems (EFSs) that are normally stowed in a deflated condition and are inflated either in flight or after contact with water should be evaluated as follows:

(i)       The emergency flotation system should include a means to verify its system integrity prior to each flight.

(ii)      Means should be provided to automatically trigger the inflation of the EFS upon water entry, irrespective of whether or not inflation prior to water entry is the intended operation mode. If a manual means of inflation is provided, the float activation switch should be located on one of the primary flight controls and should be safeguarded against inadvertent actuation.

(iii)     The inflation system should be safeguarded against spontaneous or inadvertent actuation in flight conditions for which float deployment has not been demonstrated to be safe.

(iv)     The maximum airspeeds for intentional in-flight actuation of the emergency flotation system and for flight with the floats inflated should be established as limitations in the RFM unless in-flight actuation is prohibited by the RFM.

(v)      Activation of the emergency flotation system upon water entry (irrespective of whether or not inflation prior to water entry is the intended operation mode) should result in an inflation time short enough to prevent the rotorcraft from becoming excessively submerged.

(vi)     A means should be provided for checking the pressure of the gas stowage cylinders prior to take-off. A table of acceptable gas cylinder pressure variation with ambient temperature and altitude (if applicable) should be provided.

(vii)    A means should be provided to minimise the possibility of over inflation of the flotation units under any reasonably probable actuation conditions.

(viii)   The ability of the floats to inflate without puncturing when subjected to actual water pressures should be substantiated. A demonstration of a full-scale float immersion in a calm body of water is one acceptable method of substantiation. Precautions should also be taken to avoid floats being punctured due to the proximity of sharp objects, during inflation in flight and with the helicopter in the water, and during subsequent movement of the helicopter in waves. Examples of objects that need to be considered are aerials, probes, overboard vents, unprotected split-pin tails, guttering and any projections sharper than a three-dimensional right-angled corner.

(3)      Injury prevention during and following water entry.

         An assessment of the cabin and cockpit layouts should be undertaken to minimise the potential for injury to occupants in a ditching. This may be performed as part of the compliance with CS 27.785. Attention should be given to the avoidance of injuries due to leg/arm flailing, as these can be a significant impediment to occupant egress and subsequent survivability. Practical steps that could be taken include:

(i)       locating potentially hazardous items away from the occupants;

(ii)      installing energy-absorbing padding onto interior components;

(iii)     using frangible materials; and

(iv)     designs that exclude hard or sharp edges.

(4)     Water entry procedures.

         Tests or simulations (or a combination of both) should be conducted to establish procedures and techniques to be used for water entry, based on the conditions given in (5). These tests/simulations should include determination of the optimum pitch attitude and forward velocity for ditching in a calm sea, as well as entry procedures for the most severe sea condition to be certified. Procedures for all failure conditions that may lead to a ‘land immediately’ action (e.g. one engine inoperative, all engines inoperative, tail rotor/drive failure) should be established. However, only the procedures for the most critical all-engines-inoperative condition need be verified by water entry test data.

(5)      Water entry behaviour.

         CS 27.801(d) requires the probable behaviour of the rotorcraft to be shown to exhibit no unsafe characteristics, e.g. that would lead to an inability to remain upright.

         This should be demonstrated by means of scale model testing, based on the following conditions:

(i)      For entry into a calm sea:

(A)     the optimum pitch, roll and yaw attitudes determined in (c)(4) above, with consideration for variations that would reasonably be expected to occur in service;

(B)     ground speeds from 0 to 15.4 m/s (0 to 30 kt); and

(C)     descent rate of 1.5 m/s (5 ft/s) or greater;

(ii)     For entry into the most severe sea condition:

(A)     the optimum pitch attitude and entry procedure determined in (c)(4) above;

(B)     ground speed of 15.4 m/s (30 kt);

(C)     descent rate of 1.5 m/s (5 ft/s) or greater;

(D)     likely roll and yaw attitudes; and

(E)     sea conditions may be represented by regular waves having a height at least equal to the significant wave height (H_s), and a period no larger than the wave zero-crossing period (T_z) for the wave spectrum chosen for demonstration of rotorcraft flotation stability after water entry (see (c)(6) below and AMC to 27.801(e) and 27.802(c));

(iii)     Scoops, flaps, projections, and any other factors likely to affect the hydrodynamic characteristics of the rotorcraft must be considered.

(iv)     Probable damage to the structure due to water entry should be considered during the water entry evaluations (e.g. failure of windows, doors, skins, panels, etc.); and

(v)      Rotor lift does not have to be considered.

Alternatively, if scale model test data for a helicopter of a similar configuration has been previously successfully used to justify water entry behaviour, this data could form the basis for a comparative analytical approach.

(6)      Flotation stability tests.

         An acceptable means of flotation stability testing is contained in the AMC to CS 27.801(e) and 27.802(c). Note that model tests in a wave basin on a number of different rotorcraft types have indicated that an improvement in seakeeping performance can consistently be achieved by fitting float scoops.

(7)     Occupant egress and survival.

         The ability of the occupants to deploy life rafts, egress the rotorcraft, and board the life rafts should be evaluated. For configurations which are considered to have critical occupant egress capabilities due to the life raft locations or the emergency exit locations and the proximity of the float (or a combination of both), an actual demonstration of egress may be required. When a demonstration is required, it may be conducted on a full-scale rotorcraft actually immersed in a calm body of water or using any other rig or ground test facility shown to be representative. The demonstration should show that the floats do not impede a satisfactory evacuation. Service experience has shown that it is possible for occupants to have escaped from the cabin but to have not been able to board a life raft and to have had difficulty in finding handholds to stay afloat and together. Handholds or lifelines should be provided on appropriate parts of the rotorcraft. The normal attitude of the rotorcraft and the possibility of capsizing should be considered when positioning the handholds or lifelines.

[Amdt No: 27/5]