GM5 to
AMC4 ATS.OR.205(a)(2) Safety assessment and assurance of changes to the
functional system
ED Decision 2019/022/R
ASSURANCE — SWAL COORDINATION
(a) Within the scope of this Regulation, only the ATS provider can identify hazards, assess the associated risks and mitigate or propose mitigating measures where necessary. This requirement is also applicable to software assurance evidence which may include information on the mitigation measures established to address software failures or unintended behaviours.
(b) ATS and non-ATS providers may rely on different sets of software assurance processes and, if applicable, different sets of SWALs.
(c) For a particular change to the functional system, the safety assessment performed by the ATS provider, and documented in the safety case, may rely on evidence associated with the services provided by a non-ATS provider, as documented in its corresponding safety support case. It should as a minimum demonstrate that the rigour of the assurances produced by the non-ATS provider within the safety support case provides the adequate level of confidence for the purpose of the ATS safety demonstration in the safety case.
(d) If SWALs are used, the ATS provider should evaluate the adequacy of the SWALs defined in the software assurance processes of the non-ATS providers and the consistency of the allocated SWALs for the parts of the functional system affected by the change at the non-ATS provider.
EASA aviation regulations require Air Traffic Services (ATS) providers to assess and mitigate risks from functional system changes, even when relying on non-ATS providers. The ATS provider must ensure adequate safety assurance from all involved parties, evaluating software assurance levels and consistency across the entire system for aviation safety.
* Summary by Aviation.Bot - Always consult the original document for the most accurate information.
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