GM1 ATM/ANS.AR.A.005(c) Certification,
oversight and enforcement tasks
ED Decision 2017/001/R
COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN COMPETENT AUTHORITIES FOR SELECTION AND REVIEW OF MULTI-ACTOR CHANGES
(a) When the notification of a change to a service provider’s functional system indicates, as per AMC1 ATM/ANS.OR.A.045(a), that the change will affect the services provided by other service providers either directly or by affecting the context in which these services are delivered, these other service providers and the notifying service provider are participating in a multi-actor change. Some or all of these other service providers may also notify their competent authorities because they either have to make a reactive change or they are participating in a cooperative change to their functional systems.
(b) If there are service providers participating in the multi-actor change who are proposing to make changes to their functional systems and are under the oversight of more than one competent authority, then the decision to review and the review itself of safety assessments and safety support assessments has to be a coordinated activity involving all the competent authorities that oversee the service providers participating in the multi-actor change.
(c) Normally, competent authorities act independently when making decisions on how to select and review safety assessments, but in the case of multi-actor changes that cross State boundaries, the only way to ensure the effective selection and review of the notified changes is through coordination with other competent authorities. Coordination arrangements, which are difficult to define in advance, are to be established when the need arises. The objective of these agreements should be to ensure that the overall change is safe, i.e. the overall safety case is based on a complete and correct set of assumptions and mitigations and the associated risk assessments are valid.
(d) The arrangements should ensure that:
(1) the competent authorities involved evaluate in a harmonised way the risk posed by the change, and as a consequence there is an agreement on what safety (support) assessments will be reviewed by each competent authority; and
(2) individual reviews of safety (support) assessments assure the necessary conditions are met, i.e. common assumptions and common mitigations are used correctly in each safety (support) assessment and the identified risks are valid.
(e) However, the assurance that the set of common assumptions and common mitigations are complete and correct cannot be provided in each individual safety case. The argument for that assurance has to be made in an overall safety case and reviewed collectively by the competent authorities involved in the overall change. The form of this collective review should be included in the coordination agreement.
EASA regulations require coordinated oversight for multi-actor ATM/ANS changes affecting multiple service providers, especially across state boundaries. Competent authorities must harmonize risk evaluations and safety assessments. A collective review of an overall safety case ensures complete assumptions and mitigations for the entire change, guaranteeing aviation safety.
* Summary by Aviation.Bot - Always consult the original document for the most accurate information.
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