AMC1 ATM/ANS.OR.C.005(b)(1) Safety support assessment and assurance
of changes to the functional system
ED Decision 2017/001/R
The service provider other than the air traffic services provider should ensure that verification activities of the safety support assessment process include verification:
(a) that the full scope of the change is addressed throughout the whole assessment process, i.e. all the elements of the functional system or environment of operation that are changed or affected by the change and those unchanged elements that depend upon them and on which they depend are identified;
(b) that the way the service behaves complies with and does not contradict any requirements placed on the changed service by another part of the regulations or conditions attached to the providers’ certificate;
(c) that the specification of the way the service behaves and the safety support requirements are complete and correct;
(d) that the specification of the operational context is complete and correct;
(e) that the specification was analysed in the context in which it is intended to operate;
(f) of the completeness of the argument as per AMC2 ATM/ANS.OR.C.005(a)(2);
(g) that the safety support requirements are correct and complete by reference to the specification; and
(h) to the intended degree of confidence, that the implementation satisfies the safety support requirements and behaves only as specified in the given operational context.
EASA Aviation Safety Regulations: Service providers must verify changes to functional systems comprehensively. Verification includes assessing the change's scope, regulatory compliance, specification accuracy, operational context, and safety support requirements. Implementation must satisfy requirements and behave as specified within the operational context, ensuring aviation safety.
* Summary by Aviation.Bot - Always consult the original document for the most accurate information.
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