AMC 20-19 Passenger Service and In-Flight Entertainment (IFE)Systems

0       PREAMBLE

This document provides acceptable means of compliance (AMC) to obtain approval for the installation of in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems. It has been developed on the basis of Joint Aviation Authorities Temporary Guidance Leaflet (JAA TGL) No 17, and addresses the following concerns:

(a)     the increase in the complexity of the IFE systems due to the additional cables, as well as the increase in the power needed for IFE systems;

(b)     the potential consequences on the aircraft or passengers of system/electrical faults, including the risks of smoke, fire or interference with aircraft systems; these concerns are validated by adverse service experience with different types of aircraft;

(c)      the potential consequences for other aircraft systems due to the transmitting capability of the IFE systems; and

(d)     the lack of specific guidance on the installation of IFE systems, as these systems are categorised as non-essential services, even though these systems may affect compliance with the applicable provisions for seats and emergency evacuation.

1       PURPOSE

This AMC has been created to provide guidance to aircraft installers and equipment manufacturers on the airworthiness of IFE systems and equipment installed on civil aircraft. It does not constitute a regulation. It highlights safety concerns about IFE systems, and contains acceptable means of compliance to address those concerns and obtain airworthiness approval of such systems. An applicant for such an approval may choose another means of compliance.

2           RELATED CERTIFICATION SPECIFICATIONS (CSs)

Some of the certification specifications for which this AMC can be used are listed below. This list is for reference only and should not be considered as comprehensive. Additional CS-25 provisions are referenced where applicable. Provisions with the same number (e.g. CS 25.301) are generally read across to the other CSs (e.g. 27.301 and 29.301). However, please note that in some cases, the same topic is addressed by different provisions (e.g. for a specific CS-25 provision, the corresponding CS-23 provision may have a different number):

—      CS 25.301, 303, 305, 307, 333, 337, 341, 365(g), 471, 561, 562, 581, 601, 603, 605, 609, 611, 785, 787, 789, 791, 811, 831, 853, 863, 869, 899, 1301, 1309, 1319, 1327, 1351, 1353, 1357, 1360, 1423, 1431, 1441, 1703, 1705, 1707, 1709, 1715, 1719, 1721, 1723;

—      for CS-23:

—      AMC-20 — Amendment 19 SUBPART A — GENERAL AMC 20-19 Annex to ED Decision 2020/010/R Page 149 of 581 — Amendments 1 to 4: CS 23.561, 562, 785, 787, 791, 811, 867, 1301, 1309, 1327, 1351, 1353, 1357, 1359, 1431, 1441;

—      Amendment 5: CS 23.2265, 2270, 2315, 2320, 2325, 2330, 2335, 2500, 2505, 2510, 2525, 2605, 2615;

—      CS 27.561, 562, 610, 785, 787, 807, 853, 1301, 1309, 1319, 1327, 1351, 1353, 1357, 1365; and

—      CS 29.561, 562, 610, 785, 787, 807, 853, 1301, 1309, 1319, 1327, 1351, 1353, 1357, 1359, 1431.

3       REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

The documents listed below are standards and guidance that were in force when this AMC (AMC 20‑19) was adopted. Later or previous amendments may apply whenever the retained certification basis allows for it.

(a)     ED Decision 2017/020/R, AMC-20 — Amendment 14, AMC 20-115D, Airborne software development assurance using EUROCAE ED-12 and RTCA DO-178, 19 October 2017

(b)     ED Decision 2020/010/R, AMC 20 — Amendment 19, AMC 20-152A, Development Assurance for Airborne Electronic Hardware, July 2020

(c)      ED Decision 2020/006/R, AMC 20 — Amendment 18, AMC 20-42, Airworthiness information security risk assessment, 24 June 2020

(d)     ED Decision 2014/029/R, AMC and GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2, Amendment 1, Portable electronic devices, AMC/GM to CAT.GEN.MPA.140, 24 September 2014, as amended by ED Decision 2019/008/R of 27 February 2019

(e)     EASA Certification Memorandum No CM-ES-001, Certification of Power Supply Systems for Portable Electronic Device, Issue 1, 7 June 2012

(f)      EASA Certification Memorandum No CM-ES-003, Guidance to Certify an Aircraft as PED tolerant, Issue 1, 23 August 2017

(g)     International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc 9284-AN/905, Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (Addendum No. 2), 30 June 2005

(h)     Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 21-16G, RTCA Document DO-160 versions D, E, F, and G, ‘Environmental Conditions Initiated by: AIR-100 and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment’, 22 June 2011

(i)      FAA Policy Memorandum PS-ANM100-2000-00105 (also numbered 00-111-160), Interim Policy Guidance for Certification of In-Flight Entertainment Systems on Title 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft (Policy Number 00-111-160), 18 September 2011

(j)      FAA AC 91.21-1D, Use of Portable Electronic Devices Aboard Aircraft, 27 October 2017

(k)     FAA AC 20.168, Certification Guidance for Installation of Non-Essential, Non-Required Aircraft Cabin Systems & Equipment (CS&E), 21 July 2010   

(l)      FAA AC 20.115D, Airborne Software Development Assurance Using EUROCAE ED-12( ) and RTCA DO-178( ), 21 July 2017 AMC-20 — Amendment 19 SUBPART A — GENERAL AMC 20-19 Annex to ED Decision 2020/010/R Page 150 of 581

(m)    FAA AC 21.49, Gaining Approval of Seats with Integrated Electronic Components, 9 February 2011

(n)     EUROCAE ED-14G, RTCA DO-160G, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment, May 2011, December 2010

(o)     RTCA DO-313, Certification Guidance for Installation of Non-Essential, Non-Required Aircraft Cabin Systems and Equipment, 2 October 2008

(p)     Society of Automotive Engineers Aerospace Recommended Practice (SAE ARP) 5475, Abuse Load Testing for In-Seat Deployable Video Systems, 20 June 2005

(q)     Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated (ARINC) 628, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, 27 December 1993

(r)      MIL-STD-1472G, Human Engineering, 11 January 2012

3.1     Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this AMC:

3.2     Definitions

The following definitions used in this AMC apply:

4       SCOPE

Communication, information and entertainment systems are often provided for the convenience of aircraft passengers. As customer services improve, those systems are becoming more sophisticated and complex. Subsystem design features are often unique, based on the needs of operators, thus leading to many different possible IFE system configurations that depend both on the specific operator requirements and the cabin layout.

The following non-exhaustive list contains some examples of IFE systems:

(a)        systems that provide passengers with audio entertainment and the related controls;

(b)        systems that provide passengers with video entertainment and the related controls;

(c)         passenger flight information systems (PFISs);

(d)        systems that provide passengers with information, e.g. safety videos;

(e)        interfaces to, and functions of, systems for controlling some cabin environment parameters such as, for example, reading lights, general cabin illumination, crew call buttons, air vents, etc.;

(f)         systems that provide passengers with wired and/or wireless data distribution for entertainment connectivity including television (TV) and communication access (i.e. telephone, internet).

The aim of this AMC is to provide general criteria for the approval of such systems and equipment as they are installed in aircraft. The following aspects are addressed: mechanical installation, electrical installation, software/hardware aspects and electromagnetic compatibility, as well as the assessment of the potential hazards. In some cases, the application of this AMC, in conjunction with the certification basis for the product, is deemed to be sufficient.

For certain systems and equipment, additional certification material may be needed to address the aspects that are not covered by this AMC. Some examples are:

—      IFE systems with wireless-communication capabilities (e.g. wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) access points, mobile-phone systems);

—      electrical outlets installed in the cabin for connecting portable electronic devices (PEDs);

—      lithium batteries;

—      data-loading systems;

—      data communication systems (e.g. satellite TV, radios, passenger telephone systems, etc.); and

—      large monitors/displays.

5       APPROVAL CONSIDERATIONS (AT AIRCRAFT LEVEL)

Section 6 below provides a summary of the issues that are pertinent to the safety of the aircraft, its occupants and maintenance personnel, which the equipment manufacturer and the installer should consider. Since IFE system installations are typical for commercially used large aeroplanes, it is expected that the approach to be followed for General Aviation (GA) aircraft will be different (for the purpose of this AMC, ‘General Aviation aircraft’ are those aircraft that comply with the CS-23 specifications). Section 6.7 below provides guidance in this regard. Some general considerations are presented below:

(a)     The applicant for the approval of an IFE system should demonstrate compliance with the applicable aircraft certification basis. The installed IFE system should function as intended, and no ‘credit’ should be given for its performance capability. Substantiation is required to demonstrate that the IFE system and equipment in their installations and in operation do not interfere with the operation of other aircraft systems, or do not cause any hazard to the aircraft, to its occupants, or to maintenance personnel.

(b)     If part of an IFE system is designed to transmit the required safety information (e.g. the passenger briefing), the replacement system should also meet the safety objectives required for that function. The installer should identify these safety objectives, which depend on the type of function for which the IFE system is used.

(c)      The applicant may use existing approvals for interfacing equipment (e.g. IFE system parts mounted in seats). However, the applicant should ensure that all the applicable airworthiness provisions are addressed. For example, European technical standard orders (ETSOs) on seats do not contain electrical provisions; therefore, the electrical aspects of the seats should be reviewed to ensure that the installation of IFE system equipment does not invalidate the original ETSO for the seats.

(d)     If other aircraft system installations are affected by the installation of the equipment of the IFE system, then the applicable requirements for these affected systems should be taken into account.

(e)     If an IFE system is designed to be available for the operating crew, EASA should approve the related flight operation limitations.

(f)      The applicant should demonstrate that any non-essential equipment (which includes equipment installed for the purpose of passenger entertainment), as installed:

—      is not a source of danger in itself;

—      does not prejudice the proper functioning of an essential service; and

—      does not in any way reduce the airworthiness of the aircraft to which it is fitted, even in the event of a failure to perform its intended functions.

For example, for large aeroplanes, compliance should be demonstrated with CS 25.1309. A functional hazard assessment (FHA) should be performed to identify the IFE system failure scenarios and the worst possible consequences (e.g. electrical shock) for the aircraft and its occupants. This assessment should take into account electrical, electronic, and component faults that may result in a short circuit and/or electrical arcing and/or the release of smoke. Particular attention should be given to the likelihood of the following:

—      accidental damage due to exposure of wiring or components in the cabin, such as wires that are pinched in the seat track;

—      misuse of the equipment by passengers, such as the incorrect stowage of video screens, stepping on or kicking the seat electronic box, spilling liquids, etc.;

—      electronic-component breakdowns; and

—      wire chafing.

(g)        The installer should demonstrate that the equipment of the IFE system has been installed in accordance with the equipment manufacturer’s declaration of design and performance (DDP) and their installation instructions. The demonstration may, in addition, involve the examination and testing of the equipment. Subpart O ‘EUROPEAN TECHNICAL STANDARD ORDERAUTHORISATIONS’ of Annex I (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 and the related AMC 21.A.608 provide guidance on drafting and formatting the DDP.

(h)        If an operator allows passengers to use PEDs on board the aircraft, it should have procedures in place to control the use of those PEDs. Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and the related ED Decisions contain, respectively, requirements and associated AMC and GM on PEDs. For commercial air transport (CAT) operations, the corresponding requirement is point CAT.GEN.MPA.140 of Annex IV (Part-CAT).

(i)          If environmental testing of the IFE system equipment is required, EUROCAE ED-14/RTCA DO 160 ‘Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment’ may be followed. This is addressed in Section 0.1 below.

6       SYSTEMS INSTALLATION

6.1     Mechanical systems — aspects

6.1.1  Equipment location

The equipment and its controls should be positioned in locations where they do not impede the movement or the duties of the flight crew or the cabin crew (including in crew rest areas), or the normal movement of passengers.

(a)     In a light aircraft, for example, if audio entertainment is audible to the pilot, a means to control the sound level should be provided to the pilot. Visual-entertainment equipment should be located where it does not distract the crew.

(b)     Equipment should be located and, where necessary, protected to minimise the risk of injury to the occupants of the aircraft during a normal flight or an emergency landing. For equipment AMC-20 — Amendment 19 SUBPART A — GENERAL AMC 20-19 Annex to ED Decision 2020/010/R Page 156 of 581 with cords in large aeroplanes, for example, the lengths of the cords should be determined by their possible effects on the egress capability of the occupants. The cords should not span across a main aisle such that they may become entangled in other features (such as armrests), thus impeding egress. Means for proper and easy stowage should be provided.

(c)      Equipment used for screens should not obscure any required notices or information signs (e.g. ‘Exit’, ‘No Smoking’, ‘Fasten Seat Belt’ signs, etc.). For video monitors in large-aeroplane installations, the following should apply:

(1)     For video monitors installed above the aisle:

—      all the installations should be such that the required ‘exit’ signs are still visible whether the monitors are fixed or retractable; if this is not possible, additional ‘EXIT’ signs are required;

—      fixed video monitors should be such that the minimum distance between the cabin floor and the lowest point of the monitor is 185 cm (73 in); and

—      retractable video monitors that do not meet the 185-cm (73-in) limit in the deployed position should not have sharp edges or should be padded, and they should be able to be stowed manually without requiring exceptional strength.

(2)     For video monitors installed underneath overhead compartments:

—      all the installations should be such that the required signs (e.g. ‘No Smoking’, ‘Fasten Seat Belts’ signs, etc.) are visible whether the monitors are fixed or retractable; if this is not possible, additional signs are required;

—      fixed video monitors should be padded and should not be installed above or between the seat backs of seat rows that border the access to emergency exits; and

—      retractable video monitors should be able to be stowed manually without requiring exceptional strength and should not be installed above or between the seat backs of seat rows that border the access to emergency exits.

(d)     Connecting units for wired on-board data exchange (e.g. USBs, local area networks (LANs), etc.) should be designed so that their use is obvious to the crew and passengers. Placards close to their outlet units should describe their capabilities and functions.

Units that are capable of supplying power with:

—      a voltage greater than or equal to 42 V;

—      power greater than 15 W; or

—      a current greater than 3 A,

should be treated as power outlets.

(e)     For individual video monitors attached to the seats (e.g. to the seat armrests, seat backs, movable hinge arms), the protection of the seat occupants, as well as of the crew and passengers moving around the cabin, should be considered. Video monitor installations should be such that injuries due to contact with sharp edges/corners during normal operation and turbulence are avoided. The abuse loading of video monitors (e.g. if a passenger leans on the monitor when taking or leaving their seat) should be accounted for. The criteria of SAE ARP5475 ‘Abuse Load Testing for In-Seat Deployable Video Systems’ or alternatives, as agreed by EASA, may be used in assessing designs regarding this aspect.

6.1.2  Construction and attachment strength

(a)     Any seat/monument installation, after modification, should continue to comply with the original certification basis.

(b)     Equipment, attachments, supporting structures, and their constituent parts should be constructed such that they do not break loose when subjected to the loads (either for flight or for emergency ditching) that are prescribed in the relevant CSs. Some commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment might not comply with these provisions and may need to be strengthened before being installed in an aircraft (see Section 6.6 below on COTS equipment).

(c)      The design of IFE-system-related antennas, their location and manner of attachment should be such that there is no adverse effect on the aircraft systems and no danger to the aircraft under any foreseeable operating conditions. Remark: If external antennas are installed, the applicant should address the corresponding certification aspects, for which specific guidance is available (i.e. antennas in pressurised areas, the installation of large and/or deployable antennas, etc.). The certification approach for such external antenna installations should be agreed with EASA.

(d)     As far as practicable, the equipment should be positioned so that if it breaks loose, it is unlikely to cause injury or to nullify any of the escape facilities for use after an emergency landing or after ditching. When such positioning is not practicable, each such item of equipment should be restrained under any load up to the prescribed ultimate inertia forces for the emergency landing conditions. Furthermore, for each item of equipment that is subject to frequent installation and removal, the local attachments of these items should be designed to withstand 1.33 times the specified loads (see CS 25.561(c)(2)). Compliance with CS 25.365(g) should also be considered.

Note 1: The structural provisions applicable to equipment can vary depending upon the type and size of the aircraft in which the equipment is installed; if the equipment is designed to be installed in any aircraft, then the applicant should consult all the relevant airworthiness CSs and create an envelope of conditions for design purposes.

Note 2: If an STC holder installs the equipment, they may need to consult the TC holder to obtain data on the vertical-acceleration factors (resulting from gusts and aircraft manoeuvres) that are applicable to a given aircraft type and to the proposed location of the equipment.

(e)     If the IFE system is installed in a seat or in a monument adjacent to a seat, the installation may need to be reapproved for structural integrity and, if appropriate, for the emergency-landing dynamic conditions, including the occupant injury criteria. For large aeroplanes, for example, to avoid head injuries (CS 25.562(b) and CS 25.562(c), as referenced in CS 25.785) caused by seat‑back‑mounted IFE equipment, compliance with CS 25.562(c)(5) should be shown for a fully equipped seat back in the take-off and landing position.

(f)      Weight and stress assessments should be made in cases of already embodied shelves that need to be relocated.

(g)     Glass surfaces may be part of IFE system components, e.g. in display units. The potential hazard for the occupants in case of breakage of large sheets of glass should be considered. The approach that the applicant should follow should be agreed with EASA based on CS 25.788 (b). Compliance with CS.25.365(g) should also be considered.

6.2     Electrical systems — aspects

6.2.1  Power supplies

The IFE system equipment should be powered by an electrical busbar that does not supply power to the aircraft systems that are necessary for continued safe flight and landing.

The IFE system should be designed to provide circuit protection from overloads and short circuits by means of suitable protective devices.

(a)     The method of connection of the equipment to the aircraft electrical system and the operation of the equipment should not adversely affect the reliability or integrity of the electrical system or any other electrical unit or system that is essential for the safe operation of the aircraft.

(b)     If applicable, the aircraft electrical system should be protected from any unacceptable EMI caused by a connected PED.

(c)      The flight/cabin crew should be provided with a clearly labelled and conspicuous means to disconnect an IFE system from its source of power at any time, and that means should be as close as practically possible to the source of power. The disabling/deactivating of component outputs should not be considered to be an acceptable means to cut off power, i.e. the disabling/deactivating of the output of a power supply unit, seat electronic box, etc., as opposed to cutting off the input power of the system. Moreover, pulling system circuit breakers (CBs) as the sole means to cut off the IFE system power is not considered to be acceptable. This is because CBs are not normally designed to be used as switches. The pulling and resetting of CBs over a period of time may degrade their trip characteristics, and then the CBs might not trip when required.

(d)     An electrical-load analysis (ELA) should be carried out, taking into account the maximum load that the IFE system may utilise, to substantiate that the aircraft electrical-power generating system has sufficient capacity to safely provide the maximum amount of power required by the IFE system to operate properly. The applicant should base the IFE system ELA on an ELA that accurately reflects the aircraft’s electrical loads prior to the installation of the IFE system. If this is not available, the applicant should make measurements of the aircraft’s condition prior to the installation of the IFE system, and use these measurements for the ELA of the IFE system.

(e)     The potential cumulative effect of the installation of multiple IFE units on the harmonic content of the electrical-power supply should be considered. There have been cases in which the installation of multiple IFE units with switched mode power supplies has changed the shape of the alternating current (AC) voltage waveform to the extent that the operation of the aircraft electrical power supply system (PSS) has been affected.

(f)      Where batteries are used, consideration should be given to the stored energy, and provisions should be made for protection from short circuits and other potential failure modes.

The safety issues associated with the use in the IFE system of batteries whose technology may pose hazards that are not covered by the current provisions should be addressed by additional provisions to be agreed with EASA (e.g. for lithium battery technology).

6.2.2  Bonding

The electrical bonding, as well as the protection against static discharge of the installed system and equipment, should be such as to:

(a)     prevent a dangerous accumulation of electrostatic charge; and

(b)     minimise the risk of electrical shock to the crew, passengers and maintenance personnel.

The system bonding arrangements should be in accordance with the aircraft manufacturer’s standard practices, and suitable for conducting any current, including a fault current, which may need to be conducted. The designer should take into account bonding connections in the system design such that the loss of a single bond does not result in the loss of more than one essential circuit or in the dangerous inadvertent operation of any aircraft system.

Cabin equipment designers should adhere to the standard practices for bonding, grounding and shielding, as well as to other methods for eliminating or controlling electrostatic discharge.

All electrical and electronic equipment and/or components should be installed so as to provide a continuous low-resistance path from their metallic enclosures and wiring to the aircraft bonding structure.

6.2.3  Interference

6.2.3.1  Magnetic effects

Whether the installed IFE system equipment is operating or not, the aircraft compass systems should continue to meet the prescribed accuracy standards. Where other equipment approved as part of the aircraft is installed, the installer should take account of the declared compass safe distance when designing the installation.

Account should be taken of the compass safe distance in respect of both the compass and the flux detector. The installer should also consider potential interference of the installed IFE system equipment with the relatively low-level signal of the compass system interconnecting cables.

6.2.3.2  Electromagnetic interference (EMI)

The levels of conducted and radiated interference generated by the equipment via power supply feeders, by system interfacing or by EMI should not cause an unacceptable degradation of the performance of other aircraft systems. If some equipment or functions are never used, the applicable system function should be properly disabled and/or terminated to prevent any interference with other aircraft systems.

(a)     Antennas

Antennas for IFE systems should not be located where an unacceptable reduction in the performance of a mandatory radio system would result. In addition, the effects of a lightning strike on these antennas should be considered to ensure that essential services are not disrupted by electrical transients conducted to the aircraft via these antenna leads.

(b)     Cumulative interference effects

The actual interference effect on an aircraft receiver may be the cumulative effect of many potentially interfering signals. For this reason, a system consisting of multiple units should be operable even in the worst-case orientation when interference tests/demonstrations are conducted. Tests/demonstrations should take into account the critical configurations of the use of the IFE system, including the critical configurations of passengers’ portable electronic devices (PEDs) connected to the IFE system. The test configuration should be agreed with EASA.

(c)      Flight phases

If the whole IFE system or parts of it are to be active during the critical flight phases (i.e. takeoff and landing), particular attention should be paid to the demonstration of non-interference during these critical flight phases.

6.2.4  Electrical shock

Occupants should be protected against the hazard of electrical shock. Therefore, the applicant should demonstrate the means to minimise the risk of electrical shock as per CS 25.1360(a). Particular attention should be given to high-voltage equipment. If high- or low-voltage power outlets are available for passenger use, the aspects related to the use of PSSs for PEDs should be considered.

6.2.5   Wiring harness and routing

The electrical-wiring interconnection system (EWIS) associated with the IFE system should be installed, as for all other electrical systems, in accordance with the provisions of CS-25 Subpart H, or any equivalent document accepted by EASA. In order to meet these provisions, the applicant should adhere to the following guidelines:

—      the wiring installation should be in accordance with the standard wiring practices manual (SWPM) of the aircraft or any equivalent standard accepted by EASA;

—      standard original-equipment manufacturer (OEM) wiring or compatible types of wiring should be used;

—      all the data necessary to define the design, in accordance with point 21.A.31 (Annex I (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) No 748/2012), including the installation drawings and wiring diagrams, shall be available; and

—      where the IFE system EWIS is routed through standard aircraft wiring looms, spacers or equivalent means of separation should be used to keep the IFE EWIS at a minimum distance from any other electrical system in accordance with the SWPM of the aircraft.

In the absence of more specific guidelines in the SWPM of the aircraft, 230 VAC voltage power supply wires should not be routed through standard aircraft wiring looms. As the EWIS connected to the IFE system is present throughout the cabin (exposed in some cases), the potential for system faults is increased by the wide exposure to varying hazards (e.g. EWIS chafing in the seat tracks, passengers stepping on or kicking the seat electronic box, spilled liquids, etc.). Since these systems are exposed to hazards, the potential to adversely affect other systems that are necessary for the safe operation of the aircraft significantly increases, as well as the possibility of shock hazards to occupants. Special consideration should be given to the protection against damage to the IFE EWIS components installed in the seat itself: they should have appropriate protection means so that passengers cannot damage them with their feet or access them with their hands. The engineering data that controls the installation of IFE EWIS and equipment should contain specific and unambiguous provisions for the routing, support and protection of all IFE EWIS and equipment, and should specify all the parts that are necessary for those installations.

Care should be taken to ensure that any electrical IFE system equipment installed in aircraft seat assemblies does not invalidate the seat certification (e.g. the applicable ETSO). In addition, it should be noted that compliance alone with any applicable ETSO for seats does not cover the electrical equipment installation aspects of the IFE system.

6.3     Aircraft interaction and interfaces

If an IFE system is electrically interfaced with other aircraft systems, the performance and integrity of those aircraft systems should not be degraded. Appropriate means should be provided to isolate the IFE system from the aircraft systems.

(a)     If an IFE system is connected to the aircraft avionics system (or any other system that may have a safety-related function), the installer should demonstrate that no malfunction of the IFE system may affect the aircraft avionics system. The installer should conduct a safety analysis to substantiate this. Supplementary to this safety analysis, special attention may be required due to cybersecurity issues. The installer should assess the information security aspects in accordance with AMC 20-42.

(b)     If an IFE system interfaces with the public address (PA) function, the use of this system should not impair the audibility of crew commands or instructions. A PA override feature should be considered to allow cabin announcements to be heard by passengers.       

(c)      If an IFE system is available for the operating crew, the operation of this system should not interfere with, or adversely affect, the crew’s ability to operate other aircraft systems and respond to alerting systems. The aircraft flight manual (AFM) should contain appropriate limitations and procedures.

The applicant should consider the following design interface features as acceptable means of compliance:

(1)        no access to any form of visual entertainment equipment; AMC-20 — Amendment 19 SUBPART A — GENERAL AMC 20-19 Annex to ED Decision 2020/010/R Page 162 of 581

(2)        automatic muting of the IFE systems when any cockpit aural caution or warning is sounding; there should be no perceptible delay between the muting of the IFE system and the activation of the caution/warning;

(3)        automatic muting of the IFE systems when any real-time (R/T) transmission or reception is in progress; there should be no perceptible delay between the muting of the IFE system and the activation of the R/T transmission or reception; and

(4)        readily available controls such that the volume of the IFE system is easily reduced.

(d)     If an IFE system includes wireless capabilities (wireless local area network (WLAN), mobile phone, Bluetooth, etc.) to connect with other aircraft equipment and/or passenger or crew transmitting portable electronic devices (T-PEDs), the installer should address the electromagnetic compatibility of the aircraft with the intentional emissions of the IFE system, and the approach to be followed in that respect should be agreed with EASA.

Note: The responsibility for establishing the suitability for use of a PED on a given aircraft model continues to rest with the operator, as required by point CAT.GEN.MPA.140 (Annex IV (Part-CAT) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012).

The design interface features used to comply with the above should be designed with a development rigour that depends on the function that is being interfaced with or replaced by the IFE system.

6.4     Software/airborne electronic hardware (AEH)

6.4.1   Software architecture

The software architecture of IFE system components should consider the following distinction between:

—      core software as part of the functional scope defined in the specification of the component (e.g. operating systems, hardware drivers, functional applications such as PA), including all the required core software configuration data (the core software may be field loadable); and

—      content data, including content configuration data (it may be field loadable by the aircraft operator); for IFE system equipment, the aircraft operator is usually required to make some adjustments and/or changes in the short term; such changes may be related to the content data and/or content configuration data — some examples of the latter are the following:

—      the selection of passenger-accessible graphical user interface (GUI) elements;

—      the activation of predefined GUI designs; and

—      the selection of regional information data (e.g. different country borderlines).

A change in the core software requires a component modification or redesign (change of part number) and, therefore, leads to a change in the aircraft configuration.

A change in the content data remains in the operational responsibility of the aircraft operator (field‑loadable software) and, therefore, does not lead to a change in the aircraft configuration.

6.4.2  Software development assurance

The item development assurance level (IDAL) required for the IFE system software should be determined through the functional hazard assessment (FHA) that identifies the worst failure to which the software may contribute. If the IDAL is equal to IDAL D or greater, AMC 20-115, latest revision, provides guidance for the production of airborne systems and equipment software that performs its intended function with a level of confidence in its safety that is compliant with airworthiness provisions. This is an acceptable standard, and it should be taken into consideration for software in IFE systems, in particular those that replace or interface with the required functions of the aircraft.

6.4.3  Airborne electronic hardware (AEH) development assurance

The functional development assurance levels (FDALs) identified through the FHA should be used, in conjunction with the system architecture considerations, in order to determine the IDAL to be used for the development of airborne electronic hardware (AEH), and to identify the rigour of the development processes used.

For the development assurance of AEH of IFE systems that replace or interface with the required functions of the aircraft, the provisions of AMC 20-152, latest revision, apply.

6.5     Other risks

For the risks associated with hazards that may be caused by the IFE system equipment due to the operating environment of the aircraft, the standard environmental and operational test conditions and test procedures of EUROCAE ED-14/RTCA DO-160 may be used in combination with FAA AC 21-16G.

The responsibility for selecting the appropriate environmental and operational test conditions and test procedures lies with the installer. Section 6.5.1 below provides guidance on the selection of the test types. Sections 6.5.2, 6.5.3 and 6.5.4 below address other associated risks.

6.5.1  Environmental qualification

If the IFE system equipment is not linked to any other aircraft systems and is only connected to a non-essential power busbar, the following is recommended as a minimum list of environmental tests:

—      temperature and altitude,

—      temperature variation,

—      operational shocks and crash safety,

—      vibration,

—      power input,

—      voltage spikes, and

—      emissions of radio frequency energy.

The installer is responsible for selecting the appropriate test conditions and for agreeing them with EASA. The assessment of the installation may prove that some of the above test types are unnecessary or, contrarily, that additional tests should be performed.

6.5.2  Touch temperature

In addition to CS 25.1360(b), the following should be considered: any hot surfaces of IFE system components that are accessible to the crew or passengers should not be exposed if inadvertent contact with those surfaces may pose a hazard.

The definition of MIL-STD-1472G ‘HUMAN ENGINEERING’ applies:

Equipment which, in normal operation, exposes personnel to surface temperatures greater than:

—      For momentary contact: 60°C for metal, 68°C for glass, 85°C for plastic or wood;

—      For prolonged contact: 49°C for metal, 59°C for glass, 69°C for plastic or wood;

or less than 0°C should be appropriately guarded.

6.5.3  Fluid exposure

If the equipment is mounted in a position where exposure to fluid is possible, for example on or under a passenger seat, or where catering operations take place or liquid cleaning agents are used regularly, it should be established that fluid spillage does not render the equipment hazardous. Where possible, installations in areas susceptible to moisture should be avoided. Otherwise, consideration should be given to minimise the hazard of liquid ingress, e.g. the inclusion of drip loops in wiring harnesses and the installation of drip trays.

If the approach described above is followed, the fluid susceptibility test may be disregarded.

6.5.4  Rapid decompression and high-altitude operation

The installer should ensure that no arcing that causes a fire risk or unacceptable levels of interference will occur in the equipment when the equipment is subjected to an atmospheric pressure that corresponds to the maximum operating altitude of the aircraft. Alternatively, means should be provided to automatically disconnect the electrical supply to the equipment when the cabin pressure reduces to a level below which the safe operation of the equipment is not ensured (e.g. rapid decompression). The guidance of RTCA DO-313 in this area may also be followed.

This section should be followed in addition to the test conditions of Section 6.5.1.

6.5.5  Explosion, fire, fumes and smoke

(a)     The installer should pay particular attention to the quality and design of components such as transformers, motors and composite connectors in order to minimise the risk of them overheating. The design of the mounting provisions for IFE system components installed in the passenger cabin (e.g. passenger seats, closet/cabin partition walls, overhead compartments, etc.) should fully reflect the cooling provisions for the equipment, including heat sinking, ventilation, proximity to other sources of heat, etc.

(b)     All materials should meet the appropriate flammability provisions. Inadvertent blockage (e.g. by passengers’ coats, luggage or litter) of any cooling vents should be prevented either by the design or by operational procedures. Appropriate protection against overheating should be part of the design of such in-seat systems.

(c)      For the installation of IFE system components in racks located in the equipment bay that are not accessible in flight, the installer should address the potential hazard to other essential or critical systems/equipment located in the equipment bay, in case of an IFE system malfunction. The installer should substantiate that the worst-case scenario of a possible malfunction of the IFE system does not affect the components located in the equipment bay that are necessary for safe flight and landing. This demonstration should account for the risks of:

—      overheating,

—      smoke release,

—      electrical failure, and

—      fire propagation.

For large aeroplanes, for example, the following is considered an acceptable means of compliance in that respect: a hazard analysis to demonstrate that none of the potential ignition risks that originate from IFE system malfunctions pose a risk of a sustained fire in any area where IFE system components are located; this demonstration should account for:

—      the fire containment properties of the equipment,

—      the non-fire-propagating properties of the adjacent materials, and

—      the detectability of fire and smoke.

(d)     The installer should consider protecting IFE system components that are located in the cabin to ensure that fault conditions will not result in the failure of components within a unit that may generate smoke or fumes (e.g. if using tantalum capacitors). In addition, power supplies should have current-limiting output protection at a suitable level (e.g. in-seat equipment). The IFE system installation should comply with the applicable fire and smoke provisions of CS 25.831(c), CS 25.853(a), CS 25.863 and CS 25.869(a).

(e)     Procedures should be established to terminate the operation of the IFE system at any time, in case of smoke/fire/explosion. The crew should maintain overall control over the IFE system. If control over the IFE system is possible via cabin controls only, appropriate procedures should address flight crew compartment–cabin coordination.

The guidance of RTCA DO-313 in this area may also be followed.

6.6     Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment

This section provides guidance for the cases in which the installer uses COTS equipment as part of an IFE system modification.

In principle, the installation of COTS equipment, as for all other IFE system equipment, should follow the guidance provided in this document. It is, nevertheless, recognised that COTS equipment is supplied from a market whose industry standards differ from the aviation ones. As a consequence, it may be difficult to follow some of the guidance of this document.

The main impediments are the following:

—      traceability and configuration control; and

—      it is burdensome to perform most of the testing in accordance with the state-of-the-art aviation standards (e.g. EUROCAE ED-14/RTCA DO-160).

In certain cases, the installer may directly follow the guidance provided in this document by using specific design features/adaptations and mitigations in terms of design or operational instructions.

The steps described below compose a road map that the installer may follow to apply for the approval of COTS equipment as part of an IFE system:

—      The installer should perform a safety risk assessment of the potential hazards associated with the installation of the COTS equipment, either during normal operation of the equipment or in case of its failure.

—      Based on the identified hazards, some evidence of environmental qualification for the equipment may be required. This could be achieved either by testing or by providing alternative laboratory standards to which the equipment has been tested, or industry standards to which the equipment has been certified. The acceptability of these standards should be agreed with EASA.

—      A design solution may be developed in some cases to provide means of compliance that are alternatives to testing, e.g.:

—      hosting of the COTS component in a ‘shelter case’ (an air-tight-sealed housing) with electrical isolation of all the needed interfaces; or

—      a declaration of ‘loose equipment’ that is temporarily brought on board and is permanently accessible and visible by the crew.

—      It should be ensured that the design specifications of the COTS equipment manufacturer are followed (in terms of the operating environmental conditions, cooling, etc.).

—      Configuration control: quality control criteria should be provided for those aspects of the COTS equipment whose malfunctions may create hazards. If detailed design data is not available for such aspects, the applicant should propose a process by which the configuration control of the design is maintained and should ensure that any changes in the design or any non-compliance introduced during manufacturing are identified. Critical characteristics of COTS equipment may include power, dimensions, weight, electrical power, software and hardware parts, material flammability behaviour, etc. This should also encompass subsequent changes to those parts.

The above points should help the installer in the certification of the COTS equipment. RTCA DO-313 Appendix D follows a similar approach and is considered to be an acceptable alternative.

6.7     Approach for General Aviation (GA) aircraft

This section provides guidance for the installation of IFE system equipment in GA aircraft.

The installer may follow the approach described in Sections 6.1 to 6.6, or follow the approach described below:

—      Perform an assessment of the potential hazards associated with the installation of the IFE system equipment.

—      Identify the list of hazards and possible safety issues created through either normal operation of the IFE system equipment or its failure.

—      The hazards and issues described in Section 6 of this AMC may be used as a reference, but the applicant is not expected to demonstrate the same level of compliance as that required for large aircraft. Some evidence of environmental qualification (and/or testing) may be needed, but it is expected that in many cases, alternative compliance solutions may be provided. Some examples are the following:

—          specific-installation solutions or the use of mitigations (via limitations and/or placards) may provide an adequate level of safety and circumvent the need for environmental testing; and

—          industry and/or laboratory standards may provide an acceptable alternative.

The acceptability of the above should be agreed with EASA.

—      It should be ensured that the design specifications of the IFE system equipment manufacturer are followed (in terms of the operating environmental conditions, cooling, etc.).

—      Configuration control: the configuration of the IFE system equipment should be identified, at least for those design features whose malfunctions may create hazards.

It is worth mentioning that in many cases, the IFE system equipment installed in GA aircraft is COTS equipment, thus the described approach largely reflects the approach to COTS equipment in Section 6.6 above.

7       DOCUMENTATION

This section provides guidance on the documentation that should be developed for IFE system installations.

7.1     Certification documentation

The certification documentation may consist of but it is not limited to:

—      equipment specifications,

—      the system description,

—      analysis reports,

—      test reports, and

—      a DDP.

It should include references to the standards that are met.

The installer should demonstrate that they have taken proper account of the equipment manufacturer’s DDP and installation instructions. This demonstration may, in addition, involve the examination and testing of the equipment. Point 21.A.608 (Subpart O of Annex I (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) No 748/2012) and AMC 21.A.608 provide guidance on the drafting and formatting of the DDP.

Appropriate documentation should be provided to define the designer’s responsibilities for equipment installed in non-IFE system components of the cabin (e.g. IFE system equipment installed in seats or galleys, or in-seat wiring harnesses). A DDP should be provided to confirm that the installation of the IFE system equipment does not invalidate the approvals of existing equipment (e.g. seat ETSOs, or the certification of the galley).

Wire routing should be specified in detail to minimise the variability in manufacture, installation and maintenance in order to avoid the risk of wire chafing and damage.

7.2     Operations and training manuals

The design and installation of the IFE system should minimise its impact on the operational procedures. However, since flight or cabin crew procedures should comply with the applicable airworthiness provisions, these procedures should be included in the corresponding manufacturer’s documentation to be provided to operators and, if appropriate, in the AFM.

7.3     Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA)

For IFE system installations on board an aircraft, the installer should draft appropriate ICA and submit them to EASA. The installer should accomplish this task not only at the aircraft level, but also at the equipment level.

7.3.1  Equipment level

At the equipment level, the manufacturer should provide the installer with the necessary information for the safe operation and maintenance of the component. In particular, it should be highlighted whether a component requires scheduled maintenance or contains life-limited parts or has any other limitation that affects its continued airworthiness.

Suitable means of providing ICA information at equipment level are the following (examples only):

—      operator’s guides,

—      CMMs,

—      illustrated parts catalogues, or

—      dedicated ICA manuals.

The documents that contain the ICA for the component/equipment should be referenced in the corresponding DDP and cross-referenced in the documentation at the aircraft level.

7.3.2  Aircraft level

At the aircraft level, CS 25.1529, CS 25.1729 (or an equivalent SC if contained in the certification basis) and Appendix H of CS-25, as applicable to the installation under consideration, determine the format and the minimum content of the ICA. The ICA for an IFE system may include the following:

—      system descriptions and operating instructions such as (non-exhaustive list):

—      AFM supplements,

—      supplements to the master minimum equipment list (MMEL),

—      supplements to the flight crew operations manual (FCOM), and

—      supplements to the cabin crew operations manual (CCOM);

—      maintenance instructions (including information on testing, inspections, troubleshooting, servicing, the replacement of parts, lifetime limitations, tooling and software loading) via supplements to the following (non-exhaustive list):

—      the aircraft maintenance manual (AMM),

—      the wiring manual,

—      the illustrated parts catalogue,

—      the maintenance planning document, and

—      the service manual.

The amount and content of the necessary ICA may vary depending on the kind of installation.

7.3.3  Scheduled maintenance tasks

The installer should draft the ICA by following the method applied during the certification process of the aircraft, including the development of scheduled maintenance tasks. However, some of these methods may not properly address the specific operational and technical conditions of the IFE system installations:

—      in-service occurrences have shown that failures in or damage to the IFE system installation may become a potential source of ignition and heat, creating a smoke hazard and/or a fire hazard;

—      particular attention should be given to in-seat equipment and wiring that is vulnerable to damage induced by passengers, servicing personnel, crew, changes to the cabin configuration or maintenance actions, which therefore may become potential sources of an electrical shock or other risks due to degraded or damaged electrical insulation; and

—      contamination by dust, debris or spilled liquids in the cabin may cause overheating and a risk of smoke or fire.

These kinds of potential causes of failure, especially if the failure or damage is not easily detectable by the crew or the maintenance personnel while performing their normal duties, should also be considered when defining the scheduled maintenance tasks for IFE system installations.

The scheduled maintenance of IFE system installations may include but is not limited to the following tasks:

—      functional checks of latent systems (e.g. the power shutdown function and/or IFE-systemspecific smoke detection function);

—      inspections (e.g. of the condition of system cabling and/or seat-mounted components; the correct position of physical protection, such as insulation, ducting, covers and/or drip trays);

—      discarding/replacement of components (e.g. air filters and/or IFE system batteries); and

—      restoration tasks (e.g. the cleaning of cooling vents or filters, the removal of dust and debris).

8       OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

The regulatory requirements related to air operations are specified in Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 (see also the related AMC and GM). The operator should ensure that both the flight crew and the cabin crew are fully familiar with the operation of the IFE system, and that passengers are provided with appropriate information, including restrictions on the use of the IFE systems in normal, abnormal and emergency conditions.

[Amdt 20/19]