GM1 CAT.POL.H.225 Helicopter
operations to/from a public interest site
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES
(a) General
The original Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(i) was introduced in January 2002 to address problems that had been encountered by Member States at hospital sites due to the applicable performance requirements of JAR-OPS 3 Subparts G and H. These problems were enumerated in ACJ to Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(d) paragraph 8, part of which is reproduced below.
‘8 Problems with hospital sites
During implementation
of JAR-OPS 3, it was established that a number of States had encountered
problems with the impact of performance rules where helicopters were operated
for HEMS. Although States accept that progress should be made towards
operations where risks associated with a critical power unit failure are
eliminated, or limited by the exposure time concept, a number of landing sites
exist which do not (or never can) allow operations to performance class 1 or 2
requirements.
These sites are
generally found in a congested hostile environment:
—
in the grounds of
hospitals; or
—
on hospital
buildings;
The problem of
hospital sites is mainly historical and, whilst the Authority could insist
that such sites not be used - or used at such a low weight that critical power
unit failure performance is assured, it would seriously curtail a number of
existing operations.
Even though the rule
for the use of such sites in hospital grounds for HEMS operations (Appendix 1
to JAR-OPS 3.005(d) sub-paragraph (c)(2)(i)(A)) attracts alleviation until
2005, it is only partial and will still impact upon present operations.
Because such
operations are performed in the public interest, it was felt that the
Authority should be able to exercise its discretion so as to allow continued
use of such sites provided that it is satisfied that an adequate level of
safety can be maintained - notwithstanding that the site does not allow
operations to performance class 1 or 2 standards. However, it is in the
interest of continuing improvements in safety that the alleviation of such
operations be constrained to existing sites, and for a limited period.’
As stated in this ACJ and embodied in the text of the appendix, the solution was short-term (until 31 December 2004). During the commenting period of JAA NPA 18, representations were made to the JAA that the alleviation should be extended to 2009. The review committee, in not accepting this request, had in mind that this was a short-term solution to address an immediate problem, and a permanent solution should be sought.
(b) After 1 January 2005
Although elimination of such sites would remove the problem, it is recognised that phasing out, or rebuilding existing hospital sites, is a long-term goal which may not be cost-effective, or even possible, in some Member States.
It should be noted, however, that CAT.POL.H.225(a) limits the problem by confining approvals to hospital sites established before 1 July 2002 (established in this context means either: built before that date, or brought into service before that date — this precise wording was used to avoid problems associated with a ground level aerodrome/operating site where no building would be required). Thus the problem of these sites is contained and reducing in severity. This date was set approximately 6 months after the intended implementation of the original JAR-OPS 3 appendix.
EASA adopted the JAA philosophy that, from 1st January 2005, approval would be confined to those sites where a CAT A procedure alone cannot solve the problem. The determination of whether the helicopter can or cannot be operated in accordance with performance class 1 should be established with the helicopter at a realistic payload and fuel to complete the mission. However, in order to reduce the risk at those sites, the application of the requirements contained in CAT.POL.H.225(a) should be applied.
Additionally and in order to promote understanding of the problem, the text contained in CAT.POL.H.225(c) refers to the performance class and not to ICAO Annex 14. Thus, Part C of the operations manual should reflect the non-conformance with performance class 1, as well as the site-specific procedures (approach and departure paths) to minimise the danger to third parties in the event of an incident.
The following paragraphs explain the problem and solutions.
(c) The problem associated with such sites
There is a number of problems: some of which can be solved with the use of appropriate helicopters and procedures; and others which, because of the size of the site or the obstacle environment, cannot. They consist of:
(1) the size of the surface of the site (smaller than that required by the manufacturer’s procedure);
(2) an obstacle environment that prevents the use of the manufacturer’s procedure (obstacles in the backup area); and
(3) an obstacle environment that does not allow recovery following an engine failure in the critical phase of take-off (a line of buildings requiring a demanding gradient of climb) at a realistic payload and fuel to complete the mission.
— Problems associated with (c)(1): the inability to climb and conduct a rejected landing back to the site following an engine failure before the Decision Point (DP).
— Problems associated with (c)(2): as in (c)(1)).
— Problems associated with (c)(3): climb into an obstacle following an engine failure after DP.
Problems cannot be solved in the immediate future, but can, when mitigated with the use of the latest generation of helicopters (operated at a weight that can allow useful payloads and endurance), minimise exposure to risk.
(d) Long-term solution
(2) No mandatory phase-out is foreseen for sites approved under a derogation from CAT.POL.H.225 that were established as public interest sites before 28 October 2014.
(3) No mandatory phase-out is foreseen for sites approved under CAT.POL.H.225 that were established as public interest sites before 1 July 2002.
(4) A public interest site should be considered to be established at the time when it was operated in the public interest for the first time.
(5) As of 25 May 2024 there should be no more approvals of public interest sites that were established after 28 October 2014, in accordance with point ARO.OPS.220(c).
(6) As of 25 May 2024 the obstacle environment at approved public interest sites should be kept under continued review in order to avoid new obstacles causing a significant safety impact, in accordance with point ARO.OPS.220(d).
Table 1
Duration of public interest site approvals
Date on which the
approved PIS was established |
Maximum duration of
the PIS approval |
Before
28 October 2014 |
Unlimited duration, provided that
there is no permanent worsening of the obstacle environment. |
After
28 October 2014 |
PIS approval to expire on 25 May 2028. |
(i) The performance level of 8 % climb gradient in the first segment required by point CAT.POL.H.225(a)(5) reflects ICAO Annex 14 Volume II in ‘Table 4-1 ‘Dimensions and slopes of obstacle limitations surfaces’.
(ii) The performance delta is achieved without the provision of further manufacturer’s data by using existing graphs to provide the reduced take-off mass (RTOM).
(iii) If the solution in relation to the original problem is examined, the effects can be seen.
(A) Solution with relation to (c)(1): although the problem still exists, the safest procedure is a dynamic take-off reducing the time taken to achieve Vstayup and thus allowing VFR recovery — if the failure occurs at or after Vy and 200 ft, an IFR recovery is possible.
(B) Solution with relation to (c)(2): as in (c)(1) above.
(C) Solution with relation to (c)(3): once again, this does not give a complete solution; however, the performance delta minimises the time during which a climb over the obstacle cannot be achieved.
EASA aviation regulations address helicopter operations to public interest sites like hospitals, acknowledging performance limitations. Approvals are confined to sites established before July 2002, prioritizing safety with specific procedures and performance margins. Sites established after October 2014 must be phased out by May 2028, ensuring continued safety reviews.
* Summary by Aviation.Bot - Always consult the original document for the most accurate information.
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